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ABSTRACT
The considerable increase in the literature on civil 
disobedience during the 1950s and 1960s led to the development 
of an orthodoxy with respect to the definition of civil dis­
obedience and to a concentration on questions of its 
justifiability. It was held that these were two separate 
questions, that there is a logical separation between what 
counts as civil disobedience and whether civil disobedience 
can be morally justified, either in general or in particular 
cases. One of the major aims of this thesis is to show that 
position to be untenable.
There are moral principles that are objective in the 
sense that they must be included in any moral theory. These 
core principles are concerned with the minimum conditions of 
social life itself; they cover the areas of truth, life, 
and duty. Particular moral theories, however, may interpret 
and build upon these principles in various ways. Hence any 
moral person must recognise that some facts are moral values, 
although the moral judgements are presumptive rather than 
conclusive.
To morally justify an action is to meet charges against 
it from within the moral point of view. There are, however, 
important differences between three levels of justificatory 
discourse (agent, action, and practice) and between under­
mining and overriding responses to charges. Moreover, that 
an action is morally right is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition of its being morally justified.
iii.
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Any moral person must acknowledge a non-conclusive 
moral obligation to obey the law where the institution of 
law helps secure the social conditions within which persons 
may be moral. The moral point of view itself also limits 
that obligation through the constraints of process and of 
content. The obligation to obey is undermined if the process 
through which laws are enacted does not satisfy the require­
ments of reasoned discourse as part of the moral point of view. 
Political obligation may be overridden according to the 
constraint of content if the law requires a moral person to 
act contrary to the important and reasoned provisions of his 
own moral theory.
The orthodox analysis of civil disobedience cannot 
maintain a strict separation between criteria of recognition 
and criteria of justification. The ways civil disobedience 
is defined affect both the onus of justification and the ways 
civil disobedience so defined may be morally justified, since 
it allows certain charges to be made against it and rules out 
others. There are important differences between civil dis­
obedience directed towards securing changes in laws, policies, 
decisions, etc., and an agent's disobeying in order to 
preserve his own moral integrity. In either case, disobedience 
may be direct or indirect.
A number of charges against civil disobedience are 
considered; none is decisive against the practice of civil 
disobedience. The conditions for their success against 
particular acts of disobedience are also examined. Civil 
disobedience may be morally justified within a democracy.
The claim to a 'right' to disobey serves only to underline 
a claim to agent-justification.
For Colleen
______
PREFACE
Questions about the obedience owed to government are 
both as old as government and authority themselves and as 
immediate as yesterday's legislation. The Hebrew midwives1 
disobedience of the Pharaoh, Antigone's defiance of Creon, 
Socrates' arguments in the Crito, the actions of the early 
Christian maftyrs, Martin Luther, Sir Thomas More, the 
opponents of laws held to restrict religious liberty in the 
United States in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
the disobedience of the US Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, Gandhi's 
campaigns of passive resistance and civil disobedience in 
South Africa and India, the civil rights movement in the US in 
the 1950s and 1960s, the anti-war and anti-conscription 
campaigns in many countries in recent years - these are merely 
the best known examples of actions which oppose government and 
authority through disobeying orders or breaking the law. They 
are by no means the only ones, either in ancient times or in 
our own day. They all raise important and difficult questions 
of practical politics and of moral and political philosophy.
This is well illustrated by the enormous philosophical 
literature on civil disobedience in response to the civil 
rights and anti-war campaigns in the United States in the 
1950s and 1960s. The dominant theme of that literature was 
the moral justifiability of civil disobedience; that 
inevitably led to the examination of other questions: what
are the proper relations between the individual and public 
authority? should there be limits to the exercise of state 
power? what is the function of law? should those who disobey 
always be punished? how does the nature of the political 
system affect the moral justifiability of disobedience?
vi.
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All these questions (along with many others) are central to 
jurisprudence and to political philosophy. They are large, 
complex, interrelated questions, requiring detailed analysis 
and careful argument. Some of the difficulties of doing so 
at the time, of course, were related to the fact that these 
issues were more than just abstract matters of moral and 
political philosophy; they were also important political 
problems concerning life and death, freedom, protest, dissent, 
violence, and commitment. It would have been surprising if 
the rigours of philosophical debate had been observed in such 
circumstances in the face of rhetoric, special pleading, and 
the use of force. Yet moral and political philosophy can be 
served by such an atmosphere as well as being restricted by 
it, for circumstances can impart an urgency and vigour to 
both of them without which they can become sterile. The 
imperatives of circumstances can also lead to the need to 
examine the foundations and assumptions of arguments about 
legitimate government, the duties of the citizen, and the 
role of the state; hence the commonplace •'about political 
philosophy flourishing in response to turbulent political 
times.
My intentions when I began this project were to use the 
literature on civil disobedience as the basis for discussing 
some of these topics within the context of democratic theory. 
But the more I looked at the arguments within the literature 
concerning the moral justification of civil disobedience, 
the more I became convinced that they were based on highly 
dubious assumptions. Part of this was doubtless due to the 
highly contested nature of the issues, as I mentioned earlier.
viii.
But I gradually became convinced that the problem lay deeper 
than that, and that the analytic tradition of moral 
philosophy within which many of these writers were working 
was also deficient in these respects. The focus of the 
project thus became rather narrower, for it became necessary 
to examine the structure of arguments about the moral 
justifiability of actions, a matter on which recent moral 
philosophy has been rather silent. This led me to develop a 
theory of moral argument and in particular to examine the 
relationships between the description of an action and the 
moral evaluation of it. This is, of course, part of the 
larger problem of fact and value, ’is' and 'ought', and 
naturalism and non-naturalism. These issues have come to 
bestride moral philosophy in the middle half of the twentieth 
century, and it was therefore necessary to pay some attention 
to them and to their influence on moral argument.
These matters are considered in Part One. Chapter One
looks at the role of description in moral theories, and at
part of what it is to be a moral person. -In Chapter Two I
give an account of the logic of the moral justification of
actions similar to that in Carl Wellman's book Challenge and
1 *Response: Justification in Ethics but one that goes beyond
Wellman's theory in a number of respects. In Part Two, I use 
the results o*£ these two Chapters to consider the moral 
justifiability of civil disobedience. In Chapter Three I 
consider whether there is a moral obligation to obey the law. 
In Chapter Four I show how the patterns of argument considered 
in Part One are used by a sample of writers on civil dis­
obedience. In Chapter Five I look at the moral justifiability 
of civil disobedience in the light of the results of the 
previous Chapters.
*Notes to the Preface are on p.319.
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Sidney Hook once wrote that originality in discussing
'the nature and limits of democratic resistance of democratic
2authority ... is almost always a sign of error....' That
afforded some relief when I realised that the account of
morality and of political obligation I had developed was
similar to that of Rousseau and the particular line of his
successors that virtually ended with the English Idealists -
although John Rawls retains some important elements of it.
I also found many similarities between my account of the
moral justification of civil disobedience and that in Burton
Zwiebach's book Civility and Disobedience," although the
foundations and directions of my arguments were well laid by 
4that time.
Several people have given me much advice and encouragement 
during my work on this thesis. The Canberra College of 
Advanced Education granted me six months' leave during 1978, 
and the hospitality of the Department of Philosophy in the 
Research School of the Social Sciences at the Australian 
National University allowed much more to be done than might 
otherwise have been the case. Frank Snare generously commented 
on an early draft of Chapter One. I have benefited from the 
criticisms and suggestions I received when I read papers at 
seminars in Canberra, Christchurch and Wellington, and at the 
conference of the New Zealand Political Studies Association in 
Christchurch in May 1980. Two philosophers have guided me 
throughout my work on this project. Chris Parkin, of Victoria 
University, introduced me to the philosophical problems of 
civil disobedience and has commented on most of what I have 
written on the subject ever since. Stanley Benn has been an 
assiduous supervisor, always willing to comment upon drafts
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and to discuss my work with me. That both will find that 
there is now much that is different from the early drafts 
they saw is due in large measure to the cogency of their 
criticisms. Both will also find, however, that I have 
occasionally decided that my arguments could stand their 
criticisms without substantial alteration, but they have 
always made me think twice (and more) before reaching that 
conclusion. I am most grateful to them.
My family has had much to endure while this thesis was 
being written. Bridget, Timothy, James, and Alexander somehow 
knew when I did not want to be interrupted. - and when I did. 
Colleen has always encouraged and understood; I dedicate it 
to her.
P.R.H.
Wellington 
January 1981
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PART ONE
MORAL THEORIES AND MORAL JUSTIFICATION
CHAPTER ONE
Moral Theories and Description 
1. Points of view
The notion of points of view provides a convenient way of
referring to the variety of interests we have in the many
objects, conditions, circumstances, etc., that we encounter in
our lives. A particular point of view may be defined in terms
of the notions of a purpose (in the sense of a particular kind
of interest or concern with certain objects, etc., or of a
particular kind of problem to be solved, or of a specific
kind of goal to be achieved), and of a general kind of
1 *approach towards fulfilling this purpose. In this sense we 
talk, for example, of the scientific, the aesthetic, the 
economic, the military, the legal, and the moral points of 
view. A particular point of view thus refers to an interest 
or goal (or a set thereof), more or less vaguely specified, 
to be attained in a particular way, again more or less 
specific. As such it has certain principles, standards, and 
characteristic procedures which are applied to certain kinds 
of objects, phenomena, or situations. Thus, for example, the 
aesthetic point of view is concerned with the evaluation and 
appreciation of things (typically, but not exclusively, 
paintings, sculptures, photographs, buildings) and activities 
(e.g. dancing, singing, moving, acting, 'performing') 
according to certain criteria that form part of the point of 
view itself and are appropriately applied to the object or 
activity of attention. Similarly, the scientific point of 
view is concerned with the classification, explanation and 
prediction of various classes of empirical phenomena, using
*Notes to this Chapter are on pp.320
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certain methods of data collection and experiment.
Different points of view may be concerned with different 
kinds of objects, etc., or with the same kinds but for 
different reasons and according to different criteria. They 
may overlap, change, conflict, and be more or less specific.
But they are essential to our lives, for without them we 
would have no way of concentrating the particular kinds of 
concerns with different objects, events, etc., that are part 
of our lives simply because we live, act and react in a natural 
and social environment in response to our various and varying 
needs and purposes.
A participant in a point of view is a person who accepts 
the characteristic problems, goals and methods definitive of 
that point of view as guides to action and to judgement.
That person is recognisably a scientist, a religious person, 
or a moral person. He may or may not be a good scientist, a 
devout person, or a virtuous person; he may or may not 
exhibit sound and consistent judgement, and he may often fall 
short of the various standards of achievement set by and within 
that point of view. Be that as it may, he is still someone 
who acknowledges certain problems, goals and methods as guides 
to action and to evaluation, as general criteria according to 
which particular statements, conditions, states-of-affairs, 
actions, judgements, explanations, etc., can be measured.
Hence, these criteria must be acknowledged by any participant 
in that point of view, for they help to define that very 
participation. The 'must' is therefore a logical 'must’, for 
it is part of what it is to be a participant in that point of 
view. Not to acknowledge them would be to admit to a failure 
to understand what it is to be a participant in that point of
view.
4.
A particular point of view, however, does not determine 
the exact ways we deal with the things, events, etc., that 
are the objects of our attention (for convenience I shall use 
X to refer to an object of attention). For that we need the 
notion of a theory within a point of view. These theories 
enable us to reduce the complexities of the world around us 
to a (relatively) small number of variables that we expect to 
be relevant to our interest in X. Theories, that is, allow us 
to confine our attention to a finite number of variables of, 
or associated with, X. They allow us to say, for example, that 
it is the application of heat to a metal that causes it to 
expand; that apples fall because there is a force between any 
two physical objects proportional to their masses and to the 
square of the distance between them; that we need to establish 
mens rea in order to prove legal guilt; that the goodness of 
actions is a function of the pleasure and pain of their con­
sequences; that the mode of production is the ultimate deter­
mining factor of large-scale historical change; and that the 
relevant variables are not characteristics'such as: that
today is Tuesday; that the falling apple was green; that the 
observer is a Presbyterian; that historical change occurs as 
a result of God's will. Theories are thus essential within 
points of view because they indicate which of the indefinite 
number of characteristics of X (including cause and consequence) 
are likely to be relevant to our purposes in examining X. They
admit some 'dimensions of variation' as relevant to our purposes
2and exclude others.
Theories within a particular point of view, then, indicate 
a particular way of looking at the things that are the concern 
of that point of view, with particular concepts, variables, 
rules of inference between variables, criteria of application
5 .
to phenomena, and relations to other points of view. Of 
course, there may be rival theories about the same matter 
within a single point of view; nor need an individual hold 
to one theory in all matters covered by a point of view, for 
different theories may be held to be more successful with 
different aspects of that point of view. Points of view 
establish what might be called ‘the domain of relevance’.
They indicate in a general way, with more or less precision, 
the purposes to be served, the subjects of concern (objects, 
actions, events, etc.), and the kind of approach to be 
adopted tov/ards those subjects. On the other hand, theories 
within a point of view of a particular kind, recognisably 
moral, or scientific, or economic, as the case may be, 
establish 'a range of relevance' by dealing with some or all 
of that domain in a particular way, by positing certain ways 
of fulfilling the purposes associated with that domain, by 
establishing certain relationships between concepts, principles, 
and phenomena, by regarding cases as similar or different, 
relevant or irrelevant, important or trivial, and by arriving 
at, and ordering, certain general principles or maxims as guides 
to action or evaluation. A theory is a particular realisation 
of the aims or purposes of the point of view itself.
Underpinning all these theories within points of view, of 
course, are the principles and concepts necessary for communic­
ation and reasoned discourse themselves. Included in these are 
the rules of logic and the rules and conventions of language, 
for without these no communication can take place between 
participants in the same or different points of view. They 
provide a backdrop against which theories operate, and they 
provide a means of communication about, and initiation into, 
points of view and their associated theories. Their role is 
crucial, as we shall see.
6.
2. The moral point of view
Debate about the nature of morality has occupied a
prominent place in moral philosophy in recent years. That
debate has largely been carried on between the proponents of
3two broad positions, the formalists and the descriptivists.
The formalists have argued quite convincingly that only 
formal requirements need be satisfied if a principle is to be 
a moral principle. Particular requirements vary from one 
writer to another; some hold that a principle is a moral 
principle if and only if it is both universalisable and 
prescriptive. Others either add or substitute conditions about 
the importance or 'over-ridingness' of moral principles 
compared to other principles, or conditions about the character­
istic responses associated with the observance or breach of 
moral principles. But essential to all the formalist positions 
is a rejection of the descriptivists' view that the criteria 
for a principle's being a moral principle must have something 
to do with the content of that principle. The formalists 
point to the wide range of moral principles that people have 
held at one time or another, or in different societies, or in 
different groups, and they accuse the descriptivists of either 
making empirical claims for which there is abundant counter­
evidence, or of begging the question by making moral recommend­
ations in disguise. They appeal to the naturalistic fallacy 
and reassert the logical impossibility of deducing an 'ought' 
from an 'is'. But they too are open to serious criticism on 
the general grounds that the satisfaction of purely formal 
criteria does not seem to capture all the important and 
distinctive features of moral principles, although it may 
capture some. On their view, it seems, a person logically need
have no moral principles (or perhaps even moral opinions) about
7.
such paradigmatically moral matters as lying, killing people,
and duties to other persons; he could, indeed, have a set of
'moral' principles of which the most important was 'Always
clasp your hands three times on the second Tuesday of each 
4month'. If this were so, we could challenge his actions on 
grounds of consistency and concerning matters of fact. But 
we could not challenge them morally on grounds of their effects 
on others, such as neglecting their welfare, for such matters
simply would not be morally relevant considerations for him.
5And that kind of extreme individualism would place him so far 
from what seems to be important about morality and the kinds of 
activities and judgements characteristic of the moral point of 
view that it seems perverse to regard him as a participant in 
it, and hence it throws doubt on the formalist position as an 
adequate characterisation of moral principles.
The descriptivists, on the other hand, want to argue 
(among other things) that a principle must be connected to 
human wants, needs, or interests, or to some notion of human 
flourishing, if it is to be a moral principle at all. Like 
the formalist, however, the descriptivists want to hold that 
this criterion applies to all moral principles. But (again 
like the formalist) therein lies the weakness of their theory, 
for it then seems to succumb to the formalist objections 
mentioned above.
Contrary to the formalist position, I wish to argue that 
there are some substantive moral values which are 'objective' 
in the sense that they are entailed by the moral point of view 
itself, and hence must be acknowledged by any participant in 
that point of view. But I do not wish to argue that this is 
true of all moral principles; formal characteristics may be
used as criteria for other moral principles, but one of these
8 .
criteria concerns the relationship to the principles that 
express the objective moral values.
I argued in Section 1 that a particular point of view is 
characterised by certain general notions about the types of 
phenomena to which it is applicable, the purposes for which 
it is applied, criteria of success, and the methods through 
which these purposes are applied to the phenomena in question.
In general terms, the moral point of view is concerned with 
the evaluation of certain classes of human behaviour as right 
or wrong, and with a way of praising and blaming persons on 
account of their actions and their dispositions to act. These 
evaluations are based on principles and rules at least some 
of which concern how an individual should take account of the 
wants, needs, interests, and purposes of other people in 
deciding how he should act and how he should evaluate others' 
actions. The methods used are those of argument, debate and 
justification, of reasoned discussion with consideration 
given to reasons for action, motives, intentions, and knowledge 
of matters of fact. The moral point of view thus draws on the 
requirements of reasoned discourse: concern for appropriate
evidence, for reasons, and for impartiality. Moral debate, 
that is, is grounded in reasoned consideration, according to 
moral principles (to be discussed below), of the praise and 
blame to be accorded to persons and to actions (or types of 
action) in certain circumstances. It is impartial, rather in 
the sense in which the ’rule of law' is opposed to 'the rule 
of men': the interests of particular individuals in the outcome
of a particular case do not override the reasoned consideration 
of an action in the light of the relevant principles.
9.
This is one way in which the moral point of view is 
inherently social. The evaluation of actions and agents is 
essentially a social activity because it must, in principle, 
be a public activity. It must, that is, allow the possibility 
of others' evaluating my actions according to my reasons for 
acting, my motives, and my principles, and it must allow the 
possibility that others may check my own evaluations of my 
actions. Just as the notion of following a rule in a linguistic 
context entails that I cannot have a completely private 
language, so too the activity of moral evaluation cannot be a 
completely private matter, for this would be to undermine the 
moral point of view as a way of evaluating acts and agents 
according to the tenets of reasoned discussion. It would allow 
no notion of following a rule, no consideration of impartiality, 
and no notion of consistency with respect to action in the light 
of moral principles.
These characteristics of moral evaluation are quite
capable of being satisfied by the formalist position; indeed,
they are close to Hare's notion of universalisability.  ^ But
the formalist falls foul of a second sense in which the moral
point of view is essentially social, a more substantive sense
according to which the nature of the moral point of view
itself establishes certain values, and hence principles, for
any participant in it. This second sense has a long ancestry
7within moral philosophy, although not necessarily in the form 
in which I shall argue for it. Although it has been somewhat' 
neglected in the face of the positivist and formalist 
ascendancy in recent years, it has now come to be advanced 
more and more as a way of countering the formalists' claims 
about the nature of morality itself. Its implications for the 
process of moral argument and for the fact-value and
10.
description-evaluation debates have largely been unrecognised, 
however, and it is in the light of these considerations that 
I shall discuss this position.
Consider egotistical individuals in an amoral social 
environment, in which each person acts in response to desires, 
wants, perceptions of needs, interests, purposes, etc. Each 
person is thus what we might call a 1 projectmaker', able to 
conceive ends as his own and to initiate courses of action 
aimed at gaining or at least protecting them. But the nature 
of these desires, etc., of the ends of human action in general, 
and of the material environment in which individuals live, are 
such that different individuals’ ends will be incompatible, or 
will come into conflict, or will rely on the non-interference 
of others (whether individually or collectively) for their 
attainment. Hence it is in each projectmaker's interest to 
establish and maintain regulatory devices and mechanisms to 
maintain order and to establish settled expectations concerning 
the behaviour of others. Such conditions serve to maximise 
the chances that individual projectmakers will in fact achieve 
whatever goals they set themselves, that they will attain those 
satisfactions of themselves that they prescribe to themselves, 
and that they will be able to rely on others’ behaviour in 
setting and pursuing their projects in ways that they would not 
otherwise be able to do.
The particular settling and regulatory devices that are 
established or evolve in any particular society (or in a group 
within a society) will, of course, depend on the history and 
circumstances of that society - its customs, traditions, 
economic base, culture, and the kinds of goals that members 
choose to pursue and the ways that others may be able to
11.
frustrate their attainment, whether this be by design or by 
accident, directly or indirectly. But any society that is 
beyond a certain size or level of development is likely to 
have to combine certain formal institutional methods, based on 
rules and sanctions enforced through the exercise of public 
power in some form or other, with informal methods based on 
custom, convention, and etiquette, and acquired through social­
isation, education, and training. These formal and informal 
methods provide the framework within which any projectmaker 
can realise his goals in that environment, whatever these 
goals might be within the limits set by these constraints.
The latter are thus likely to encompass the minimum conditions 
for social existence itself, and to supplement and interpret 
these in the ways which give a particular society its identity.
Each projectmaker's adherence to these regulatory 
mechanisms is purely self-interested; they are followed 
because, and in so far as, they enable an individual to attain 
his ends in an environment in which others are doing the same.
If adhering to the strictures of these devices in a particular 
case obstructs the attainment of goals in that case, then that 
is a reason for going against them - although it may not be a 
conclusive reason, for that will depend on the risks that are 
taken and on whether the calculation extends to possible and 
probable long-term effects as well as those likely in the 
immediate future. Calculations of advantage and disadvantage 
are based entirely on the effects that adherence or nonadherence 
will have on being able to realise projects now and in the 
future. Short- and long-term self-interest are thus the only 
relevant concerns for the egotistic individuals in this form of 
social existence. In these circumstances, an individual may be
12.
susceptible to arguments of the general type 'But what if 
everyone did that?' but their effect on him would turn on 
the likelihood that everyone would. If that likelihood is 
low and he can benefit from ignoring the constraints in 
question, then calculations of prudential advantage will 
require him to ignore them.
The projectmaker qua projectmaker thus has an interest 
in preserving and promoting these conditions because, and to 
the extent that, they make it possible for any projectmaker 
to realise his goals, even though they cannot themselves 
guarantee that any particular projectmaker will do so in 
general or in any specific case. These conditions thus warrant 
some degree of allegiance and consideration from him insofar 
as he is a projectmaker at all, as distinct from this or that 
projectmaker with particular goals, desires and interests.
This interest is shared with all other projectmakers qua 
projectmakers; it is the interest of any projectmaker, even 
if the result of showing this consideration is to remove the 
possibility of having certain kinds of projects at all, or of 
using particular methods to achieve particular kinds of 
projects in particular circumstances. It is in this sense 
that we may talk of a 'common interest' that depends on the 
distinction between being a projectmaker as such, and being 
a particular projectmaker with particular goals, interests, 
etc. That common interest is therefore something that must be 
taken into account by any projectmaker in deciding how to act, 
for to jeopardise it may be to jeopardise the possibility of 
his achieving any of his projects. This common interest need 
not be paramount in his reasoning; it is not the case that the 
egotistical projectmaker in a society of similar persons must
13.
always defer to the common interest. It may be that the risk 
of damage to the common interest is slight, or uncertain, or 
unimportant; on the other hand it may be considerable, certain, 
and of great importance. That will depend on circumstances.
But someone who paid no account to the requirements of the 
common interest in deciding how to act would be undermining 
his existence as a projectmaker in common with others. The 
fault is thus one of prudence rather than of logic; the person 
who ignores the common interest thus conceived is not being 
irrational - indeed it may be quite rational to do so in certain 
cases where, for example, an advantage can be gained at no cost, 
or where others cannot be relied upon to pay heed to the 
requirements of the common interest and where the individual 
would be disadvantaged if they did not. What the person who 
ignores the common interest does is to gamble that others will 
not do so when they come to act. Such a person may be quite 
happy to take the risk, to say ’My advantages are maximised and 
I succeed in my projects when I pay no heed to the common 
interest; beat me if you canl' That may be misguided or 
imprudent; it is not necessarily irrational.
The commonality of the common interest as I have outlined 
it lies in the recognition among projectmakers that they are 
alike in so far as they are projectmakers. That is still 
compatible with a good deal of diversity of projects, of 
competition and conflict, as well as of a mutual tolerance 
conditional upon self-interest. The recognition of this 
commonality amounts to a recognition by the individual that 
others are projectmakers like himself. Their projects may be 
worthwhile or trivial in his eyes; they may be selfish or 
altruistic, foolish or wise, desirable or undesirable; they
14.
may exhibit a harmony of character or a wild diversity of 
apparently inconsistent elements. But beneath all this 
diversity lies a common identity - that of each as a person 
with goals, passions, interests, and desires to be satisfied 
through action in the world. That is the foundation of 
whatever commonality there is in this rather bare world that 
I have sketched; it is the basis of the common interest, but 
a common interest that is at the mercy of self-interested 
calculations of individual projectmakers’ short- and long-term 
advantages and the characteristics of individuals and the 
kinds of projects they happen to have.
Let us now consider the moral person who is a projectmaker 
in a world of projectmakers. By 'moral person' I mean a person 
who participates in the moral point of view; he may be a 
virtuous person on the whole, or a vicious person on the whole. 
The moral person as I use the term is thus to be distinguished 
from the amoral person rather than from the immoral person; 
the moral person is someone who takes moral considerations 
seriously, who recognises that the moral terms 'good' and 
'bad', 'right' and 'wrong', 'ought' and 'ought not', can be 
applied to persons' actions and dispositions to act, and 
consequently to judgements concerning their characters, and 
who is prepared to evaluate his own actions and the actions 
of others accordingly and accepts that others may do so with 
respect to his actions.
The moral point of view makes possible the transition 
from the notion of the common interest to that of the common 
good. The group of egotistical projectmakers can have no 
society beyond the level of social existence, for each has
as the aim of his actions the satisfaction of his own desires,
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interests, etc. A projectmaker cannot form bonds of social 
cooperation, trust, affection, altruism, or benevolence 
except insofar as they are likely to lead to the satisfaction 
of his goals. If they do not promote these satisfactions, 
then they will be abandoned. In a group of projectmakers who 
are moral persons, on the other hand, there can be a form of 
social life characterised by a degree of mutuality between 
persons that is not at the mercy of calculations of self- 
interest. Here there can be trust, benevolence, affection, 
respect for persons as persons rather than as instruments of 
self-interest, and obligations that are beyond the calculation 
of advantage. Here the prudential 'ought' of the egotistical 
projectmaker gives way to the 'ought' of the moral agent; the 
conditions of mere proximate existence that form part of the 
concerns of the egotistical projectmaker now become part of 
the concerns of the moral person, for they are the conditions 
within which he may be moral. They provide the foundation on 
which he can build a moral life; they thus become an importantgconcern of any moral theory. They must therefore be taken 
into account when a moral person decides how to act, although 
it does not follow that they are the only factors to be taken 
into account, nor that they must always be paramount in our 
decisions about actions and our evaluations of them. Any 
moral person's set of action-guiding principles and rules (his 
moral theory) is likely to contain principles and rules 
concerning his own wants, but it must also contain principles 
and rules concerning the conditions of social living as such, 
and hence concerning the ways he must take account of the wants, 
needs, and interests of others in deciding how to act and how 
to morally evaluate actions. Any moral person who does not
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recognise these conditions as important to his decision­
making simply does not know what it is to be a participant 
in the moral point of view. The conditions of social living
thus form part of the conditions within which anyone can be
9moral within a social context, whatever the particular ways 
they decide to be moral within the limits set by those 
conditions. I call the conditions of social living viewed 
from the moral point of view 'the core of morality'.
The moral point of view, then, implies a set of principles 
which concern any person's (and hence other persons') 
interests in social living. They have to be taken into 
account in the moral evaluation of actions and hence of persons. 
But the ways they may be taken into account - the particular 
rules of priority between principles, the rules about the 
particular kinds of situation in which particular principles 
are appropriately applied, the ways the evaluation of actions 
is translated into the evaluation of persons, and the rules 
of excuse and mitigation - are not set down in any detail by 
their status as part of the core of morality. These depend, 
in general, on such factors as the rules and categories of 
language, cultural tradition, economic circumstances, etc., 
of a particular group, society, or individual. But within 
these broad limits, the core principles of morality must have 
a prominent role simply because of their status as_ core 
principles.
I have argued that the moral point of view is concerned • 
with the evaluation of actions and agents in terms of praise 
and blame, rightness and wrongness, justifiability and unjust­
ifiability, using the methods of reasoned discourse, according 
to sets of principles and rules at least some of which must 
concern how other people's wants, etc., (and particularly those
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concerned with the conditions of social life itself) should 
be considered in deciding how to act. Of course, such 
notions and activities are not exclusively moral in them­
selves, but rather they become so when combined in this way. 
Thus characterised, for example, the moral point of view might 
seem to include action on religious principles, or acting 
according to the canons of politeness and etiquette. I will 
deal with the detail of the instantiation of the moral point 
of view through moral theories in Section 4, and will now only 
sketch the features of the moral point of view relevant to its 
relationship to these other areas.
Historically, of course, moral principles have been 
closely associated with religious beliefs. The conduct 
enjoined by a particular set of religious beliefs may be 
virtually the same as that required by a particular moral 
theory, with the same considerations to be taken into account, 
and almost the same rules of application and excuse.1  ^ Many 
have accounted for the existence of religion in terms of the 
need to promote and preserve social life, or the need for 
humans to project their purposes and inadequacies, using 
arguments similar in form (but not identical) to the one I 
used for the importance of the core of morality. It is also 
possible that a religion may take the place of morality in a 
particular society, i.e. that the moral point of view may be 
absorbed into religion, and that the society could not be 
said to have a morality at all in the sense in which I am 
using the term. The same might be true for an individual.
The difference I wish to point to is that between the sources 
of religious morality and secular morality. In the Western 
tradition at least, a religious ideal is one which is grounded,
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perhaps in some ultimate sense, in a claim about some 
transcendent being who either issues commands to be obeyed 
or who is taken to have revealed (e.g. through some text, or 
through some innate human faculty) guides to right conduct. 
Obedience is owed to these principles simply on account of 
their origin; they are expressions of the will of God, and 
that is taken as sufficient to override any counterclaims 
based on the wants of men. On the other hand, obedience is 
not owed to the principles of secular morality in quite the 
same way; it is the wants of men as men that are important 
in deciding how to act, not the wants of men as creations of 
God or as possessors of some parts of God's divine nature. 
Religious morality is thus a different kind of morality from 
secular morality; the two are based on quite different 
considerations which are taken to justify the holding of 
particular moral principles. But the structures of argument 
about the justifiability of actions are similar, and I shall 
not differentiate between them in considering those structures.
The relationships between moral principles and rules on 
the one hand and the rules of politeness and etiquette on the 
other are rather less clear. Again, both guide conduct and 
are appealed to in the evaluation and justification of actions 
and the characters of agents; the patterns of argument in 
both are again similar. It is, of course, possible that a 
particular moral theory might regard some rules of behaviour 
as important from the moral point of view while others consider 
them mere rules of etiquette and politeness. Similarly, a 
particular moral theory may not regard the content of the rules 
of etiquette as morally significant, but may so regard 
obedience to those rules. But one difference between the two
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kinds of rules in our kind of society lies in the fact that 
the rules of etiquette are merely conventional ways of 
smoothing the paths of everyday social interaction, and are 
likely to be of relatively minor importance vis-a-vis most 
moral principles. Some are instantiations of moral values, 
and as such have rather more status within the moral point 
of view than those that are not. Interrupting others' 
conversation, knocking before entering, not being insulting 
or coarse, standing when a lady enters a room, are all 
instances of politeness and etiquette based on the moral 
value of respect for others. This is not so obviously the 
case, however, with the rules prohibiting eating peas off 
knives, drinking tea noisily, or not wearing gardening clothes 
to a dinner party; that people might be offended in various 
degrees by such actions is a (moral) reason for refraining 
from doing them, but others' objections are not reasons for 
the rules in the first place; they arise because of the 
rules. Moreover, people's objections to these practices are 
not in themselves very significant from a moral point of view7, 
unless there are further reasons for behaving in accordance 
with the edicts of etiquette, e.g. setting an example, or 
because one would offend someone to whom honour is due, or 
because the situation is one that others take particularly 
seriously. The rules of etiquette in this lesser sense, 
then, are not clearly distinct from moral rules and 
principles; they are merely conventional ways of behaving, 
followed in particular situations or within particular social 
groups, but the breach of which is not necessarily a matter 
of great moral concern, since the character of the agent is 
not impugned in the ways that follow a breach of moral rules.
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Apart from the fact that some moral principles and 
rules must concern the core whereas it does not seem 
possible to have such a substantive requirement for rules 
of etiquette, there does seem to be one further difference 
between the two kinds of rules: particular rules of
etiquette tend to be associated with particular social 
groups within a society in a way that, moral rules are not.
The formalist criterion that moral rules be universalisable 
is useful here, because it does seem to point to one 
characteristic that can distinguish moral rules from other 
types of rules. Those in 'polite society' would not expect 
their conventions of behaviour to be observed among the 
'lower' sections of society, and perhaps also vice versa. 
These expectations are both empirical and prescriptive; they 
do not merely concern what will be found if one looks, but 
what the members of different social strata would consider 
it proper for those of other social groups to do. Indeed, 
the very terms 'etiquette' and 'politeness' seem to be 
confined to some social strata in a way that suggests that 
members of other social strata could not be_ polite, no matter 
how much they imitated the behaviour of those in 'polite 
society'. Etiquette and politeness, then, serve to mark 
social divisions in a way that the requirement of universal- 
isability means that moral rules cannot.
There is one other matter to be considered before I 
turn to a more detailed account of the core of morality, viz, 
the question 'Why should I be moral?'. This question asks 
whether there are any reasons why someone should be a 
participant in the moral point of view at all, and, if so, 
what kinds of reasons these are. In discussing these 
questions, I shall also be concerned with the relationship
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between social and individual morality.
The general question 'Why should I be moral?' asks 
for reasons why an individual should regard the conditions 
of social living and others' wants as important in 
deciding how he should act, and perhaps in some cases 
regard them as more important than his own. Nov/ provided 
the questioner is a participant in social life and provided 
he shares the spirit of reasoned inquiry, a reasoned case 
can be advanced for showing the need for a minimal social 
morality to be shared by all moral persons v/ithin that 
society, and I have tried to do just that earlier in this 
Section. But our reply to someone who questions the value 
of communal life as such, rather than this or that version 
of it, is to point to the advantages of participating in 
social life compared with the disadvantages of not doing so, 
from the point of view of the formulation and achievement 
of personal wants and desires, and to ask for a careful 
weighing-up of one against the other. And if he decides 
that communal life is not necessary for the achievement of 
his goals and opts out accordingly, then all we can do is 
wish him well.
But the case is different with the person who wishes 
to remain in society, but who, after reasoned discussion, 
decides to accord moral principles in general, or the core 
principles in particular, a significantly lesser weight than 
other principles, and acts accordingly. Others must accord 
those views the respect due to any views arrived at in this 
way, and they are entitled to try to persuade such a person 
to a different view using those same methods of reasoned 
discussion. But if the dissenter remains unconvinced, and 
if the disagreement .is fundamental enough to jeopardise
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others' social lives, then the community itself is 
entitled to resort to more formal, coercive measures to 
influence behaviour in those areas, but again within the 
limits of respect and consideration, for such a licence is 
clearly open to considerable abuse. The community is not, 
however, entitled to expect meek compliance on the part of 
the dissenter where that could be for him to compromise 
his own convictions. Such a situation is a serious one, 
for it indicates a fundamental challenge to the very 
foundations of communal life, and must therefore be taken 
very seriously by all concerned. It requires what is 
unfortunately rare in such cases: considered, dispassionate
examination of the principles and arguments involved, for 
the community has a considerable responsibility to ensure 
that it is not forcing its particular form of social life, 
based on its own history, culture, and tradition, on to 
those members of the society who do not share that background. 
The'community is entitled to insist on behaviour in accordance 
with the requirements of social life as such; it is not 
entitled to insist that the core of morality is any more 
than just a core and to try to extend it to cover all areas 
of individual behaviour. All it requires is behaviour in 
accordance with the necessities of social life; if a person 
is completely amoral, then that is of no concern, provided 
he can be relied upon to behave in ways appropriate to the 
continued existence of communal life. If he is a participant 
in the moral point of view, but acts in accordance with 
principles which he takes to override core principles, then 
the same situation applies. But such a circumstance is 
reason for pause, for reflection and reconsideration, and
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for respectful and minimal influence and coercion, for in 
this case the dissenter is not concerned to undermine 
social life itself. The need for respect and concern is 
particularly important where there are many dissenters, for 
this is an indication of reasoned, fundamental and widespread 
disaffection with the basis of communal life, and must give 
any community cause for self-examination. But, in the end, 
the community is entitled, in a reasoned and considerate way, 
to enforce the minimal conditions for its existence as a 
community.
The community's answer, then, to the general question 
'Why should I be moral?' comes in the end to this: 'It
doesn't matter to us whether you are or not, but you must 
behave in certain ways if you wish to remain part of 
communal life; if you do not, we will consider your arguments 
in the spirit of reasoned discourse; if we still find your 
case unpersuasive, or have failed to convince you of the 
merits of our case, we will respect you and your views and 
expect you to respect us and ours, but we will require you 
to behave in a manner consistent with the minimal requirements 
of social living.'
It will be apparent that I do not believe that it is 
possible to make a case for being moral that is such that 
any person would be irrational not to be convinced by it.
(Nor do I think that the question is satisfactorily resolved 
formally, by defining 'moral' in part as those considerations 
that an agent regards as always, or most often, overriding; 
that seems to me no more than a verbal victory with counter­
intuitive results. It is not enough to say, in effect, that 
anyone who is, or aspires to be, a reasonably consistent 
agent is therefore a moral agent, no matter what the basis of
his choices might, be. It may be true that most people 
who are recognisably moral persons - as distinct from 
virtuous persons - usually allow moral considerations to 
override other reasons for acting. But it does not seem 
to be true as part of the nature of morality itself.)
There is nothing illogical about someone's being totally 
and consciously amoral, although such a policy might make 
some aspects of social life difficult for him. Such a 
person need not even be of communal concern provided his 
behaviour is in accordance with the requirements of social 
life itself. It is possible to choose whether to be a 
participant in the moral point of view, although of course 
most moral persons never make such a decision, for morality 
is simply part of what they are. Morality may be a necessary 
part of social life as such, but it does not follow that it 
must be part of the life of any person who lives a social 
life. In fact, it might be more rational for someone not to 
be moral if the conditions of communal life are secured by 
others' being moral and provided he does hot act contrary to 
the conditions of social life itself. But one does not 
logically need to conform to these conditions for moral 
reasons, and so it is possible that one may be totally amoral 
yet still live socially.
3. The core of morality: truth, life, and duty
There are three areas of social life as such which 
constitute the minimal conditions of social living, and the 
moral principles derived therefrom comprise the core of 
morality. I call these the areas of truth, life, and duty.
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A society without any concern for the practice of 
truth-telling (in a general sense) would be a society 
lacking one of the essential conditions for communal 
living.^ Without concern for what-is-the-case, 
communication between people would be impossible, and 
hence the possibility of achieving many human purposes 
would be seriously threatened. Truth is relied upon in a 
myriad of ways in our everyday relationships with each 
other. No one person can afford not to trust other people’s 
accounts of the factors which he has to take into account 
in deciding how to act, for no person's experience is 
sufficiently extensive to allow him to rely on it alone in 
achieving his wants, needs, and purposes. Without a concern 
for truth, education and science would be impossible, for 
both are communal activities which rely upon the practice 
of truth. Indeed, any kind of reasoned discourse, including 
moral discourse itself, would be impossible. Social life 
requires us to value truth and to take it into account when 
deciding how to act; it also requires us to value truth 
when giving others information on which they might wish to 
act. It must, that is, be taken into account in our relation­
ships with others because it is one of the essential features 
which enable others to decide how to act in pursuit of their 
wants, needs, and purposes.
Concern for truth is, then, a moral matter because 
concern for truth is one of the foundations for social 
living. It is expressed through a moral principle such as 
'Always tell the truth' or 'Lying is wrong' plus a number 
of derived principles and rules concerning (i) what is to 
count as telling and not telling the truth (rules of
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application, and therefore about when a claim that a 
particular situation falls under the rule is undermined);
(ii) those occasions when the core principle is overridden, 
i.e. when not telling the truth is to be regarded as 
permissible, or even praiseworthy, and those cases where 
telling the truth is itself to be regarded as an overriding 
principle (rules of priority); (iii) the ways that moral 
evaluations of actions are to be translated into moral 
evaluations of agents' characters (rules of translation); 
and (iv) the circumstances in which the moral evaluation of 
an agent on account of his action is to be modified in the 
light of those circumstances (rules of excuse and mitigation).
These four types of rules are associated with non-core
moral principles as well as with core principles. They are
importantly different in terms of the scope an individual
has to adopt rules that are different from those adopted by
others. As I will show later, rules of application are
rather constrained by the rules and practices of language.
Rules of translation are similarly constrained. The general
terms of rules of excuse and mitigation are common to all
moral principles, both core and non-core, and are derived in
part from the moral point of view itself. Rules of priority
offer the greatest scope for the individual to arrive at
moral judgements that differ from those arrived at by someone
with the same set of principles, but, of course, any ordering
of moral principles within a moral theory must acknowledge
12the importance of core principles.
The particular ways these rules are formulated will 
depend upon the language, culture, needs, and circumstances 
of particular societies, groups, and individuals within them. 
A capitalist society might have rules about fraud and mis-
27..
representation which a different kind of society does not 
need, yet may not regard some kinds of advertising as 
falling under any principle derived from the value of truth. 
(This may, of course, point to an inconsistency in the rules 
of application.) Concern for truth may encompass both state­
ments and actions, expressed in rules about deception 
through action as well as about deception through speech.
Some rules about truth-telling are appropriately enforced 
through public authority, while others are not. Different 
societies, groups, or individuals may regard different 
circumstances as overriding or excusing; telling the truth 
at the cost of betraying someone may be thought of as blame­
worthy, even where there is no close relationshipe between 
the two parties, e.g. honour among thieves, or solidarity 
in the face of adversity. Similarly, ignorance of fact or 
good intentions may be held to be excusing in some cases 
but not in others, perhaps depending on the seriousness of 
the case. And the general principle about telling the 
truth may be regarded as differently applied, overridden 
or excused according to whether the goal is the moral 
evaluation of the action or of the agent. In addition, some 
of the rules of application, priority, translation, and 
excuse may be derived from the moral point of view itself, 
as in the case of the general rule of priority concerning 
core principles, or rules about the applicability of moral 
rules in general to certain classes of people, e.g. those 
able to engage in reasoned discourse about the moral status 
of their actions.
The necessity of a concern for truth is reflected in the 
conventional categories of our language. Since we also need 
to talk about telling the truth and about those cases where
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not telling the truth is to be excused, blamed, permitted, 
etc., we need to have categories of language that reflect 
our interests in these types of matters. Thus we construct 
terms such as lie, perjury, mislead, misrepresent, white 
lie, fraud, cheat, confidence trick, acting (in a play), 
pretend, and so on. All these terms are conventionally 
applicable in certain types of situations so as to both give 
a picture of what happened, and to embody a particular moral 
perspective on that event because of the relation to the 
central moral value of truth-telling. Thus to say 'A lied' 
is not just to say what A did; it also raises a moral 
question about A's action according to the moral point of 
view itself, for the statement embodies a moral charge, an 
accusation from the moral point of view, about A's conduct. 
One’s purpose in making the statement on a particular 
occasion may not be to morally evaluate A's action on that 
occasion; but for someone to deny that the simple statement 
'A lied' raised any moral questions at all would be for that 
person to admit to being outside the practice of morality. 
That is, of course, possible. I shall return to this point 
in Section 5.
I am not suggesting that all participants in the moral 
point of view must agree in their moral judgements about 
particular cases coming under moral principles concerning 
truth-telling. How they deal with specific cases will depend 
on their particular moral theories containing the relevant 
rules of application, priority, translation, and excuse that 
I mentioned earlier. What I am concerned to argue is that 
lying is a moral matter because it is a part of the very 
practice of morality itself; that the moral status of truth­
telling as such and its variations in action are part of the
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conventions of our language; and that, therefore, to
describe some action as a case of lying is also to establish 
13a presumption about the moral status of that action and 
hence to assign the onus of justification and the limits of 
debate within whatever moral theory might be applied to the 
case. Some of the rules of application of the core principle 
concerning truth are contained in conventions of language.
One cannot be morally indifferent to lying and still be a 
participant in the moral point of view; lying is not the 
same (morally speaking) as scratching one's nose.
The cases are similar for the areas of social living I 
have called life and duty. A society needs rules restricting 
the circumstances in which its members may be killed or may 
injure each other, for without rules about the physical 
security of persons, no society could maintain itself as a 
means for pursuing common and individual purposes. A society 
in which there were no curbs on the use of physical power 
against others, in which death or physical injury could be 
inflicted without fear of sanctions (whether these sanctions 
be informal in terms of revenge or mere castigation or formal 
in terms of punishment by public authority) would be a 
society lacking minimal conditions for persons as participants 
in communal life. Again, the ways in which particular 
societies regulate the killing and injuring of persons will 
differ; the moral weights assigned to particular activities, 
the overriding considerations, and the relationships between, 
certain forms of death and injury and other moral values, may 
differ from one society to another, or within one society at 
different times, or from one group to another in the same 
society at the same time. Nevertheless cases of human injury 
and death are paradigmatically moral matters, and it is only
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through the application of particular moral theories in 
the light of the moral point of view that the exceptions, 
the excuses, and the permitted will emerge.
As with the case of truth, the area I have called 
life may be extended in various ways in different societies 
or in different moral theories to cover such things as rules 
about sexual behaviour, acquisition of the means necessary to 
life (food, shelter, clothing, etc.), and matters pertaining 
to the richness or fullness of life - the attainment of 
individual potential, etc. Thus a moral value about the 
provision of education, for example, may be seen as derived 
from moral principles about the value of human life as such; 
the notion of harm may be similarly extended to cover injury 
to the psyche as well as to the body, or to a person's 
interests or projects.
Again, the moral point of view with respect to life is 
absorbed into the conventions of language in such a way that 
the paradigm case of an offence against life, 'A killed B', 
embodies a presumption about the moral status of A's action 
in the same way as the paradigm case of an offence against 
truth, 'A lied', does. Again, too, if A is a moral person, 
then he has to either accept the judgement implicit in the 
description, or produce overriding considerations, or try 
to undermine the judgement by showing that the description 
which embodies the judgement is misapplied, or that there is 
another descriptive term which is more appropriate to the case 
according to the conventions of language. The case is 
similar for 'A struck B'. In both cases, to describe is to 
raise the moral question in a particular form; the starting 
point of the debate is provided.
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I have called the third core area of morality the area 
of duty. I use this term to refer to those areas of social 
life where we can be said to have duties to the community as 
a whole, and to others as a result of these general duties.
My concern at this point is to show that the moral person must 
acknowledge that he ought to abide by the mechanisms of social 
regulation that are concerned with safeguarding communal life, 
but that the moral point of view also sets limits to that 
obedience. I shall discuss obligations in general, and 
political obligation and its limits in particular, in more 
detail in Chapter Three.
I argued in Section 2 (pp. 10-14) that a society that is 
beyond a certain size or level of development is .likely to 
have to adopt both formal and informal methods of social 
regulation in order to provide the framework within which 
individuals may seek to realise their goals. I further 
argued (pp. 14-16) that, for the moral person, these methods 
give, a content to the notion of the common good, for they 
provide the conditions within which any moral person can be 
moral, and thus must be part of any moral theory.
The ways a particular society meets this need for social 
regulation and the rules it has will obviously depend upon 
its history, culture, and tradition. But our experience of 
the facts of social existence suggest that the set of formal 
rules will have to be coercive.^ Different circumstances and 
the possibility of different relations between persons might 
allow noncoercive social regulation, but history suggests that 
such a situation is rather improbable, however appealing the 
prospect.
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In our type of society, this set of coercive rules of
behaviour, made and enforced through public authority, forms
part of the legal system. Again, the particular form it takes,
and the various laws it contains, will be the result of an
interplay between a number of factors. But the role of law as
a means for securing part of the basis of communal life provides
the grounds of a general moral duty to obey the law as such.
Law is a moral institution, since it provides the conditions for
the social life necessary to the kinds of actions through which
a moral person can be moral. The general duty to obey the law
must therefore be recognised by any participant in the moral 
15point of view. In fact, it amounts to a moral obligation, as 
I shall show in Chapter Three, Section 2 (pp. 119-133 below).
There are, however, two sets of constraints on this 
general duty, that of process, and that of content. Both 
arise out of the general status of lav/ as a moral institution, 
and they serve to undermine or override this general duty.
They are extremely important to the consideration of political 
obligation and civil disobedience, and I shall discuss them 
more fully in Chapters Three and Five; my purpose at this stage 
is to sketch their outlines.
I have suggested that the moral point of view must use the 
methods of reasoned discourse and argument, involving the open, 
non-dogmatic consideration of the moral status of actions 
and agents according to reasons. Since law is a means of 
securing the basis of communal life, it is a moral 
institution and hence must share in those methods. Simply 
to impose a requirement that people act or not act in certain 
ways without giving reasons or without giving them a real 
opportunity to. express opinions and arguments concerning 
these requirements would be to negate the reasoned 
discussion required by the moral point of view. Hence the
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process through which particular rules acquire the status 
of law must be open and reasoned; there must be some 
mechanism whereby the members of the community in whose 
names public power is exercised, in whose general interests 
the law functions, and who are subject to it, can only be 
excluded from effective influence on law-making if there 
are good reasons for that exclusion. In other words, the 
onus is on those who would exclude others from being able 
to exert influence to justify that exclusion. I do not 
contend that there are never any good reasons why some 
people or groups of people might be excluded, either in 
general or in a particular case; examples might be those 
incapable of reasoned discourse itself, or where there are 
serious considerations of efficiency or urgency. Nor do I 
want to suggest that any such exclusion is always sufficient 
to override a duty to obey the law, or that it is the only 
ground on v/hich that duty is overridden. I wish to argue 
only that the moral point of view provides a general ground 
for a moral duty to obey the law, but that that duty is also 
limited by the moral point of view itself.
The argument for the second kind of constraint, that of 
content, is similar, and has already been outlined in 
considering the question 'Why should I be moral?' at the end 
of the last Section. The process of moral argument is not 
always determinate in the sense of leading to a conclusion 
with v/hich all participants in the moral point of view must 
agree. I have argued that there are objective moral values 
based on the moral point of view itself, but that these values
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are subject to different rules of application, excuse and, 
within limits, priority; they therefore do not necessarily 
lead to objective moral conclusions either in general or 
with respect to particular cases. It follows from this, and 
from the open, non-dogmatic character of reasoned discourse, 
that two individuals may quite legitimately disagree about 
the moral justifiability of a particular type of action or 
instance of a specific action, with each being able to support 
his conclusions with reasoned argument consistent with his own 
moral theory. But it also follows that for A to require that 
B behave in accordance with A's conclusion about what ought 
to be done would be to violate the very principles of that 
point of view. Thus the fact that a particular law has been 
duly enacted as part of a moral institution which provides 
some of the necessary conditions of communal living itself is 
not conclusive of whether that law has an overriding moral 
claim on an individual’s obedience. An individual has no 
final moral duty to obey if the law requires him to do some­
thing which seriously offends his own important and reasoned 
moral principles - at least not on account of its status as 
law, although there may be other grounds on which he ought to 
behave in accordance with the law. But that does not 
necessarily undermine the authority of the community to 
coerce his behaviour if the matter is fundamental to communal 
life, although again that coercion must be conducted in a 
reasoned and considerate manner. Nor does it necessarily 
imply that the dissenter must submit to that coercion.
From the relation of law to the core of morality 
it follows that to say 'A acted illegally' establishes a 
presumption about the moral status of A's action, and hence 
about how we should evaluate A as agent. Note that 'A acted
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legally' does not itself establish any similar presumption 
that A is to be praised; only if we are also given reasons 
(not necessarily conclusive) for regarding A's act as morally 
praiseworthy, such as acting legally in the face of consider­
able temptation not to do so, can we conclude that A is to be 
praised for not disobeying the lav/, for acting in accordance 
with law is a standard we are all expected to observe, and 
are entitled to expect others to observe, as a matter of 
course and in the absence of good reasons to the contrary.
And, of course, there are cases where acting in accordance 
with the law might be judged morally reprehensible, e.g. 
where it is evidence of disloyalty to one's fellows. 'A 
acted legally' does not itself either call A's act into 
question or show that A's act is to be praised in the way 
that 'A acted illegally' embodies a moral charge against A;
'A acted legally' does not itself embody a moral charge or 
commendation (although it might in a particular context).
Indeed, the very description of A's act as legal is only 
appropriate where there are particular reasons for pointing 
out that aspect of A's act, for example in response to a 
challenge about the moral status of the act.
'A acted illegally', then, only establishes a presumption 
about the moral status of A's act. Further considerations may 
support an argument to show that A was in fact morally 
justified in so acting; which considerations may be relevant 
will be determined by a moral theory and the context in which 
A's action is being evaluated. As in the previous two paradigm 
cases of 'A lied' and 'A killed B', 'A acted illegally' is a 
description of A's action which can be contested. The notion 
of illegality is a somewhat tricky one in this context. Laws 
covering behaviour must contain descriptive terms that must be
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applied, but within the context of the legal system itself.
Ordinary usage of terms is therefore not necessarily decisive;
many laws in fact include clauses setting out the ways various
terms are to be interpreted in the application of the law.
The ways these rules are applied is, in principle, decided by
bodies authorised to do so, viz. the courts. Hence if an
individual asserts that a particular action in a particular
context is or is not illegal, he is implicitly relying on a
prediction of what the courts would decide if faced with that
16action in the context in which it occurred. " In many cases, 
of course, there is no room for doubt, given knowledge of the 
ways the courts have decided similar cases in the past, and 
this (plus the fact that judgements need to be reasoned) 
provides grounds for criticising courts* decisions. But given 
that, generally speaking, laws are framed in general terms and 
that interpretations can and do change from time to time, the 
legal status of some actions may be uncertain prior to actual 
consideration by the courts. Hence the recognition of some 
cases a_s test cases, where the explicit aim is to get an 
authoritative declaration of whether an action, say, in 
particular circumstances is or is not covered by a particular 
rule.
Of course, it is always open to someone to argue that the 
description of his act as illegal is a straightforward mis­
description in the circumstances in which he did it, or that 
there are other descriptive terms which better capture his 
action in that they convey a more accurate picture of what 
happened. These other descriptions may undermine the 
original attribution of illegality (e.g. 'I didn’t evade taxes, 
I avoided them*), or modify a challenge made from the legal
37.
point of view (’It. wasn’t manslaughter, it was murder.’),
or they may seek to override it from a moral point of view
(e.g. 'Not to commit perjury would have been to betray a
confidence'). Which redescription is sought will depend on
the particular point of view in use at the time, on the
conventions of language, and, if the purpose is moral
evaluation, on the roles of descriptive categories within
17the moral theory that is being used. Redescriptions are 
the result of both a concern for truth and accuracy in 
conveying a picture of what happened, and a desire to modify 
the original moral and/or legal charge, for different moral 
and/or legal presumptions are embodied in different 
descriptive terms. In part this will depend on particular 
moral or legal systems, as in the change from describing an 
action as tax evasion to describing it as tax avoidance.
But in part it will ref^lect the moral presumptions surrounding 
those activities I have referred to as constituting the core 
areas of morality, and the conventional terms associated with 
them. 'You didn't just kill him - you murdered him!' 
redescribes someone's action according to the conventions of 
language and embodies a moral judgement that can be undermined 
but not overriden (although, of course, the rules of excuse 
and mitigation may affect the evaluation of the action). In 
some cases, too, the core areas of morality will overlap in 
their import, e.g., 'You didn't just tell a lie - it was 
perjury!'
Redescriptions are important, then, both because they 
can be used to give more accurate or more complete information 
about an action, and because they provide a means of modifying 
presumptions embodied in the original description, and hence 
of modifying the grounds and limits of moral debate. But that
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they have both roles means that the second can overshadow 
the first, that the conventions of language with respect 
to description can come to be subordinated to the modification 
of moral presumptions, and this enables the necessarily 
imprecise limits of the application of certain terms within 
our language to be exploited for moral ends. As we shall see 
in Part Two of this thesis, it also allows modification 
of the usages of some terms in order to serve justificatory 
purposes; where there are no relatively settled conventions 
about the criteria for the use of certain terms, those 
involved in the moral evaluation of the activities referred 
to by those terms are able to set the criteria in such a way 
as to establish moral presumptions in accordance with their 
moral views concerning the activity in question. This is 
much more difficult, however, where the conventions of 
language do establish relatively settled limits for the use 
of a term. I shall return to these matters in Chapter Two.
The argument in this Section has shown that there are 
some descriptive categories which have a dual role within 
the moral point of view, but independent of particular moral 
theories. They both describe and evaluate because of their 
relationship with what I have called 'the core of morality'.
(I do not suggest that all terms that both describe and 
evaluate do so because of a connection with this core.) I 
have identified three such areas, which I have called truth, 
life, and duty. Any moral theory must be concerned with 
these three areas at least, for they are part of the minimal 
conditions for communal life. Within each of these areas, 
there are certain clear cases where the description of 
certain actions also, and at the same time, establishes a 
presumption about the moral status of the action described.
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But the moral judgement implicit in the notions used is 
only presumptive, and can be overridden by other consider­
ations depending on particular moral theories. The core 
areas of morality are just that - they do not exhaust the 
moral point of view. Different moral theories build on 
this core in different ways, and it is to the consideration 
of moral theories that I now turn.
4. Moral theories
A full discussion of the characteristics of moral 
theories would take us too far from the concerns of this part 
of the thesis. I will, therefore, deal with some of their 
general features and then turn to a discussion of those 
aspects of moral theories that are relevant to the role of 
descriptive categories in the process of moral evaluation.
Any moral theory has a number of elements: substantive
moral principles which serve to guide action and as a basis 
on which to evaluate actions and persons on account of their 
actions, associated with general and specific rules of 
application, rules of translation, rules of excuse and 
mitigation, and rules of priority between principles. Any 
moral theory must also take account of the three core areas of 
morality mentioned in the previous Section in the sense that it 
must include principles and rules concerning the areas of truth, 
life, and duty. A moral theory could be based entirely on core 
principles and their associated rules of application, trans- • 
lation, excuse, and priority, according to the needs, traditions, 
and situation of a particular society, group, or individual.
A diversity of moral theories may result from differences in 
the rules of application, translation, excuse, and priority
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associated with the core principles, or from differences in 
principles based upon those wants, needs, and purposes which 
are not part of the foundation of social life as such. Not 
all these secondary wants, needs, and purposes give rise to 
moral principles, and not all moral principles must be based 
on wants, needs, or purposes of either type. Moral 
principles are thus of two types: core, and non-core. A
principle of conduct P is a non-core moral principle for an 
agent A (a moral person) if and only if:
(i) P has associated rules of application, translation, 
and excuse;
(ii) A regards P as binding on himself such that his 
observance or breach of P entails the same kind of judgement 
of himself’and his action as he applies to observance or 
breach of core principles and rules, viz. praise and blame, 
justified and unjustified, right and wrong, commendation and 
condemnation;
. (iii) similarly, A regards the same kinds of circumstances 
as excusing or mitigating in cases of the breach of P as are- 
excusing or mitigating in cases of the breach of core 
principles and rules;
(iv) there are rules of priority associated with P with 
respect to core principles and other principles which satisfy
(i) - (iii) .
The criteria for identifying a non-core moral principle 
are, therefore, formal, for they depend on the relationships 
between that principle and the core principles. I have argued 
that the latter are derived from the moral point of view 
itself, and are not identified formally but substantively.
This way of analysing moral principles thus combines the
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insights of both the descriptivists (core principles) and 
the formalists (non-core principles). It allows the 
possibility of considerable moral diversity, both through 
the selection of non-core principles, but also through 
variations in rules of application, translation, excuse, 
and (in particular) priority, while at the same time requiring 
that a moral person have some regard for the wants, needs, 
interests, and purposes of others in a social environment.
And, of course, both this commonality and the diversity occur 
within the bounds set by the requirements of reasoned discourse.
A moral theory guides conduct and helps us to evaluate 
the actions of others and of ourselves through delineating the 
morally relevant features of a particular situation and giving 
us a means of weighing those features against each other 
(although this is not to deny that moral conflict can occur 
which cannot be resolved within a particular moral theory).
It enables us to say that two apparently dissimilar actions 
are sufficiently alike from the moral point of view, as 
instantiated in a moral theory, for us to evaluate them 
similarly and vice versa. In other words, a moral theory 
enables us to give moral order to our experience; it gives 
us a perspective through which we can view actions, agents, 
situations, and relationships; it is an essential means for 
participation in the moral point of view.
But a moral theory is not just a means for solving moral
problems, nor just a guide to action, for it also indicates
what is to count as a moral problem in the first place. For
consider what happens when a person A is confronted with some 
18action X. That action X can only be of moral concern to A 
if there are some features or characteristics of X (including 
its situation and its consequences) which raise questions of
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praise or blame etc. for A. He must have some reason to 
regard X as a moral matter, some characteristic of X must 
cry out, as it were, for moral consideration. Whether or 
not this happens depends on the kinds of things A considers 
to be moral matters, i.e. on A's moral theory. In other words, 
for X to be of moral concern for A, there has to be some 
connection between A's moral theory and X; this requires 
that X be described (or be describable) in a way that is 
consonant with A's moral theory. That is, X must be subsumed 
under some principle of that moral theory such that A can 
recognise that there is some feature about X and its 
circumstances which indicates that there is something morally 
disturbing or morally exemplary about X.
The ways in which X does fit A's moral theory will depend 
on the categories and rules contained within it and upon A's 
experiences with the theory in making moral judgements, e.g. 
our conclusion with other similar X's in the past have often 
been condemnatory, so we start from examining those features 
of the present case that are similar to the previous cases in 
order to see whether the similarities are important or not.
But this connection between X and A's moral theory only sets 
the process of moral evaluation under way; it does not 
necessarily result in a conclusion about the moral status of 
X, for that comes as a result of a consideration of all the 
morally relevant aspects of X according to other principles 
applicable to X, and rules of priority among all the applicable 
principles. If A is also interested in evaluating the agent, 
then consideration has to be given to his rules of translation 
and rules of excuse and mitigation. Again, the applicability 
of each of these will depend on there being a connection 
between X and the particular principle or rule. In some cases,
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that applicability will be uncertain, for the rules of 
application of certain principles are not exhaustive lists 
of cases; rather they embody a notion of a type of action, 
and leave it to judgement in particular cases whether the 
principle is to be applicable or not. There are at least 
two related constraints on that process; the first is, of 
course, consistency in the application of a rule, i.e. that 
there needs to be a reason for a refusal to apply the same 
rule to a situation when it was applied to a similar 
situation on an earlier occasion. The second constraint is 
that the formulation and application of rules is subject to 
the conventions and rules of language, which themselves 
establish presumptions of applicability of moral rules 
according to the conventions of the language. I shall defer 
a detailed argument for this position until later in this 
Chapter.
There is another presumption of applicability of certain 
terms which is also important for the operation of moral 
theories. I want to suggest that the implementation of moral 
principles in general, and not just core principles, results 
in the creation of certain paradigm instances of cases falling 
under those principles. These paradigm instances are used as 
rules of application in that they enable us to subsume events 
under a principle according to the closeness of their fit with 
these paradigm instances. Thus, for example, we might have a 
number of paradigm cases for moral principles concerning charity 
or loyalty, or justice, such that we can recognise further cases 
by the closeness of their correspondence to the paradigm cases.
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We know, that is, that to donate to certain organisations 
is a paradigm case of being charitable, that to stick by a 
friend in trouble is to be loyal, that to treat a person 
accused of a crime according to the procedures laid down in 
law is to be (procedurally) just.
In other words, experience with making moral judgements 
according to the principles and rules within our moral theories 
enables us to arrive at a number of paradigm instances of the 
applicability of those principles and rules and at the moral 
judgements appropriate to those paradigm instances. For not 
only do we establish the rule that certain combinations of 
circumstances are to be taken as sufficient for the application 
of a particular moral principle, but we also have established 
that the moral judgement encapsulated in that principle is 
also applicable. Thus, having concluded that it is morally 
praiseworthy to donate money to the Crippled Children's Society, 
we can go on to suggest that voluntary work for the Society of 
St Vincent de Paul is another example of charity and is also 
(ceteris paribus) morally praiseworthy. Indeed, we may try to 
formulate a general rule which says 'Any donation of time, 
money, goods, or effort to an organisation whose primary 
concern is to assist disadvantaged people is an instance of 
the moral virtue of charity' and see how experience with new 
cases modifies that.
Clearly, the description of X is also very important in 
this process of applying precedents. I have already suggested 
that, in general terms, a question about the moral status of 
some X can only be raised for some person A if either there is 
a direct connection between X and A's moral theory T (or, more 
specifically, between X and some principle P within A's moral 
theory T according to the rules of application of P), or if X
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is similar to Y and Y is covered by the rules of application 
of P. Whether or not there is such a connection will depend 
on the way X is described and the various descriptive 
categories of T. It is now time to consider the role of 
descriptions in moral evaluation in some detail. In particular, 
I wish to argue against the view that the description of X is 
always a logically separate matter from the moral evaluation 
of X because values cannot be derived from facts, or because 
goodness is a non-natural property. I have already argued 
(in Section 3) that this separation does not hold in connection 
with the core areas of morality so that an_y participant in the 
moral point of view must recognise that, for example, the
description of an action as the killing of one person by
another is ipso facto to raise the question about the moral 
status of that action, although not necessarily to raise it on 
that occasion. In other words, anyone who agreed that the
description 'A killed B' was a correct one (though perhaps a
partial one) and who was also a participant in the moral 
point of view, could not also consistently deny that the moral 
question is at least raised, even though there might be 
disagreement about the way it is to be resolved. I now wish 
to examine the relationship between description and moral 
evaluation in more general terms.
5. Description and moral evaluation
19To describe something is akin to giving a picture of it. 
But if we understand 'the description of X' to include all the 
characteristics of X, then there can never be a complete 
description of any X since the number of characteristics of 
any X is, in principle, indefinite. That is why we need some 
criterion that allows us to discriminate among all the possible
46.
characteristics of X that could be included in a description
of X. That criterion is, in general, the purpose in
describing X on that occasion. Purpose functions as a
discriminator, enabling us to include or exclude characteristics
in a description; hence it also serves as a criterion of
completeness: a description of X is incomplete when it omits
characteristics of X that would make a difference to achieving
2 0the purposes for which the description was requested.
Purposes also influence the range of characteristics to be
included in a description of X, whether, for example, it is
21to include anything about the causes or effects of X.
This is not to say, however, that we must always be 
aware of someone's purpose in requesting a description of X, 
for there are what we might call 'multi-purpose' descriptions 
that are compatible with a number of different purposes.
The characteristics included in descriptions depend upon the 
general category into which X is conventionally placed 
according to the rules of language. But once this general 
category is determined, there may be various ways in which 
we can select the characteristics of X to include in our 
description even though we do not have a particular purpose 
to guide us. In the first place, we obviously select those 
characteristics that we are in a position to determine. Thus, 
for example, when we are describing people we do not include 
the number of freckles on someone's left forearm, for that 
fact (which may suit our purpose admirably, e.g. if we wish 
to identify uniquely) is not one that we can acquire very 
easily. It is our practice to mention certain characteristics 
when we are describing people, such as sex, height, eye and 
hair colour, weight, build, race, physical and behavioural 
peculariti.es, and so on but not others, such as the number of
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freckles on the left forearm. So even where we do not have 
a purpose to guide our selection, we are able to provide a 
description of someone on the basis of common practices 
concerning the description of persons. A particular 
description may include more than is required, or it may 
require further detail if it is incomplete according to the 
questioner’s purpose. But the point is that we can describe 
in the absence of purpose because we are used to describing 
certain things in certain ways. If it is a physical object, 
then we include things like dimensions, colour, weight; if 
it is an action or an event, then we include antecedents, 
consequences, agency, time, and place. Further characteristics 
are included according to the kind of physical object (person, 
car, horse, book), action or event (killing, reading, 
travelling, riot).
Secondly, the detail of a description formulated in 
the absence of purpose will also depend on the circumstances 
of that situation or type of situation: how much each of the
participants knows or is in a position to discover about X; 
the context in which X is described or the point of view 
applied to X; and so on. Some of the detail included in a 
description may depend upon assumptions about the purpose 
behind the request, or the uses to which the description 
might be put. These in turn might depend upon further 
assumptions about the context, or upon the identity or role 
of the person making the request.
The description of human actions is similar to the 
description of physical objects, but is rather more complex.
The main source of this extra complexity is the fact that 
human actions are not simply in the world in the same way as 
physical objects are, but are, in an important sense,
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'constructed' out of human behaviour.
The distinction I wish to draw between human action
22and human behaviour is a relatively common one. It comes 
down to this: human actions (or 'acts': I shall use the
terms synonymously) are manifestations of the self-conscious­
ness and intentions of the agent; human behaviour, on the 
other hand, does not have these two elements and can be 
regarded as mere bodily movement. The description of 
behaviour is akin to the description of objects, whereas the 
consciousness inherent in human actions means that our 
descriptions of actions must go beyond mere behaviour.
In the same way as the description of a physical 
object gives us little more than the 'brute facts' about it, 
although not necessarily a_s (in the language of) brute facts, 
so too the description of behaviour gives us little more than 
the brute facts about bodily movements. Once again the rules 
and conventions for the use of terms within our language 
allow us to go beyond mere spatio-temporal movements if we 
want to, according to our purposes. Thus*we can say that a 
series of bodily movements, more or less complex, can be 
summed up by (or are good reasons for) saying 'He scratched 
his nose' or 'He tripped on the step'. As before, purpose, 
situation, and descriptive practices indicate the kinds of 
reply that are appropriate to a request for a description, 
or that are appropriate where we describe without being able 
to rely on a stated purpose as a discriminator
An action is more than mere behaviour. The same 
behaviour (bodily movements) may be part of different actions; 
the scratching of one's nose (behaviour) may be a means of 
relieving discomfort, or a signal to a bridge-partner (actions) 
- or it may not be an action at all, e.g. when it is done, as
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it were, unconsciously. To shake someone's hand may be to 
offer congratulations, to make an agreement, to welcome or 
to farewell someone, or to make someone's acquaintance.
What makes us count behaviour as (or as part of) an action 
is the attribution of intention to the agent in 'performing' 
that behaviour. It is the difference between an involuntary 
reflex and 'something that is deliberate and planned or for 
which motivating reasons can be given (as in the case of 
habitual actions), between someone's tugging his left ear as 
an involuntary response whenever he meets strangers, and his 
doing so because it is a code of recognition among patriots.
It follows from this that the agent's understanding of 
his behaviour must play an important (although not necessarily 
decisive) part in its description, for only he can tell us 
whether it is to count as an action or not and what his 
intentions were in any particular case. We may have good 
grounds for attributing certain intentions to an agent 
through observation of his behaviour, or through knowledge 
of his character, and so on. But any such description can 
only be tentative, albeit more or less firmly based, and it 
is open to refutation or corroboration by the agent concerned. 
This can be important in considering the justifiability of 
actions, as I shall show in Chapter Two.
In some cases, the same words may be used to indicate 
either an action or to report behaviour. 'Jones shot Smith' 
and 'Jones tugged his left ear' give us a picture of what 
happened, yet neither tells us whether Jones did so 
deliberately or not. We need to inquire further if this piece 
of information is important to our purposes (and, of course, 
tone of voice or context may give it to us without any further 
direct inquiry). Indeed, our purposes may be thwarted in a
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case if we cannot obtain enough information to allow us to 
distinguish between behaviour and action, for example in a 
legal or moral context. Again, our conventional practices 
in describing will assist us to decide in some cases; 
scratching their noses is commonly the sort of thing that 
people do involuntarily, but it can also be a deliberate 
action. On the other hand, stealing is not commonly done 
unintentionally and without deliberation, although it is 
possible for it to be so. Thus the practices and conventions 
of the use of language to describe establish presumptions 
about people’s behaviour according to which some behaviour 
will - in the absence of evidence to the contrary - count as 
actions and some will not. Similarly, some cases will require 
evidence to show that they are not examples of mere behaviour. 
Sometimes the results of these processes will determine which 
descriptive term or phrase we use, because there are both 
'action terms and phrases' and 'behaviour terms and phrases' 
available, for example 'steal' and 'take', 'jump' and 'fall' , 
'He swam past the boat' and 'He was swept past the boat'
(whereas 'He went past the boat' leaves the question open).
The rules of language and the practices of its use, 
which together govern the ways in which we describe actions, 
objects, events, situations, etc., arise out of our interests 
in wanting to be able to communicate about certain aspects of 
our lives. Among other things, they establish which evidence 
is to be taken as giving good reasons for the use of particular 
action terms. But in the case of actions, that evidence is not 
always confined to mere overt behaviour, for there are some 
cases where intention cannot be attributed on mere behavioural 
grounds, e.g. 'He thought about my offer', or 'He ignored me'. 
Again, too, rules of language establish the circumstances in
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which certain categories may be appropriately used - 'he
lied' instead of 'he deliberately told an untruth with the
intention of deceiving'; 'he was courageous' instead of 'he
deliberately put his own safety at considerable risk in
carrying out his duty'; 'she murdered him' instead of 'she
deliberately killed him, not in self-defence, nor in wartime
'he was uncharitable' instead of 'he refused to donate
money to help those less fortunate than himself when he could
afford to do so and had the opportunity.' It is not that the
second description is wrong or inadequate in these cases -
indeed, given the facts in each case, the second establishes
that the first can be used appropriately. To use the second
and to deny the use of the first without good reason based on
the public rules of language would be to violate those rules.
Moreover, to accept the second but to refuse to recognise that
the first is applicable on the grounds that it embodies a
moral judgement would also be to violate those rules. (It may
be the case, of course, that an agent would accept the second
but not the first on the grounds that there were other factors
that made the first inappropriate; in that case, the onus is
on him to show that the second is not a full description or is
otherwise inappropriate.) It is not the case that anyone who
says, on a particular occasion, 'she murdered him' must also,
on that occasion, go on to actually make a moral judgement about
her or her action. It is the case, however, that anyone who
does follow the rules of our language must agree that there is
2 3a moral judgement implicit in the description. One's 
purposes on a particular occasion will govern whether one 
actually makes moral judgements or not, but the rules of logic 
and language govern whether or not moral judgements are implicit 
in the language used on that occasion. In other words, the
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moral point of view and moral theories are incorporated
into some of the terms of our language that are used to
give us a picture of events, actions, states-of--affairs,
24etc. One does not need to be a moral person to recognise 
this; one need only be a language user. Nor does it follow 
that mere use of language is enough to make one a moral 
person, just as mere use of terms such as ’gravity* and 
'friction' does not make the user a participant in the 
scientific point of view.
I now want to bring together the theories and arguments 
of this and earlier sections of this Chapter in a more general 
consideration of the role of description in the moral 
evaluation of agents, conditions, etc. I have argued that 
the moral point of view reflects the minimal conditions for 
communal life itself through core principles and associated 
rules of application, translation, excuse and priority which 
may vary from one society to -another according to the traditions 
and circumstances of each. It is this last aspect of the 
argument that I wish to develop in the rest of this Section in 
the light of earlier points about the roles of purpose and 
practice in the description of actions,
A particular community has to interpret, build upon, and 
enforce core principles in order to sustain its own communal 
life. The ways it does so are likely to be extremely complex, 
and to vary in response to changing circumstances and conditions, 
both material and (in a broad sense) cultural. The results of 
this dynamic interaction permeate and influence the roles and 
development of many overlapping areas of social life - education, 
socialisation, morality, commerce, religion, language, the 
processes and ideologies of political and legal institutions, 
and so on. They also influence the ways in which the people
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in those societies interact with each other, some of the 
kinds of purposes they have, and some of the ways in which 
they seek to realise those purposes. In brief terms, that 
is, the need to sustain communal life leads to the instant­
iation of core principles in a society in ways that influence 
how people see their environments and how they respond to 
them. But the necessities and conditions of social life 
itself require that there be certain general practices and 
expectations concerning how the members of a particular 
society act; how some actions and types of action are to 
be viewed and responded to; the meanings of actions; what 
is to count as evidence for what; what needs justification 
and what does not; which descriptive terms are appropriate 
in certain kinds of situations according to which kinds of 
purposes; and so on. The application of these practices is 
not usually conscious; we do not usually have to reflect 
upon how we will interpret the world around us - although we 
may have to on some occasions, e.g. when there appears to be 
no readily applicable descriptive rule or practice, or when 
several inconsistent descriptive rules or practices appear 
to be applicable, or when it is appropriate to react to a 
description in a number of ways according to the possible 
purposes of the describer. A particular set of these rules 
and practices is 'presented' to us automatically, as it were, 
because we share in the life and practices of a community or 
a group through our socialisation within it.
The application of descriptive practices is, in principle, 
presumptive in that they represent social constructions of 
reality. These constructions are defeasible; they are open to 
modification by further evidence or through a re-ordering of 
initial impressions. In many cases, of course, experience
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allows us to be very confident concerning how we use the 
descriptive terms of our language; we can, for example, 
be extremely confident about the application of the term 
'table' to a wide range of objects, even while w7e recognise 
that there are borderline cases. Similarly, the social 
practices of our language allow us to be confident about the 
application of action-descriptive terms like 'voting', 
'promising', 'murdering', 'acting conscientiously', 'reading', 
'counting', etc., even though we recognise that the agent's 
own description is important for the description of his action, 
and even though we may have to modify our initial application 
of a particular action-description in the light of other 
aspects of the situation.
Action-descriptive terms are applied according to 
conventions that emerge from (and may influence) certain 
kinds of purposes, for it is purpose that selects and 
discriminates among the features of the world. Certain 
purposes, however, enter into a society's rules and practices 
for the application of some action-descriptions because they 
are taken to reflect the interests in certain aspects of the 
world of anyone in that society. Some action-descriptive terms 
are unique to a particular purpose or point of view; others 
are multi-purpose. The terms in this second group, that is, 
provide springboards for a number of purposes because they 
embody a particular slant on the action according to those 
points of view. But this does not mean that these terms must' 
be neutral according to each of these different points of 
view, for each is interested in the action referred to by the 
term for different reasons, according to different criteria, 
for a different purpose. And I have already argued that an 
action comes under moral notice because its description is
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related to a moral theory according to which actions under 
those descriptions are to be (presumptively) counted as 
right or wrong.
Any group of people with a communal life rather than 
mere proximate existence will have a moral theory, or perhaps 
several moral theories, built in to its various institutions, 
processes, ideologies, and practices, because it will 
implement core values in particular ways through particular 
rules of application, priority, translation, and excuse, 
and because these core values will be supplemented by the 
implementation of other values. There will also, of course, 
be other kinds of theories built in to these communal 
structures and practices, e.g. sociological, religious, 
psychological, etc. As a result, we can broadly characterise 
such a society in whole or in part according to the values 
of its dominant structures and processes, e.g. as individualist, 
capitalist, provincial, liberal, democratic, collectivist, 
secular, organic, theocratic, anarchic, humanitarian, 
traditional, authoritarian, monarchic, oligarchic, elitist, 
republican, constitutional, and so on. Of course, each of 
these terms admits of various degrees, and different (and 
perhaps inconsistent) classifications may be applicable to 
different areas of life within a particular society. But 
each of these descriptions serves to give us a 
picture of how the society works in whole or in part, and 
of the values, including moral values, to which it subscribes. 
To describe a society as liberal, for example, implies that 
it has certain kinds of institutions and that there are 
certain ways in which the members of that society are likely 
to view certain actions, regarding some as raising moral 
questions and others as not, and settling these questions in
56.
certain ways and not in others. In other words, to 
describe a society as liberal implies that a moral theory 
of a certain kind permeates social institutions and 
processes, and is also presumptively applied in the moral 
evaluation of actions. It allows us to mount certain 
kinds of challenges to the practices of that society and of 
individuals within it, for it allows us to raise questions 
concerning the consistency of value and practice. It implies 
a particular view of individuals and how they should be 
treated, of how we should respond to the actions of others 
around us.
The particular ways in which a liberal society 
implements its liberalism will depend, of course, on its 
history and circumstances. Nor does this view imply that any 
particular individual within the society does or must share 
the society's liberal values. All I am suggesting is that 
the description of a society as liberal implies certain 
practices, judgements, and expectations which themselves 
imply certain presumptions about the moral status of actions 
according to particular ways of describing those actions. It 
implies, that is, that there are certain conventions concerning 
the uses of some descriptive terms and the purposes for which 
they are used. These conventions establish logical relation­
ships in a weak sense, for they govern the ways particular 
terms are used - the relationships between terms, criteria, 
and practices that are part of the ways these terms are used 
in order to communicate. Thus the conventional relations 
between some descriptive terms and their implicit presumptive 
moral evaluations are matters of logic because they are part 
of the uses of those descriptive terms themselves.
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This is so for any language user, whether or not he is
a participant in the moral point of view and whether or not
he accepts all or part of the moral theory which permeates the
25practices of the community in which he lives. I have argued 
that any moral theory must take account of the core of morality 
as a reflection of the minimal conditions for social existence, 
and that the ways a particular community builds its institutions, 
processes and ideologies according to its own circumstances, 
culture and history, etc., will amount to a particular way of 
implementing the core. I have also suggested that a particular 
society's moral theory will be reflected in the logic and 
conventional uses of language concerning (among other things) 
the use of some descriptive terms and the relation between 
particular descriptive terms and moral evaluation.
It follows from the role of the core of morality within 
any moral theory that the moral theory of any person must take 
account of the moral theory of the community in which he lives 
in the sense that it must at least recognise the institutions 
and processes of his society as attempts t.o establish the 
minimal conditions of social life. Those attempts affect him 
as a participant in the life of that community because he is 
subject to these institutions and processes as he seeks to 
satisfy his wants, needs, purposes, and interests. He may 
morally applaud or abhor the ways his society tries to provide 
these conditions. But he cannot be morally neutral about them 
because of their fundamental role within the instantiation of 
the moral point of view itself in the community's moral theory, 
and because they set limits to the ways he can act. They 
therefore require examination from the perspective of his own 
moral theory if the reasoned nature of moral evaluation and 
moral conduct is to be maintained. Thus the moral theory of
58.
any moral person within a particular society has to contain 
principles and rules concerning the various principles and 
rules of that society's moral theory and the ways these are 
implemented in communal institutions and practices. He 
cannot be indifferent.
I want now to discuss briefly some examples of the 
relationships between description and evaluation with an eye 
to the discussion of civil disobedience that is to come in 
Part Two of this thesis. A more detailed examination of the 
arguments of some writers on civil disobedience in the light 
of the arguments presented in this chapter will be given in 
Chapter Four.
I have argued that there are certain paradigm cases of 
the description of actions which raise moral questions because 
they embody a presumption about the moral status of the action 
so described, viz. those related to core principles: 'A lied',
'A killed B' , 'A disobeyed the lav;' . But the moral theory of 
a liberal-democracy such as our own establishes further moral 
presumptions, both through an elaboration ‘and interpretation 
of the moral point of view and its core principles and also 
through moral values derived from this society's history and 
cultural traditons. Thus, for example, liberal-democratic 
values imply that acts of protest about public policy have a 
certain legitimacy within such a polity, so that to say 'A 
protested against lav; L' carries with it an implicit presumption 
about the moral status of A ’s action. Again, that judgement 
may be overridden by other features of the act and its 
circumstances, the way A went about his protest for example, 
but that does not undermine the initial presumption - assuming 
the statement is an accurate description of A's action. If A 
protested by disobeying the lav;, there are two implicit but
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contradictory judgements about the moral status of A's action 
so described. Which of these judgements overrides the other 
in the absence of further information about A's action will 
depend upon the terms of the particular moral theory according 
to which they are considered. But the facts of the two 
presumptions must be acknowledged by any participant in the 
moral point of view within that society, whether or not he 
shares the liberal-democratic values of that society, for they 
arise out of the core of morality itself (illegal actions) and 
out of the instantiation of that core in the values of liberal- 
democratic social structures and processes (protest), and these 
values must be taken into account by the moral theory of anyone 
subject to them.
Secondly, suppose it is said that 'A acted courageously’.
To use that description of A's action is to establish a moral 
presumption about it in the same way as in the previous 
example, for acting courageously is conventionally regarded as 
morally praiseworthy within our society, although not generally 
as an instance of a core moral value. The rules and 
conventions of our language, moreover, establish that 'A acted 
courageously' is properly - but defeasibly - used as a 
description of A's action when certain empirical conditions are 
met. The onus is on someone who does not agree with the 
presumption itself to show why an agent is not to be praised if, 
and insofar as, he acts courageously. It is not logically 
impossible that this might be done. But to do so would under­
mine many of the values, conventions, and practices of our 
society, to the extent that we would need a different kind of 
society were we to change accordingly. A person who acts 
courageously is therefore to be praised insofar as he acted 
courageously, although this judgement may again be overridden
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by other features of his act. Just which features will serve 
to override will depend on particular moral theories, but 
again there are certain conventions within our society 
concerning what will do so, e.g. that A acted out of base 
motives, or that his courage was part of the act of bank 
robbery, and so on. In itself, that is, courage is to be 
commended, although the goals, aims, or methods of courageous 
acts may serve to override that commendation. Similar points 
may be made concerning the moral presumptions implicit in the 
descriptions of actions as, say, loyal, selfish, mean-spirited, 
cruel, considerate, and so on.
The onus, then, is on someone who does not share the 
moral judgement implicit in the use of a particular action- 
description to show either that it is undermined because the 
descriptive term itself is incorrectly used, or that it is 
overridden within his own moral theory. Unless it is under­
mined, however, the presumption stands. But it is the rules, 
conventions, and practices of language, and the instantiation 
of the moral point of view within the moral theory and 
communal practice of the community that place that onus on the 
moral person.
6. Conclusion
I have argued that there are moral principles that are 
objective in the sense that they must be included in any moral 
theory. These core moral principles are concerned with the 
minimal conditions of social life itself (as contrasted with 
mere social existence); they cover the areas I have called 
truth, life, and duty. Particular moral theories, however, may 
interpret and build upon these principles in various ways 
through different rules of application, priority, translation,
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and excuse. These rules are part of both core and non-core 
moral principles.
I have also argued that moral presumptions are implied 
when actions are described in ways consonant with the moral 
theory that permeates a society's institutions and processes. 
These moral presumptions are part of the logic of these terms; 
they must be acknowledged by any user of that language, whether 
or not he is a participant in the moral point of view and 
whether or not he agrees with them in general or in a particular 
case. The onus is on the moral dissenter to undermine or 
override such a presumption; he cannot ignore it and remain 
within the moral point of view.
My views about the nature of morality thus differ from 
both the formalist's and from the descriptivist's. Unlike the 
former, I wish to argue that formal criteria cannot serve as 
a complete characterisation of moral principles, for these 
criteria cannot account for core principles. I do, however, 
use formal criteria as ways of identifying non-core principles, 
except that some of these criteria concern the relationships 
of non-core principles to core principles (see Section 4, 
pp. 39 - 41). My disagreement with the descriptivists is
parallel: their views seem to account for core principles
but not for non-core principles, and hence they do not allow 
the scope for moral principles that seems required in the face 
of considerable moral diversity.
I have also argued that a strict separation between 
description and moral evaluation is untenable; some facts 
are moral values, although the moral judgement, is presumptive 
rather than conclusive. This last qualification is vital, for 
a good deal of the confusion in this area has come about 
because of the failure to distinguish clearly between the
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presumptive and conclusive uses of 'ought'. Moreover, that 
moral judgements are implicit in some descriptive terms does 
not mean that whoever uses those terms must be making a moral 
judgement in doing so; the implicit judgement is, as it were, 
available to be taken up by moral persons and used in moral 
debate. This is important in the process of moral argument 
because it serves to assign the moral onus, and it sets some 
of the grounds and limits of debate about the moral justifia­
bility of actions. I shall take up these matters in the next 
Chapter.
CHAPTER TWO
The Moral Justification of Actions
1. Introduction: the limits of justification
The process of justifying actions must, on any account, 
be absolutely central to morality as an activity concerned 
with the evaluation of actions (among other things) from 
within the moral point of view. Justification is a sub­
category of evaluation, and hence the logic of justification 
deserves analysis as an important part of the programme of 
moral philosophy.
The study of practical reason has, of course, been part 
of moral philosophy since Aristotle. Yet there are few 
systematic accounts of what might be called 'the logic of the 
moral justification of actions'. Moral philosophers concerned 
with justification have concentrated almost exclusively on 
the cognitive status of moral principles and moral statements, 
to the extent that there seems to be something of a consensus 
that an action will be morally justified if and only if it 
can be subsumed under a justified statement or principle.
This account needs to be revised because it obscures a number 
of important differences between justifying moral principles 
and statements on the one hand, and justifying actions on the 
other, differences that must be made clear if we are to be 
sure about what counts as a justification of an action, and 
if we are to be aware of the ways in which an action may be, 
or may fail to be, morally justified.
Part of my task in this Chapter will be to examine this 
orthodoxy about the justification of actions within the moral 
point of view. While I willingly concede chat the cognitive 
status of moral principles and statements must be an important
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concern of moral philosophy, I also hold that the standard 
analysis of the moral justification of actions does not pay 
sufficient attention to the ways in which the moral justi­
fiability of an action may be called into question, or to the 
strategies for arguing about moral justifiability. I do not 
suggest that the orthodox account is wrong in all respects, 
merely that it needs revision in order to deal with these 
matters.
Before I begin an inquiry into the ways in which actions 
can be morally justified, however, it is necessary to be clear 
about what we can legitimately expect to accomplish in such an 
enterprise. It is not my purpose to try to arrive at a set of 
rules that can be mechanically applied in order to test whether 
a given action is or is not morally justified, for I do not 
believe that it is possible to arrive at such a set of rules 
that is more than merely indicative of the general form of 
justification. Aristotle's well-known remarks in Book I, 
Chapter 3 and Book II, Chapter 2 of the Nicomachean Ethics 
about the degree of precision to be sought.in an enterprise 
depending on the kind of enterprise that it is, must always 
be kept before us - not because they provide an excuse for a 
less than rigorous approach, but because they remind us that 
the degree of rigour that is appropriate is inherent in the 
enterprise itself.
Requests for a justification of something (X) can be made 
from within a number of different points of view, e.g. legal, 
religious, political, economic, moral. Which point of view is 
appropriately applied to any particular X on a particular 
occasion will depend, to a large extent, on what X is, e.g. an 
action, an event, a condition. Which point of view actually 
is applied will depend on the purposes of the persons involved 
:m the consideration of X. I suggested in Chapter One, Section
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1 (pp. 2 - 3 ) / that each point of view embodies particular 
notions about the types of phenomena to which it is applicable, 
the purposes for which it is applied, the methods through 
which it is applied, and the criteria of success in achieving 
those purposes. I further argued that evaluation from within 
the moral point of view must be carried on through reasoned 
discussion, with all that implies in terms of concern for 
evidence, reasons, and impartiality.
Requests for a justification of some X are only appropriate
where that X is the kind of thing over which agents have, or
1 *could be expected to have, some control. It is simply not 
appropriate to ask for justifications of 'natural* events, 
processes, or conditions, such as earthquakes, mountains and 
scarlet fever. Justification is inextricably tied to the 
things that people do, or fail to do, with some element of 
responsibility or voluntarism. I may be able to explain an 
earthquake or a sunset, but that does not justify i.t because 
the question simply does not make sense. It could do so only 
if earthquake or sunsets could be consciously caused by the 
actions of men (or perhaps by God). Similarly, I may be able 
to prove that the sum of the internal angles of a triangle is 
180 degrees, but that does not amount to a justification of 
that proposition, although it may justify my asserting it.
The domain of justification is the things people do or fail 
to do; its moral range is limited by the standard moral 
exceptions, the conditions that indicate that questions of 
praise and blame simply do not arise because of the absence 
of the circumstances that make it appropriate to ask for a 
justification. Actions can be justified or unjustified; 
statements, principles, theorems, etc., can only be demonstrated
* Notes to this Chapter are on pp. 32 8 - 332 .
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or proved, not justified or unjustified. To regard them as 
capable of justification is to speak metaphorically, not 
literally.~
The mere request for a justification of an action X is, 
however, ambiguous, for discourse about the moral justification 
of actions can take place on three levels: (i) one might be
concerned with the moral justifiability of an agent A's doing 
action X in circumstances x^, x. t ..., x^; (ii) one might be
concerned with the moral justifiability of action X in circum­
stances x^, x^/ . .., x^; and (iii) one might wish to examine
the moral justifiability of the practice of X 'ing. I shall 
call these 'agent-justification', 'action-justification', and
'practice-justification' respectively. Which of these is 
appropriate in any particular situation will depend on the 
kind of thing X is; which is actually sought will depend on 
the purposes of those involved.
Agent-justificati.on is concerned with whether a particular 
agent was (or would be) morally justified in doing the action 
in question in the circumstances which did (or might) occur.
The basis of judgements about justification at this level is 
therefore the agent’s own moral theory considered in the light 
of the circumstances in which he acted. An action can thus be 
morally justified at this level, even though it was morally 
wrong according to the agent's own moral theory. Consider the 
case where an agent does X after careful reflection on the 
status of X according to his moral theory, and suppose that 
he concludes that he ought to do X. His action X is morally 
justified. But suppose he reconsiders the matter after acting, 
and concludes that this action was, in fact, morally wrong, 
e.g. on the basis of new information or circumstances he had 
taken into account but to which he had not attached much weight,
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a decision he nov/ concludes was wrong and which alters the 
moral status of his action. The fact that X was morally 
wrong does not alter the fact, that he was justified in doing 
it. An action's being morally right cannot be a necessary 
or a sufficient condition for anyone's being morally justified 
in doing it. A similar argument shows that an action may be 
morally right, yet an agent be morally unjustified in doing it.
Action-justification is concerned with whether a particular 
action was (or would be) justified in particular circumstances, 
with particular results. The question is not now whether a 
particular agent would be justified in doing it but whether 
there are any good reasons for or against the action in those 
circumstances, and how such reasons are related to each other. 
Again, an action may be right or wrong considered i.n itself, 
yet this moral status may not determine its justifiability; 
a wrong action may be justified (e.g. because it is the lesser 
of two evils, where both are wrong yet one is justified), and 
a right action may be unjustified (e.g. because it is not 'as 
right' as an alternative action according to appropriate rules 
of priority). Only if 'right/wrong action' is analysed as 
'conclusively, the right/wrong thing to do, all things 
considered' does rightness/wrongness determine justifiability, 
and that way of analysing them only captures a part of their 
moral usage.
Practice-justification is concerned with the moral status 
of types of actions, abstracted from particular circumstances 
and particular agents. Here the search is for reasons that are 
always relevant to whether or not X'ing is right or wrong, i.e. 
reasons concerning the practice of X'ing. It is the most 
general level of justificatory discourse about actions. Thus, 
for example, instead of looking at whether A was justified in
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keeping his promise to B in those particular circumstances 
(agent-justification) or at whether that promise ought to 
have been kept in those circumstances (action-justification), 
we look at the moral justifiability of promise-keeping itself, 
at the practice of keeping promises. This is what we do when 
we debate the moral status of such practices as punishment, 
war, abortion, tyrannicide, revolution, lying, terrorism, 
charity, civil disobedience, drunken driving, smoking in the 
presence of non-smokers, and so on.
I do not wish to suggest that these levels of justificatory
discourse are always neatly distinguishable in particular cases
of moral debate, for a particular accusation against some X
can sometimes straddle the different levels, and the success of
a charge at, say, the action-level, may entail its success at
3the agent-level. But it is important to distinguish the 
three levels, for the level at which a charge is made will 
determine the level at which it must be met, and hence influence 
the appropriate response strategy. I shall discuss this in 
more detail in Section 5; its particular application to 
arguments about the moral justifiability of civil disobedience 
will be examined in Chapter Five.
2, The general form of justification
My aim in this Section is to outline the general ’form' 
of justification applicable across different points of view.
The next Section will consider the ways in which this scheme 
is applied within the moral point of view and the ways in 
which that point of view provides some of the criteria and 
standards of moral justification.
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Charges are central to justification. The question of
the justifiability of some X within a particular point of view
only arises when the status of X within that point of view is,
or can be, challenged through a relevant and serious charge
against X. To justify X within a point of view is to meet these
challenges from within that point of view. Clearly, then, a
particular charge against X will have an important role in
setting the grounds of the debate about the justifiability of X.
The importance of charges in the process of justification
is acknowledged by many writers on the topic. The earliest
attempt at a relatively formal model of the logic of justification
4was by A.G.N. Flew in 1954. He stresses the ’multiply
relational' character of justification:
A justification has to be of A, rather than 
B, against C, and to or by reference to D, 
where A is the thing justified, B the possible 
alternative(s), C the charge(s) against A, and 
D the person(s) and[/]or principle(s) to whom 
and/or by reference to which the justification 
is made.
Flew goes on to make several points in relation to this 
model:
(1) each of the variables, A, B, C, and D may have more than 
one value within a single context;
(2) the variables do not all have to be explicitly given 
definite values in a particular case. Indeed, 'in most 
cases of justification the values of some of the variables 
are given only implicitly by the context, and perhaps 
rather indefinitely too'.
(3) to say 'there is no alternative to A' is always itself 
either a sufficient justification of A or is grounds for 
saying that the question of justification of A does not 
in fact arise.
(4) the reference point D 'has the same rather indefinite
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value implicit in most actual contexts: the value
'"(whom I consider) reasonable people, and what 
(fundamentally) they agree on".'
Flew's model is useful because it emphasises a number of 
important points about the logic of justification that are 
often overlooked. In the first place, it makes it clear that 
to ask for the justification of something is to suggest that 
the other variables can each only take one value, i.e. that 
there is only one alternative, one charge, and one reference 
point against which to judge. While there may be circumstances 
where this is the case, these are likely to be the exceptions 
rather than the rule.
Secondly, the model also allows us to emphasise that there 
may be different contexts in which a justification of some X 
may be attempted, depending on the kind of D that is used, and 
these kinds of D cannot be assumed to coincide or even to overlap. 
Knowing the kind of justification that is being sought is import­
ant in helping us know how to respond to a charge. We may think 
that the moral justification of an X is the most important to 
be attempted, but moral charges do not always arise - e.g. 
because there is no disagreement about the moral status of an 
action - and they need not be the most important on any particular 
occasion. Other types of charges may well arise, and they demand 
satisfaction in terms of other 'person(s) and/or principle(s)'.
A legal charge against an action invites a response in terms of 
legal principles etc., not in terms of economic or aesthetic 
principles, although someone may well hold that the latter over­
ride the legal ones, either in general or on that particular 
occasion. Moral justification of an X may either not be required 
or have been settled one way or the other, and we may still be 
able to formulate a charge from a different point of view without 
re-opening the question of the moral justification of X.
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Flew's account also emphasises that the question of the 
justification of an X only arises when we are faced with a 
charge against X. His analysis of the role of charges is, 
however, rather slight. It is developed by John Patterson in 
a more recent Note:
If the person who asks for the justification 
is unable to say at least what might be wrong 
with [the action] then his request for a just­
ification is not in order .... In the case 
where no one has asked for a justification, 
those to whom it was given would not even 
regard it as a justification unless it were 
clear that the person giving the justification 
had some charge in mind: that he was anticipating
some charge which could well be laid.5
Patterson suggests that we may justify some X against a 
given charge in two ways: the charge may be refuted, e.g. by
showing that it is based on factual inaccuracy; or it may be 
overridden by admitting the charge but claiming, for example, 
that doing X will have consequences that are beneficial 
according to a 'higher' principle. Patterson calls these 
'type (a) justifications' and 'type (b) justifications'g
respectively; I shall continue to use 'undermining' and
'overriding'. Patterson continues:
The moral importance of this is that to give 
a justification of something need not be to 
show that all is well with it morally, even 
where the charge is a moral one and the 
justification is of type (a). All that a 
justification must show is that one particular 
charge has not been sustained or has been over­
ridden. 7
While this conclusion is consistent with the Flew model, 
it also points to a difficulty with it, for to speak of a 
justification in this sense is far too weak. This is so for 
three reasons. First, a charge must be relevant to the action 
in the sense that it might count as a reason for not doing it. 
The onus is on the objector to show this. The point of view 
within which the charge is made will obviously influence the
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kinds of charges that can be relevant.
Secondly, the charge must be serious. This too will be 
a function of the point of view within which it is made and 
of the principles and standards that are invoked against the 
action. If showing that a charge against an action is 
relevant is to show that it might count as a reason for not 
doing it, to show that a charge is serious is to show that 
it might be a good reason for not doing the action. Showing 
that all the charges against an action are trivial thereforegbecomes a way of justifying it.
Thirdly, it does not seem enough to say that undermining 
or overriding one particular charge is enough to justify the 
action against which it was (or could be) made. That some 
charges within a point of view can be more serious than others 
means that meeting one particular charge may still leave other 
more serious ones to be laid. That a charge can be undermined 
by showing that it is based on factual inaccuracy does not 
itself mean that the action in question must be justified, for 
there could still be other more serious charges against the 
action that must be met.
Two further points may be made arising out of the Flew/ 
Patterson model. First, there may be a relevant and serious 
charge against an action without anyone's actually making it.
I argued in Chapter One, Section 5 (pp. 50 ~ 60) that some terms 
used to describe actions embody presumptions about the moral 
status of the actions they describe. To use such a term 
embodying a negative presumption is therefore to make a charge 
against the action for any language user who is also a participant 
in the moral point of view. Similarly, a charge against an 
action may be obvious because of the nature of the action, the 
circumstances in which it was done, or its consequences. It
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does not need anyone to point this out for there to be a 
charge that requires answering.
Secondly, there does seem to be an important difference 
between undermining and overriding charges that is sufficient 
to make us wonder whether the former is a genuine mode of 
justification: would undermining all the moral charges that
are or could be made against an action allow us to say that the 
action is therefore morally justified in the same way as over­
riding all such charges would? I am inclined to think not; 
undermining charges in this way shows that there is no reason 
to think the action unjustified, and so the question of 
justification does not really arise. There is a difference 
between ’being shown to be justified’ and ’not. being shown to 
be unjustified'. The former is clearly applicable where 
charges against an action have been overridden; the latter is 
appropriate where it has yet to be shown that there is a good 
reason against the action that requires overriding. This is 
not to say, of course, that undermining charges is not an 
important strategy in moral debate; I shall consider some of 
the ways particular types of charges might be undermined in 
Section 5 of this Chapter.
There are many similarities between Carl Wellman's account 
9of justification and the Flew/Patterson model, although each 
side seems to have arrived at its conclusions independently - 
Wellman does not seem to be aware of the Flew article, and 
Patterson does not mention Wellman’s book.
Wellman concentrates on the justification of ethical 
statements, although he does claim that his analysis also 
accounts for the process of justifying actions. (I shall 
examine this claim in Section 4.) Like Flew, Wellman includes 
the idea of an alternative (p. 177) and he anticipates 
Patterson by allowing refutation as one way of meeting challenges
74.
to a statement (p. 130), although it does not follow for 
Wellman that the statement is thereby justified. He also 
overcomes the difficulty with the Flew/Patterson model noted 
above by saying that a challenge to a statement must claim 
to be 'upsetting’ to the claim to rationality implicit in the 
statement (p. 123), and clearly only a relevant and serious 
charge can make this claim.
Again, the key notion in Wellman's account is that of
the challenge, corresponding to the charge in the Flew/
Patterson model. The whole process of justifying, says Wellman,
is one of meeting challenges with responses:
Justifying a statement, belief, attitude, 
emotion, or action is meeting challenges 
to it. To meet a challenge is to give an 
adequate response which is accepted, had, 
or understood by the challenger. An 
adequate response is one that after 
indefinite criticism would cause anyone. 
who thinks in the normal way and accepts, 
has, or understands both challenge and 
response to withdraw or withhold the 
challenge; the adequacy of a response is 
an impersonal status to be determined by 
the ideal outcome of criticism, (p. 128)
Wellman, moreover, avoids some of the counter-intuitive 
results of the Flew/Patterson model, according to which under­
mining a single charge constitutes a justification, by 
distinguishing between the verbal and adjectival uses of 
'justified' (pp. 130-133). In its verbal form, says Wellman, 
it is to be understood as 'has been justified by this person 
on this occasion'. In its adjectival form, to say that some­
thing 'is justified’ is to claim that all possible genuine 
challenges have been met. Wellman does, however, allow the 
use of 'is justified' to refer to a particular action provided 
that it is understood that this does not claim finality, only 
that the action 'has been justified' on at least one occasion 
and has not been shown to be unjustified, and provided that the
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claim that the action 'is justified' is taken as tentative 
and subject to further challenges.
But it is in his account of the process of responding to 
challenges that Wellman differs most from the Flew/Patterson 
model. The latter seem, although implicitly, to regard the 
process of relating the thing to be justified to the 'person(s) 
and[/]or principle(s) to whom and/or by reference to which the 
justification is made' as one of deduction. In other words, 
in that model of justification the task is to show how A can be 
deduced from D, the basic principles held by those considered 
to be reasonable people.
Wellman’s thesis, however, is that deduction is not the
only kind of valid argument in ethics. In particular, he
claims that there are at least two other kinds of valid argument,
neither of which can be reduced to deduction. The first is
induction, by which Wellman means:
a sort of reasoning by which a hypothesis is 
confirmed or disconfirmed by establishing 
the truth or falsity of its implications.
To show that the consequences of some hypoth­
esis are true is to provide evidence for its 
acceptance, (p. 32)
In Wellman's view, the reasoning whereby thought 
experiments are used to establish or refute ethical hypotheses 
is logically distinct from both deduction and induction. He 
calls this third type of valid ethical reasoning ’conduction' 
and says that it
can best be defined as that sort of reasoning 
in which 1) a conclusion about some individual 
case 2) is drawn nonconclusively 3) from one or 
more premises about the same case 4) without 
any appeal to other cases, (p. 52)
Examples of conductive reasoning are 'Martin Luther King is a
fine man because, in spite of occasional arrogance, he is an
unselfish and courageous worker for his fellowman' (p. 52);
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'bees have a language because they can communicate information 
about the location of flowers to one another' (p. 54); 'you 
ought to help him for he has been very kind to you' (p. 55);
'this is not a good book because it fails to hold one's 
interest, is full of vague description, and has a very 
implausible plot' (p. 56). Wellman argues that conductive 
reasoning is not just applied deduction because conduction is 
always inconclusive:
it is always possible for the conclusion to be 
false even though the premises are true and the 
inference valid .,..[E]ven a perfect fit of 
premises to individual cases is no guarantee of 
the truth of the conclusion because additional 
information may be uncovered to outweigh the 
given premises, (pp. 52-53)
Wellman also claims that his model of the process of 
justification avoids the problems of the infinite regress of 
reasons. In his view, there is no need to search for indubi­
table premises on which to base reasoning, since a claim that 
a statement is or is not justified must be understood as 
tentative and not as a claim to final truth (pp. 130-133) . 
Moreover, he argues at length that it is not necessary that 
the premises used in reasoning about the justifiability of a 
statement be shown to be true in order for the reasoning 
process to count as one of justification. Instead 'as long as 
the first premises are actually accepted by the parties 
concerned, they constitute reasons that justify the conclusion 
in question' (p. 157).
In Part Two of his book, Wellman distinguishes and 
discusses 'seven dimensions of justification in ethics, seven 
fundamentally distinct sorts of challenge that need to be met 
to justify any ethical statement' (p. xii) . Challenges to 
statements threaten the claim to truth implicit in any statement, 
a form of the claim to rationality that calls for a response 
whenever it is challenged (pp. 118-119). Challenges to state-
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merits can be to:
(i) the statement's claim to truth. 'To claim that a 
statement is true is to claim that the reasons that could 
be given for it outweigh whatever reasons could be given 
against it; the claim to truth is the critical claim that 
an indefinite amount of reasoning would support that for 
which the claim is made' (p. 176). This challenge can be 
made and met on two levels, either against an individual 
ethical statement, or against all ethical statements (the 
'wholesale challenge' ; p. 179) . Truth challenges are met by 
giving 'reasons for the original statement. The arguments 
advanced to defend the statement might be deductive, inductive, 
or conductive, depending on the statement being defended...'
(p. 178) .
(ii) the statement's claim to have truth-value, i.e. that 
'it may not be a statement at all because it may be neither 
true or false' (p. 185). Again, the challenge can be made 
'wholesale or retail' (p. 194).
(iii) the statement's claim to be meaningful, i.e. 'to suggest 
that it has no meaning at all, that it is not even a significant 
part of language' (p. 205). Here, however, wholesale 
challenges do not seem to occur, although retail challenges
do (p. 213).
(iv) the claim to validity implicit in any argument given in 
response to a challenge to a statement. While wholesale 
challenges are inappropriate, certain types of arguments can 
be challenged, e.g. on the basis of the 'naturalistic fallacy' 
(pp. 218-224).
(v) a proffered argument's very status as an argument, where 
‘what purports to be or is taken to be reasoning is not 
reasoning but something else like persuading or rationalisation'
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(p. 233). Again, validity-value challenges can be wholesale 
or, albeit less commonly, retail (p. 235).
(vi) the competence of a speaker to assert a statement or 
an argument. Wellman holds that a competence challenge does 
not always have to be met, for the onus is on the challenger
to show how lack of competence affects the truth of a statement
or the validity of an argument (p. 247). Wellman thinks this
can be done in three ways:
The incompetence of the speaker is indirect 
evidence of the falsity of his statements 
because incompetent speakers are less likely 
to speak the truth than other speakers.
Although an incompetent speaker can claim 
truth for his statement, he is not in a 
position to defend his claim. And the 
opinion of an incompetent speaker cannot 
represent itself as the verdict of the 
process of criticism, (p. 250)
Wellman holds that there is no universal standard of 
competence as an ethical judge, for what is to count as 
competence can vary with issues or different types of issues.
He does, however, provide an outline of the kinds of 
standards that are relevant: correctness of past judgements
in similar cases; having all the relevant information, and 
recognising its relevance; being reasonable, being willing 
and even inclined to reason; being undrunk; being undrugged; 
being unmystical (pp. 257-262).
(vii) the very 'knowability! of the statement, with the claim 
that we can never know whether it is true or not. A knowa­
bility challenge is a challenge to the competence of the 
speaker, whoever he may happen to be, and therefore undermines 
his claim to speak the truth (o. 265). The knowability 
challenge is 1 a ... general one, one that implies that no 
possible speaker, at least no human speaker, is or can become 
competent on the matter at hand' (p. 266).
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I have already suggested that an account of justification 
based on challenges against statements overlooks important 
distinctions between the justification (i.e. proof) of 
statements and the justification of actions, and I will 
elaborate on this aspect of Wellman's position in Section 4 of 
this Chapter. In particular, I shall argue (i) that there are 
some types of charges against an action that cannot be made 
against statements; and (ii) that Wellman's account ignores 
the differences between justifying an action X as that of an 
agent A, as an action in itself, and as a practice.
Wellman holds that a statement is justified when it can
be supported with a 'valid' argument, i.e. when the argument
is 'subjected to an indefinite amount of criticism, the
considerations offered are persuasive for everyone who thinks
in the normal way' (p. 101; putting it this way, of course,
allows the possibility of competence challenges). Wellman
understands a 'way of thinking' as
something ... like a tendency to be persuaded 
by some sorts of arguments and not by other 
sorts. The notion here is that what persuades 
one depends upon the nature of his mind and 
that underlying the many variations in one's 
mental state or condition is a relatively stable 
individual mentality. Now the claim to objective 
validity presupposes that there is something 
like a normal way for the human mind to work.
This normality is not identical with the 
consensus of present agreement or the present 
persuasive force of various arguments but by 
[sic] a uniformity of persuasiveness that is 
usually there in the thinking of most men on any 
given sort of argument, (pp. 96-97) .
Wellman's idea of normality is rather unclear and somewhat 
problematic. He seems to regard the human mind as structured 
in such a way that it is generally persuaded by certain kinds 
of argument and not by other kinds. This persuasiveness is 
somehow independent of the content of these arguments and is 
related to theii: structures. And presumably Wellman would
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count deduction, induction, and conduction as parts of this 
set of arguments. Nevertheless, it is hard to know whether 
Wellman regards this normality shared by most men as an 
established fact or as an assumption for the purposes of 
his argument, open to modification in the light of further 
empirical discoveries. If he accepts the former, then he 
should have given the evidence on which it is based. If he 
regards the matter as still tentative or as an assumption, 
then he ought to modify his claim that 'objective validity1 
can be attained in the justification of statements (pp. 108- 
109) . He seems to regard normality as some kind of statistical 
regularity (and the statistically abnormal would comprise 
more than those to whom we would deny competence), yet he 
fails to justify using the particular criteria he chooses.
There is one other important aspect of the logic of 
justification that has been implicit in the discussion so far 
and that needs to be brought out into the open, viz. the 
question of the onus of justification. The fact that a moral 
justification of X is given in response to a charge against 
X that invokes moral principles and standards means that the 
onus is on those who would object to X to say why they do so. 
But this is only a procedural question; the absence of any 
actual moral charges against X does not mean that X is to be 
taken as morally justified or as morally unexceptionable. That 
would be the case only if either there could be no possible 
charges against X from within the moral point of view, or if 
all charges which could be made would be either undermined or 
overridden. The first possibility is unlikely - indeed, it 
is then possible to argue that the question of the justifia­
bility of X simply does not arise, that X is neither justified 
nor unjustified. Flew comes close to this position.^
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Wellman suggests that the second possibility is a counsel 
of perfection, since we can never be sure that all possible 
charges have been made or would be met, and he therefore 
suggests that we use 'is justified' to make a tentative claim 
rather than a final one (pp. 130-133). But this is too 
restrictive, for there are occasions where we can be sure that 
all possible challenges have been, or could be, met and that 
we can therefore claim that X is justified in a final sense, 
viz. in a case of agent-justification.
3. Justification and the moral point- of view
In Chapter One, Section 2 (p. 8) I argued that one 
of the central concerns of the moral point of view is the 
evaluation of agents on account of their actions, and the 
evaluation of actions themselves as right or wrong, good or 
bad. This does not, of course, exhaust the scope of moral 
evaluation, for we also morally evaluate agents on account 
of their characters and their dispositions to act, and we 
evaluate conditions and states of affairs from within the 
moral point of view.
Moral justification of actions (including failures to act) 
and agents is, in turn, an essential part, but only a part, of 
the general activity of moral evaluation. The key to the 
difference is the role of the charge: moral justification
of an X consists in responding to charges that X does not 
measure up to some moral standard that is appropriately applied 
to X.^  Moral justification of X is thus a vindication of X in 
terms of certain moral standards that X is required to satisfy. 
Hence the possibility that a charge may be irrelevant or 
trivial. In general, however, the evaluation of some X from 
within the moral point of view need not be in response to a
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charge against X formulated from within that point of view.
All moral justifications are moral evaluations, but not all 
moral evaluations are moral justifications.
It follows that moral justification is an activity that 
must be recognised by any moral person, even if only because 
of the mere possibility of action contrary to the core 
principles that must be part of his moral theory. He must, 
that is, recognise moral justification as a formal activity, 
involving charges and various strategies for responding to 
them at various levels of justificatory discourse, etc. He 
must also acknowledge that certain descriptions embody 
presumptions about the moral status of the actions, etc., they 
describe that amount to charges against them, whether these 
charges are made explicitly or not.
But the practice of moral justification will be much 
wider than this within a particular society, for there will
also be general practices and expectations about moral
♦
justification, particularly about what needs justification 
and what does not as a result of the application of certain 
descriptive terms to certain types of situations. In other 
words, the mere use of some descriptive terms will be 
conventionally taken as embodying a moral charge against that 
which is described, whether that charge is made explicitly or 
not. Some of these charges will have to be recognised by any 
language user, and hence by any participant in the moral point 
of view that uses that language; others will be more specific 
to particular groups within a society and be built in to the 
ways they use language. Such charges may be easily undermined 
or overridden, but they must be acknowledged as charges that 
arise out of the ways of society's conventional morality 
becomes embedded in its language and moral practice.
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In a more general sense, the nature of moral evaluation 
as an activity involving reasoned discourse implies that 
there are certain more or less formal standards concerned with 
justification within the moral point of view. These standards 
allow us to say (a) whether or not some statement C is a 
charge against X according to some moral principle P applicable 
to X; (b) if C is a moral charge against X, whether or not it 
is relevant and serious and thus deserves a response R; (c) 
whether R is or is not an adequate response to C, i.e. whether 
it meets C in one of the ways in which that type of charge 
against that type of X can be met (including whether P overrides 
the other moral principles applicable to X); and hence (d) 
whether C shows that X is morally unjustified. These standards, 
in other words, allow us to keep some sort of formal check on 
justificatory reasoning. They are there to remind us that not 
just any accusation against an X must be considered to be a 
moral charge against X, and that not just any reply to a charge 
is to be considered to be a response to that charge. They also 
remind us that justificatory reasoning requires adherence to the 
standards of reasoned discourse on the part of the participants.
4. The proof of ethical statements and the moral justification 
of actions
At the very end of his book on justification in ethics,
We1lman write s:
I willingly concede that it is the justification 
of actions that is central to ethics, but it does 
not follow that the justification of ethical state- 
ments is a mere preliminary to this because the 
problem of choice arid the answers to it can be put 
into words, into the critical, language we 
ordinarily use for discussing such issues. The 
problem of choice is the problem of what to do and 
not simply what to say, but one can pose this 
problem of doing by saying "what ought I to do?"
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The practical solution to a problem of choice 
is an action and not a mere statement. Still, 
if the action calls for justification, this is 
because it makes an implicit .claim to ration­
ality, which can be formulated "I ought to do 
that act", an ethical statement. To be sure, 
justifying this ethical statement is not the 
same as justifying that action, but there is no 
more to justifying the action. In fact, there 
is less; for the statement is open to challenges, 
like the truth-value challenge, to which the 
action is immune. Since the statement puts into 
words the claim to rationality implicit in the 
action, there is no way of challenging this 
claim of the action that would not also be a 
challenge to the statement. Therefore, the 
justification of the statement contains within 
itself everything that would be contained in the 
justification of the action and more. For this 
reason my discussion of the justification of 
ethical statements is no mere preliminary to the 
justification of actions.... Since actions are 
persuadable, since one's choice is modified by 
discussion and thinking, actions make an implicit 
claim to rationality. This claim can be 
challenged and such challenges met just as state­
ments can be challenged and these challenges met. 
Therefore, on my theory actions can be justified 
in precisely the same sense and in much the same 
way that statements can be justified.12
Wellman, then, wants to claim two things: (i) that the
challenge-response model of justification is applicable to the 
moral justification of actions as well as to the 'justification' 
(i.e. proof) of ethical statements; and (ii) that the moral 
justifiability of my action X follows from the truth of the 
ethical statement 'I ought to do X.'
The first of these claims is unexceptionable; the second, 
however, is far from self-evident. Wellman provides no 
satisfactory argument for this position, yet it is clearly 
important to know whether it is true or not, given (what 
Wellman himself acknowledges) the central position within 
ethics of the moral justification of actions.
In the first place, Wellman seems to assume that all 
actions make an implicit claim to rationality, i.e. to (moral) 
rightness. This seems false; actions do not claim anything, 
either explicitly or implicitly, and hence do not claim
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rationality. What Wellman should have said is that moral 
rightness is a standard that is appropriately applied to the 
class of actions, and therefore provides a basis for 
challenges to particular actions and types of actions. Just 
which actions can be challenged will depend on the rules of 
application of moral principles, both core and non-core, and 
these must be specific and refer to particular actions or 
types of actions.
Secondly, Wellman apparently holds that actions are 
morally justified if and only if they are morally right.
Since he analyses 'morally right' in terms of the truth of 
the corresponding ethical statement, and since for him state­
ments are true 'all things considered', he is analysing 'right 
action' as 'conclusively right thing to do, all things 
considered'. (I suggested in Section 1 of this Chapter that 
this does not capture the ways 'right' and 'wrong' are used 
in the context of actions.) But this account of truth as a 
status awarded 'all things considered' is somewhat at odds 
with his position concerning the process of justification as 
one of responding to challenges and, indeed, is inconsistent 
with common usage. Suppose I acknowledge that I ought to do 
X, but hold that doing X is overridden in this case and that 
I ought to do Y, all things considered. Wellman's account 
would regard the statement 'I ought to do Y' as true and the 
statement 'I ought to do X' as false. But the fact that doing 
X is overridden does not mean that the corresponding statement 
is false. It could do so only if one held that presumptive 
moral judgements could only have presumptive truth. It seems 
that Wellman must hold this, but this position is at odds with 
moral practice. The statement 'I ought to do X' is true 
whether or not it represents a final judgement or a presumptive
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judgement that could be (and perhaps has been) overridden by
another moral judgement. Overriding a charge thus involves
some 'moral cost', for it amounts to an admission that an
action was wrong according to one moral principle, but a claim
that it was nevertheless right according to another, and that
13the latter has priority over the former.
Thirdly, Wellman claims that there is no way of 
challenging an action that would not also be a challenge to an 
ought statement about that action. This claim is false, for 
there is always the possibility of a challenge to the relation­
ship between an action and the corresponding statement. This 
challenge could be to the description of the action, in which 
case it would come close to the challenge of a pre-supposition 
of the statement, and Wellman does allow for this possibility 
under truth-value challenges, as we have seen. But the 
challenge could also be to the execution of the action referred 
to in the statement. Consider, for example, the person who says 
'All things considered, I ought to look after my aged parents' 
and let us suppose that this ethical statement is true in 
Wellman's sense. Clearly, there is room for variation in what 
individuals count as 'looking after', such that the possibility 
of a new challenge arises, a challenge that is not covered by 
any of Wellman's seven dimensions of challenges to ethical 
statements because it is the action rather than the statement 
that is being challenged: 'Call that looking after your parents?
I call it neglecting them! You never visit them, never give, 
them financial assistance, never invite them to your house.
All you have done is arrange for Meals on Wheels to call.'
This is a challenge to the action referred to in the statement, 
not to the statement; it is to the adequacy of the agent's 
understanding of what it is to look after someone who is in
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the circumstances of the agent's parents. It invokes the 
standard of consistency between profession and action. The 
statement is true, yet the action is unjustified. Thus there 
is a way of challenging an action that is not a way of 
challenging the corresponding statement about that action, 
and Wellman's claim is falsified.
But despite these deficiencies in Wellman's argument, 
his general position is correct (indeed, his statement is true 
even though he was not justified in asserting it), although it 
is important to be clear about its limitations.
For any participant in the moral point of view to accept
the truth of 'According to my moral theory, I ought to do X'
as a final judgement about what he ought to do (i.e. he has
successfully responded to all charges against his doing X)
is for him to be morally justified in doing X. No further
14considerations are necessary. For A to say 'I accept that 
I ought to do X, all things considered, but would I be morally 
justified in doing X?' would be for A to confess that he did 
not understand moral discourse. As in the case of truth and 
assertion, where there may be a gap between the truth of a 
proposition and the moral justifiability of asserting that 
proposition, there is also a gap between an agent's acknowledging 
the truth of the ethical statement 'I ought to do X in 
circumstances , x^r ..., x ' and the moral justifiability 
of his doing X in those circumstances.
Agent-justification is, however, only one of the levels 
of justificatory discourse about actions, although it is the 
one of primary concern for moral philosophy. The situations 
with respect to action-justification and practice-justification 
are rather more complicated. The truth of the statement 'X is 
morally right in circumstances x-j , x^r . . . , x 1 does not
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necessarily entail the moral justifiability of any particular 
agent's doing X in those circumstances. It would do so only 
if (i) the principles and standards invoked were those of the 
agent concerned or were those he ought to hold; and (ii) there 
were no overriding principles within his moral theory. Hence 
the truth of the statement does not imply the moral justifiabil­
ity of an agent's doing the corresponding action. But whether 
the action is or is not morally justified in itself, the 
charges against the action are available as challenges against 
a particular agent's doing that action. That an action X in 
itself is wrong in specific circumstances according to moral 
principle P deserves a response from agent A when it is 
invoked against his doing X. If A does not hold P and it is 
not the case then he ought to hold P, then the charge is 
undermined. But the way that A responds to the charge need 
not be the same as the response when the charge is made 
against the action considered in itself, for the moral 
theories that are brought to bear in each case may be quite 
different such that the principle Q in A's moral theory 
serves to override the charge whereas there was no overriding 
principle in the moral theory invoked against the action X 
considered in itself.
But, of course, the situation is slightly different when 
core moral principles are invoked against X, for these 
principles must be acknowledged by any participant in the 
moral point of view, and hence must be acknowledged by A.
But it is still open to A to undermine such a charge, not by 
denying that it is a relevant and serious charge that deserves 
a response, but by showing that the rules of application of 
the relevant core principle do not cover his doing X in those
circumstances.
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The situation with respect to practice-justification is 
parallel to that for action-justification, even though judge­
ments about the moral status of practices can be either
conditional ('X'ing is right in circumstances , x^ , . .., xr')
15or unconditional ('X'ing is right/wrong'). Charges against 
the practice of X'ing must be against characteristics shared 
by all examples of X, and hence must be against the defining 
characteristics of X or against constant, or highly probable, 
accompanying characteristics. They cannot take account of all 
the circumstances encountered in particular examples of the 
practice, and thus the moral status of the practice does not 
necessarily determine the moral status of those examples, 
whether the question is of agent-justification or of action- 
justification. That a practice is not justified, whether 
conditionally or unconditionally, does not determine the moral 
status of an agent A's doing a particular action X unless it 
can be shown that the reasons against X'ing are also conclusive 
reasons why A ought not do X. Charges against the defining 
characteristics or constant accompanying characteristics of 
the practice of X'ing will also be charges against A's doing 
X where the principles invoked against the practice are or 
ought to be held by A; successful charges against A's doing 
X based on highly probable accompanying characteristics of 
X'ing will be undermined if it can be shown that these 
characteristics were not present in the particular case of A's 
doing X. Similarly, that the practice of X'ing is unjustified, 
conditionally or unconditionally, only provides grounds for 
challenging the moral status of a particular action X considered 
in itself. It does not determine its status, for the grounds 
on which X'ing is unjustified may be undermined by different 
rules of application to those of the principles invoked
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against the practice (as when core principles alone are 
successfully invoked against the practice) or they may be 
overridden by principles invoked through the circumstances 
of that case.
5. Charges and responses concerning actions
The moral justifiability of actions can be challenged 
in a number of distinct ways. In this Section I shall 
briefly (i) outline those ways; (ii) indicate any conditions 
required for each type of charge to be relevant and serious 
at each of the three levels of justificatory discourse; and 
(iii) indicate response strategies, both in general and any 
that are specific to the different levels.
It must be kept in mind, however, that moral debate is 
a very complex process. I do not pretend to give more than 
a very general typology of charges and responses, with all the 
limitations inherent in any typology dealing with something as 
varied as moral debate. Some charges straddle the types 
mentioned below; others involve overlapping levels of justifi­
catory discourse. These complexitites are beyond the scope of 
the typology outlined below, since it would require a much 
more developed account of these types of charges than is 
necessary for my purpose. Yet it is important to attempt the 
task, for it enables us to become much clearer about what is 
going on in moral debate, to know what can and cannot be 
achieved in particular types of justificatory discourse, and 
to evaluate justificatory arguments.
A number of assumptions lie behind this typology. First, 
these types of charges against actions are to be taken in 
conjunction with Wellman's seven dimensions of challenges 
to ethical statements, particularly those concerned with
arguments given in response to an initial challenge to a
statement. Secondly, I shall assume that those involved in
the debate are moral persons, and I shall not discuss charges
based on the requirements for participation in the moral point
of view itself. Finally, for convenience I shall continue to
use the letters X, Y and Z to stand for the subjects of the
levels of justificatory discourse; A and B to stand for
agents; T to stand for a moral theory, and to stand for
A's moral theory; P and Q to stand for principles and
standards; x, , x_, ..., x to stand for the circumstances of1 2  n
action X, including the consequences; and C to stand for a 
charge against an X.
(i) Wrongness Charge
This charge has the general form 'X is morally wrong 
according to P', i.e. the rules of application of P cover X.
It is the most basic type of charge in justificatory discourse, 
and appears in some of the other types of charges discussed 
below. Wrongness charges can be implicit in descriptions, 
as I argued in the last Chapter. Examples of wrongness charges 
are 'But that's illegal', 'What you did was wrong; you must 
learn to have more concern for the welfare of others', and 
'Saying that to her was less than charitable'.^
There are five general response strategies which can 
undermine a wrongness charge:
(a) a denial that P is a principle or standard at all;
(b) a denial that P is a moral principle or standard;
(c) a denial that P is a moral principle or standard
that is, or must be, or should be, accepted;
(d) a denial that the rules of application of P do or 
should cover X;
(e) a claim that X has been wrongly described by the
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accuser.
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There is one general overriding response strategy:
(f) while X is morally wrong according to P, it is 
morally right according to Q, and the relevant 
rules of priority place Q over P.
The use of one of these response strategies need not, 
of course, bring the debate to a halt, either in this or in 
any of the other types mentioned below. An argument in response 
to a charge can itself be challenged on several grounds, and 
even if a particular response cannot be challenged, new charges 
may still be laid, perhaps of the same general type. Similarly, 
several response strategies may be used against a single charge, 
some of which may prevent other types of charges being laid, 
e.g. 'I don't accept that P is a moral principle; but even if 
I did, it would not cover X and anyhow would always be over­
ridden by Q. '
A wrongness charge at the level of agent-justification 
alleges:
(a) that A did do X, and
(b) that P either is, or must be, of should be part 
of A's moral theory T, i.e. that the general 
undermining response (c) is not available or 
can be refuted if it is used. This may be done 
by showing that P is a principle that A does 
accept, or by showing that P is a core principle 
which the A should accept as a participant in 
the moral point of view, or by showing that A 
must accept P since it follows from other moral 
principles which A does or should accept. This 
last possibility requires the omission to be 
'culpable' in the sense that the agent ought to 
have recognised that P followed from other
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principles; showing that the omission was 
not culpable will undermine this charge.
Similarly, in order for an overriding response to 
succeed against a wrongness charge at the level of agent- 
justification, it must be the case that Q is part of and 
that rules of priority place 0 over P. But in this case 
Q must be explicitly held by A if it is to override P. It is 
not enough to show that Q should have been held by A, or that 
Q is implied by the principles that A does hold. If Q is not 
actually held by A in an explicit and conscious way, then it 
cannot be used to justify his conduct. In addition, of course, 
the rules of application of Q must actually cover A's doing X; 
showing that they do not would be a successful countermove 
to the use of an overriding strategy.
There is one other possible response to a wrongness 
charge brought against an agent A, a response that undermines 
all the other charges that can be brought against A's action.
It is to admit that X was wrong according to T^, but to argue 
that in deciding to do X, A did everything that could reasonably 
be expected of a moral agent in A's circumstances, and that 
while X was wrong according to T , A was in fact justified in 
doing X.
This strategy invokes the distinction between justification 
of an agent's doing X and the justifiability of the action X, 
i.e. the distinction between the levels of justificatory 
discourse mentioned earlier in this Chapter, in conjunction 
with the general principle of moral discourse about the 
justification of actions: an agent cannot be blamed for taking 
all reasonable care and attention in the circumstances in 
deciding what to do, even if his action is in fact wrong 
according to his own moral theory. This is similar to, but not
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the same as, an excuse strategy. It is not claimed that 
circumstances (e.g. being drunk, angry, emotional, provoked, 
ignorant, etc.) prevented A from examining X in a manner 
appropriate to reasoned discourse. It is more like the 
situation where the benefits of hindsight enable us to say 
that the circumstances were such that A should have considered 
some particular factors about X where A either reasonably 
thought that he did not need to consider them, or could not 
reasonably have been aware of them. The agent is not adjudged 
to have been unjustified in acting in that way, and then 
excused; he is not adjudged unjustified at all.
An accusation of wrongness against an action X considered 
in itself or against the practice of X'ing becomes a relevant 
and serious charge if X is asserted to be wrong on the basis 
of a principle or standard, i.e. a generalised statement of 
the form 'It is wrong to do X.' Unless this is the case, there 
is no charge against X and hence no need for a response. But, 
of course, that a principle or standard is cited allows the use 
of the undermining strategies mentioned earlier, for not every 
principle is a moral principle, not every standard is 
appropriate to moral discourse, and not every moral principle 
or standard deserves the reasoned assent of any particular 
participant in the moral point of view, or the reasoned assent 
of all such participants. Moreover, an accuser who cites a 
principle or a standard must be able to give the rules of 
application and rules of priority of that principle or standard. 
He must, that is, be able to locate it in a moral theory; 
otherwise moral discourse could not take place, or would be 
extremely restricted, for there could be no way of knowing how 
the principle is to be applied or the relationships it has with 
other principles. This allows another response strategy in the
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case of charges against actions and against practices: the
accuser can be challenged to show how any principle or 
standard cited against an action or a practice could be part 
of a moral theory. But even if this is done, the charge can 
be undermined by denying that the principle, standard, or 
theory is one that is or should be accepted, or by denying that 
it should have the particular rules of application or priority 
that form the basis of the charge.
(ii) Description Charge
This charge has the general form 'According to the rules
and conventions of language, X should be described as (or as
a case of) Y, and Y is covered by the rules of application of
P and is wrong according to P '. In other words, the description
charge alleges that X is really a Y, and that a wrongness charge
can be made against Y. The role of descriptions in moral
evaluation, and hence in moral justification, outlined in
Chapter One, make this a particularly important type of charge,
for the way an X is described can itself embody a charge
against X and hence set the scope and limits of moral debate
about X. It is, therefore, an important way of setting the
17terms of moral debate and thus influencing its outcome.
Examples of description charges are: 'Abortion is no more
nor less than murder'; 'You call it liberating the people's 
money - I call it stealing'; 'Loyalty or not, it was still a 
lie'; 'Civil disobedients break the lawT, and must therefore 
be treated in the same way as any other law-breakers'; 
'Plagiarism is theft'.
There are three general response strategies which can 
undermine a description charge:
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(a) a denial that X is wrongly described according 
to the rules and conventions of language;
(b) a denial that X should be redescribed as, or as 
a case of, Y;
(c) a denial that Y is wrong according to P , i.e. 
the undermining strategies available against 
a wrongness charge.
There are two general response strategies which can 
override a description charge, parallel to that available 
to override a wrongness charge:
(d) even if X could be redescribed as, or as a case 
of, Y, and even if Y is wrong according to P,
X is right according to Q, and Q overrides 
P;
(e) even though X is properly described as Y, and
Y is wrong according to P , Y is right according 
to Q and Q overrides P.
.The first of these two overriding strategies relies on 
the counter-claim that X need not be redes*cribed as Y, even 
though it could be, and that the action is right under 
description X according to principle Q which overrides P; 
for example: 'Even though you are - strictly speaking - 3:ight 
to say that I lied, I prefer to regard it as a case of not 
telling the whole truth in the interests of justice.' Strategy 
(e) is the same as the strategy for overriding wrongness 
charges.
There are no special conditions for the applicability of 
description charges at any of the three levels of justificatory 
discourse other than the conditions for the applicability of 
wrongness charges. Nor are there any extra response strategies.
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(iii) Consistency Charge
This charge can be made in two ways:
(i) 'X is relevantly similar to Y, which is 
morally wrong.1
(ii) 'X is inconsistent with Y, which is relevantly 
similar to X and which is morally right.'
Consistency charges are obviously very close to 
description charges, yet they are not the same. The latter 
appeal to the rules and conventions of language in an attempt 
to show that X is a case of Y. A consistency charge, on the
Iother hand, does not do this but only claims that there is a 
parallel between X and Y, and that the moral status of Y is 
transferable to X. Examples of the first variant of this type 
of charge are: 'After all we have done for you, telling the
police where to find us was like betraying your own mother';
'How do you reconcile using that loophole to avoid tax with 
your position as Commissioner of Police?'; and 'For the 
government to proceed with this legislation would herald a 
return to the fascist period of our history'. An example 
of the second variant is 'You are right to donate to CORSO, 
yet you are unwilling to donate to African freedom fighters - 
what is the (morally) relevant difference between them?'
There are three general response strategies which can be 
used to undermine these charges:
(a) a denial that X is relevantly similar to Y;
(b) a denial of the claim about the moral status 
of Y;
(c) a denial that X is inconsistent with Y.
A consistency charge can be overridden as follows:
(d) there are circumstances about X that are different 
from those about Y w7h.ich make a difference to the
moral status of X;
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(e) the moral theory according to which Y was 
judged is different from the moral theory 
according to which X is to be judged, e.g. 
through the addition or deletion of moral 
principles, or through changes in rules of 
application and/or in the rules of priority.
In order for a consistency charge against A's doing X to 
be relevant and serious, it has to .invoke A's moral theory 
against himself. A consistency charge at this level, that of 
agent-justification, could refer to different actions of A, or 
to actions which A has judged according to his moral theory T, 
or to actions which could be judged differently according to T , 
or to any combination of these. Thus the undermining and over­
riding strategies open to A can vary according to which of 
these charges is adopted. The charge of inconsistency may 
invoke action-justification or practice-justification against 
the justifiability of A's action X, e.g. 'How can you be 
justified in doing X when you hold that X'ing is always wrong?'
I consider these types of charges below.
There are no special conditions for a consistency charge 
against an action or against a practice to require a response; 
nor are there any extra response strategies.
(iv) Causation Charge
This charge has the general form 'X will lead to Y, and 
Y is morally wrong according to P '; examples of this type of 
charge are 'For you to disobey this law will inspire others to 
do likewise, and that will cause chaos'; 'But what if everybody 
broke their promises when it became convenient to do so?';
'You ought to give up your life of crime - think of the effect 
on your family if you are caught'; and 'To drink alcohol before 
driving is wrong because it puts others at risk of injury or
death 1.
99.
There are three general ways of undermining a causation 
charge:
(a) to deny the level of the causal connection 
alleged in the charge according to (i) timing,
(i.e. whether X and Y are past or prospective, 
certain or merely probable), and (ii) whether 
X is alleged to be the sole cause of Y, or a 
major cause, or merely an important contributing 
factor;
(b) to deny that Y is morally wrong according to P;
(c) to deny that P is a moral principle that is, or 
should, or must be accepted.
A causation charge can be overridden in two ways:
(d) by arguing that either X or Y is morally right 
according to Q, and Q overrides P;
(e) by arguing that X also leads to Z, and that Z
is morally right according to Q, and Q overrides 
P.
Strategy (a) is probably the most common way of meeting 
a causation charge. It can be, however, a rather more complex 
strategy than it looks, for it may be necessary to admit that 
X was causally connected to Y, yet to deny that this is enough 
to sustain the charge. This is particularly so where Y is the 
action of another; just because A's action is causally 
connected to B's acting wrongly does not warrant the claim that 
A's action was unjustified if B had to decide to act in that 
way. A cannot necessarily be held responsible for what others 
do even where what they do is causally connected to his action. 
The same point applies at the other levels of justification; 
a practice is not necessarily unjustified because others can 
and do abuse it, and an action is not inflexibly tied to the 
ways others act in consequence.
100.
There are no special conditions for the applicability 
of a causation charge other than those for a wrongness charge; 
nor are there any extra response strategies.
( v) Agent-justification Charge
This charge has the general form 'X is wrong because 
agent B was (or would be) unjustified in doing X in circumstances 
Xf, x , . .., xn because of C* (i.e. C was a successful charge 
against B's doing X in those circumstances). In other words, 
a successful wrongness charge against the justifiability of 
B’s doing X is given as a reason why A is wrong to do X, or 
why X is wrong, or why X'ing is wrong. It can be merely another 
way of making the charge C against the agent, action, or 
practice in question, and thus can be dealt with on that level. 
Alternatively, it can be a consistency charge in disguise, 
asking why C should not also be regarded as a reason against 
X in this case when it was a successful charge against B's 
doing X. Examples of agent-justification charges are: 'Jones
was unjustified in passing his daughter on 48%, and you would 
be wrong to do so too'; 'Giving money to that famine relief 
fund is wrong; Jones did so last year and has since said that 
he was unjustified in doing so because all the money is taken 
by corrupt administrators and none is used to buy food for the 
relief of the starving'.
The general response strategies available against an 
agent-justification charge are a combination of those 
available against wrongness charges ((a) below) and 
consistency charges ((b) below), plus some which deny the 
relevance of the status of B's action to the X in question.
There are three general undermining strategies:
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(a) a denial that B was wrong to do X because of 
C, i.e. a denial of the adequacy of the 
reasoning leading to the conclusion that C 
is a successful charge against B's doing X
in circumstances xw  , . . . , x ;1 2  n
(b) a denial that B's action X is relevantly 
similar to the X under consideration;
(c) a denial that C is relevant and serious for 
the justificatory problem at hand (e.g. by 
citing the relationships between the levels 
of justificatory discourse).
There are two general overriding strategies:
(d) although C is a serious and relevant charge 
against X, it is overridden by principle Q in 
this case;
(e) although B's action X is relevantly similar to 
the X in question, there are circumstances of 
the latter which are different from those of 
the former, and these make a difference to the 
moral status of the X under consideration 
according to principle Q.
An agent-justification charge is usually rather weak 
when directed against actions and practices because it is 
easy to undermine the charge by showing that the justifia­
bility of B's doing X is not a relevant and serious charge 
against X considered at the level of action or practice. An 
agent-justification charge directed against an agent A's 
doing X is, however, on the same level of justificatory dis­
course, and those undermining strategies are therefore not 
available. But it is still relatively easy to undermine the 
charge by denying (i) that C is a relevant and serious charge
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against A's doing X according to A's moral theory T, i.e. 
by using the undermining strategy appropriate to wrongness 
charges at the level of agent-justification; or (ii) that 
B's action was wrong according to T , the undermining strategy
Xx
available at this level against consistency charges.
(vi) Action-justification Charge
This charge has the general form 'X is wrong because 
action X is unjustified in circumstances x^, x^, . ..,
because of C  i.e. C is a successful charge against action X. 
Again, it alleges that the unjustifiability of action X on 
account of C is a reason why A should be regarded as wrong to 
do X, or why action X is wrong, or why the practice of X'ing 
is wrong. Again, too, this charge may be a wrongness charge 
in disguise, or a consistency charge in disguise, or a 
combination of both. Examples of action-justification charges 
are: 'Your passing that student was wrong because he only
scored 48% in the exam'; 'You would be wrong to lie in order 
to join up because it is always unjustified to lie, even in 
order to be patriotic'; '/avoiding tax in those cases is wrong 
because it is unjustified to rely on a legislative oversight 
when the intention was clearly to close that loophole.'
General response strategies are parallel to those for 
agent-justification charges. There are three undermining 
strategies:
(a) a denial that X is, or would be, unjustified
in circumstances x,, x_, ..., x because of C,1 2 n
i.e. to use the strategies available to under­
mine a wrongness charge;
(b) a denial that the action X is relevantly similar 
to the X under consideration; this is to use 
the strategies available to undermine consistency 
charges.
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(c) a denial that C is relevant and serious for the 
justificatory problem at hand, e.g. by citing 
the relationships between the levels of justific­
atory discourse.
There are two general overriding strategies available:
(d) even though C is a relevant and serious charge 
against X in this case, it is overridden by 
principle Q;
(e) although the action X is relevantly similar to
the X under consideration, there are circumstances
about the latter that are different from the
circumstances x, , x„ , ..., x in the former, and1 2  n
these make a difference to the moral status of 
the X in question according to principle Q.
An action-justification charge against an agent A's doing 
X is relevant and serious if it can be shown that the reason 
why the action X was unjustified could also be (rather than is) 
a reason why A would be wrong to do X. The charge is under­
mined, then, if it can be shown that C is- not a reason which 
A does acknowledge, or ought to acknowledge, as relevant to 
whether he should or should not do X, and this will of course 
depend on A's moral theory T.
An action-justification charge against a particular action 
X is relevant and serious if it can be shown that the two 
actions in question are comparable, i.e. if the action X in 
question is similar to the action X claimed to be unjustified. 
Similarly, an action-justification charge against the practice 
of X'ing will be relevant and serious if the X in the charge 
is an example of that practice, for that allows the possibility 
that C might be relevant and serious against all examples of 
actions of X's type.
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There are no special response strategies in either
case.
(vii) Practice-justification Charge
This charge has two general forms:
(i) unconditional - ’X is wrong because X'ing is 
unjustified because of C*;
(ii) conditional - 'X is wrong because X'ing is
unjustified in circumstances x^, x^ , . ..,
because of C .
As before, this charge may be a disguised wrongness 
charge, or a disguised consistency charge, or a combination 
of both. Examples of practice-justification charges are ’You 
were wrong to strike him as a punishment for hitting his 
sister - corporal punishment is always wrong because it is 
a denial of the respect due to persons'; 'You should have 
told him that the refrigerator was faulty before you sold .it 
to him; you were less than honest’; 'To leave one's mother 
in order to join the resistance is wrong because neglecting 
the welfare of one's parents is unjustified when they have to 
rely on one child to support them'; and 'Drunken driving is 
wrong because it unnecessarily endangers the lives of innocent 
bystanders, and this is always unjustified'.
There are three general undermining strategies 
applicable to both formulations of the charge:
(a) a denial that X'ing is wrong (conditionally or 
unconditionally according to the charge) because 
of C, i.e. use of the general undermining 
strategies available against wrongness charges;
(b) a denial that X is an example of the practice of 
X'ing;
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(c) a denial that C is relevant and serious for 
the justificatory problem at hand, e.g. 
because it is based on probable accompanying 
characteristics of examples of X which do 
not apply in the case in question.
There are two general overriding strategies applicable 
to both formulations of the charge:
(d) even though C is a relevant and serious charge 
against X, it is overridden by principle Q;
(e) although the X in question is an example of the 
practice of X'ing, there are circumstances about 
the former which make a difference to the moral 
status of X according to principle Q (e.g. while 
X is an example of the practice of X’ing, it is 
also an example of the practice of Y ’ing, which 
is justified and which overrides the practice of 
X'ing).
A practice-justification charge against the justifiability 
of A's doing X is relevant and serious if X'ing is unjustified 
according to T . There are no extra conditions or special 
response strategies in the cases of practice-justification 
charges made against actions or practices.
(viii) Excuse Strategies
There is one general response strategy that is available
when any of the types of charges discussed above is made
against an agent, viz. to offer an excuse rather than a 
18justification." A successful excuse strategy can undermine 
all possible charges against an agent's doing X if it shows 
that the agent is not to be held morally responsible for the 
action, and hence that there can be no moral blame to be 
attached to him on account of it. It can thus undermine the
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very relevance of both agent-justificatory discourse and 
the moral evaluation of the agent's character with respect 
to that action by removing one of their conditions. Other 
excuses will reduce the moral blame due to an agent on 
account of his action rather than remove it altogether.
In Chapter One, Section 3 (pp. 25-26) I argued that 
rules of translation and of excuse and mitigation are part of 
any moral theory. Some of the latter rules are part of the 
moral point of view itself, and hence must be acknowledged by 
any participant in it in the same way as core moral principles 
must be acknowledged. That is, some rules of excuse and 
mitigation must be assented to by any moral person although, 
like substantive moral principles, they will also have 
associated rules of application (when an excuse rule is 
applicable, either in general or with reference to particular 
moral principles) and priority (which of two excuse rules is 
to be given priority when both are applicable to the same 
situation).
These 'core excuse rules' are part of the moral point of 
view itself because they reflect the conditions governing the 
ways that the purposes of that point of view may be achieved. 
Given that the moral point of view is concerned with the 
evaluation of human actions as right or wrong and justified 
or unjustified, and hence with the attribution of praise and 
blame to persons on account of their actions, and given that 
we know that some of the things that people do are not to be 
counted as actions at all, and that some are to be taken as 
'incomplete' actions, then the fact that something convention­
ally counts as an action allows the applicability of moral 
evaluation. But if it can be shown that the subject of 
evaluation is not an action at all, or is only incompletely
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an action, then moral evaluation is either inappropriate 
or must be diluted. This is what excuse strategies try to 
achieve.
A full discussion of the various ways of offering
19excuses would be beyond the scope of this study. What 
follows is merely indicative of the ways excuses can be 
offered and dealt with.
Strictly speaking, an excuse need only be offered in 
response to a successful charge against an agent's doing X, 
but, of course, excuses are often used to forestall the very 
possibility of any charge at all. Excuses are of three broad 
types:
(i) the agent claims that he was not in control of 
what he did, that it was not his action, e.g. 
that he was compelled to do X; that he had no 
choice or no alternative but to do X (or perhaps 
that he had no realistic choice or alternative); 
and so on.
(ii) the agent claims that the causes of the action
were beyond his direct control, e.g. that it was 
accidental; that he was non-culpablv ignorant; 
that he was provoked, drunk, distracted, angry, 
is of a passionate or emotional disposition, was 
hypnotised, drugged, in a trance, and so on.
(iii) the claim is made that the agent is not capable
of reasoned discourse about his actions, e.g. that 
he is a young child, or is mentally ill or
defective.
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Each of these excuse strategies can be used to absolve
completely or partially. As in the case of charges and
responses thereto, excuses can be undermined or overridden.
An excuse is undermined if it can be shown to be based on
factual inaccuracy, e.g. that there was an alternative, or
that the agent is_ capable of reasoned discourse about actions.
Similarly, both an excuse strategy and a response to that
excuse may depend on the way the action is described. An
excuse may in fact serve to aggravate the blame attached to
the agent because it shows that he was somehow negligent or
was culpable in allowing the action to occur, or because it
2 0allows other charges to be laid. Suppose, for example, 
that an agent kills a pedestrian while driving his car, and 
that he excuses his action by saying that he was drunk.
That may modify the types of charges that can be made against 
his action, but it opens up others, viz. that he ought not to 
have been driving while drunk.
Excuses can be overridden in this way. They can also be 
overridden by other excuses according to rules of priority, 
thereby either removing all blame to be attached to the agent, 
or increasing or reducing its severity. Responses to excuses, 
whether undermining or overriding, may also require judgements 
about the reasonableness of the excuse in the circumstances 
in which the agent was placed, e.g. was a possible alternative 
a reasonable one? was his anger understandable? would a 
reasonable person have been provoked in those circumstances?
6. Conclusion
The aim of this Chapter has been to examine the structure 
of arguments about the moral justifiability of actions in the 
light of the arguments about moral theories developed in
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Chapter One. I have argued that discourse about the moral 
justification of an action can take place on three levels, 
that of the agent's doing the action, of the action itself, 
and of the practice of which the action is an instance. To 
justify an action on one of these levels within the moral 
point of view is to meet charges against it formulated from 
within that point of view. I have identified and discussed 
seven ways of formulating charges against actions, the 
responses that can be made against those charges, and a 
general strategy which can be used to undermine any charge.
The arguments of Part One have been necessary as 
preliminaries to an examination of the ways civil 
disobedience has been, and can be, morally justified because 
much of the debate about its justifiability has shown a 
marked lack of understanding of what is involved in moral 
justification. (Indeed, this is true of much moral philosophy 
concerned with justification; it does not apply to civil 
disobedience alone.) The tasks of Part Two are to show this, 
and to develop a more adequate theory about the moral 
justifiability of civil disobedience.
PART TWO
THE MORAL JUSTIFICATION OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
CHAPTER THREE
Pollti cal Obligation
1. Introduction
In Chapter One, Section 3 (pp. 31-34) I argued that
any moral person must recognise a general moral duty to
obey the law where the institution of lav; helps secure the
conditions of social life within which a person can be moral.
I also argued, however, that this general duty was
limited by what I called 'the constraint of process' and
'the constraint of content'. My purpose in this Chapter is
to develop these arguments further, to consider why such a
reason for obeying the law is properly called an obligation
(Section 2), to expand on the two constraints of political
obligation and examine how the structure of the political
system is to be considered in the light of them (Section 3),
to show why some other theories of political obligation are
inadequate (Sections 4 and 5), and to consider some possible
objections to the analysis I have developed (Section 6).
First, however, we need to give some attention to the place
of the 'problem' of political obligation within political
philosophy, and to the arguments of those who claim that it
is no more than a pseudo-problem.
The term 'political obligation’ itself was first used
1 *in the late nineteenth century, by T.H. Green. Of course,
the relations between the citizen and political authority had
long been discussed within political philosophy. But Green
was among the first to regard political obligation as central
2to political philosophy, and many other writers have followed
* Notes to this Chapter are on pp.333 - 348.
111.
112.
him in counting it among the central concerns of that 
3discipline.
That emphasis is probably rather exaggerated, for
political obligation is not central to political philosophy
per se but rather to a particular version of it which depends
upon certain assumptions about men and society. Thomas
McPherson perceptively suggests that political obligation
only represents a problem to be solved for theorists who
tend to be individualists as opposed to collectivists, who
are likely to think that society is artificial rather than
natural, and who tend to hold an ethics of duty rather than
4an ethics of love. The problem of political obligation
only tends to arise, that is, when the desires or will of an
individual can lead to actions that are in conflict with
the actions required by law and government, and v;here both
have some moral claim to be followed. The relationship
between the individual and the government is thus seen as
5one . of sepairation , of me-you or us-them. A collectivist, 
on the other hand, thinks of the individual as part of an 
organic whole which sustains him and gives him his existence 
as a human being. Questions about an obligation to obey the 
lav; are, therefore, not problematic in principle, for any 
rational individual must recognise how much he depends on 
the collectivity for his life as a human being capable of 
reason and morality, and hence he must recognise that even to 
ask the question 'why should I obey the law?' is either to 
misunderstand the nature of communal life or to betray one­
self as subject to desire and self-interest rather than to 
rationality.
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McPherson's arguments for the other two correlations 
are similar. The main aim of his book, however, is to show 
that the common way of putting the problem of political 
obligation is too general and too abstract to allow answers 
that can be of very much use in helping us decide how to act 
in particular situations. Indeed, he concludes that the 
notion of political obligation is so open that we might dog
better to dispense with it altogether." I shall examine some
of his arguments later in this Section.
Hanna Pitkin agrees that the simple way of asking the
question 'Why should I obey the law?' has produced more
7confusion than enlightenment. She argues that there is, in
fact, a cluster of problems, each of which raises different
questions from the others. Varying answers to the problem
of political obligation must not be seen as different answers
to a single question, but as answers to different questions,
8'questions of quite various kind and scope.1'
• Pitkin distinguishes four such clusters of interrelated 
questions: (1) The limits of obligation (1 When are you
obligated to obey, and when not?’). (2) The locus of
sovereignty ('Whom are you obligated to obey?'). (3) The 
difference between legitimate authority and mere coercion 
('Is there really any difference; are you ever really 
obligated?'). (4) The justification of obligation ('Why are
Qyou ever obligated to obey even a legitimate authority?').' 
She then examines traditional consent theory in the light of 
these distinctions and shows how the answers it gives to some 
of these questions are inconsistent with the answers it gives 
to others. Pitkin attempts to resolve these difficulties by 
proposing a new interpretation of consent theory which she 
calls ' hypothe t i cal con sen t' . ° 
arguments in Section 4.
I shall consider some of her
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My main concern in this Chapter is with the third of
these questions, although (as Pitkin says) that will involve
me in considerations relevant to the other three. It is,
however, first necessary to distinguish two senses in which
the term 'political obligation' is used, a wider sense and a
narrower sense. The latter is commonly used to refer to the
question whether an individual ought to obey the law, whether
he ought, in other words, regard the fact that some action is
required or forbidden by law as a moral reason for acting
accordingly. Other writers, however, have seen this as only
a part of the notion of political obligation, and have wanted
to include the individual's obligations as a citizen within
11the scope of the term. This is particularly the case with 
those who examine political obligation within a democratic 
context, where they consider whether citizens have an 
obligation to participate in political activities, to follow 
the requests and exhortations of government as well as to 
obey the law, to be well-informed, to consider the public 
interest as well as individual interests, and so on. I will 
examine some of these arguments in the next Section in 
discussing the notion of obligation and the relationships 
between legal, political, and moral obligation.
Some writers contend, however, that even to ask whether
there is a general moral obligation to obey rhe law is to
betray a fundamental confusion because that very question is
'meaningless', 'senseless', or 'absurd'. Three
proponents of this view are Margaret Macdonald, McPherson,
12and Pitkin. Their arguments are of two types. In the first 
place, it is claimed that the vagueness of the way the 
question is put leads to vague, general, abstract answers 
which are of no practical value in helping someone decide how
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to act. Macdonald and McPherson argue in this way. Secondly, 
it is argued that the question itself is a symptom of logical 
confusion, indicating an inadequate understanding of some or 
all of the concepts of law, authority, government, and 
political society. All three writers advance this argument 
in one form or another.
McPherson's arguments about the impracticality of the
notion of political obligation include, and to some extent go
beyond, those of Margaret Macdonald; I shall therefore
discuss this position in the terms in which it is given in
McPherson's book. He argues that the terminology of
'obligation', 'obedience' and 'order' are too general, too
abstract, and therefore too vague to cope with the complexities
13of the relations between citizen and state, Theories that
attempt to give a single answer to the question of political
obligation are therefore guilty of a gross oversimplication:
To the extent that all the standard theories 
are attempts to offer such a single, simple 
answer they are all equally at fault. It may 
be the case that some of us ought to obey the 
government for one reason, others for another.
Or it may be that for all of us there is one 
reason why we ought to obey when the govern­
ment asks us to do one thing, but a different 
reason when it asks us to do another.
Both writers argue that the important questions about political
15obligation are the specific ones. The individual faced with
a decision about whether to obey this law, now, is not helped
by knowing that he has consented, or that he has entered into
a contract, or that to obey would be in accordance with his
real, i.e. rational, will. Whether he ought to obey 'depends
on these three things at least: what the government is asking
[him] to do; what is meant by "the government"; and how the
16appeal is made.' A general answer cannot help decide these
matters.
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McPherson is right to argue that a general answer to
questions about political obligation cannot in itself resolve
questions about how an individual ought to act on a particular
occasion. 1 shall argue in the next Section that political
obligation must be understood as a kind of reason that enters
into decisions about how the moral person should act, but that
it must there take its place among other reasons concerning 
17action. Although other reasons may override political
obligation, however, the fact that one has a general moral
obligation to obey the law must always enter into a decision
about whether or not to obey this law, now. McPherson's
mistake is to claim that, since a general answer about the
grounds of political obligation cannot resolve decisions about
specific actions, and given the answer to the second argument
to be considered below, the importance of political
obligation within political philosophy must be diminished -
18and perhaps the concept dispensed with altogether. On the 
contrary; it is a reason for trying to be clear about why and 
how that reason does or shou.l.d enter into decision-making, a 
reason for examining why any moral person needs to take 
account of political obligation. To hold that such a reason 
can be thought to determine conclusively how a person should 
act without a great deal of further argument would be to 
misunderstand the role of reasons for action. It is not 
senseless to ask whether we do have good reasons to obey the 
law; if we do, then that must enter into our decision-making 
process. But it is important to recognise why it does so, how 
it does so, and the limitations on its doing sc, for these 
affect the role that political obligation has within that
process.
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The second argument claims that to ask why I should obey
the law in general is to exhibit logical confusion rather
than just to oversimplify a complex matter. McPherson writes:
We have not understood what it means to be 
a member of political society if we suppose 
that political obligation is something that 
we might not have had and that therefore 
needs to be justified...„ [T]hat we are 
involved in obligations is analytically 
implied by membership of society or societies 
.... To seek a general justification of 
political obligation - a justification of our 
being obliged at all in political society - is 
to pursue a meaningless question.19
Pitkin advances a similar argument in connection with the
fourth type of question concerning political obligation
(’Why are you ever obligated to obey even a legitimate
authority?') although she is content to answer it at a rather
trivial level. She writes:
To call something a legitimate authority is 
normally to imply that it ought t.o be obeyed.
You cannot, without further rather elaborate explanation, maintain simultaneously both 
that this government has legitimate authority 
over you and that you have no obligation to 
obey it.... Part of what 'authority' means is 
that those subject to it are obligated to obey.2 0
McPherson's argument is akin to that which claims that 
to ask 'Do I have a reason to keep my promises?' is a meaning­
less question that betrays confusion about what it is to make
a promise, for that very action gives the person doing it a
21good reason for doing what he has promised to do. In the 
case of political obligation, the argument is that being a 
member of a political society analytically implies an 
obligation to obey the rules which must form the basis of that 
society. Those who ask' for reasons why one should obey the 
law have, therefore, misunderstood the nature of political 
society.
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There is, however, a shift in McPherson's argument 
which makes it clear that he is talking about a particular 
kind of membership in political society. His analogy through­
out is that of a person who chooses to belong to a political
22system or to a club, “ and he is right to argue that such a 
voluntary act gives rise to a moral obligation to obey the 
rules of that society or club. But McPherson then argues that 
any form of membership implies a similar obligation, and hence 
that membership in political society implies political 
obligation. The argument is, of course, invalid; not all 
memberships are voluntary, and it cannot be argued that 
membership per se gives rise to obligations as if it were 
voluntary.
Unlike McPherson, Pitkin does not claim to have under­
mined the very enterprise of considering the question of 
political obligation, for while there is something odd about 
the fourth question, and, however unsatisfactory it is to 
answer it by pointing to the logical relationship between 
terms, to answer it in this way is not to deal with any of 
the first three questions. But it is to indicate the kinds 
of questions that should be asked, viz. those concerning the 
criteria for, and hence differences between, legitimate 
authority and mere coercion. And this is where her hypo­
thetical consent theory (to be discussed below) is more useful 
than traditional consent theory, for it directs attention to 
the characteristics of the government rather than to any 
previous act of consent, express or tacit.
Macdonald's argument is similar to McPherson's but 
concentrates on a slightly different aspect of the relation 
between political society and political obligation. She writes
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To ask why I should obey any laws is to ask 
whether there might be a political society 
without political obligations, which is 
absurd. For we mean by political society, 
groups of people organised according to 
rules enforced by some of their number.23
This argument raises two important questions which must be
answered: even if we grant that there is a close connection
between the idea of a political society and the idea of lav;
(although it is doubtful whether it is an analytic connection
as Macdonald claims), does it follow that the fact that these
laws exist and are enforced creates an obligation to obey them?
If so, is this obligation properly called ’political obligation'?
I discuss the notion of obligation and the relationships
between lav; and political obligation in the next Section. I
shall argue that there is a sense in which the very existence
of a law7 under certain conditions does give rise to an
obligation to obey it, but that this obligation is not a
moral obligation and hence is not properly called ’political
obligation'. Macdonald's argument therefore fails.
2• Obligation: legal, political, moral
To say 'A has an obligation to do X’ is to say more than 
'A ought to do X', although it is always to say that. To use 
the term 'obligation' is to imply something about the kinds 
of reasons A has for doing X, and about the relationships 
between those reasons and other reasons relevant to whether 
A should or should not do X. Obligation-talk, like rights- 
talk, is a shorthand way of referring to the kind and weight 
of reasons for action.
We talk about obligations in a variety of different but 
related contexts, e.g. legal, religious, political, moral, 
organisational and institutional, concerning roles and 
responsibilities, and so on. Obligations are thus related to
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theories within some points of view in the sense that the 
judgement that reasons for action are to be expressed in 
terms of obligation depends upon being able to determine 
what is to count as a reason for or against an action, and 
how that reason is to stand in relation to other reasons 
for or against that action. Obligation-talk becomes 
appropriate when we want to express the weight of certain 
kinds of reasons concerning an action. To say that I have 
an obligation of a certain kind to do X is to say that I 
ought to do X for the following reasons ..., and that these 
reasons outweigh some other reasons against doing X. It is 
to say that I have good reasons for doing X, although it is 
not necessarily to say that I have conclusive reasons for 
doing X.
Generally speaking, there are three kinds of reasons 
for saying that someone has an obligation to do X, corresponding 
to three different kinds of obligation.
(i) Role-obligations
That A has a role requiring him to do X means that he 
has a reason for doing X, and if doing X is an important 
part of that role, then we may say that he has an obligation 
to do X. Examples of role-obligations are those between 
parents and children, a teacher’s obligation to give classes 
at the appointed times, a judge’s obligation to be impartial 
between the parties to a case, a doctor's obligation to care 
for the sick. These obligations may be voluntarily assumed 
(e.g. judge, doctor) or they may be imposed by circumstance 
(e.g. parent, child).
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Roles also give rise to duties. The difference between 
a role-obligation and such a duty lies in the importance of 
each to the role. A duty that is an important part of a role, 
such as a parent’s duty to ensure the well-being of his 
children or a judge's duty to be impartial, are properly 
called obligations, whereas that term is inappropriate for the 
minor duties of a role. Some duties are role-obligations, but 
some are not.
(ii) Rule-obligations
If A is properly subject to a rule requiring that he do 
X, then he has an obligation (or a duty - the terms are used 
synonymously in this case) to do X, for example that an 
income earner make an annual return of income, that a soldier 
salute an officer, that the club president convene a monthly 
meeting. Again, these obligations may be assumed or imposed. 
They arise from the exercise of authority in enacting or 
laying down or recognising rules concerning the actions of 
those subject to that authority. Rule-obligations may be quite 
closely related to role-obligations, e.g. where a rule of this 
type creates a role. But whether or not a person has a rule- 
obligation is not only a matter of whether there is a rule 
requiring him to act or to forbear; it must also be a rule to 
which he is properly subject. This last condition is vital; 
it is not the mere existence of the rule ’All A ’s shall do X' 
that establishes a rule-obligation, for it must also be the 
case that the rule is properly applied to the person in 
question. This amounts to more than simply satisfying the 
description in the rule, for otherwise any rule containing a 
description which an individual satisfied would create an 
obligation for that individual, and that is absurd. Whether 
or not an individual has an obligation under a particular
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rule will depend upon the relation between the source of , . 
the rule and the individual. A person can only be said to 
have an obligation under a rule passed by a tennis club if 
he is a member of that club or if he participates in its 
activities in some way, e.g. by attending matches organised 
according to those rules. Rule-obligations thus depend upon 
both the existence of a rule and upon the jurisdiction of the 
source of that rule.
We can divide rule-obligations into two types according 
to the sources of rules. In the first place, there are what 
we might call ’institutional (or organisational) rule- 
obligations', i.e. obligations which arise under rules enacted 
or recognised by some organisation (or individual, e.g. king) 
having jurisdiction over a person. Secondly, there are 
obligations arising out of some of the rules which an 
individual prescribes for himself as guides for his own conduct, 
or those which he ought to prescribe for himself. I call these 
'personal rule-obligations'. Thus a person who sets himself 
the genera] rule 'Always act charitably' and who regards that 
rule as more important than other rules which he sets himself 
(e.g. 'Always be polite') can be said to have a general 
obligation to act charitably and a particular obligation to 
act charitably in any situation to which the rule applies. 
Similarly, a person who did not have as his own a rule such 
as 'Always tell the truth' could still be said to have an 
obligation to tell the truth because he ough.t to have that 
rule as his own, or a person who had that rule but who did 
not regard it as applicable in a particular case might still 
be said to have an obligation to tell the truth in that case.
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(iii) Agreement-obligations 'i *
As the name implies, an agent A has an agreement-
obligation to do X if he has voluntarily agreed to do X,
e.g. by promising to do X, or through entering into a
contract requiring him to do X, or through consenting to do
X. I call these ‘agreement-obligations'. They are close to,
but not identical to, personal rule-obligations (e.g.
promising) and in some cases to institutional rule-obligations
(e.g. some contracts). That they create obligations is
obvious, for when the individual promises, contracts, or
consents to do X, he is in effect saying 'I place myself under
an obligation to do X', and perhaps adds, ’given the following
circumstances....' Such an action clearly gives him important
reasons for doing X which he would not have had without the
2 4promise, contract, or the giving of consent.
The difference between agreement-obligations and personal 
rule-obligations is that the former require at least two 
parties: the person under the obligation and the person to
whom the obligation is owed. Personal rule-obligations, on 
the other hand, need not be relational in this way, although 
they may be. The difference between agreement-obligations 
and institutional rule-obligations is that there need not be 
(although there may be) a formal rule enforcing the terms of 
the agreement, whereas an institution with jurisdiction 
enacting a formal rule or recognising a custom or convention 
is essential to the very existence of an institutional rule- • 
obligation. In addition, institutional rule-obligations are 
likely to have some formal sanction attached, although this 
is by no means necessary, whereas personal rule obligations 
are not, although again there may sometimes be sanctions 
attached in the form of social disapproval, blame, condemnation,
etc.
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These three grounds of obligation are not necessarily 
exclusive. An institutional rule creating an obligation may 
be enacted because of a need to enforce some agreement- 
obligations or some personal rule-obligations. Similarly, a 
person may have a personal rule-obligation concerning agreement- 
obligations or concerning institutional rule-obligations. But 
these distinctions also make it clear that a person may have 
conflicting obligations as well as reinforcing obligations with 
respect to some action X. Whether or not he ought to do X, all 
things considered, can be affected in various ways by important 
reasons derived from a number of different sources. An 
agreement-obligation may conflict with either type of rule- 
obligation, and both may run counter to a role-obligation.
And, of course, conflict can occur within types of obligation.
A person may have promised not to do something yet have also 
contracted to do it. Similarly, I may have a role-obligation 
to protect my child yet also have an obligation as a citizen 
to report any illegal act, even though my child is responsible. 
Obligations can reinforce each other in much the same kind of 
way: I may have obligations to do X because I have agreed to
do X, because the law requires me to do X, because my own moral 
theory requires me to do X, and because I have a role- 
obligation to do X.
The fact that obligations arise out of judgements about 
reasons for acting makes it clear that it is always appropriate 
to ask what the reasons for any alleged obligation are, that 
undermining and overriding strategies can be applied in 
connection with obligations, and that an obligation-statement 
can be a way of making a relevant and serious charge against
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an agent, an action, or a practice. (That to call something - 
an obligation implies that it is a good, perhaps even over­
riding, reason for action also explains something of the 
persuasive use of the term in moral debate and rhetoric.) A 
person may be mistaken about whether he has an institutional 
rule-obligation to do X, or he may be unsure about whether the 
terms of an agreement do in fact require him to do X. To have 
a particular obligation is just to have an important reason 
for acting; it need not be the only reason in any particular 
case, nor need it be the most important. It is, therefore, 
necessary to be clear about two ways in which obligation-talk 
is used: in a presumptive or non-conclusive way, and in a
final or conclusive way. In other words, to say that A has an 
obligation (of whatever type) to do X may be to say either that 
A has at least one important reason for doing X, or it may be 
to say that A's reasons for doing X outweigh those he has (or
even those he could have) for not doing X, all things 
25considered. To say that A has an obligation to do X, 
therefore, may be to initiate moral debate about A's action or 
it may be to conclude it. I shall use 'obligation' alone to 
mean presumptive or non-conclusive obligation, and 'conclusive 
obligation' to refer to the overriding obligation in a 
particular case.
I want to suggest that legal obligations correspond to 
institutional rule-obligations, that moral obligations are 
derived from personal rule-obligations, and that political 
obligation is based on a combination of role-obligation and 
personal rule-obligation.
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To ask whether I have a legal obligation to do X does
no more than ask the question 'Is there a law L in the legal
2 6system S to which I am subject that requires me to do X?'
This question thus incorporates a very general question of 
jurisdiction ('Does S have jurisdiction with respect to my 
doing X?') and a specific question about the content of S 
('Does S contain a law L requiring me to do X in these 
circumstances?'). The first, jurisdictional, question is 
usually answered quite easily, for in the normal situation 
the jurisdiction of a legal system is defined territorially. 
Indeed, the question of jurisdiction is only likely to arise 
in exceptional cases, e.g. in a federal system with division 
of powers, with respect to the high seas, concerning delegation 
of legislative powers, or in a situation such as a civil war 
where different groups are contending for power and the right 
to govern and each is promulgating and enforcing rules of 
behaviour. But despite these possibilities, in most cases we 
are quite clear about whether there is a legal system that 
has jurisdiction.
Whether or not S contains a law L which applies in a 
particular situation and requires me to do X is also, at least 
in principle, a relatively straightforward matter. The legis­
lative act by the recognised source of law within S, plus 
whatever customs, precedents, judgements, commands and 
conventions that constitute or affect rules for behaviour 
within S, indicate w7hether there is a legal rule (in a broad 
sense) which is applicable to my situation and requires me to 
do X. Again, of course, there may be complex matters involved 
in deciding this question. The validity of L within S may be 
open to doubt (although I shall argue in Chapter Four, Section 
3, (pp. 232-234) that L only ceases to be a law because of
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invalidity when it is authoritatively declared invalid), or 
the interpretation or application of L in the light of other 
rules, conventions, etc., may be open to dispute, or X may 
be described in different ways with different results within 
S (even according to the same lav;) . Hence whether I have a 
legal obligation to do X may be open to question. But that 
question is decidable because part of S will be able to give 
an authoritative answer to it, viz. the adjudicative bodies 
within S. In our type of system, the conclusive test about 
whether I have a legal obligation to do X in the particular 
circumstances is whether the courts say that I do. The 
reasons for the decision may be open to dispute; courts and 
legal authorities may disagree, and I may have to take my 
case through a hierarchy of courts to the highest within the 
legal system. But the role of the courts as the bodies 
authorised to pronounce on what the law requires means that 
they are the bodies who, in the final analysis, decide whether 
the rules enacted by the legislature, or promulgated according 
to authority derived from such a rule, amount to legal 
obligations in particular cases.
Despite these complexities about jurisdiction and about
the interpretation of law in the light of custom, precedent,
etc., the question of whether I have a legal obligation to do
X in particular circumstances is a question within the legal 
2 7point of view. Legal obligations are thus institutional 
rule-obligations. To find out whether I have a legal 
obligation to do X is analogous to finding out whether the 
rules of cricket require a player to wear white; I consult 
the official rule-book, discuss the matter with those in a 
position to know, find out how umpires interpret whatever rules 
there are on the matter, and if I am in doubt I seek the 
guidance of the official adjudicative body or bodies. It is,
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therefore, necessary to examine both the letter of the law 
and also the way in which that letter is interpreted and 
applied in different kinds of circumstances in order to know 
whether I have a legal obligation to do X. I have a legal 
obligation to do X if the law requires me to do X, but it is 
likely to require more than just an examination of a statute 
in order to discover what the law does in fact require.
Questions about whether an agent A has a moral obligation
with respect to some action X are, first, questions about
whether (i.e. A's moral theory T) contains a principle P
that is applicable to the relevant situation according to the
rules of application of P, whether P requires X to be donef
and, if so, whether the rules of priority of P within T make
2 8P an important principle within T . Secondly, they may
concern gaps or deficiencies within of one or more of the
following types: (a) T may not contain a core principle
that ought to be acknowledged by any moral person; (b) there 
may be some defect in the rules of application of P within T^; 
(c) there may be an inconsistency between two or more 
principles within in, for example, rules of application or 
rules of priority; or (d) there may be some shortcoming in 
the application of rules of excuse and mitigation (e.g. 'You 
can't always claim that as an excuse for not doing XI*).
Questions of moral obligation are thus closely related 
to questions of the moral justification of actions, since 
obligations are important in reasoning about the moral 
justification of actions. But there is also another parallel, 
associated with the distinction between the different levels 
of justification: if A has a moral obligation to do X
according to his own moral theory but fails to take that into 
account in his reasoning about what to do, then he can be
12 9.
blamed for that failure. Similarly, if A has a conclusive 
moral obligation to do X yet fails to do X (assuming no change 
in the relevant circumstances), then he too can be blamed for 
that failure to act. But if the judgement that A has a moral 
obligation to do X is based upon a deficiency in A's moral 
theory, then although we can still say that he had a moral 
obligation to do X, we can only blame or condemn A for either 
failing to act according to a conclusive moral obligation, or 
for failing to take a moral obligation into account, if we 
judge that deficiency to be culpable.
To say to A 'You have a moral obligation to do X 1 can 
therefore be a way of making a moral charge against the 
justifiability of A's action, for it alleges that he has an 
important moral reason for doing X. This charge will embody 
one or more of the types of charges analysed in Chapter Two, 
Section 5, viz. wrongness, description, consistency,- causation, 
agent-justif.ication , action--justification , and practice- 
justification. It follows that the undermining and overriding 
response strategies appropriate to each type of charge can 
also be used against a charge made in the form of an alleged 
obligation to do X.
Moral obligations are thus personal rule-obligations.
They are what we are bound to do according to the ways the 
principles of our moral theory either do or should require 
us to act or to forbear.
I said earlier (p. 114) that political obligation can be 
understood in both a narrow sense, where it is concerned with 
whether there is a moral obligation to obey the law, and in a 
wider sense, where it is concerned with whether any moral 
obligations arise out of a person's role as a citizen. I 
want to suggest that political obligation in the wider sense
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is a combination of role-obligation and personal rule- 
obligation, and that political obligation in the narrower 
sense is a role-obligation expressed through a personal 
rule-obligation. In both cases, then, political obligation 
is a moral obligation.
To be a citizen of a country is to have a role to which
29certain entitlements are attached. A citizen is entitled 
to participate fully in the political life of the country, 
i.e. in matters concerned with the formation and execution 
of public policy. But the role of a citizen has a special 
significance from the moral point of view, because of the 
importance of political institutions and processes in helping 
to secure the common good - the conditions of communal life 
within which an_y person may be able to pursue a moral life. 
That role therefore carries with it certain duties which 
amount to obligations for the moral person since they are 
important reasons for acting qua moral person. In a modern 
liberal-democracy, rule (as distinct from government) is 
exercised by 'the people' (i.e. the body af citizens) via 
representative institutions through which the power to decide 
is delegated to some of their number who nonetheless remain 
formally accountable to the citizenry. A citizen's 
obligations within such a political system will encompass any 
activity that will help to secure and further the common good 
as interpreted by the liberal-democratic ideal, and to do so 
by liberal-democratic means. The citizen therefore has a 
moral obligation to be informed, to assess and criticise, to 
discuss, to participate, to vote, and to make his views known, 
for these are the mechanisms on which the liberal-democratic
ideal relies.
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Political Obligation in this wider sense is clearly a 
role-obligation. But it is also a personal rule-obligation; 
any moral person must recognise an obligation to act in ways 
that further the attainment of the common good, whether or not 
he is a citizen. The citizen has a role-obligation to 
participate in political life according to the forms and 
processes it takes within his society, and according to the 
resources and opportunities he has at his disposal. A moral 
person who is a citizen has additional avenues for implementing 
part of the core of morality, and thus has an obligation to use 
them.
Political obligation in this wider sense therefore 
combines role-obligation and personal rule-obligation. Never­
theless it is not conclusive, for it can be overridden by 
other obligations or important reasons for acting. An 
individual's obligations as citizen may be overridden by 
those he has as father, as teacher, or as judge. An 
individual's political obligations qua moral person may be 
similarly overridden. Nor do I mean to imply that these 
obligations must serve a conservative purpose with respect to 
a particular political system, for they may (perhaps in 
conjunction with other obligations and reasons for action) 
have a reformist or even a revolutionary role. A political 
system with no allowance for popular participation or with 
very restrictive criteria for citizenship is not immune from 
criticism, on the grounds that the argument outlined above 
entails acceptance of whatever political system one happens to 
be in, a sort of political quietism. On the contrary. Not 
only does the argument above provide a basis for acknowledging 
political obligations; it also provides a basis for criticism, 
and indeed action, where the communal ideal is distorted to 
favour a few or where popular influence on communal processes
132.
is unduly restricted without good reason in terms of communal. 
needs or interests. I shall return to these matters in Section 
3 of this Chapter.
I argued in Chapter One, Section 3 (pp. 31-32) that any 
moral person must acknowledge a general moral duty to obey the 
law where the institution of law is a means of providing the 
framework within which moral persons may be moral through seeking 
to achieve their own wants, needs, and purposes in a context 
where others are doing the same. Viewed from the moral point of 
view, lav; is a means of harmonising anybody' s interests in being 
able to act as he wishes (and hence in being a moral person) 
with those of anybody else. Insofar as it fulfils this role, 
therefore, any moral person has an important reason for 
obeying the law; he must acknowledge that the fact that some 
action is required by the law or is against the law is a good 
moral reason for doing or not doing that action as the case 
may be. The importance of the law as seen from the moral, point of 
view ■ means that there is an obligation to obey rather than a 
general moral duty to do so. It is an obligation that arises 
out of what it is to be a moral person; it is part of the core 
of morality, and hence must be acknowledged in any moral theory.
It is, therefore, a role-obligation that is expressed through a 
personal rule-obligation.
Again, the obligation to obey the law is not conclusive of 
30itself. It places the onus on the agent to show why he
(morally) ought not do as the law requires, given that he has a
31legal obligation to do so. The action required by law may be 
iniquitious, or the individual may regard the action forbidden 
by law as morally required. But these considerations can only 
serve to override the moral obligation to obey a particular law 
as an element of the institution of law. The obligation would
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only be undermined if it could be shown that the institution 
of law was not fulfilling its function according to the moral 
point of view or if the constraint of process was not 
satisfied. I shall discuss these points in the next Section 
and in Chapter Five.
3. The limits of political, obligation
The basis of a moral obligation to obey the law, then, 
lies in the role of the institution of law in helping to attain 
the common good. It arises out of a particular way of looking 
at what the law does within the society, viz. from the moral 
point of view. But looking at law in this way not only gives 
rise to a moral obligation to obey the law that must be 
acknowledged by any moral person; it also sets limits to that 
obligation. I argued in Chapter One, Section 3 (pp. 32-34) that 
there are two constraints to this obligation. The constraint 
of process requires that the standards of reasoned discourse 
applicable to the moral point of view itself are also 
applicable to law as a moral institution, i.e. to the process 
whereby some rule of behaviour acquires the status and force of 
law. The constraint of content requires that the fact that a 
law has been duly enacted according to the rules of the legal 
system and according to the processes of reasoned discourse 
does not necessarily mean that an individual would be wrong to 
disobey that law if it requires him to act contrary to the 
important and considered provisions of his own moral theory.
The purpose of this Section is to examine these two constraints 
more closely, and to look at how political obligation as a 
reason for acting enters into decisions about what to do in a 
particular case in response to a particular law. More detailed
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arguments in the context of civil disobedience will be given 
in Chapter Five.
The application of the standards of reasoned discourse to 
the processes and results of the operation of the legal and 
political systems means, in effect, acknowledgement of the 
autonomy and integrity of moral persons. Decisions and rules 
need to be supported by adequate reasons; those affected by a 
decision or a rule should have the real opportunity to 
participate, to have their views taken into account, and to 
influence the making of decisions and the enacting of rules; 
those given the power to act and enact on behalf of the 
community should be responsive to the wishes of the community 
and accountable to it; the decisions made and the rules 
enacted should not consistently favour one section of the 
community at the expense of another without good reason; 
benefits and burdens should be fairly distributed; force is 
to be used sparingly and as a. last resort; and exceptions to 
some of these conditions can only be justified on the basis of 
urgency and/or efficiency in attaining the common good.
These constraints of process sound like a recipe for a 
democratic political system, and so they are. But that does 
not mean that liberal-democracy is the only way that these ends 
might be attained. Nor does it mean that the political system 
of any country that calls itself a democracy must be given that 
status, and hence that any participant in the moral point of 
view therein must acknowledge a moral obligation to obey the 
law. There is ample empirical evidence to suggest, for 
example, that liberal-democratic systems do not (and perhaps 
cannot, if the arguments of Robert Michels are accepted) meet 
these objectives and do not depart from them for reasons based 
on any acceptable claim about the common good.'"'' In particular,
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systems based on the role of interest groups, whether straight
pluralist, or elite-pluralist/democratic-elitist, seem to work
in the interests of a few rather than all in the sense that the
34distributions of benefits and burdens are skewed.
Participation by most people in the political process (except 
through the minimal and - usually - infrequent avenue of voting) 
is sporadic, usually fruitless, difficult, frustrating, time- 
consuming, and expensive. Some of this is as it should be; the 
common interest in effective and efficient government means 
that some voices might on occasion have to be ignored, or 
access to decision-makers denied, or information about decisions 
or reasons for action withheld. But again the problem is that 
the voices that are ignored and the individuals to whom access 
is denied consistently belong to certain groups and not to 
others. Again, the operation of the political system is 
distorted at the expense of some of the community and in favour 
of others. In addition, the increase in the number and 
complexity of bureaucracies (both public and private) can make 
it more difficult for individuals and groups of all kinds to 
have an effect on the process of government. Again, in some 
respects, that is how it should be. Individuals and groups do 
not necessarily want to speak on behalf of the common interest, 
but rather on behalf of their own individual or sectional 
interests. Indeed, that is why many of these groups exist at 
all. But it is clear that some of them have much better access 
and much more influence than other groups and that they have a 
disproportionate effect on decision-making as a result. Perhaps 
this is understandable given the complexities and concerns of 
government in conjunction with the view that the voice of the 
populace should be heard. But that does not mean that it is 
inevitable or that it cannot be remedied, although perhaps only
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within the limits imposed by efficiency, urgency and expense.
Whether or not a political system is democratic thus has
an effect on the obligation to obey the law, not because
voting always implies an agreement to abide by the outcome,
or because there is some opportunity to influence policy and
decision. The participant in the moral point of view has an
obligation to obey the law based on the relationship between
35the moral role of 'the institutions of civil life' and the 
way that role is exercised. If the constraints of process are 
not satisfied, political obligation is undermined.
The constraint of content refers to the relation between 
a particular individual’s obligation to obey a particular law, 
the content of that law (what it requires him to do or forbids 
him to do) and the content of his own moral theory. It thus 
operates on a different level from the constraint of process, for 
we are now concerned with the way a general moral obligation to 
obey the law enters into the decision of a particular individual 
whether or not to obey this law.
I have argued that the obligation to obey the law is, 
in itself, non-conclusive for it can be overridden according to 
the rules of priority of an individual's moral theory. But the 
fact that it is an obligation, an important reason for acting, 
means that it cannot be overridden save by other reasons that 
are either important in themselves (and are thus also 
obligations) or that have priority in a particular context or 
situation. Thus, for example, we might allow that there are . 
circumstances in which the moral obligation to obey the law is 
overridden by another obligation to save a drowning person, or 
to protect and provide for one's family; or someone might say 
'I admit that I have a general moral obligation to obey the 
law, but on this occasion my moral principles require me not to.
137.
Of course, we will want to examine the reasoning used in 
each case, to see whether the overriding obligation or 
principle really is applicable and really does override.
But we cannot claim that there is anything inconsistent 
about the possibility that it might, that there is a logical 
reason or a reason based on the moral point of view itself 
why it cannot do so.
That there is an obligation to obey the law means no
more than that the fact that some rule of behaviour is a law
must be recognised by any participant in the moral point of
view as an important factor in his decision about whether or
not to do what the lav; requires. I do not argue that
political obligation must always be decisive for any individual
in respect of whether or not he ought always to obey the lav/.
That may be the case according to some individuals' moral
theories if their rules of priority are such that the
principle 'obey the law' always overrides all other principles
when it is applicable to a particular situation. That is not
3 6an incoherent position to adopt, nor is it uncommon. But 
it is an unreflective one, since it would elevate law, either 
in itself or as an important part of the political process, to 
a supreme role in the attainment of the common good. It also 
elevates the obligation to obey the law over all other moral 
obligations, e.g. to family, friends, even to the community as 
a whole. Again, this is not an impossible position, but it 
needs a great deal of argument to be persuasive.
That the moral obligation to obey the law is grounded in 
the law's role in helping attain the common good means that a 
legal system which did not fulfil that role would have no 
moral claim to obedience (although there might be other good, 
even moral, reasons for doing what is required by a particular
138.
law within that system) . And if we allow that the lav; might 
only secure the common good to a limited extent, then we will 
also allow that judgements about the weight of obligation 
with respect to a particular legal system can be a matter of 
degree. These judgements are not based on the extent to 
which the institution of law secures the conditions of social 
life within which particular moral persons may be moral.
Rather the question must be considered disinterestedly, from 
the point of view of any moral person. The possibility (indeed 
likelihood) of a considerable diversity of theories within the 
moral point of view must be taken into account in judging the 
extent to which the institution of law fulfils its moral role.
I do not suggest that the moral role of law means that 
it must secure all the conditions of social life within which 
individuals may be moral, only that it provides some. Nor do 
I suggest that the law is the only way that they may be, or 
are, secured, or that providing these conditions must exhaust 
the function of law. I am not arguing, thirdly, that it is 
the purpose of the lav; or the state to make men moral. The 
moral role of law - the function of law according to the moral 
point of view - is to use collective power in order to secure 
social life as such. A moral, person must acknowledge the 
conditions of social life as such as an important moral concern, 
since they make it possible for individuals to live together 
on terms of mutuality, respecting each other as persons and 
acknowledging that the wants, needs, interests and purposes 
of others must be important elements in deciding how to act 
and how to evaluate actions, however a particular moral person 
does so according to his own moral theory. Under certain 
conditions (concerning the size and level of development of 
the society), law is an empirically necessary means for
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establishing and maintaining that social life, although it 
is not the only means nor does it necessarily secure all 
the conditions of social life. Hence, under those conditions, 
law has a moral role. It may fulfil this role well or badly, 
partially or completely. That will depend in part on the 
circumstances of that society and on the other means it has 
for securing the conditions of social life (customs, traditions, 
etc.). And since the moral obligation to obey the lav; depends 
on the extent to which it fulfils this role, a system of lav; 
that does so only partially has only a partial moral claim to 
obedience, and one that fails to secure the common good at all 
has no moral claim at all on the obedience of moral persons.
What are the conditions of social life as such? Two of 
them are immediately obvious, for they coincide with the parts 
of the core areas of morality I have called truth and life.
The use of communal power to protect life is appropriate 
because without life, project-making and achieving are 
impossible. Life is a necessary condition for individuals' 
seeking their own ends, and hence it is appropriately 
protected through communal power. Similarly, truth is relied 
upon in many ways by individuals in formulating and executing 
their enterprises, and we have to rely on the truth of the 
statements of others in doing so. Truth is, therefore, also 
a candidate for communal protection through law, but a 
difficulty arises: how wide are we to cast the net, given the
inherent difficulties in detecting breaches without resorting 
to measures that are wrong or distasteful on other grounds 
(e.g. as invasions of privacy)? The line must therefore be 
drawn at a point (or through a series of points) that are 
important and serious matters and where truth can be required 
or where failure to tell the truth or deliberate deceit can
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be established with a reasonable degree of confidence without 
violating (or, at least, not too much) other important 
customs or principles. Hence we have laws against, e.g., 
perjury, misrepresentation, fraud, slander, etc., but not 
necessarily directly enforcing truth-telling in other everyday 
activities, although the misfortune or injury befalling one 
who relies on another's word in such cases can be considerable, 
even more so than in some of those matters covered directly by 
law. (Tort may of course provide remedies in some of these 
other cases.)
There is also another reason why law might regulate 
certain activities which might not in themselves warrant the 
exercise of public power. That is, broadly speaking, to 
protect the claims of anyone accused of doing certain things 
to be able to realise his projects. The law provides a means 
whereby persons who have no personal interest in a particular 
dispute or an alleged wrong decide impartially upon the merits 
of some accusations rather than let disputants contend among 
themselves with the risks to personal and public safety and 
convenience that might cause. As Locke recognised, it is 
important that there be a system which prevents others' 
passions and emotions from detrimentally affecting individuals 
in certain of their enterprises,and which endeavours to decide 
disputes on their merits, without prejudice or favour, and 
removes the need for lynch-mobs and their less drastic 
counterparts. These formal avenues are part of the common 
good because any moral person must realise that others' 
acting on prejudice, passion, and emotion can interfere with 
his project-making, whether such interference is deserved or 
not. Regulation of disputes through public power can be a 
means of securing the common good by both securing project-
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making from interference, and also by protecting the individual 
from being thwarted in his pursuit of his own projects by 
others who, rightly or wrongly, accuse him of interference with 
theirs.
The common good can thus be seen in both a negative and 
a positive light. The negative aspect is summed up by the 
notion of non-interference: any individual must be able to
pursue his ends provided that is compatible with others' doing 
the same. But there is also a more positive aspect to the 
common good: communal institutions have a role in assisting
individuals to have enterprises, or a wider range of enter­
prises than those associated with mere physical existence, by 
providing those who are disadvantaged in that respect with 
some assistance in over-coming their disadvantages. This 
does not mean that civil institutions must adopt a totally 
paternalistic role; it means that there are two ways of 
providing the conditions individuals need to pursue their ends: 
by removing the interference of other individuals, and by 
removing the interference of conditions and circumstances.
The latter can diminish or prevent the development or 
exercise of autonomy, and while we are all diminished in this 
way to some extent, some suffer from these disadvantages to an 
extent that the very probability of their having more than a 
very narrow range of projects is very low.
There are, then, aspects of the common good which it is 
the role of institutions of civil life to secure and of the 
law to promote and protect. These aspects are not exhausted 
by the areas of truth, life, and the protection and promotion 
of the possibilities of autonomy. It is difficult to be more 
than suggestive about some of these other areas, depending as 
they do on particular social arrangements and practices.
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Examples might be access to communal facilities, the distribution 
of particular burdens and benefits provided through communal 
effort, the facilitation of travel, education, health, the 
provision of laws and forms of marriage, property, currency - 
the list is large. That law is the means by which these 
provide a framework for individuals to establish and secure 
their ends and consider the wants, needs, interests and 
purposes of others in doing so means that law is inescapably 
a moral institution and that any participant in the moral 
point of view must recognise an obligation to obey the law as 
such.
What is the situation when the general obligation to obey 
the law is undermined through the failure of the lav/ to secure 
the common good at all? I have argued that there would then be 
no general moral obligation to accept the fact of a law 
concerning X as an important moral reason in any decision about 
whether to do X. But it does not follow that we would there­
fore be justified in doing X. The undermining of a general 
obligation to obey the law only removes one relevant and 
important factor from the whole range of factors that need to 
be taken into account in any decision about whether or not to 
do X. It does not, by itself, mean that there could be no 
other moral reasons relevant to that decision. One may still 
have a role-obligation to do X, or an agreement-obligation, or 
both. And there may be other relevant considerations depending 
on the principles of one's moral theory and their rules of 
application and priority. Thus, if political obligation is 
undermined, then the moral obligation to obey a particular law 
as law is also undermined, but that does not mean that 
disobedience is automatically justified.
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That the role of law in itself is to secure the common 
good, thus establishing a general moral obligation to obey for 
any participant in the moral point of view, does not mean that 
political obligation applies only to laws which do in fact 
secure the common good, or are likely to do so, and that there 
is no moral obligation to obey any other law. Political 
obligation arises out of the moral role of the institution of 
law as such; it does not depend on whether particular laws do 
or do not themselves help secure the common good. It is rather 
like the distinction between obedience and respect being due to 
someone in authority (in the legal-rational sense rather than 
in the charismatic or traditional senses); it is the office or 
the role that the person has that commands obedience and respect 
rather than it being due to that person. So it is with lav;. 
Obedience is owed to a particular law because of its status as 
law rather than because of its specific terms. Hence an 
obligation to obey the law establishes an obligation to obey 
all the laws within that legal system to which the categories 
'obedience' and 'disobedience' are appropriately applied, not 
just those laws that further the end of lav; as seen from the 
moral point of view. But it is worth stressing again that 
this obligation is not conclusive,for i t can be overridden by 
the content, of a particular law or the way it is administered.
The constraint of content is another way of putting the 
argument of the last few pages. The obligation to obey the 
law in general is not absolute. The fact that some action X 
is required or prohibited by law must enter into a moral 
person's reasoning about whether or not he would be justified 
in doing X, but that fact alone is not itself necessarily 
conclusive concerning whether he ought to do X. It is, of 
course, possible that, an individual's own moral theory could
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make the legal status of X an overriding moral consideration.
But that would in part be to abrogate his role as a participant 
in the moral point of view, for it would be to turn lav; into an 
overriding moral authority and hence deny his own responsibility 
to ensure that he_ is the author of his own actions and is to be 
held morally responsible for them. Of course, if a person holds 
that the particular requirements of the law are the same as the 
requirements of 'true' rationality or of ’true' morality, and 
that an individual ought therefore act according to law even 
though his own reasoning indicates that he should not, then he 
is again avoiding the requirements of being a morally autonomous 
person in the sense of taking moral responsibility for his own 
actions. Subordination of individual moral judgement to some 
external authority is a denial of the reasoned nature of moral 
discourse, because it removes the onus on the individual to 
decide for himself on the morally justified course of action.
It is an eschewal of some of the requirements of participation 
in the moral point of view.
4. Political obligation as agreement-obligation
I argued in Section 2 (pp. 120-125) that there are three 
different kinds of obligations corresponding to three kinds of 
reasons for saying that someone has an obligation to do X. I 
called these role-obligations, rule-obligations (further 
divided into personal rule-obligations and institutional rule- 
obligations) , and agreement obligations. My purpose in the next 
two Sections is to use this typology to examine three other 
arguments about political obligation. The first, to be 
discussed in this Section, alleges that we have an obligation 
to obey the law because we have agreed to do so. The second is 
Rousseau’s argument that we have an obligation to obey when the
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law corresponds to our real will. The third I shall examine . 
is T.H. Green's version of the claim that we have an obligation 
to obey because it is for the common good that we should do so.
My discussion of each of these theories is, of necessity, brief 
for my aim is to show why they are unsatisfactory, not to 
engage in lengthy exegesis nor to contest the finer points of 
textual interpretation.
There are obvious advantages in being able to show that 
individuals have an agreement-obligation to obey the law.
Such a basis for political obligation would satisfy those who 
hold that an individual can only have a moral obligation 
through his own voluntary actions. One's obligation to obey 
the law can thus be treated as analogous to a promise to do so, 
and it is clear how promises create moral obligations. Secondly, 
it provides a clear basis on which to judge the legitimacy of 
the exercise of political power. The individual has an 
obligation to obey as long as the terms of the agreement are 
adhered to, whatever these might be; the obligation is thus, 
in some sense, reciprocal and the exercise of political power 
may be limited by the terms of the agreement. Thirdly, it 
seems to give a simple and unambiguous test for the obligation 
to obey the law: if a person has agreed to obey, then he has
an obligation to do so; if he has not agreed, then there is 
no obligation. And whether or not he has agreed is an event, 
and it is an empirical matter whether or not such an event has 
taken place.
Broadly speaking, there are two (often related) kinds of
agreement-obligation theories of political obligation: social
contract, and consent. The classical versions of social
contract theory are Hobbes's Leviathan and Locke's Second
37Treatise on Civil Government..' ' (I consider Rousseau's Du
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Contrat Social below in discussing general will theory.)
Both hold in one form or another that individuals have an
obligation to obey the law because they have entered into a
contract whereby each agrees not to exercise certain ’natural
rights' and to obey a central authority set up under the terms
3 8of the contract in order to safeguard individuals' rights.
There are two obvious objections to social contract theories
39thus conceived. In the first place, actual examples of
40social contracts seem rare, yet their authors clearly do not 
intend to imply that only those who were party to such an event 
have an obligation to obey the law. Secondly, even if there 
were an event that could properly be described as entering into 
a social contract, there is still the problem of how the 
successors of the parties to the original contract can be said 
to have an obligation to obey the law.
The obvious solution, of course, is to deny that the 
theory is meant to be taken literally as reporting an actual 
historical event and to claim, instead, that it is meant to be 
no more than a heuristic device - a thought experiment - in 
order to underline a claim that the relationship between 
citizen and government may be seen as if it were a kind of 
contract. It is a particular way of looking at the individual 
and the requirement that he obey the law, i.e. from the legal 
point of view, and thus of being able to emphasise certain 
things - that political obligation is voluntary, that it is a 
moral obligation, that it is reciprocal, and that it is limited 
by adherence to the terms of the contract. The state of nature 
thus becomes a way of pointing to the need for government ~ and 
hence for obligation, and the impossibility of allowing the 
unfettered exercise of even natural rights. But although
government is necessary, it is only legitimate if it acts in
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certain ways - within boundaries more or less widely defined. 
That government is necessary, in other words, does not mean 
that any government at all must be obeyed, although Hobbes 
comes close to this point when he defines the sovereign in 
terms which are also the sufficient conditions of its 
legitimacy.^
But this obvious solution is also the reason why social 
contract theory is ultimately unsatisfactory, for it is now 
not at all clear what work the notion of 'contract' is doing.
The theory seems to be saying no more than 'in some respects, 
the relations between the individual and government are like 
those between the parties to a contract, and hence there is an 
obligation to obey the government just as there is an 
obligation to abide by the terms of a contract.' There may be 
some similarities between the obligations owed under a contract 
and the individual's obligation to obey the law, but there are 
also differences that are important enough to make the term 
'contract' as likely to mislead as it is to enlighten.
Consent theory of political obligation fares little better.
Of course, there is no single mould into which all consent
theories fit neatly. The classical statement of the theory is
again in Locke's Second Treatise; Joseph Tussman and Harry
Beran try to avoid the problems in Locke's theory, although
they generally share his aims. Hanna Pitkin argues that there
is a better theory implicit in the arguments of both Locke and
42Tussman. I shall discuss each writer in turn.
Consent is absolutely central to Locke's account of 
legitimate government: 'Men being ... by nature all free, 
equal, and independent, no one can be put out of his estate 
and subjected to the political power of another without his 
own consent ...' (ST, 95). By giving his consent to 'make
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one body politic under one government', a man ’puts himself .
under an obligation to everyone of that society to submit to
the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it
(ST, 97). But Locke recognises that there are problems
about what is to count as giving consent. As is now notorious,
he argues that there are two ways of doing so: expressly and
tacitly. As the term implies, express consent is the voluntary
use of particular forms of words in particular circumstances,
or perhaps the voluntary performance of certain 'actions' with
the clear understanding of what it is that one is doing. Locke
is clear that express consent is the only means of forming
political society or of becoming a 'perfect' member and hence
4 3a subject of it once formed (ST, 119; 122). Men are not
born members or subjects of any political community; they
only become so through express consent. Locke is especially
obtuse in his account of express consent, particularly that of
the descendants of the 'Founding Fathers'. Ke holds that a
party to the original contract must also put his possessions
under the jurisdiction of the government (ST, 120). This is
particularly true of possessions in land, since the government's
jurisdiction is defined territorially. Locke says that those
who will 'enjoy the inheritance of their ancestors ... must take
it on the same terms their ancestors had it, and submit to all
the conditions annexed to such a possession' (ST, 73; cf. 116-
117). And since commonwealths do not permit
any part of their dominions to be dismembered, 
nor to be enjoyed by any but those of their 
community, the son cannot ordinarily enjoy the 
possessions of his father but under the same 
terms his father did, by becoming a member of 
the society, whereby he puts himself presently 
under the government he finds there established, 
as much as any other subject of that commonwealth^
(ST, 117)
This suggests that anyone who inherits land from a member of the
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body politic must also give his express consent and thereby 
himself become a member. Yet Locke also implies that simple 
ownership of land does not amount to or entail express consent, 
but only that the owner submit to the government (ST, 120). 
Finally, express consent is irrevocable; once the individual 
has given it, he is
perpetually and indispensably obliged to be, and 
remain unalterably a subject of it, and can never 
be again in the liberty of the state of nature, 
unless by any calamity the government he was under 
comes to be dissolved; or else by some public act 
cuts him off from being any longer a member of it.
(ST, 121)
Locke recognises, as of course he must, that not everybody
who is required to obey a government need have given their
express consent to do so. Since it is clearly unacceptable for
him to conclude that they have no obligation to obey the lav;,
Locke relies upon 'a common distinction’ (ST, 119) between
express and tacit consent to account for their situation. There
are, he says, two parts to the question of tacit consent:
what ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent, 
and how far it binds.... And to this I say, that 
every man that hath any possession or enjoyment 
of any part of the dominions of any government 
doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as 
far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of 
that government, during such enjoyment, as any 
one under it, whether this his possession be of 
land to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging 
only for a week; or whether it be barely 
travelling freely on the highway; and, in effect, 
it reaches as far as the very being of anyone 
within the territories of that government. (S_T, 119)
Since the area of the jurisdiction of the government is 
defined according to the land possessed by those who participate 
in the original contract, that jurisdiction extends to anyone 
who ’dwells upon and enjoys’ (ST, 121) that land - whether or 
not he has expressly consented to the government and hence 
whether or not he is a member of the body politic.
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Whoever therefore, from thenceforth, by \ .
inheritance, purchase, permission, or 
otherwise enjoys any part of the land so 
annexed to, and under the government of that 
commonwealth, must take it with the condition 
it is under; that is, of submitting to the 
government of the commonwealth, under whose 
jurisdiction it is, as far forth as any 
subject of it. (ST, 120)
Unlike the member and 'perpetual subject' of a commonwealth
(ST, 122), however, the land owner who tacitly consents to
submit to the law through living on and enjoying his land must
obey only while he does so:
so that whenever the owner, who has given 
nothing but such a tacit consent to the 
government, will, by donation, sale or 
otherwise, quit the said possession, he is 
at liberty to go and incorporate himself 
into any other commonwealth, or agree with 
others to begin a new one in vacuis locis, 
in any part of the world they can find free 
and unpossessed___(ST, 121)
The argument then seems to be this: the express consents
of the original parties to the contract of government define 
the original territorial jurisdiction of that government. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that these boundaries are 
not varied by conquest or by additions of territory through 
further acts of express consent, these initial boundaries 
remain the limits of that government's jurisdiction for as 
long as it shall last. Any person born within its boundaries 
is not thereby its subject: 'He is under his father's tuition
and authority till he come to age of discretion, and then he 
is a free man, at liberty what government he will put himself 
under, what body politic he will unite himself to' (ST, 118).. 
He is free not to do so at all; but if he inherits property 
from a member of the body politic, he too must also become a 
member (he may of course choose to renounce his inheritance if 
this or any other condition is unacceptable to him). Those 
who have not given express consent must nevertheless submit to
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the laws of the government while they are within its juris­
diction. By remaining there, 'enjoying privileges and 
protection under them' (ST, 122), the individual pays the laws 
the 'homage1 of acknowledging their jurisdiction over him and 
his possessions - provided, of course, he is not in a state of 
war with the government. He must obey the laws laid down by 
the majority of the members of the body politic just as they 
must; the government protects his 'life, liberty and estates' 
(ST, 87) just as if he had expressly consented. The rational 
man in the state of nature knows this; he merely consents in 
a way that differs from that given by those who become members 
of the body politic.
But therein lies the problem with tacit consent as a 
ground of political obligation, for it is now no longer a 
matter of consent unless that notion is stretched beyond the 
limits of credibility. While we may accept express consent as 
a case of agreement-obligation, it is difficult to see how 
tacit consent still retains that element of voluntarism that 
Locke needs in order to be able to say that the individual has 
consented and thereby has an obligation to obey. There is, 
of course, a sense in which it is legitimate to speak of 
consent as tacitly given. If someone is required to do some­
thing, or is asked to authorise something to be done on his 
behalf, and if he understands it as such, has the opportunity 
to disagree and is not coerced into acquiescence, then silence 
on the matter can be taken as amounting to consent. Such things 
are part of the conventions of our everyday life and language. 
But they are absent from Locke's account of tacit consent taken 
as given in the ways he mentions. It may be that travelling 
on the highways or not emigrating can rightly be taken as signs 
of tacit consent on the part of some people. But they cannot
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be taken as signs of tacit consent on the part of anyone who .
does such things, for some of the essential conditions for
the giving of consent, whether express or tacit, are absent.
To say that some of the things that people normally do in the
course of their everyday lives are to be taken as tacit consent
to do something else, despite their ignorance of the
implications that are to be drawn from these actions and
despite the lack of reasonable opportunities to live in any
other way, is to devalue the idea of consent to an extent that
renders it virtually meaningless. It is, as Margaret Macdonald
remarks concerning the very question of political obligation,
4 4'to stretch the bounds of language beyond significance'.
There is another element in Locke's account of tacit
consent that deserves to be mentioned, although it plays a
subordinate role within his argument. It is the notion that
receiving benefits from and through law and government gives
4 5rise to an obligation to obey the law. Thus that someone 
receives the benefits of public highways, of property laws 
(security, inheritance), or public education and defence, is 
said to imply that he has a moral obligation to obey the 
law in general, for we owe something in return for the benefits 
we can only receive through public power and public law. This 
obligation is an agreement-obligation in a somewhat tenuous 
sense, for some of the benefits alleged to give rise to the 
obligation are public goods that are provided whether or not 
particular individuals agree that they should be, or make use. 
of them.
This argument contains an element of truth, although no 
more than that, and this element is usually generalised in 
arguments that rely on it so that it becomes the whole of the 
truth about political obligation. The element of truth is
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that the role of law in securing and maintaining the common - 
good does provide some of the ground for political obligation.
But it may also be the case, however, that the institution of 
law succeeds in securing the common good, yet specific laws 
may provide benefits to some but not to others, or no benefits 
at all; this may affect (but it does not necessarily determine) 
the decision whether to obey that law, but only in an over­
riding sense, not in an undermining sense. Just what is to 
count as a benefit is also, of course, open to dispute; what 
is a benefit to one may be a burden to another. The distribution 
of benefits and burdens may also be unjustifiably inequitable.
It thus becomes rather odd to say that whatever benefits I 
receive, whether I want them or not, whether I agree that they 
are benefits or not, and whatever my share of benefits compared 
to the shares of others, I nevertheless have an obligation to 
obey because I have received some benefit.
This seems to be Hobbes's argument: that the sovereign
removes the state of nature and thereby secures peace is to
my benefit, and I therefore have an obligation to obey, but
4 6only to obey whoever can provide that benefit. The return 
to the state of nature would be the summurn malum; hence I 
must obey the dictates of the sovereign, for they are the 
necessary means for avoiding the worst of all conceivable 
fates. Avoiding the war of all against all is the only benefit 
worth worrying about; all else is insignificant. I have an 
obligation to obey even if that is the only benefit I receive, 
and even if the price of my receiving it is to have to bear a 
disproportionate share of burdens.
There are two strategies for countering Hobbes's 
argument. The first, and perhaps the least satisfactory, is 
to try to undermine it by arguing that it is simply not the
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case that the alternatives are or must be as Hobbes puts them
- the state of nature or an obligation to obey an absolute 
4 7sovereign. It could be argued that the absence of a 
sovereign would not lead to the desperate conditions Hobbes 
pictures, but rather to another kind of society - perhaps 
small, regulated by considerations of kinship, tradition and 
morality - wherein covenants do not need to be backed by the 
sword and the constant 'motion' of men in search of self- 
satisfaction does not lead to conflicts which can only be 
resolved through superior power. Such has, of course, been 
the dream of the Utopians, the communitarians, and some 
anarchists. The weakness of the argument, however, is that 
it needs to show that such a society is both possible and 
likely to survive. That seems to me to be an extremely 
difficult task, but not necessarily an impossible one given 
certain environmental, historical and cultural conditions.
Hence this strategy for responding to Hobbes remains less 
than convincing.
The second strategy is also undermining. It consists in 
admitting that there is a moral obligation to obey the 
sovereign, but denying that this must necessarily be an 
absolute obligation that overrides all other obligations. I 
have argued that it is part of the moral point of view itself 
that there is a moral obligation to obey the lav.7, but that this 
obligation is not thereby conclusive for any moral person when 
deciding how to act. A particular individual may decide to 
make it override all other moral principles within his own 
moral theory, but that cannot be enough for Hobbes. I have 
also argued, however, that to do so would be to compromise the 
individual's responsibility for deciding how to act, and that 
to succumb to the power or authority of the law by giving the
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Obligation to obey the law the highest priority would be to
eschew that responsibility. Hobbes's argument is therefore
inconsistent with part of the moral point of view itself, and
4 8must therefore fail.
Joseph Tussman is one writer who does not shrink from the 
problems associated with consent theory. He regards the body 
politic (particularly a democratic one) as 'a system of agree­
ments'. It therefore rests on the consent of its members:
To be a member [of a body politic] is to 
acknowledge that one's own interests are 
only a part of a broader system of 
interests, that other members have theirs 
as you have yours, and that it is the 
function of government to promote and safe­
guard the entire system, of which yours is 
a part but no more significant a part than 
any other 's ....
To be a member of a body politic is thus 
to be a voluntary party to a basic agree­
ment or system of agreements which involves 
the subordination of private to public 
interest and of private to public decision 
and which establishes a claim to a broad 
range of rights.49
Tussman is not very specific about the acts of 'native' (i.e.
non-naturalised) citizens 'which can be taken as a sign that
one has become a party to the system of agreements constituting
50a body politic'. But he does hold that one necessary
condition of consent, whether tacit or express, is that it be
done '"knowingly"', that it be 'understood by the one performing
the act that his action involves his acceptance of the
51obligations of membership'. Tussman therefore rejects Locke's
view of the kinds of actions that may be taken as indications
of tacit consent. It means, he writes, that
we must accept it as a plain fact that many 
native 'citizens' have in no meaningful 
sense agreed to anything. They have never 
been asked and have never thought about it.
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They are political child-brides who have . .
a status they do not understand and which 
they have not acquired by their own consent.... 
Non-consenting adult citizens are, in effect, 
like minors who are governed without their 
own consent. The period of tutelage and 
dependence is unduly prolonged.52
Yet Tussman does not examine the implications of this 
argument, for he does not confront the question: why should 
these political 'child-brides' obey? He certainly holds that 
they may be coerced into obedience, but he does not stop to 
examine the legitimacy of that coercion.
The theories of political obligation of Locke and Tussman 
based on consent are thus inadequate. Pitkin claims, however, 
that both writers can be interpreted in such a way as to yield 
a more acceptable theory of political obligation based on 
consent. i will not discuss the adequacy of her interpretations
of Locke and Tussman, but will examine the theory itself.
5 3Pitkin calls it the theory of 'hypothetical consent'. She
argues that, in fact, the
Lockean doctrine becomes this: your personal
consent is essentially irrelevant to your 
obligation to obey, or its absence. Your 
obligation to obey depends on the character 
of the government - whether it is acting 
within the bounds of the (only possible) 
contract. If it is, and you are in its 
territory, you must obey. If it is not, then 
no amount of personal consent from you, no 
matter how explicit, can create an obligation 
to obey it.... As long as a government's 
actions are within the bounds of what such a 
contract hypothetically would have had to 
provide, those living within its territory 
must obey.... The only 'consent' that is 
relevant is the hypothetical consent imputed 
to hypothetical, timeless, abstract, rational 
men.54
And in the case of Tussman's argument she writes:
Thus a different doctrine begins to emerge 
between the lines of Tussman's book, as it 
did with Locke. It is not so much your 
consent nor even the consent of a majority 
of the aware few in your society that 
obligates you. You do not consent to be 
obligated, but rather are obligated to
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consent, if the government is just. Your \ .
obligation has something to do with the 
objective characteristics of the government 
- whether, for example, its 'tribunals' are 
or are not 'corrupt1. Again the relevant 
consent seems to be best interpreted as 
hypothetical or constructive - the abstract 
consent that would be given by rational men.
Like Locke, Tussman can be pushed back to 
this position: you are obligated neither by
your own consent nor by that of the majority, 
but by the consent rational men in a hypo- 
thetical 'state of nature' would have to give.3
Actual consent, whether express or tacit, therefore becomes
irrelevant as a basis of political obligation, understood as a
way of indicating which considerations are relevant in deciding
whether to obey. Instead, hypothetical consent tells us to
look to 'the nature of the government - its characteristics,
56structure, activities, functioning'. But the obligations 
that arise‘because of the relations between the actual 
characteristics of the government in question and the 
characteristics which 'rational men would, abstractly and
57hypothetically, have to give to a government they are founding'
are still only prima facie obligations,  ^for there still
remains the possibility of justified resistance on utilitarian 
59grounds.
The theory of hypothetical consent of political 
obligation is similar to the general will and common good 
theories I shall discuss below. There is, however, one final 
question to be considered before I do so: in what ways is 
the theory of hypothetical consent a theory of consent? The 
difficulty is that the theory seems to amount to this: you
have an obligation to obey if the government deserves the 
consent of rational men. But it now seems superfluous to 
speak of consent at all, for the introduction of the notion of 
rationality removes all trace of the voluntarism necessary to 
consent. Hypothetical consent is not a matter on which the
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individual may exercise any freedom of choice; if the 1 *
government is of a certain kind, he must consent to obey, 
for he would be irrational not to. Hypothetical consent is 
not consent at all.
Consent theory of political obligation thus seems
destined to founder on the problem of answering Locke's
questions: 'what ought to be looked upon as tacit consent,
and how far it binds' (ST, 119). Either the consent theorist
must admit that few people within the state have actually
consented and hence that few must acknowledge political
obligation, or he must concede that the actions and conditions
taken to signify consent empty the notion of moral significance.
Harry Beran has, however, made a bold attempt at a defence of
consent theory. He argues that
consent is (at least) a necessary condition of 
political obligation.... Consent consists in 
acceptance of membership in a state by each 
person who is under political obligation.... 
Native-born citizens implicitly agree to obey 
when they cease to be political minors and 
accept adult status, that is, full membership, 
in the state.60
Beran allows the obvious objections to implicit consent;
there must be no coercion or deception, etc. Persons unable
to leave the state 'can avoid political obligation by ...
declaring publicly and to the appropriate officials that they
are not accepting membership in the state'.^ Yet he does not
say nearly enough about the crucial notion of what it is to be
a member in the state. Being a member simpliciter seems to
amount to no more than being within the jurisdiction of the 
6 2state. ~ Beran seems to think that a person accepts full 
membership of the state either through naturalisation or 
through being a native-born adult who is subject to the state 
and who has not renounced full membership. But Beran's examples 
of the differences between 'political minors' and full members
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are in terms of legal rights (to hold public office, to vote,
6 3to leave the country, to sue, to serve on juries ). There 
are two difficulties with this. The first is a minor one: 
an individual’s renunciation of full membership would have to 
be in terms of the exercise of rights rather than merely 
having the rights, since these will typically be granted to 
others besides himself. Secondly, in many countries there is 
a law requiring native-born adults to be on the electoral roll 
provided they fulfil certain age and residency requirements. 
Being on the roll is a necessary precondition for being able 
to vote, to serve on juries, or to hold some public offices. 
Rights to sue and to leave the country without permission, on 
the other hand, typically do not require any such condition. 
Beran thus 'seems committed to the odd claim that there is no 
political obligation to obey the electoral enrolment laws.
Yet it is precisely those rights that are the most plausible 
indicators of full membership of the state rather than the 
right to sue, the right to leave the country, or simply being 
an adult within its territory. (I ignore the aberration of 
compulsory voting.) Hence full membership is not as automatic 
as Beran implies; one has a legal obligation to become a full 
member. But that seems to be coercive and hence to fall short 
of implicit consent.
5. The general will and the common good
I have argued that any moral person must recognise a moral 
obligation to obey the law where the institution of lav; helps 
to secure the conditions of communal life. This is similar to 
Rousseau's theory of the general will and to the theory of 
political obligation based on the common good developed by the 
English Idealist T.H. Green. The aim of this Section is to show
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why these two theories are unsatisfactory. I shall suggest, . 
however, that each does contain the basis of a coherent theory 
of political obligation, a 'rational kernel within a mystical 
shell' to borrow a famous phrase. Each needs to be 
prevented from claiming too much.
The claims of Rousseau's theory of the general will and
6 4the standard criticisms of it are common currency. His aim, 
he says, is to 'inquire whether it be possible, within the 
civil order, to discover a legitimate and stable basis of 
Government' {SC, I, Note) wherein the natural liberty and 
moral autonomy of each individual may be preserved. Since 
'Might can produce no Right, the only foundation left for 
legitimate authority in human societies is Agreement' (SC, I, 
4). Men are born free; for a man to renounce this natural 
liberty is for him to renounce 'his essential manhood, his 
rights, and even his duty as a human being.... It is incompat­
ible with man's nature, and to deprive him of his free will is 
to deprive his actions of all moral sanction' (SC, I, 4).
Hence the agreement which establishes legitimate authority 
must both limit his natural ffeedom and strength while at the 
same time it allows him to look to his own preservation and 
'that care which it is his duty to devote to his own concerns' 
(SC, I, 6).
This difficulty ... can be expressed as follows: 
'Some form of association must be found as a 
result of which the whole strength of the 
community will be enlisted for the protection 
of the person and property of each constituent 
member, in such a way that each, when united 
to his fellows, renders obedience to his own 
will, and remains as free as he was before.'
That is the basic problem of which the Social 
Contract provides the solution. (SC, I, 6)
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Each party to the contract gives all his natural irights . 
to the community; he 'gives himself to all' and hence 'gives 
himself to none' (S_C, I, 6) . The act of association 
establishes 'a moral and collective body', a 'public person', 
a 'Body Politic' (SC, I, 6; emphasis in original). Just as 
there is a difference in the individual between will and 
strength (the 'two causes' which 'combine to produce every 
free action' (SC, III, 1)), so too there is a difference in the 
body politic between will and strength. The former is 
legislative power, the latter executive power (SC!, Ill, 1) . 
Legislative power is an exercise of the 'general will' of the 
sovereign people; it is general in both the objects it seeks 
(i.e. the common interest) as well as in its origins as the 
will of all within the collectivity (S_C, II, 4, 6). Executive 
power is the means whereby the strength of the body politic is 
converted into action 'in accordance with the instructions of 
the general will' (SC, III, 1). It is exercised through 
government,
an intermediate body set up to serve as a 
means of communication between subjects 
and sovereign and it is charged with the 
execution of the laws and the maintenance 
of liberty, both civil and political.(SC, III, 1)
Sovereignty is both inalienable and indivisible (S_C, II, 
1-2). The general will 'is always right and ever tends to the 
public advantage' (SC, II, 3). It has the common interest as 
its aim; it has the force of law, is equitable, useful, and 
firm (SC, II, 4). It must therefore be distinguished from the 
will of all, for that is concerned with 'interests that are 
partial, being itself but the sum of individual wills' (SC, II, 
3). Hence there should be no 'intruiging groups and partial 
associations ... formed to the disadvantage of the whole', for 
their wills are only 'partial in respect of the State' (SC, II, 
3) .
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In obeying the general will, therefore, the individual
is obeying himself, for the general will is_ his will as a
member of the collectivity (SC, II, 4). As a member of the
body politic, he prescribes to himself those laws which he
ought to obey as a subject of the law. Hence he has an
obligation to obey them, for in participating in the social
contract he gains those conditions of life 'which determine
the existence of a civil society' (SC, II, 6) and hence within
which he can achieve perfectibility. By moving from the state
of nature to civil society, man allows himself to overcome 'the
cravings of appetite' and must now 'consult his reason and not
merely respond to the promptings of desire' (S_C, I, 8) . His
faculties 'develop', his sentiments become 'enabled', his whole
soul is 'elevated'; he turns 'from a limited and stupid animal
into an intelligent being and a Man' (SC, I, 8).
What a man loses as a result of the Social 
Contract is his natural liberty and his 
unqualified right to lay hands on all that 
tempts him, provided only that he can 
compass its possession. What he gains is 
civil liberty and the ownership of what 
belongs to him....
To the benefits conferred by the status of 
citizenship might be added that of Moral 
Freedom, which alone makes man his own 
master. For to be subject to appetite is 
to be a slave, while to obey the laws laid 
dovm by society is to be free.(SC, I, 8)65
Even this brief sketch of Rousseau's theory is enough to
indicate that there are many parallels (as well as considerable
differences) between his theory of political obligation and
mine - the emphasis on membership, the role of public institutions
in helping secure the conditions of communal life, the implications
6 6for politics and the political structure, and the importance 
of the identity of interests between each person within the 
community. Yet I want to suggest that Rousseau's theory is open 
to criticism in three areas: his account of will, his notion
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of what it is to have an obligation, and the implications of 
his theory for obedience to actual governments.
Rousseau clearly places great importance on the analogy 
between the part will plays in human actions and in the actions of 
the body politic. Just as the individual acts freely only when 
will and strength combine ('the will determines the act'; 'the 
strength ... executes it' (SC, III, 1)), so too the body 
politic needs both will and strength, i.e. legislative power 
and executive power, in order to act freely. But this will 
(logically) cannot be partial; it is the will the individual 
has as a party to the social contract, and continues to have 
as a member of the sovereign people. And since the social 
contract has opened the possibility of the perfectibility of 
his nature - a possibility which it is the task of the sovereign 
people to realise - in obeying the will of the body politic 
(the general will) the individual is obeying his own 'real' will.
There are two difficulties with this account of will:
(i) Rousseau seems to be suggesting that there are two
'parts' to the will any individual exercises in acting, one
concerned with the interests he has in common with the other
members of the community, the other with his own partial and
6 7private interests. The individual is free to the extent that 
his will is informed by reason rather than by appetite. He 
must therefore recognise that the common interest provides the 
conditions within which he can be free in pursuing his private 
interests. Hence his actions always ought to be in accordance 
with his real will - or with laws laid down by the general will 
and enforced through executive power. But the use of the term 
'will' is singularly unhelpful in this context. Rousseau's 
theory is based on 'metaphysical dualism'^^and as such it 
succumbs to Ryle’s devastating attack in Chapter 3 of The
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69Concept of Mind. It seems highly dubious, moreover, 
whether we can legitimately speak of two ’parts' of an 
individual's will, given the possibility that the 'part' 
concerned with the common interest may never be clearly 
expressed in his actions.
(ii) But even if we allow Rousseau to use 'will' as he does, it
is still far from clear whether he can move quite so easily
from the will of the individual to that of the collectivity.
Here again we seem to be in a situation analogous to Pitkin's
'hypothetical consent' discussed in the previous Section; all
members of the body politic have identical wills qua members;
we do not therefore need an assembly to determine what the
general will is except insofar as such an arrangement assists
in arriving at the general will by 'cancelling out' private
differences. But there is no guarantee that it will do so,
and hence no guarantee that the decisions of the assembly
deserve obedience. But even if these decisions do approximate
the general will, it will have done so, Bosanquet says, through
enthroning the Will of All.... By reducing the 
machinery for the expression of the common good 
to the isolated and unassisted judgement of the 
members of the whole body of citizens, Rousseau 
is ensuring the exact reverse of what he 
professes to aim at. He is appealing from the 
organised life, institutions, and selected 
capacity of a nation to that nation regarded as 
an aggregate of isolated individuals. And, 
therefore, he is enthroning as sovereign, not 
the national mind, but that aggregate of private 
interests and ideas which he has himself 
described as the Will of All.70
Bosanquet has a point (even allowing for the use of 'the
national mind'). In claiming that the general will can emerge
out of voting, Rousseau seems to be saying that both parts of
the individual's will are expressed in a11 his actions, even
those directed towards private interests. Hence even when
individuals vote according to their private interests, the
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remainder when these interests have cancelled each other out 
(as he assumes they must) is the general will. But it is 
quite unclear how both aspects of an individual's will, 
particular and general, may be expressed in a single act of 
voting, especially as it is possible that they may be contra­
dictory in their objects.
I suggest, then, that Rousseau's use of 'will' creates
71too many problems to be acceptable. I have tried to achieve 
much the same results as Rousseau through the notion of being 
a participant in the moral point of view, and what follows from 
it. If that attempt is at all successful, the troublesome 
notion of will and the hazardous distinctions which Rousseau 
has to make in order to establish political obligation may be 
avoided while still preserving the moral autonomy of the 
individual at the centre of political philosophy.
The second and third areas in which Rousseau's theory of 
political obligation is open to criticism (his notion of 
obligation, and the implications of his theory for obedience 
to actual governments) may be dealt with rather more briefly.
Let us grant Rousseau's account of the general will, and assume 
that a particular law is clearly in accordance with the general 
will. There is then a clear moral obligation to obey that law. 
But Rousseau implies that political obligation is absolute; not 
to obey the lav/ can lead one to be forced to be free. Moreover, 
since
sovereign power, albeit absolute, sacrosanct, 
and inviolable, does not, and cannot, trespass 
beyond the limits laid down by general agree­
ment, ... every man has full title to enjoy 
whatever of property and freedom is left to 
him by that agreement. The sovereign is never 
entitled to lay a heavier burden on any one of 
its subjects than on others, for, should it do 
so, the matter would at once become particular 
rather than general, and, consequently, the 
sovereign power would no longer be competent to deal with it. (SC, II, 4)
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That the general will has pronounced concerning an 
individual's action must, therefore, decide the matter, and 
must override all other obligations. My account of 
obligations in general, and political obligation in particular, 
in Sections 2 and 3 of this Chapter will make it clear that I 
regard this conclusion as too sweeping, since I hold that 
political obligation must enter into decisions on how to act, 
not that it must necessarily be absolute. For Rousseau to 
elevate obedience to law that is in accordance with the general 
will to the supreme position in an individual's decision-making, 
and to force him to be free should he not do so, is to renounce 
autonomy even while attempting to retain it through the sub­
terfuge of a 'real' will.
Let us now consider the implications of Rousseau's theory 
for moral and political practice, and grant his claim that 
the general will is the ideal for the legitimate exercise of 
political power, the attainment of which, however, must be 
tempered by conditions and circumstances (SC, III, 8, 9, 15). 
When we look at the kinds of political communities 
Rousseau thought would be necessary even to approximate the 
ideal of the general will and at the scope that laws must have 
if they are to emulate the general will, even imperfectly, it 
soon becomes clear that we would be forced to conclude both 
that we would have no moral obligation to obey the laws 
enacted by any actual government in the world today if we were 
within its jurisdiction, but also that we could have no such 
obligation given the large populations and the role of 
interest-groups in modern states and the consequent 
impossibility of getting anywhere near the ideal. All modern 
governments are thereby illegitimate on his analysis; their 
exercise of political power amounts to no more nor less than 
the coercion of those against whom it is used.
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Rousseau admits this; 'Man is born free, and everywhere
he is in chains' (SC, I, 1). The relations between governments
and individuals are those of master and slave;
The English people think that they are free, 
but in this belief they are profoundly wrong.
They are free only when they are electing 
members of Parliament. Once the election 
has been completed, they revert to a 
condition of slavery: they are nothing.
Making such use of it in the few short 
moments of their freedom, they deserve to 
lose it.(SC, III, 15)
Yet Rousseau stops short of allowing any right of rebellion 
against tyrants or corrupt representatives. All he will allow 
is that such rules have no moral claim on obedience; it may 
still be the case that their unfortunate subjects ought to obey 
for prudential reasons. Again, the reasoning seems close to 
Hobbes; to allow a right of rebellion when the ideal of the 
general will is not attained is to risk all the freedom, justice, 
and morality attained through social life by opening the 
possibility of a return to an asocial state. Yet if this is 
the case - if the end result is that moral beings must simply 
acquiesce in what amounts to a state of slavery ~ then Rousseau 
seems to be saying that we must simply agree to forfeit our 
liberty and hence our humanity. That seems too high a price to 
pay, even if it is for prudential reasons.
Rousseau's analysis of political obligation is subtle and
insightful - even revolutionary. It had an important effect on
Kant, Hegel, and Fichte and on the English Idealists Green and
Bosanquet. My task now is to show briefly how Green's theory
of political obligation as based on the common good is also
ulimately unsatisfactory, although it too contains much of 
72value.
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Green's views on political obligation cannot be
separated from his metaphysics and his theology. His Lectures
on the Principles of Political Obligation and the Prolegomena
73to Ethics were both published posthumously. The former was 
compiled from Green's lecture no tes, the latter was in the final 
stages of revision at the time of his death. The Lectures 
begin with a highly compressed summary of the theory developed 
in the Prolegomena, and it is necessary to give the main points 
of that theory in order to establish the basis of his theory of 
political obligation.
Green's principal aim in the Prolegomena was to argue 
against empiricism in ethics and against Utilitarianism. His 
fundamental objection to both is epistemological; according to 
Green, there is no fact about the wTorld that is not dependent 
upon consciousness (PE, 13). But this must be true of each and 
every fact, whether or not anyone actually knows it. Therefore, 
says Green, the consciousness on which facts depend is not 
human consciousness but is an 'eternal consciousness' (PE, 67), 
a timeless consciousness in which human throught participates 
imperfectly through the spiritual part of human nature. This 
eternal consciousness, or 'self-conditioning and self­
distinguishing mind' (PE, 85), or 'divine mind' (PE, 180), 
'manifests itself' progressively throughout human history; it 
gradually 'realises itself* through human institutions, customs 
and laws and is immanent in them (PE, 95). The eternal 
consciousness is capable of being known by human reason, albeit 
imperfectly (PE, 72). Every person realises himself through 
actions that are aimed at achieving closer union with the 
eternal consciousness; to do so is inherent in human nature
(PE, 174).
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Each person's self-consciousness is one of becoming, of
a history of self with an identity through time (PE, 80-82).
Activities of the self are free in the sense of being self-
originated (PE, 82); the motive for action is self-determined
(PE, 97). Human action can only be explained as 'the action of
an eternal consciousness, which uses [natural functions and
processes] as its organs and reproduces itself through them1
(PE 82). Hence, when we speak
of the human self, or the man, reacting upon 
circumstances, giving shape to them, taking 
a motive from them, what is it exactly that 
we mean by this self or man?... We mean by it 
a certain reproduction of itself on the part 
of the eternal self-conscious subject of the 
world - a reproduction of itself to which it 
makes the processes of animal life organic, 
and which is qualified and limited by the 
nature of those processes, but which is so 
far essentially a reproduction of the one 
supreme subject, implied in the existence of 
the world, that the product carries with it 
under all its limitations and qualifications 
the characteristic of being an object to 
itself. It is the particular human self or 
person, we hold, thus constituted, that in 
every moral action, virtuous or vicious, 
presents to itself some possible state or 
achievement of its own as for the time its 
greatest good, and acts for the sake of that 
good.(PE,99)
But even though individuals are the vehicle for the real­
isation of the eternal consciousness, human personality is only 
'actualised' through society (PE, 183). The human self
is already affected... by manifold interests, 
among which are interests in other persons.
These are not merely interests dependent on 
other persons for the means to their gratific­
ation, but interests in the good of those other 
persons, interests which cannot be satisfied 
without the consciousness that those other 
persons are satisfied. The man cannot contemplate 
himself as in a better state, or on the way to 
the best, without contemplating others, not merely 
as a means to that better state, but as sharing 
it with him. (PE, 199)
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Hence, says Green, the notion of the common good is 
essential to any society - it is part of human life in company 
with others to conceive and seek a 'permanent well-being in 
which the permanent well-being of others is included' (PE, 201). 
Laws and social institutions are the means to this end (LPPO, 7). 
They represent the record of progress so far; hence they 
deserve obedience.
The foundation of morality, then, in the reason 
or self-objectifying consciousness of man, is 
the same thing as its foundation in the 
institutions of a common life - in these as 
directed to a common good, and so directed not 
mechanically but with consciousness of the good 
on the part of those subject to the institutions.
Such institutions are, so to speak, the form and 
body of reason, as practical in men. Without 
them the rational or self-conscious or moral man 
does not exist, nor without them can any being 
have existed from whom such a man could be 
developed, if any continuity of nature is implied 
in development. No development of morality can 
be conceived, nor can any history of it be traced 
... which does not presuppose some idea of a 
common good, expressing itself in some elementary 
effort after a regulation of life.... With it, 
however restricted in range the idea may be, there 
is given 'in promise and potency1 the ideal of 
which the realisation would be perfect morality, 
the ideal of a society in which every one shall 
treat every one else as his neighbour, in which to 
every rational agent the well-being or perfection 
of every other agent shall be included in that 
perfection of himself for which he lives. (PE, 205)
Green therefore has a teleological view of law and government. 
The function of 'the institutions of civil life' (LPPO, 7) is to 
allow the individual to 'realise his reason, i.e. his idea of 
self-perfection, by acting as a member of a social organisation 
in which each contributes to the better-being of all the rest'
(LPPO, 7). It is 'the business of the law to sustain and extend 
... those powers of action, acquisition, and self-development on 
the part of the members of the society' (LPPO, 94) . I.aw is thus 
'the expression of a general will5 (LPPO, 94) which makes it 
'possible for a man to be freely determined by the idea of a 
possible satisfaction of himself instead of being driven this way
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and that by external forces...' (LPPO, 7). Since the real 
function of government 'is to maintain conditions of life in 
which morality shall be possible', and since morality consists 
in 'the disinterested performance of self-imposed duties'
(LPPO, 18), and hence of freedom, we have an obligation to obey 
because the real function of government is to secure the common 
good :
Morality and political subjection thus have a 
common source.... That common source is the 
rational recognition by certain human beings 
... of a common well-being which is their well­
being, and which they conceive as their well­
being whether at any moment any one of them is 
inclined to do it or no, and the embodiment of 
that recognition in rules by which the inclinations 
of the individuals are restrained, and a 
corresponding freedom of action for the attainment 
of well-being on the whole is secured.(LPPO, 117)
But these rights do not antedate society, for a man only 
has rights within a social context and insofar as he has a moral 
capacity. Green does allow the term 'natural rights', but only 
if it is used to refer to rights that 'arise out of, and are 
necessary for the fulfillment of, a moral capacity without which 
a man would not be a man' (LPPO, 30). Rights are grounded in 
'an end to which the maintenance of the rights contributes'
(LPPO, 23). Hence
everyone capable of being determined by the 
conception of a common good as his own ideal 
good, as that which unconditionally should 
be (of being in that sense an end to himself), 
in other words, every moral person, is capable 
of rights; i.e. of bearing his part in a 
society in which the free exercise of his 
powers is secured to each member through the 
recognition by each of the others as entitled 
to the same freedom as himself.... Only 
through the possession of rights can the power 
of the individual freely to make a common good 
his own have reality given to it.(LPPO, 25)
Since a right 'is a power of which the exercise by the 
individual or by some body is recognised by a society, either 
as itself directly essential to a common good, or as conferred
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by an authority of which the maintenance is recognised as so 
essential' (LPPO, 103), there can be no right of resistance to 
a government that fails to act for the common good, for there 
can be no right save on the basis of the common good. If the 
common good requires action, however, then there is a duty to 
act (LPPO, 107), perhaps even in cases where reform or changes 
are unlikely (LPPO, 108).
I therefore have an obligation to obey because the law 
(along with the other institutions of civil life) provides me 
with a life of my own (LPPO, 114) and also provides the 
conditions within which I can pursue moral perfection. This 
obligation I have as a man, for this moral capacity is part of 
each person by virtue of his humanity. Hence political 
obligation is based upon a common good, since the institutions 
of civil life provide the conditions 'for the possibility of 
morality in the higher sense of the term, and are justified, or 
have a moral claim upon our loyal conformity, in consequence' 
(LPPO, 51).
Green's theory of political obligation is based on meta­
physical and epistemological views that are highly dubious at 
best. H .A . Prichard castigates him for a 'peculiar theory of
Moral Obligation which is totally inconsistent with our ordinary
75moral ideas and therefore with ordinary language....' He
76accuses Green of a shift in the notion of a common purpose,'
77and of a question-begging notion of 'society'. Prichard
suggests that Green may be confusing a complex issue by searching
7 8for a single ground of political obligation,' and postulates
(but does not elaborate) a notion that whether there is an
obligation to obey depends on the relationship between reasons
79for obedience and those against.
Melvin Richter's excellent account of Green's life and 
thought provides a good analysis of the important relation­
ships between his ethical theory and his theory of political 
obligation. Richter too points to inconsistencies, vagueness 
and ambiguities in those theories, and concludes that 'Green's
philosophical work ... may well be regarded as an abstract and
81crabbed utopia'. Indeed, Richter goes so far as to say that 
'both as an abstract ideal and as a criterion of actual 
governments, the notion of the common good is of dubious value' 
Hence the very foundation of Green’s theoretical enterprise is 
fundamentally misconceived.
It will again be evident that the theory of political 
obligation developed earlier in this Chapter touches Green's 
theory at many points, e.g. the role of the institutions of 
civil life necessary to a moral life, the close link between 
politics and morals, the recognition that 'will not force is 
the basis of the state' (LPPO, Part G), the emphasis on the 
moral status of every person, and the way the individual must 
decide whether or not to obey in particular circumstances 
(LPPO, 100-112). Once again, however, there are also some 
important differences:
(i) Green's metaphysics and theology offer much scope for 
debate and disagreement. I shall not offer any criticisms of 
them except to say that Green does not need to rely so heavily 
on them. If the theory of political obligation I have 
developed in this Chapter is acceptable in its principal 
conclusions, then the essentials of Green's theory may be 
retained without bringing such metaphysical and theological 
baggage along with it.
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(ii) While I accept Green's notion of obligation based on the 
role of civil institutions in providing the conditions within 
which the moral person acts, I do not go as far as saying that 
the real aim of these conditions is to provide the means for 
self-perfection or self-realisation in a moral or any other 
sense.
(iii) Green allows that the slave has no obligation to obey the
law (LPPO, 145) but he also argues that the citizen does. Here
he seems to vacillate; the role of the state with respect to
the common good is an ’ideal' (LPPO, 143). There is a
distinction between having a right and having a right to
exercise that right (LPPO, 144). The citizen must try to have
the slave law repealed, but he must obey it while doing so,
particularly if disobedience would be likely to bring about
the disappearance of the conditions under which 
any civil combination is possible; for such a. 
destruction of the state would mean a general 
loss of freedom, a general substitution of force 
for mutual good-will in men's dealings with each 
other, that would outweigh the evil of any 
slavery under such limitations and regulations 
as an organised state imposes on it. (LPPO, 147)
While I do not wish to deny that such a possibility must be
considered by anyone contemplating disobedience, I would
argue that the situation of the citizen is different from the
way Creen portrays it. For the existence of slave laws would
be a clear indication that the common good was not being
secured. The common good must be understood in terms of the
conditions within which anyone may lead a moral life. The
institution of slavery is clearly incompatible with the common
good. Unlike Green, therefore, I do not look upon the situation
of the citizen as one where he must weigh the claims of
political obligation against other moral obligations concerning
the slave; there is simply no moral obligation to obey the law
in such circumstances.
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The general will and common good theories of political 
obligation are on the right track. I have argued that each 
is defective, and that a theory of political obligation that 
emerges out of participation in the moral point of view can do 
a similar job while avoiding the major pitfalls inherent in 
the other two theories.
6. Some objections and a conclusion
I have argued that any participant in the moral point of 
view must acknowledge a moral obligation to obey the law. But 
what of those who reject a particular social order in which 
they are subjected to law? What of the anarchist, the Marxist? 
Must they also acknowledge such an obligation? Let us consider 
each in turn.
There are, of course, many different kinds of anarchism,
with different principles, different traditions, and different 
8 3programmes. It is, however, possible to discern some common 
ground (although what follows should not be taken as exhaustive 
of that common ground or as a complete characterisation of any 
particular anarchist position). That common ground is the 
rejection of coercion as a violation of freedom and as a denial 
of moral autonomy. Hence the institutions of the state and 
government are morally objectionable if they impose certain 
requirements upon an individual that he act or refrain from 
acting. They exercise coercive power over him if he chooses 
not to act according to the requirements of this external 
power; he acts because he. is forced to act, not because he 
freely wills his own action. Therefore no person can 
legitimately be said to have a moral obligation to obey their
edicts or laws.
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Although there are some points of agreement between this 
part of anarchist theory and the theory of political obligation 
I have developed above, there are two real points of conflict:
(i) whether the fact that I am required by law to do X or not 
to do X is a moral reason for acting accordingly; and (ii) 
whether a penalty is legitimate should I fail to comply. 
Concerning (i): an anarchist,need not reject this position
provided the law is not imposed upon him. Richard De George 
has argued convincingly that it is no part of anarchism to 
reject the exercise of authority as such.^ If someone consents 
to authority, or if authority is delegated, or if it arises out 
of a relationship such as that of parent and child, the 
authority so exercised is unobjectionable even from an 
anarchist point of view. The anarchist does not therefore 
object to law as such, but to law imposed from above and in the 
absence of any of these justifying considerations. I have 
argued that, although individuals must remain their own moral 
guardians, they cannot legitimately do so if they ignore others 
in their actions and in their moral judgments about actions. 
Hence an individualistic anarchism in the sense of an extreme 
egoism is incompatible with the theory I have developed, but 
a communitarian anarchism, organised for the common good, is 
not.
But that raises question (ii), viz. is it legitimate for 
authority to impose requirements for action on .individuals, 
even when that action is for the common good? And here the 
optimistic (or perhaps utopian) character of parts of the 
anarchist tradition come to the fore. Some would simply deny 
that anyone in a fully anarchist society could act save for 
the common good, in harmony and co-operation. Others claim 
that the conditions of anarchist society will be so different
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from those prevailing at present that even scarcity of 
resources will not lead to competition based on self-interest. 
The common interest, fair allocation, and justice will 
prevail, arising out of the will and benevolence of individuals 
acting in concert; thus there will be no need for rules of 
behaviour to be imposed from above and be secured imperfectly 
as a result.
I must confess that I am less than persuaded by this way
of arguing, despite the very pleasant prospect it would present
if it could be realised. It may be thought to be possible in
a small, decentralised, relatively homogeneous community
rather than in a large heterogeneous society. Indeed,
decentralisation is a recurrent theme in some anarchist 
8 5literature. But small communities can be authoritarian in
informal ways, through peer pressure, through individuals'
responding to needs concerning acceptance, status, and self-
image, through despotic majorities and John Stuart Mill's
8 6'coercion of public opinion'. Individual rights may in fact 
need less protection in large plural societies, even relatively 
centralised ones, because of the possibility of anonymity in 
diversity. Small communities, on the other hand, are such that 
deviance stands out and can provoke the possibility of majority 
tyranny, and thus the need for law to protect freedom and rights 
to be autonomous against those who would restrict them - even 
unintentionally - must remain possible. That does not show gthat these laws must contain penalties, Austin notwithstanding. 
Their function could be symbolic, or as a reminder of communal 
standards, such that it would be sufficient to point to the 
provisions of a law for benevolence and harmony to be restored. 
But even autonomous individuals can clash, and in a pluralist 
moral climate a way has to be found to reconcile that conflict„
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Law is, of course, but one answer but we have little evidence
that it can be dispensed with, anarchy or no anarchy. Hence
the anarchist case must remain, in this respect, unproven.
Not all those who reject a given view can be regarded as
misguided or irrational, even in the harmony of communitarian
anarchy, and hence there remains a role for law as a
coordinator and as a means for regulating disputes.
The anarchist must, I conclude, acknowledge law as a
moral institution in its service of the common good, and hence
he must acknowledge an obligation to obey the lav/, albeit (need
I add)one that can be overridden by the features of the regime
in question. This case is rather similar to that of the
Marxist, v/ho rejects the capitalist system as alienating and
exploitative, who sees the law as an instrument of class
oppression and domination, and perhaps regards the very notion
8 8of obligation as a mystification.
These attitudes are certainly to be found in Marx's
writings. Although he said little about the nature and role
of morality v/ithin society, what little he did say suggests
that he regarded morality and the notion of obligation as
ideas arising out of the interests of particular classes in
89furthering their own aims. He was similarly reticent about
the nature and role of law, and again the theory seems to be
90that lav/ is simply one of the tools of class oppression.
There are, however, passages which suggest that these 
conclusions would be too simplistic, although they do contain 
an element of truth. In the first place, Marx and Engels do 
speak of 'the common interest1 in such a way as to suggest that 
this notion is not only one that can be manipulated to render 
personal or class interests legitimate, but that there are 
common interests which it would be the legitimate function of
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public authority to protect, even in a communist society.^
Of course, just what would be protected by such an authority, 
and perhaps the ways it would go about doing so would be very 
different from the ways these are done in capitalist societv.
But that does not alter the fact that the notion is applicable 
to social living, and that the ways we try to attain it can 
give rise to an important reason for acting, an obligation, 
in the way I have suggested.
It cannot be denied that, in Marx's view, law in
capitalist society is a means of class oppression. But
although that may be its main role, it does not follow that
that is its only role or that the law is such an instrument
pure and simple. Engels, of course, argued that the very
nature of law as a system of rules requires attention to such
9 2matters as consistency. But this means that law cannot just 
be a faithful reflection of economic conditions, for the lav/ 
now has another standard to meet, a standard that overrides its 
role as nothing more than a servant of class interests. Thus
the law has a certain amount of independence, just as the state
9 3does. It does not, indeed cannot, merely coerce and 
dominate according to the immediate interests of the rulinc 
class; those who make the law, who enforce it, and who adjudicate 
on breaches of it have standards to meet which are not imposed 
by or in the interests of the ruling class, and may even run 
counter to some of those interests. But, again, that does not 
deny that the law also serves those interests, but perhaps not 
in a way that the ruling class might want it to in the short 
term. And there is the additional problem that there is often 
nowhere near unanimity among the ruling class about either 
short-term or long-term strategies and tactics, for the 
interests of some 'fractions’ of that class may be quite
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9 4opposed to the interests of others. Law and the state
thus act on behalf of the ruling class, not at its behest.
Can the Marxist therefore refuse to acknowledge any
moral obligation to obey the law? Assuming (what may well
be false) that he is a participant in the moral point of view,
I think that he must at least acknowledge some obligation to
do so because of the nature of law as a means for securing
some elements of ’the common interest' in a situation where
the absence of law would mean an absence of freedom because
of the ways people would behave in pursuit of their ends. It
96may well be, as Marx believed, that there would be no need 
for lav; in a communist society, just as there would be no need 
for the state. And, of course, any Marxist who did admit an 
obligation to obey the lav; within a capitalist state will 
immediately claim that that obligation is overridden by the 
overwhelmingly oppressive way the law is administered and what 
it requires individuals to do and not to do. But that does 
not mean that there is no obligation, only that it is, in his 
eyes, easily overridden.
I have argued in this Chapter that the role of lav; in 
securing a minimal common good establishes a moral obligation 
to obey that law, based on the nature of the moral point of 
view itself. Any participant in that point of view has to 
recognise the fact that a lav; requires or prohibits an action 
as a good and important reason for doing or not doing that 
action, although it is a reason that can be overridden. But 
the moral point of view also sets limits to that obligation, 
based on the role of law, the status of lav; as a moral 
institution, and on the relationship between law as a moral 
institution and an individual's moral theory. I shall apply
9these arguments to civil disobedience in the next two Chapters.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Civil Disobedience
1. Introduction
Although disobedience to law as a protest is by no means
1 *a recent phenomenon, the term 'civil disobedience' itself is
of comparatively recent origin. Thoreau's lecture 'The Rights
and Duties of the Individual in Relation to Government' (also
known as 'On the Relation of the Individual to the State') was
first published under the title 'Resistance to Civil Government'.
It carried the title 'Civil Disobedience' in an edition
published four years after his death. There is no evidence
2that Thoreau himself ever used the term. J But although the 
term 'civil disobedience' did not become current until the late 
nineteenth century, the phrases 'civil obedience' arid 
'obedience to the civil magistrate' were used well before then.'" 
The use of 'civil' in this context served to distinguish the 
two main calls on a man's obedience: God, and government.
Obedience was owed to both, but for different reasons and with 
different limits. Conflict between divine law and "mam-made 
law has been the major source of disobedience to the latter, 
particularly as religious belief became much more individualist 
and hence pluralist according to principles of religious 
freedom. This conflict provided the impetus for the earliest 
examples of civil disobedience in the Arnerican colonies from 
the mid-seventeenth century to just before the Revolution. It 
lay behind much of the abolitionist movement and the dis­
obedience to the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. And it has
* Notes to this Chapter are on pp.349 - 359.
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played a considerable role in civil rights and anti-war 
disobedience throughout the history of the United States, 
although secular considerations also began to loom larger in 
these cases in the 1960s and 1970s. Nor is this conflict 
confined to the USA; one need only think of the Hebrew midwives' 
disobedience to the Pharaoh recounted in Exodus (I, 15 ff), 
of Antigone and Socrates, of Sir Thomas More, and of Tolstoy 
and Gandhi.
In the United States, the source of most of the contemporary 
literature concerning civil disobedience, there has been a long 
tradition of principled disobedience to law. Some of this 
disobedience was covert, such as in the case of disobedience 
to the Fugitive Slave Law. Some was violent, particularly in 
the nineteenth century. Some disobedients accepted arrest and 
punishment; many did not. Some disobedients sought changes in 
law or offj.cial practice; others were concerned with 
preserving their own moral integrity, while the motivations of 
others combined the two. A few disobedients were revolution­
aries; some were rebels; many accepted the legitimacy of the 
political system against which they practiced their disobedience, 
but regarded the lav/ or policy they found objectionable as an 
aberration, a denial of the principles and values which the 
system itself proclaimed.
Thus disobedience to law has a long, complex, and rich
history, a history largely ignored by contemporary v/riters.
Although it is true that 'the issues of individual responsibility,
reform, and the limits of civil disobedience are always with us,
and each generation must examine for itself all of the possible 
4positions', it is also true that each generation can learn 
from the experiences, arguments, and mistakes of those that 
have gone before. While an awareness of the arguments of 
earlier generations of civil disobedients and their opponents
183.
may not solve contemporary problems about the grounds and 
limits of our obedience to law, it does help to put those 
problems into perspective, to suggest parallels, continuities, 
analogies, and counter-arguments. And this is so despite the 
fact that earlier cases of civil disobedience were almost 
always justified on the basis of the precedence of divine law 
over man-made law and that contemporary examples in our type 
of society tend to appeal to much more secular considerations. 
The structures of the arguments used are similar, even if 
grounded in different ways, and many of the issues raised are 
the same.
Much of the contemporary philosophical literature on
civil disobedience has been considerably influenced by what
may be called 'the orthodox view'. That view began to develop
in the early 1960s; Gene James claims that
Serious discussion of civil disobedience by 
American philosophers began in 1961. when a 
symposium was held on the topic at the 
meeting of the Eastern Division of the 
American Philosophical Association. Since 
then, so many philosophers have given similar 
definitions of civil disobedience that one 
may speak of their views as constituting an 
orthodox theory.5
Hugo Adam Bedau (whom James includes as one of the orthodox) 
says that the orthodox analysis defends, inter alia, the 
following:
(1) we must always distinguish between whether 
an act is an act of civil disobedience and 
whether it is a justified act; (2) civil dis­
obedience is to be distinguished from revolution, 
legal dissent, riot, criminal conduct, and 
conscientious objection; (3) civil disobedience 
as such is not a crime, even if it. necessarily 
involves violation of some law; (4) not only a 
society's positive laws, but any institutional 
practices (whether governmental or not, and 
including an institution's failure to have laws 
or rules of a certain sort) can be proper objects 
of protest through civil disobedience; (5) the
positive law itself cannot, on pain of logical 
inconsistency, justify (permit, protect, authorize, 
vindicate) civil disobedience; (6) an act of
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civil disobedience is in theory equally 
genuine and open to justification whether 
or not the law it violates is the law or 
policy it protests; (7) the greater the 
distance between the law being broken and 
the law being protested, the more unlikely 
that the disobedience will be justified;
(8) prima facie, all civil disobedience, 
being illegal, is morally unjustified;
(9) there are no strictly sufficient and 
necessary conditions of moral justification 
for civil disobedience.6
This list captures most of the essential elements of 
the orthodox position, but it obscures others, particularly 
the orthodoxy with respect to the definition of civil 
disobedience, to be discussed below. It is also important 
to note that the distinction between 'criteria of recognition'
7and 'criteria of justification' (point 1) is usually stated 
much more strongly. Cohen writes 'It is one thing to identify 
an act as a clear case of civil disobedience and another thing 
entirely to judge its rightness.' The orthodox theorists 
hold, that is, that the ways civil disobedience is defined 
ought to be, and can be, evaluatively neutral in themselves, 
that there is a logical separation between questions of what 
counts as civil disobedience and whether civil disobedience 
can be justified, either in general or in particular cases.
This is similar to the way legal positivism insists on 
separating criteria for a rule's being a lav; from those 
concerning whether nor not it is a good lav;; both are no more
9than the fact-value distinction in operation.
This concentration led, not unnaturally, to a preoccupation 
with problems of the definition of civil disobedience as a 
prelude to considerations of its justifiability, not only 
among the orthodox theorists but also among their critics.
The orthodox influence was thus programmatic, but it was also 
substantive as a broad agreement on the definition of civil 
disobedience began to emerge. The extent of this agreement
185.
» i
on definition was less than on whether definition could and 
should be separated from justification, but it was still 
significant. The problem, however, is that this orthodox 
definition contains elements which contradict the orthodox 
position about the relation between definition and justification. 
In Cohen's terms, some of the criteria of recognition are also 
criteria of justification.
The critics of the separability thesis are of two types. 
First, there are those who accept the goal of complete 
separation, but deny that it has in fact been fulfilled in 
particular cases, or in the literature in general. For example, 
Madden and Hare argue that there have been two opposite 
tendencies in the literature with respect to the definition of 
civil disobedience. Some writers employ the term in such a 
general way that
it loses any special designation and becomes 
vacuously synonymous with 'disobedience to 
any authority'. On the other hand, different 
authors, for varying purposes, restrict the 
concept to one of various types of action all 
of which ordinarily would be called cases of 
civil disobedience. The vacuous * generalisa­
tions result from inattention to actual usage 
and the lack of ability to prune suggested 
generalisations and so sharpen up a concept 
that has a genuine use. The restrictive 
definitions result from confusing definitional 
and conceptual concerns over the meanings of 
'civil disobedience' with the problem of 
justifying civil disobedience. Authors of 
restrictive definitions reserve the phrase 
either for acts of dissent they think 
justified or for those thought unjustified, 
depending on what emotive overtones the phrase 
has for them. Needless to say, the results are 
mutually incompatible definitions all of a 
persuasive sort in which different groups try 
to put the phrase to work for them.
Secondly, however, there are those who deny that the 
strict separability of criteria of recognition from criteria 
of justification is even possible in cases like civil dis­
obedience. I have argued for this view in Part One of this
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thesis; the impossibility of separating definition from 
evaluation is part of the way the moral point of view is 
related to the use of language. It is not confined to any 
particular school of thought about civil disobedience. The 
studies in Section 2 of this Chapter are intended to 
illustrate the connection between definition and justification 
in both orthodox and non-orthodox theorists. I do not claim 
that the writers to be examined in that Section are representa­
tive of all the arguments about civil disobedience to be found 
in the vast contemporary literature, let alone the previous 
literature. With the exceptions of Cohen and Fortas, who do 
represent opposing and widely held positions on civil dis­
obedience, they were selected more or less at random, although 
with an eye to illustrating some of the diversity of views on 
the topic. My purpose in Section 2 is not to offer detailed 
and substantive critiques of these writers, but to illustrate 
the patterns of their arguments by drawing attention to the 
relations between their definitions and their justificatory 
arguments. I shall consider the definition of civil dis­
obedience in more detail in Section 3.
2. Studies on definition and justification
It is necessary to make some points about the structure 
of this Section before considering the writers I have chosen. 
First, none of the writers examines particular examples of 
civil disobedience (except perhaps by way of illustration), 
for each is mainly concerned with the justifiability of the 
practice of civil disobedience through examining defining 
characteristics and constant or highly probable accompanying 
characteristics. It is possible that the circumstances of a 
specific example of civil disobedience might lead a particular
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writer to advance different arguments about the justifiability 
of that act of civil disobedience, but without departing from 
his general argument. In other words, for some writers, 
particular circumstances might modify or ovexride general 
considerations. Secondly, in the interests of avoiding 
distortion of their views, I have allowed these writers to 
speak for themselves as far as possible, although I have 
summarised and paraphrased on occasion. Page references in 
parentheses are to the work being discussed.
I
Carl Cohen, Civil Disobedience: Conscience, Tactics and the Law,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1971)
Cohen was one of the early writers on the philosophical 
issues raised by civil disobedience in the early 1960s, and he 
is now taken as one of the originators and main exponents of 
the orthodox position‘d  (although he has come to depart from 
one important aspect of the orthodox definition of civil dis­
obedience, viz. that it must be nonviolent). Cohen's book is 
the most complete statement of his position, and incorporates 
some changes compared with his earlier writings, and I shall 
therefore concentrate on it.
Unlike some writers on civil disobedience Cohen is not 
concerned to mount a concerted campaign for or against its 
legitimacy, although he leaves us in no doubt that he thinks 
that particular acts of civil disobedience can be morally 
justified in some circumstances. Instead Cohen examines the 
nature of civil disobedience and the moral issue raised by its 
use in a careful, lucid, and, on the whole, dispassionate 
manner, considering objections as well as advancing his case.
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He defines civil disobedience as 'an act of protest,
deliberately unlawful, conscientiously and publicly performed'
(p. 39). Cohen understands the conscientious nature of the
civil disobedient's act to mean that he acts 'in the honest
belief that what he does is"right, in spite of the fact that
it is illegal' (p. 20). But 'conscientiousness... is a feature
of high moral value' (p. 22):
[T]hat a man is governed, genuinely and deeply, 
by the demands of his conscience is one factor 
(but not the only one) that we properly weigh 
in judging his goodness. Of course the content 
of conscientious principles varies greatly; 
some men, out of conscience, do what many others 
believe to be atrocious, wicked. Even so, the 
mere fact that an act is performed out of 
conscience is surely worthy of consideration.
If, in obeying his conscience, another man is 
obliged to do what we believe - in good 
conscience - morally wrong, the genuineness of 
that conflict must give us pause. It may lead 
us to deeper reflection upon our own principles, 
and perhaps to the development of greater wisdom 
by all parties. In this sense the civil dis­
obedient - if he truly is that - may indeed be 
an honourable man, doing service for us all.
Even supposing his act is objectively wrong, he 
may bring us to a better understanding of our 
own criteria for rightness; and in spite of the 
illegality and unjustifiability of his act, the 
goodness of his character may shine through. It 
is possible, of course, that his act is not only 
conscientious but also objectively right, (p. 212)
On the level of agent-justification, then, conscientiousness
is not merely a criterion of recognition; it is also, as
Cohen himself admits, an important criterion of justification.
This position is reinforced by the way Cohen elaborates 
on the element of protest in acts of civil disobedience.
Protest helps to distinguish acts of civil disobedience from . 
other illegal conduct (pp. 10-11) because personal advantage 
is not the primary motivation behind acts of civil disobedience. 
In fact the civil disobedient
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is likely to suffer pains going far beyond 
inconvenience - in the form of legal 
punishments, financial losses, and personal 
humiliations, and very possibly all three.
That the civil disobedient pursues his 
chosen course with the virtual certainty of 
some of these penalties ensuing provides some 
assurance that his act is, indeed, a form of 
protest, (p. 11)
But Cohen then begins to incorporate a normative element
into his account of protest. The civil disobedient consciously
breaks the law for the sake of 'some larger goal or principle'
(p. 12); in doing so, he sacrifices himself. But
The act of sacrifice is a form of protest, 
because the civil disobedient invariably 
takes himself to be acting against some 
form of injustice that he finds intolerable.
Such conduct is motivated not merely by the 
desire to achieve some social good but by 
the intense wish to eliminate some serious 
social evil.... So we rightly say that all 
civil disobedience is a form of protest. It 
is a cry of conscience, publicized and 
concretized in the act of disobedience.
(p. 12; emphasis in original)
Thus Cohen has ensured that all acts of civil dis­
obedience, as he uses the term, are conscientious protests 
against injustice. In Chapter 5 he seeks to construct 'a 
rational framework within which argument [about the justifica­
tion of civil disobedience ] can continue intelligibly and 
profitably* (p. 92). Cohen regards an act as justifiable 'if 
a reasoned demonstration of its rightness can be given' (p. 92). 
He contends that there are two main patterns of justification 
for civil disobedience: higher-lav/ justification, and
utilitarian justification.
Cohen claims that higher-law arguments consist in an 
appeal to a 'divine' or 'natural' law (which may be secular), 
the authority of which is held to be supreme over man-made 
law. Hence it is able to override man-made obligations: 'No
act of human beings, whatever its form, can create an 
obligation strong enough to match the obligation imposed by
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the higher law' (p. 105). The higher-law justification is 
thus tailor-made for the civil disobedient who, by Cohen's 
definition, is acting in the sincerely-held belief that he 
is right so to act. Moreover, although he allows that he 
has an obligation to obey the positive lav/ in question, the 
conscientious character of his disobedience is sufficient to 
override that obligation. Given Cohen's analysis of 
conscience, the conscientious character that any act of civil 
disobedience has by definition means that conscientiousness is 
not a neutral characteristic of acts of civil disobedience 
when it comes to considering questions of agent-justification. 
(Cohen specifically concentrates on agent-justification - see, 
for example, p. 104; indeed, the inclusion of conscientiousness 
in the definition leads him to do so.) Thus the way Cohen has 
defined civil disobedience establishes a strong, but not 
necessarily conclusive, presumption for its moral legitimacy 
according to his own analysis of higher-law arguments.
. The utilitarian case is similar. Cohen presents that
justification for civil disobedience thus:
The protestor here argues, in effect, that 
his particular disobedience of a particular 
law, at a particular time, under given 
circumstances, with the normal punishment 
for that disobedience ensuing, is likely to 
lead in the long run to a better or more 
just society than would his compliance, 
under those circumstances, with the law in 
question, (p. 120)
Again, by requiring that a utilitarian civil disobedient 
conscientiously believe that his disobedience is right, Cohen 
is saying that he is required to believe that a 'better or 
more just society' is likely to result from his disobedience. 
This is to establish a presumption in favour of the moral 
justifiability of the agent's doing the act, because Cohen's 
very definition of civil disobedience stipulates that it must
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be conscientious. Again, a criterion of recognition is a 
criterion of justification.
But, of course, it is not the only one. The fact of 
conscientiousness is not sufficient to establish justifiability, 
for we also want to look at 'the content of conscientiousness', 
i.e. the relevant moral principles and values held by the agent. 
We may find these principles and values totally abhorrent. But 
the notion of conscientious action, and of moral discourse 
itself, implies a reasoned consideration of the grounds for 
action. It implies a willingness to consider alternatives and 
to weigh evidence; it means being open to challenges and being 
willing to respond to them. Someone not disposed to do these 
within the limits of his situation could not be said to be 
acting conscientiously. Someone who is conscientious yet still 
adheres to principles we find objectionable is still owed the 
respect due any moral person, even as we condemn his actions.
Cohen's analysis is by no means unique, and many other
writers on civil disobedience, orthodox and nonorthodox,
include conscientiousness in one form or another in their
12definitions of civil disobedience. They too thereby
establish the same presumptions of agent-justification as Cohen,
although not all these other writers analyse moral justification
13in the way Cohen does.
The illegal nature of all acts of civil disobedience, 
of course, constitutes a wrongness charge against those acts 
that establishes a presumption against their justifiability 
that must be acknowledged by any participant in the moral point 
of view, because illegal action is an offence against part of 
the core of morality, viz. the area of duty, according to the 
way that part is implemented in our type of society. As such, 
it is always a moral reason against the justifiability of acts
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of civil disobedience, and so another criterion of recognition 
is also - indeed, could not fail to be - a criterion of 
justification. (Bedau does imply this in point 8 of his 
characterisation of the orthodox position quoted on pp. 183-184 
above.)
But although its illegality constitutes a wrongness charge 
against an act of civil disobedience, there are other factors 
contained in the definition which must also be recognised by 
any moral person qua moral person as morally relevant factors 
which override that charge. That an act of civil disobedience 
is a protest against injustice establishes a presumption of 
justifiability because it is legitimate for citizens to express 
their opinions about the basis of communal life and about the 
ways communal arrangements work in practice. The public nature 
of the act of protest is also consistent with the public nature 
of communal life, since it is an appeal to those with whom 
communal life is shared. That it is a conscientious action is 
no more than is required from any moral person. That it is a 
public conscientious act of protest, then, implies the 
allegation of some deficiency in the arrangement of communal 
life. And these characteristics are sufficient to override the 
wrongness charge arising out of the illegal nature of the act, 
for the obligation to obey the law also serves to maintain that 
communal life.
Therefore, I suggest, Cohen's definition, is not only not 
morally neutral in respect of his own argument; it cannot be 
morally neutral according to the moral point of view itself, 
although I stress that other charges derived from the circum­
stances and manner of a particular act of a civil disobedience 
may override that judgement.
Elliot M. Zashin, Civil Disobedience and Democracy, (New York:
Free Press, 1972)
Zashin argues that civil disobedience, properly so-called, 
within a liberal-democratic polity is 'an extension of demo­
cratic political techniques' (p. 308), and that it. is therefore 
justifiable in terms of liberal-democratic values. He attempts 
to establish his case through an examination of liberal- 
democratic theorists from Bodin to Barker, and claims that a 
primary value of nonrevisionist liberal-democracy as a moral 
system is that of preserving the moral autonomy of the 
individual citizen:
liberal-democratic theory gave rise to a 
conception of the citizen which made civil 
disobedience by real citizens conceivable.
Moreover, the theory of civil disobedience 
represents a futher extension of one of the 
most basic and enduring concerns ... of 
liberal-democratic theory - the protection 
of the individual as an autonomous moral 
agent. (p. 35)
Later Zashin writes:
The intent of democracy is also the intent of 
civil disobedience. Recognising that the 
democratic process requires lav; and order 
for healthy functioning, theorists of civil 
disobedience have developed the notion of 
self-imposed limitations. The theory of 
civil disobedience is an attempt to mediate 
between the conflicting pulls of political 
allegiance and private conscience.... The 
emergence of the theory of civil disobedience 
is another manifestation ... of that solicitude 
for individual moral autonomy, which lies at 
the core of liberal democracy. (pp. 61-62)
Thus the values of liberal-democracy
justify unconventional tactics as long as two 
conditions are met: (1) the tactics are
reasonably well adapted to realising liberal- 
democratic values; and (2) the tactics are 
not likely to destroy other means of seeking 
those values. In other words, if civil dis­
obedience can be shown to foster liberal- 
democratic values and to be compatible with 
the maintenance of stable liberal-democratic 
institutions, then it is legitimate. (p. 114)
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But when we place these considerations alongside Zashin's 
discussion about the nature of civil disobedience, the relation­
ship between the two becomes clear. Zashin argues that civil 
disobedience is best defined as
a knowing violation of a public norm (considered 
binding by local authorities but which may 
ultimately be invalidated by the courts) as a 
form of protest; it is nonrevolutionary, public 
and nonviolent (i.e., there is no use of 
physical violence excex^ t self-defensively when 
participants are physically attacked, and no 
resistance to arrest if made properly and without 
undue force.) (p. 118)
There are two elements in this definition which are
important for Zashin's discussion of the justification of civil
disobedience. The first is the idea of 'protest' which Zashin
understands to be action directed 'against what is perceived as
an injustice' (p. 114):
For civil disobedience, by its very nature, 
is directed towards making practitioners, 
adversaries, and bystanders more aware and 
sensitive to transcendent ideals and present 
injustices. Civil disobedients try to 
communicate that they place a higher value 
on an ideal justice and that ultimately 
their acts may lead to greater respect for 
law by bringing law and justice closer 
together. (p. 128; see also pp. 97, 122,
127)
In Zashin's view, then, there is an important relationship 
between individual moral autonomy and the protest against 
injustice that is an essential element of civil disobedience as 
he defines it. For, other things being equal, to acquiesce in 
injustice in the face of the lav/ would be to surrender one's 
moral judgement and to compromise one's standing as a morally 
autonomous individual. And, according to Zashin, liberal- 
democratic principles themselves do not require this of the 
citizens of a liberal-democratic polity. The very definition 
of civil disobedience, then, ensures that there is at least a 
presumption in favour of its legitimacy within a liberal-
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democracy, a presumption sufficient to override the obligation 
to obey the law.
The second element of Zashin's definition that involves 
a similar presumption is associated with the notion of self­
limitation, whereby the civil disobedients take upon themselves 
the burdens of their protest by acting publicly, 'risking 
arrest, violence and conviction' (p. 97). In Zashin's view,
'the key to civil disobedience is its self-limitations' (p. 134) 
These self-imposed limitations on action serve to demonstrate 
that the civil disobedient is a loyal citizen who does not wish 
to undermine the legitimacy of the regime or of its institutions 
He is not someone who disobeys for reasons of expediency or of 
personal convenience. By limiting civil disobedience to a last 
resort and remaining (at least tactically) committed to non­
violence, civil disobedience enables the citizen to 'find an 
alternative to both rebellion and acquiescence' (p. 94). Thus 
the second of Zashin's conditions for the justification of 
'unconventional tactics', quoted above, is met through self­
limitation, for that is precisely its purpose. But note how 
Zashin has built the idea of self-limitation into the definition 
of civil disobedience. That civil disobedience is non­
revolutionary, public, and nonviolent, is necessary, and these 
are important aspects of the self-limitation which allow it to
I
be justified within a liberal democratic society.^ Together,
these two elements serve to override the liberal-democratic
citizen's general obligation to obey the law. That obligation
is based upon consent, understood as
(1) the legal opportunity to participate in 
democratic institutions, e.g., to vote, hold 
office, petition officials; and (2) acceptance 
of the various benefits liberal-democratic 
governments provide (or attempt to provide) 
for their citizens - e.g., security of person 
and property, opportunities for material well­
being, for education, recreation, and so forth.
(p. 309)
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Zashin accepts that the onus of justification of acts of 
civil disobedience lies with their proponents, but it is clear 
that this onus is well on the way towards being satisfied 
through his very definition of civil disobedience. Zashin does, 
however, seem to be aware of the possibility of a relationship 
between definition and justification. But he seems to regard 
the links between definition, explanation (how civil dis­
obedience works), and justification as contingent, since
they are so often connected in discussions 
about the subject; nevertheless, I will 
try to [separate them] for the sake of 
clarity. The first task, then, is to define 
civil disobedience in an unambiguous manner,
[having regard to] distinctiveness in relation 
to other forms of direct action and applicability 
to real phenomena. (p. 109)
But, says Zashin, these last two features, distinctiveness and 
applicability,
also help provide a foundation for justification.
'Distinctiveness is crucial here, because 
proponents of civil disobedience contend that its 
claim to legitimacy is partly based on its 
differences from violent tactics, lawlessness, 
and revolution. At the same time, its efficacy 
within the bounds of democratic processes depends 
on its distinctiveness from conventional methods.
The criterion of applicability is also important 
to justification, because a defense of a civil 
disobedience which is not often practiced [sic] 
will not take us very far toward justifying 
certain unconventional tactics used by political 
dissenters. If one believes that the viability 
of such tactics is important for preserving 
liberal-democratic values and the possibilities 
of social reform in our system, then one does 
not want a definition which makes such rigorous 
demands on practitioners that their actions will 
be severely limited. On the other hand, there 
is a danger that defining civil disobedience 
operationally and then undertaking a legitimation 
of it within the context of liberal-democratic 
theory (as I do) might be taken to imply agreement 
with the tactics or aims of all civilly dis­
obedient acts. While I wish to show that civil 
disobedience (broadly defined) is a political 
tactic compatible and consistent with liberal 
democracy, this is not to say that all uses of 
it are well-thought-out or appropriate. I 
advocate the legitimacy of such tactics not 
because I think they are always employed
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responsibly, but rather because I believe that 
our society suffers from serious social defects 
which do not seem remediable by conventional 
political tactics. (pp. 109-H'O; emphasis in 
original)
Zashin also claims that it is
obvious why those who perceive civil disobedience 
as a form of coercion condemn it as morally 
illegitimate, and why those who see it solely as 
an appeal to public opinion approve it; likewise, 
why those who define it as being violent and law­
less reject it, while those who define it 
exclusively as involving absolute nonviolence and 
acceptance of legal guilt favour it. Rejecting 
these perceptions and definitions leaves us with 
a difficult problem of justification. (pp. 125-126)
This is very confusing. On the one hand, Zashin seems to 
be saying that it is possible to separate definition, 
explanation and justification, and that one ought not choose a 
definition of civil disobedience that entails a particular moral 
judgement about civil disobedience. Yet on the other hand he 
seems to be admitting that one must choose a definition with an 
eye to the ways one proposes to examine the question of moral 
justification (and, of course, that is exactly what he has done). 
Moreover, he seems to suggest that he has to show that civil 
disobedience is compatible with liberal-democracy. What he does 
not seem to appreciate is that he is not showing us anything, 
except in the sense of elucidating what is already implied by 
his definition.
Zashin's discussion of the justification of civil dis­
obedience is in two parts. In the first (pp. 125-145), he seeks 
to rebut a number of common general objections to the legitimacy 
of acts of civil disobedience. In the second (Chapter V on), 
he contends that civil disobedience is positively justified in 
the United States because, for example, civil disobedience is 
one of the few ways that certain groups in American society have 
of coming
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to share equally in the material and 
spiritual goods this society provides to 
the great majority of its members. They 
will not experience much equality of 
opportunity, security, or autonomy. For 
some dissenting groups, the value of 
political freedom cannot be kept meaningful 
without such unconventional tactics. They 
will be denied a real possibility of 
achieving extensive social reform. Yet 
liberal democracy is not intended as a 
buttress for any particular, static vision 
of the good society. It is antithetical 
to viewing any concrete society as the 
ultimate value. In addition, a liberal 
democracy, more than other polities, should 
be able to tolerate civil disobedience and 
other forms of nonviolent direct action 
because these tactics do not contradict its 
ideological underpinnings. These tactics 
do not appear to threaten the stability of 
liberal-democratic institutions as long as 
the institutions remain true to the purposes 
for which they were established. (p. 145;
emphasis in original)
The structure of Zashin's argument is clear. His
definition of civil disobedience has established a general
presumption of legitimacy according to liberal-democratic
values. Nevertheless, the onus of justification is on the
civil disobedient, and Zashin takes this to mean that the
civil disobedient must respond to challenges that seek to
undermine or override the presumption, either in general or
15jn particular cases. This Zashin does in the first part of 
the discussion on justification, by seeking to undermine 
common general charges against acts of civil disobedience.
The second part of the discussion on justification reinforces 
the general presumption for certain groups in the United States, 
but allows that this presumption could be overridden in 
particular cases, e.g. where conventional methods might be 
expected to achieve the desired end.
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But while the structure of Zashin's own argument might 
be clear, let us consider the position of the moral person who 
does not share Zashin's liberal-democratic values. Can he 
accept Zashin's definition of civil disobedience yet reject the 
presumptions of moral justifiability implied thereby?
I want to suggest that he cannot, for Zashin's definition 
is not neutral from the moral point of view itself. Any moral 
person must recognise that the fact that an action seeks to 
bring 'law and justice closer together' (p. 128) through self­
limitation and concern for individual moral autonomy is at least 
a good reason for regarding that action as morally justified.
It may be, of course, that the other factors to be considered 
in examining the action's justifiability will come to override 
that judgement. But those aspects of the action contained in 
the definition must be taken into account by any moral person 
because of the nature of communal life and of the role of lav/ 
within it. And since Zashin has defined civil disobedience so 
as to ensure that it is concerned with the relationship between 
law, justice, and individual moral autonomy, no participant in 
the moral point of view can consistently accept his definition 
yet regard it as morally neutral in itself. Its justificatory 
implications either have to be accepted, or they must be over­
ridden (assuming the use of the term itself is not undermined). 
They cannot be ignored.
Ill
Stuart M. Brown, Jr. 'Civil Disobedience', Journal of
Philosophy, 58 (1961), pp. 669-681
Brown's article was a contribution to the seminal 1961 
symposium on civil disobedience, and has been influential in 
setting part of the agenda for subsequent analysis and debate.
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He says that he assumes 'that there is no clear concept 
expressed by the use of this term [civil disobedience]'
(p. 680). Perhaps as a result, he is somewhat vague about 
what is to count as an act of civil disobedience, and it is 
hard to be sure whether the notion of civil disobedience that 
can be culled from his paper is complete or not, particularly 
when he writes of having discussed 'some of the characteristic 
features of acts of civil disobedience' (p. 680; emphasis 
added). On p. 670 we have what appears to be a list of the 
defining characteristics of an act of civil disobedience, 
reinforced on p. 672:
An act of civil disobedience breaches the law 
openly in the course of a public protest 
against some offending statute, decree, 
verdict, or practice. (p. 670)
... the freedom riders have committed acts 
of civil disobedience; that is, they have 
wilfully and publicly breached or attempted 
to breach the segregation law as a means of 
protesting those laws and obtaining their 
repeal or nullification. (p. 672) ;
On the face of it, this seems to be a morally neutral 
definition of civil disobedience, containing no overtly 
normative characteristic. Yet a closer analysis does reveal 
a connection between Brown's definition and his analysis of 
the criteria for justifying acts of civil disobedience, and 
again the link is to be found in the fact that an act of civil 
disobedience must be an act of protest.
In the course of a rather confusing discussion about the 
difference between civil disobedience and typical cases of crime, 
Brown claims that a statute outlawing civil disobedience, making 
it a crime in itself,
would have a serious logical defect. It would 
imply that the additional crime committed is 
the public protest against a law or practice.
It would imply that public protest is of and 
by itself unlawful, whether or not some further 
crime is openly committed in the course of it.
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This implication is not only inconsistent 
with cherished and basic principles of 
democratic government; it could not be 
made explicit in a statute without penalising 
as unlawful a class of acts that are not acts 
of civil disobedience as we now understand it.
Civil disobedience has a point and a rationale 
only within a system of law where public 
protest is legally permissible. The notion 
makes sense only within such a system of law.
It cannot be a crime in and of itself: any
attempt to make it a crime in and of itself 
implies that public protest in and of itself 
is criminal. (pp. 671-672)
Thus Brown is saying that public protest per se is a 
legitimate activity within (at least) a democratic political 
system, and his whole discussion is implicitly couched in 
those terms. Since an act of civil disobedience is, by 
definition, an act of public protest, there is a presumption 
of legitimacy.
Brown is quite explicit about the criteria for the
justification of civil disobedience:
In order to be justified, acts of civil 
disobedience must meet each of at least 
three conditions: (1) persons may not
be harmed, and property may not be 
destroyed; (2) there must be unconditional 
submission to arrest and to the legal 
penalties for the breaches; and (3) the 
protests, in the course of which the breaches 
occur, must be directed at constitutional 
defects exposing either all the people or 
some class of the people to legally avoid­
able forms of harm and exploitation.
(pp. 676-677)
His argument for the third of these criteria is highly 
compressed and obscure. It is, he says, 'common to both 
justified acts of civil disobedience and to justified acts
i
of civil rebellion. Both entail instances of lawbreaking 
that cannot in principle be legally recognised as standard 
exceptions' to the law (p. 677). This is because, unlike 
disobedience in exceptional cases which could in principle be 
recognised as such by the law, in cases of civil disobedience 
and civil rebellion 'the law is disobeyed in clear and central
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cases of its application' (p. 675). If these acts are ever 
justified, therefore,
the justification must be constitutional in 
nature. In so far as a constitution provides 
no effective means of remedying a remediable 
form of harm or exploitation, it is defective.
Those who, without any effective legal remedy, 
suffer the consequences of these defects have 
a substantially reduced stake in the political 
community, and at least one substantial ground 
of their political obligation is greatly weak­
ened. If the suffering is severe enough ... 
there may be no reason why those who suffer it 
should be loyal to the political state and its 
legal system. (p. 677)
In addition, what is to count
as a constitutional defect of great or little 
magnitude [hence affecting the justifiability 
of civil disobedience or civil rebellion] is 
determined not on a clear principle, but on the 
merits of each particular case as it arises and 
as it appears to private conscience. (p. 679)
Brown does not specify the senses of 'constitutional' 
and 'constitutional defect' any clearer than this. (He does, 
however, rule out successful challenges to the constitutionality 
of a law from being civil disobedience - pp. 675-676.) Nor 
' does he elaborate on the sense of ’legally avoidable' in the 
third justifying condition; one assumes that it is intended 
to refer to forms of harm which can be remedied through the 
actions of public authority in, for example, repealing a law, 
revoking a decision, or altering a practice.
Unlike some orthodox writers on civil disobedience, Brown
is clear about the roles of nonviolence and submission to
arrest as criteria of justification rather than of definition:
The [first] two conditions [for justification] 
together define what has come to be known as 
passive, nonviolent resistance. But they do 
not even partially define acts of civil dis­
obedience. A public protest in which the 
participants injure others, destroy property, 
and resist arrest is no less an act of civil 
disobedience; it is merely an unjustified one.
In order to be justified, that is, it must be 
passive and nonviolent. (p. 678)
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He advances three reasons for including the first two 
justificatory criteria (pp. 678-680) :
(a) force and violence are evil in themselves, but 1non- 
participation in public protest in the course of which laws 
are wilfully broken* (emphasis added) is not an evil in .it­
self. Since nonparticipation is always available as an 
alternative to civil disobedience, there is always a lesser 
evil available to force and violence.
(b) in order 'to maintain a clear, sharp distinction between 
justified acts of civil disobedience and justified acts of 
civil rebellion*. The latter are justified by constitutional- 
defects serious enough to justify also the use of force and 
violence.
(c) 'to preserve civil disobedience as a tolerable, ritualized 
form of public protest in which lawbreaking is minimal and for 
the most part formal. The restrictions upon the kind of law 
that may be broken tend to prevent the occurrence of clearly 
immoral action and tend to eliminate immoral intent.... It is 
quite sufficient to preserve for justified acts of civil 
disobedience a ritualistic character that distinguishes them 
from all other acts of lawbreaking and maintains their status 
as a politically tolerable form of public protest*.
Thus it appears that civil disobedience will only be 
justified if it is directed towards the removal of a law, 
policy, decree or practice (Brown does not consider disobedience 
protesting the lack of any of these) which private conscience, 
considers makes all or some of the people liable to suffer harm 
or exploitation of a lesser degree than would justify rebellion.
But now let us compare this with Brown's definition of 
civil disobedience. If we amalgamate the two definitions 
quoted earlier, we arrive at a definition of an act of civil
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disobedience as: (1) an open wilful breach of law; (2) in
the course of public protest; (3) against some offending 
statute, decree, verdict, or practice; (4) as a means of 
obtaining its repeal or nullification.
Point 1, of course, incorporates a wrongness charge and 
thus establishes a presumption against acts of civil dis­
obedience for any participant in the moral point of view.
But, I contend, Brown's criteria for the justification of 
civil disobedience allow this initial presumption to be over­
ridden for him by those arising out of points 2, 3, and 4. I 
have already mentioned Brown's view that a right to public 
protest is one of the most fundamental principles of democracy. 
Points 3 and 4 bear upon 'the legally avoidable constitutional 
defect' requirement in the justificatory schema. For the 
object of the protest is the repeal or nullification^ of some 
rule or decision of (presumably) public authority, and this 
establishes the constitutional nature of the disobedient's 
aim - at least as Brown seems to understand that puzzling 
requirement.
I conclude, then, that there are considerable grounds 
for regarding Brown's views about the nature and justification 
of civil disobedience as illustrating the close relationships 
between definition and justification within his own arguments. 
The conclusion cannot be more definite than that since the 
case I have built up relies on the interpretation of Brown's 
meaning at a number of crucial points in his argument, and - 
although I have tried to make these interpretations consistent 
with the theme and intent of the rest of his paper - they must 
remain conjectural. Brown has not written further on the 
subject so far as I am aware.
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But Brown's argument does seem less susceptible to the 
charge of confounding criteria of recognition with criteria 
of justification than the arguments of other writers on civil 
disobedience, and it thereby illustrates an important point.
This is because he is one of the few who does not include one 
or more of nonviolence, conscientiousness, or submission to 
penalty among the defining characteristics of civil dis­
obedience, although he, like most of those who do, wants to 
count such aspects of a particular act as important factors to 
be considered in its moral justification. I shall argue in 
Section 3 of this Chapter that the tendency to incorporate 
nonviolence etc. into the definition of civil disobedience 
comes about as a result of confusing the recognition of au act 
as ÜEL act °f civil disobedience with the idea that there is a 
great and honourable tradition of civil disobedience, the 
practitioners of which (e.g. Gandhi, King) also adhered to 
principles of nonviolence, etc. Once the principles of the 
tradition are made to encompass the very definition of civil
disobedience itself, the separability thesis is doomed, whatever
17the orthodox theorists and 'the fact-value gappers' might say.
Now let us consider Brown's definition from the perspective 
of any participant in the moral point of view. Again, I 
suggest, there is a presumption of moral justifiability attached 
to the fact that civil disobedience is a protest against 'some 
offending statute, decree, verdict, or practice' (p. 670; 
emphasis added) in a public and open way in an attempt to secure 
repeal or alteration. (Brown does not elaborate on the nature 
of the offence given by the statute, etc., except in his 
discussion of justification where he speaks of 'harm' and 
'exploitation'.) This presumption arises because of the nature 
of lav; as a moral institution helping to secure communal life
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itself, and because a participant in that life is attempting 
to call attention to some defect in that law in a public and 
open manner. To be sure, other aspects of the disobedience 
may easily override the presumption of justifiability; but 
that they override indicates that there was such a presumption 
in the first place, a presumption derived from the defined 
goal of the disobedience and the similarity between its methods 
and those of moral discourse itself. Brown's definition thus 
has justificatory import for any moral person simply qua moral 
person because of its relations with the nature and precepts of 
the moral point of view itself.
IV
Herbert J. Storing, 'The Case Against Civil Disobedience',
in On Civil Disobedience: American
Essays Old and New, ed. Robert A. Goldwin, 
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969) , pp. 95-120
Storing's paper is a critical examination of the aims and 
principles of civil disobedience espoused by Martin Luther King. 
The apparent aim is to argue that the time (1968) was then past 
where civil disobedience could be a useful method for Negroes 
to use in protesting racial discrimination through nonviolent 
resistance. The paper, however, has a number of strands of 
thought within it, some apparently contradictory and many quite 
ambiguous. For example, Storing appears to argue that civil 
disobedience can be a useful, and perhaps even necessary, 
weapon in the fight against injustice, yet his criticisms of 
it are phrased in such a way as to make them appear universal, 
to be criticisms of the practice of civil disobedience rather 
than of acts of civil disobedience in a particular social and 
political environment.
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Storing argues that civil disobedience is irrelevant
to contemporary problems, that 'disobedience abounds, but it
has thrust civility aside', that civil disobedience is
'obsolete or irrelevant', a 'contradictory, shallow and a
feeble guide to action' (pp. 95-96). It is
an unsuccessful attempt to combine, on the 
level of principle, revolution and conventional 
political action.... Civil disobedience is the 
resort - always a theoretically and practically 
weak resort - of the subject of law, exercised 
because the subject cannot or will not take up 
the rights and duties of citizens. (p. 96, 
emphasis in original)
Civil disobedience is a response to initiatives 
from elsewhere, an appeal to someone else to do 
something - or, more often to stop doing some­
thing. It is inherently subordinate, responsive, 
dependent, and - for the citizen of a democracy - 
degrading. (p. 117)
Nevertheless, it deserves 'serious consideration, for it is 
remarkable in its capacity to point to far more fundamental, 
timely, and relevant political questions' (p. 96). •
Storing adopts King's definition of civil disobedience 
for the sake of argument; according to King, says Storing, 
civil disobedience 'is the open, nonviolent, even loving 
breaking of law with a willingness to accept the punishment'
(p. 96), In a somewhat confusing passage, however, Storing 
notes that nonviolent resistance does not always involve the 
breaking of a law (e.g. the Montgomery bus boycott) but that 
'the heart of nonviolent resistance is disobeying a law or 
lawful authority in protest against injustice' (p. 96). In 
other places, Storing makes it clear that, in King's version, 
civil disobedience was essentially a protest against injustice. 
Storing also wishes to distinguish civil disobedience from 
successful test-case disobedience, since the latter has not 
involved any illegal act (p. 97).
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Storing's arguments against the justifiability of civil 
disobedience are a curious mixture of general considerations 
and the particular circumstances of the United States in the 
1960s. While he appears to accept civil disobedience as a 
legitimate tactic on some occasions (e.g. pp. 103, 117), he 
argues against civil disobedience on two broad but connected 
fronts.
In the first place, he advances what appears to be an
empirical argument that civil disobedience has led to uncivil
disobedience, that the theory of civil disobedience,
especially as propounded by King, has within it a 'revolutionary
part' (p. 98) associated with nonviolence. Thus
the broad result of the propagation of civil 
disobedience is disobedience. The question 
then becomes whether the encouragement of 
disobedience endangers law and civil society, 
and the answer seems clear enough today, if 
it was ever in doubt, that it does. (p. 104)
Storing also quotes from some of Martin Luther King's writings
themselves where King speaks of 'the Negro Revolution', 'the
third. American revolution', and 'the Revolution of 1963'
(pp. 9 8-9 9) . But, after making but then ignoring some quite
sensible remarks on the rhetorical tendencies of political
leaders, Storing goes on to assimilate King's use of 'revolution'
to that of Malcolm X, who
urged that Negroes take seriously the idea of 
revolution, so loosely used by King. He 
tested King's moderation against King's 
extremism; and he found that moderation weak, 
false, and untenable.... [Malcolm] was remark­
ably successful in exposing the revolutionary 
side - the system-overturning, violent side - 
of nonviolent resistance. (p. 100)
Storing thus uses the undoubted fact that more Negroes 
resorted to violent disobedience of the law after the non­
violent civil disobedience campaigns to argue that this was 
an inevitable result of civil disobedience, the seeds of which 
are implicit in the teachings of King himself. In this way,
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Storing seeks to undermine the argument of the advocates of
civil disobedience that they act in such a manner as to preserve
respect for the law as law. In Storing's view, however,
An open refusal to obey an unjust law shows the 
highest respect for law in the same way that an 
open insult to a degraded woman, with a willing­
ness to be slapped for the insult, shows the 
highest respect for womanhood. Our usual view, 
however, is that we owe respect to the law as 
law, to women as women, even when they do not in 
fact exhibit the traits we respect them for. We 
think that those traits are strengthened by our 
acting on the presumption of their presence, even 
when they are not present.... The advocates of 
civil disobedience contend that we are protected 
from these dangers to the law by the practical and 
moral consequences of the rule that the lav/breaker 
must act openly and with a willingness to accept 
the punishment. But are we so sure that we can 
enforce this rule, as the teaching of civil dis­
obedience extends through the populace, especially 
the desperately poor, the degraded, and the bitter?
(p. 103; emphasis in original)
Thus does Storing attempt to undermine one of the moral 
presumptions contained in that part of the definition of civil 
disobedience that requires acts of civil disobedience to 
demonstrate respect for the lav; and love for the opponent.
By showing that civil disobedience encourages violent dis­
obedience by example and that civil disobedience contains 
within it a revolutionary element which rejects nonviolence 
and enables a ready transition to the politics of violence 
and disorder, Storing tries to demonstrate that civil dis- 
obedients are naive in hoping that conflict can be contained 
within the bounds of love.
Secondly, Storing constructs a counter-argument to the 
moral legitimacy of civil disobedience by questioning the 
idea of justice invoked in the very definition of civil dis­
obedience. His argument has three main strands.
(1) In his writings, and particularly in his famous 'Letter
18from Birmingham City Jail', ° King advocates disobedience to 
'unjust laws' but obedience to 'just laws'. The difference is
that
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A just law is a man-made code that squares 
with the moral law or the law of God. An 
unjust law is a code that is out of harmony 
with the moral lav/. To put it in the terms 
of Saint Thomas Aquinas, an unjust law is a 
human law that is not rooted in eternal and 
natural law., Any law that uplifts human 
personality is just. Any law that degrades 
human personality is unjust.
Storing attacks King's usage of 'just' and 'unjust' as
'exceedingly loose' (p. 102) and claims
that the questions of what it means to 'uplift 
the human personality' and how that can be done 
are a good deal more complicated than they 
appeared to King in the context of legally 
segregated Southern cities. (p. 102; emphasis 
in original)
But the important point
is that to the extent that the demands of justice 
are obscure the ground for civil disobedience is 
weakened and the need for political deliberation 
and political v/orking out of the answers is 
strengthened. (pp. 102-3)
(2) Storing argues against the tendency in the writings of 
King (and Thoreau) to treat justice universalistically, when 
it is suggested that moral persons ought to have no truck 
with injustice whatsoever. On the other hand, Storing claims 
that
If the lesson of civil disobedience is to 
become in nowise the agent of injustice, 
the result is revolution against this 
government, both in Thoreau's time and 
ours, and against every government I have 
ever read of or heard of. (p. 106; 
emphasis in original)
On the other hand, however, he suggests that if some advocates
of civil disobedience, such as King,
are to be understood to say not that one 
must never in any way contribute to 
injustice but that one should consider 
whether he is, through his co-operation or 
compromise with a given political system, 
the instrument of too much injustice in 
comparison with the good that his co­
operation does, then he has begun - barely 
begun - to think and act politically, which 
is to say, beyond civil disobedience. (p. 106; 
emphasis in original)
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(3) The last quotation contains the distinction that is 
crucial to Storing's arguments against civil disobedience.
In examining the context in which the act of civil dis­
obedience occurs, he suggests that it is clear that revolution 
is called for if the regime is fundamentally unjust, and civil 
disobedience then becomes 'a mere tactic, of no more independent 
significance as a principle and of no greater moral or political 
stature than the tactics of guerrilla warfare, boycott, and 
sabotage' (p. 100). But if the regime is fundamentally just, 
as most civil disobedients hold, then
there remains the substance of politics, 
involving all of the heavy and difficult 
judgements about where justice can be 
done and injustice avoided consistently 
with the overall aim of maintaining and 
strengthening the capacity of the system 
to act well. (p. 105)
Storing's argument on this point is somewhat obscure, 
but seems to be as follows (see pp. 105-106, 116-119): in a
fundamentally just political system, civil disobedience is 
the refuge of those who think in terms of obedience and dis­
obedience, who think as subject, not in terms of the political 
activity of the citizen, which is the only avenue through 
which change to remedy injustice can come about. To act 
politically is to have gone beyond the limits of civil dis­
obedience, which can only be a political dead-end since it is 
not creative, as political action is. Storing does concede 
that some people in a polity may be subjects rather than 
citizens, and that civil disobedience 'may indeed be the only 
available form of political participation' and may 'help to 
secure an excluded people a place among the governors of this 
self-governing community' (p. 117). But
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it is always a feeble instrument; because 
its principles are contradictory, its effects 
are dubious, it tends to undermine respect 
for the law, and above all its foundation is 
the role and point of view of the recipient 
of law, the subject. Civil disobedience is 
not rule, and it will be the resort of those 
who cannot or will not share in rule. (p. 117)
Storing thus tries both to undermine and to override the 
legitimating effects of action against injustice. The first 
of the preceeding arguments seeks to call into question the 
very use of the term 'justice1, arguing that it is vague and 
uncertain, and implying that King's 'cosmic guide' towards what 
is truly just (p. 102) is inadequate as a reason for breaking 
the law. The second and third argue against civil disobedience 
in two connected ways, by attacking the universalistic use of 
'injustice' and by suggesting that civil disobedience in a 
fundamentally just regime is ineffective as a tactic, and does 
not provide a means of serving 'the positive demands of justice' 
(p. 119), though it may be useful in setting the political 
agenda. Thus, he claims, the circumstances in which civil 
disobedience takes place are important for its justification; 
the circumstances in which it was then being used, however, 
were such as to override the moral legitimacy which it might 
have, and has had, in other contexts.
Storing's distinction between subject and citizen in 
discussing civil disobedience is similar to Rousseau's in Du 
Contrat Social, Book I, Chapter 6; I shall return to it in 
Chapter Five. But it ignores the fact that civil disobedience 
(at least that specifically aimed at change in lav;, policy or 
administration in contrast to 'civil disobedience of personal 
integrity') is rarely undertaken in isolation from other methods 
which Storing allows as 'political'. Indeed, many do not 
consider civilly disobedient acts as legitimate unless they are 
used as a last resort, where legitimate methods have been tried
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but have proved ineffective, or where the demands of the 
situation preclude their use. Storing's distinction between 
the methods of the subject and the methods of the citizen is 
thus too sharp, because the methods of the latter often 
incorporate those of the former. There may be differences, 
as Storing suggests, in their respective states of mind or 
in their attitudes towards the political system, and perhaps 
this constitutes a real and difficult problem for the political 
system. But to focus the distinction on method, particularly 
on the methods hallowed in pluralist ideology, is to ignore 
that difference and hence is to overlook that element of the 
dichotomy which could prove useful.
Storing, then, argues against the justifiability of civil 
disobedience by seeking, first, to undermine the presumption 
of moral legitimacy contained in those aspects of the 
definition referring to protest against injustice while 
retaining respect for law (through disobeying openly, non- 
violently, even lovingly, and with acceptance of punishment). 
This he does in two ways: (a) by arguing that (at least in
King's usage) 'justice' is a vague, uncertain term, incapable 
of the objective support that King's argument requires; and 
(b) that civil disobedience cannot maintain respect for law 
because it leads by example to violent disobedience and 
revolutionary behaviour. Secondly, Storing argues that civil 
disobedience in present circumstances is inappropriate and 
insufficient to combat injustice in an effective way.
Any moral person faced with the definition of civil dis­
obedience that Storing accepts for the purposes of his argument 
(that civil disobedience is open, nonviolent, disobedience of 
law as a protest against injustice, with willingness to accept 
punishment) would have to recognise the presumptions of moral
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justifiability contained therein, just as Storing does.
Given the grounding of moral life in communal life, the fact 
that an action is directed at protesting the injustice of 
some aspect of that communal life (rather than its inconvenience 
or unsuitability) lends it a measure of moral legitimacy.
That presumption can be undermined and/or overridden by the 
moral status of the methods used, and that is in part what 
Storing has tried to do. That such a protest is illegal must 
clearly count against it. But that the illegal act protesting 
injustice is open, nonviolent, and submissive to community 
authority shows that the disobedient is more than a mere law­
breaker, though he is certainly that. It shows that his is a 
considered disobedience that preserves the open, reasoned 
character of moral discourse itself through a renunciation of 
violence and concealment. No participant in the moral point 
of view::could fail to acknowledge this presumption of moral 
justifiability, while reserving judgement about whether there 
are or could be other aspects of civil disobedience, in general 
or in a particular case, that override that presumption. If 
all we know about an action is that it is an act of civil dis­
obedience according to the definition that Storing uses, then 
there is a presumption that that action is morally justified.
V
Abe Fortas, Concerning Dissent and Civil Disobedience 
(New York: Signet Books, 1968)
Howard Zinn, Disobedience and Democracy: Nine Fallacies on
Law and Order (New York: Vintage Books, 1968)
Fortas' book was written and published while he was still 
a member of the United States Supreme Court. It has come to
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be regarded as a succinct statement of the liberal attitude
towards civil disobedience, I suspect more on account of its
simple and direct style than because of the cogency of its
arguments. But despite the oversimplification, qualification,
and frequent use of assertion in place of argument, it is
representative of a widely-held view of civil disobedience
and contains a number of points which warrant its being taken
rather more seriously within the debate on civil disobedience
than some critics seem to think. Zinn's book is a detailed
critique of Fortas' arguments from what may be described
20(loosely) as a 'radical’ point of view. Eike Fortas, Zinn 
occasionally allows rhetoric to obscure argument, but his 
criticisms of Fortas and the liberal attitude are, on the 
whole, well directed. I shall consider each in turn.
Fortas says that he wrote the book in order to elucidate 
'the basic principles governing dissent and civil disobedience 
in our society' (p. vii). He does this, he says, through 
trying 'to present a statement of basic legal principles' and 
'a moral, ethical, or philosophical point of view about dissent 
and how it may properly - and effectively - be expressed'
(p. vii). Part One of the book discusses the law of dissent 
under the US Constitution. In Part Two, Fortas concentrates 
on civil disobedience itself. Part Three, 'The Revolt of 
Youth', applies the principles outlined in the previous parts 
to the cases of conscientious objection and the Vietnam war.
Fortas never explicitly defines 'civil disobedience' and 
this omission makes it rather difficult to follow his arguments 
at a number of crucial points. He is clear that acts of civil 
disobedience are violations of law (p. 124) and that civil 
disobedience is to be distinguished from 'programs of 
revolution5 (p, 59). He also allows that acts of civil dis-
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obedience may be violent, although (as we shall see) he 
does not consider that such acts can be justified. The major 
gap in the definition of civil disobedience that can be culled 
from Fortas' argument is any explicit inclusion in the 
definition of the motive for the law violation which can (and 
commonly does) distinguish acts of civil disobedience from 
other illegal acts. The other characteristic which is commonly 
used to distinguish acts of civil disobedience from other acts 
which break the law is that the former are 'public' in the 
sense that the civil disobedient does not seek to avoid 
identification as the law-breaker. Fortas does not mention 
this either. He does discuss the motivation of acts of civil 
disobedience, but in ways which leave it unclear whether he 
regards the presence of certain motives as defining character­
istics of civil disobedience or as accompanying characteristics 
important in the justification of particular acts of civil dis­
obedience. His discussion of the distinction between civil 
disobedience and revolution is prefaced by the following 
sentence: 'The term "civil disobedience" las been used to
apply to a person's refusal to obey a law which the person 
believes to be immoral or unconstitutional' (p. 59). The words 
'has been used' make it unclear whether Fortas regards belief 
about the immorality or unconstitutionality of the law that is 
broken as a defining characteristic of civil disobedience in 
his usage, or whether he is reporting the usage of others with­
out adopting it for himself. That the former might be the 
case is hinted, however, by the next paragraph:
The phrase 'civil disobedience' has been grossly 
misapplied in recent years. Civil disobedience, 
even in its broadest sense, does not apply to 
efforts to overthrow the government or to seize 
control of areas or parts of it by force, or by 
the use of violence to compel the government to 
grant a measure of autonomy to part of its 
population. These are programs of revolution.
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They are not in the same category as the 
programs of reformers who - like Martin 
Luther King - seek changes within the 
established order. (pp. 59-60)
But that this cannot be a definition of civil disobedience
per se is indicated by Fortas' allowing that violation of a
law which is not itself considered immoral or unconstitutional
is also properly called civil disobedience:
The term 'civil disobedience' has not been 
limited to protests in the form of refusal 
to obey a lav; because of disapproval of that 
particular law. It has been applied to 
another kind of civil disobedience. This is 
the violation of laws which the protestor does 
not challenge because of their own terms or 
effect. The laws themselves are not the 
subject of attack or protest. They are 
violated only as a means of protest, like 
carrying a picket sign. They are violated 
in order to publicize a protest and to bring 
pressure on the public or the government to 
accomplish purposes whi.ch have nothing to do 
with the law that is breached. (p. 61)
Although there is again the problem with Fortas' use 
of 'has been', his later discussions about the justifiability 
of civil disobedience suggest that he regards indirect civil 
disobedience as properly called civil disobedience, but a 
different kind of civil disobedience from direct civil dis­
obedience. He seems to be operating with a notion of civil 
disobedience as a violation of law as a means of protest with­
in the established order; this can be done in either of two 
ways: (1) the violent or nonviolent breaking of a law which
is itself regarded as immoral or unconstitutional (direct 
civil disobedience); and (2) the violent or nonviolent 
breaking of a law as a technique of social protest, 'practiced 
[sic] as a technique of warfare in a social and political 
conflict over other issues' (p. 62) , where the lav; that is 
broken is not itself the target of the protest (indirect
civil disobedience).
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There are several components to Fortas' position about 
the justifiability of acts of civil disobedience. In the 
first place, he considers that the use of violent methods of 
social protest is
never defensible - and it has never succeeded 
in securing massive reform in an open society 
where there were alternative methods of winning 
the minds of others to one's cause and securing 
changes in the government and its policies. In 
the United States these avenues are certainly 
available. (p. 80; emphasis in original)
Fortas allows that the use of violence in a democracy may be 
effective in the short term, e.g. by producing 'quick recogni­
tion of needs' (p. 79; cf. pp. 77, 80). But he argues that 
the existence of legitimate avenues for the expression of 
dissent means that violence cannot be justified, and that 
violence, particularly by civil rights activists, is more 
likely to produce backlash and opposition than to advance the 
protestors' cause, whatever its intrinsic merits.
Indeed, the whole purpose of Fortas' book is less to 
discuss dissent and civil disobedience than to argue that 
violence is unjustified, that there are effective alternatives 
to violence, and that the state cannot tolerate violence what­
ever the motive or goal. His faith in the efficacy of 
legitimate processes of dissent pervades the book, and is the 
basis of his rejection of violence:
Procedure is the bone structure of a democratic 
society; and the quality of procedural 
standards which meet general acceptance - the 
quality of what is tolerable and permissible and 
acceptable conduct - determines the durability of 
the society and the survival possibilities of 
freedom within the society. I have emphasised 
that our scheme of law affords great latitude for 
dissent and opposition. It compels wide tolerance 
not only for their expression but also for the 
organization of people and forces to bring about 
the acceptance of the dissenter's claim. Both 
our institutions and the characteristics of our 
national behavior make it possible for opposition 
to be translated into policy, for dissent to 
prevail. We have alternatives to violence. (p. 120)
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It also provides the grounds for rejecting indirect civil 
disobedience as unjustified provided effective legitimate 
channels exist:
In my judgement civil disobedience - the 
deliberate violation of law - is never 
justified in our nation, where the law 
being violated is not itself the focus 
or target of the protest. So long as our 
governments obey the mandate of the 
Constitution and assure facilities and 
protection for the powerful expression of 
individual and mass dissent, the dis­
obedience of laws which are not themselves 
the target of the protest - the violation 
of law merely as a technique of demonstration 
- constitutes an act of rebellion, not 
merely of dissent.
Civil disobedience is violation of law. Any 
violation of law must be punished, whatever 
its purpose, as the theory of civil dis­
obedience recognizes. But law violation 
directed not to the laws or practices that 
are the subject of dissent, but to unrelated 
laws which are disobeyed merely to dramatize 
dissent, may be morally as well as politically 
unacceptable. (p. 124)
This last passage illustrates the difficulty of 
analysing Fortas' argument at crucial points. It appears from 
the first sentence that Fortas is being quite categorical in 
his rejection of indirect civil disobedience, yet the use of 
'may be' in the last sentence calls that judgement into 
question. Fortas seems to be trying to separate the question 
of the moral status of a violation of the law from questions 
of its legal or political status. But he does not do it at all 
systematically, and one kind of justification often shades into 
another, with the legal justification seeming to take precedence. 
This is not an unreasonable position to take, particularly in 
the American context, but it is a position that requires 
argument which Fortas does not provide.
This ambivalence between legal and moral justification 
is illustrated by Fortas' arguments about the justifiability 
of direct civil disobedience. He writes
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At the beginning of this discussion, I 
presented the dilemma of obedience to law 
and the need that sometimes may arise to 
disobey profoundly immoral 02: .unconstitutional 
laws. This is another kind of civil dis­
obedience, and the only kind that, in my view, 
is ever truly defensible as a matter of social 
morality.
It is only in respect to such laws - laws that 
are basically offensive to fundamental values 
of life or the Constitution - that a moral 
(although not a legal) defense of law violation 
can possibly be urged. (pp. 124-125; emphasis 
added)
And, in discussing part of Martin Luther King's civil rights
programme, Fortas writes:
This is civil disobedience in a great tradition.
It is peaceful, nonviolent disobedience of laws 
which are themselves unjust and which the 
protest challenges as invalid and unconstitutional„
(p. 67; emphasis added)
It is clear, then, that Fortas regards test-case dis­
obedience as justifiable; it is 'a means, even an essential 
means, of testing the constitutionality of the law' (p. 62), 
provided it takes place within 'the rule of law':
[T1 his is what we mean by the rule of law: 
both the government and the individual must 
accept the result of procedures by which the 
courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, 
decide that the law is such and such, and 
not so and so; that the lav/ has or has not 
been violated in a particular situation, and 
that it is or is not constitutional; and 
that the individual defendant has or has not 
been properly convicted and sentenced.
This is the rule of law. The state, the courts, 
and the individual citizen are bound by a set 
of laws which have been adopted in a prescribed 
manner, and the state and the individual must 
accept the courts' determinations of what those 
rules are and mean in specific instances. This 
is the rule of law, even if the ultimate judicial 
decision is by the narrow margin of five to four!
(pp. 58-59; emphasis in original)
But note how the legality of the law that is disobeyed also
enters into the question of the moral justification of the dis- 
21obedience.' Fortas wants to allow that disobedience to law 
can be morally justified where the law is 'basically offensive
221.
to fundamental values of life or the Constitution' (p. 125;
emphasis added). He thus appears to allow a role for private
conscience largely overlooked by his critics, particularly as
he has earlier written:
our government, as well as other states 
that reflect the ideals of civilization, 
recognizes and has always recognized that 
an individual's fundamental moral or 
religious commitments are entitled to 
prevail over the needs of the state. As 
Chief Justice Hughes said many years ago:
'When one's belief collides with the power 
of the State, the latter is supreme within 
its sphere.... But, in the forum of 
conscience, duty to a moral power higher 
than the State has always been maintained'.
(p. 102)
This exercise of individual judgement must, however, take place
according to the rule of law:
Anyone assuming to make a judgement that a 
law is in this category assumes a terrible 
burden. He has undertaken a fearful moral 
as well as legal responsibility. He should 
be prepared to submit to prosecution by the 
state for the violation of law and the 
imposition of punishment if he is wrong or 
unsuccessful. He should even admit the 
correctness of the state's action in seeking 
to enforce its laws, and he should acquiesce 
in the ultimate judgement of the courts.
For after all, each of us is a member of an 
organized society. Each of us benefits from 
its existence and its order. And each of us 
must be ready, like Socrates, to accept the 
verdict of its institutions if we violate 
their mandate and our challenge is not 
vindicated, (p. 125)
It appears, then, that Fortas allows that two kinds of civil 
disobedience may be justified when they are undertaken within 
the rule of law: (a) where the civil disobedient breaks the
law nonviolently in order to test its validity or its constitut­
ionality; and (b) where the protestor nonviolently breaks a 
law that he regards as profoundly immoral or unjust, and submits 
to the judgement of the courts.
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When we come to compare the definition of civil dis­
obedience that can be drawn from Fortas’ book with his 
discussion of the justifiability of acts of civil dis­
obedience, we find the close relationship between definition 
and justification illustrated yet again. Fortas argues in 
Part One of the book that there is a right to protest and 
dissent, a right protected by the US Constitution, which can 
only legitimately be limited by a need to prevent injury to 
persons or property or to halt 'unreasonable interference' 
with others (p. 29). Thus that an act is an act of protest 
within the US context establishes a presumption that the act 
is legitimate, and this presumption is supported if that act 
is nonviolent, does not cause unreasonable interference to 
others, and is carried out according to the rule of law. By 
definition, civil disobedience is 'an act of protest within 
the established order' and so there is a presumption in its 
favour to be balanced against the 'moral as well as a legal 
imperative' of the 'duty of obedience to law' (p. 24) and 
against other characteristics of the act. Fortas' arguments 
rejecting the use of violence and indirect civil disobedience 
as unjustified turn on the existence and effectiveness of 
alternative legitimate channels of dissent. Violence and 
indirect civil disobedience are, therefore, ruled out by the 
requirement that the acts be within the established order and 
according to the rule of law. That direct civil disobedience 
on the grounds of invalidity or unconstitutionality is 
legitimate is guaranteed by the fact that that is the only way 
to test and establish the constitutional status of a lav;. And 
that civil disobedience on conscientious grounds may be morally 
justified is foreshadowed by the fact that direct civil dis­
obedience may be against a law conscientiously regarded as 
immoral, and that such claims have a particular status in a
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civilised community. (Fortas seems clear that this does not 
affect the legal status of a conscientious act, but he does 
not discuss the legal force of the passage from p. 102 quoted 
on p. 221 above.) Thus the definitions Fortas uses establish 
a presumption of justifiability, albeit one that is open to 
being overridden by other characteristics of a particular act 
(e.g. the use of violence) or to being undermined (e.g. 
through showing that the illegal act is part of a revolutionary 
programme and is therefore not an act of civil disobedience).
Any moral person would have to regard Fortas' definition 
of civil disobedience, such as it is (an illegal act of 
protest within the established order), as establishing some 
prima facie claim to moral justifiability. I have canvassed 
the points about illegality and protest earlier in this Section, 
and will not repeat them. But the phrase 'within the 
established order' evokes the same kinds of moral overtones as 
do other phrases in other definitions of civil disobedience 
concerned with the acceptance of the legitimacy of the system.
It emphasises the commitment of the disobedient to the 
legitimacy of the general arrangement of communal life, and 
hence dramatises his use of illegal action as a protest 
against some aspect of that life that he, as a moral agent, 
must consider sufficiently serious to warrant such drastic 
measures. He may turn out to be wrong, misguided, dangerous, 
or just plain foolish; but consideration of his action must 
allow for this presumption of moral justifiability.
Howard Zinn claims to detect nine fallacies in Fortas' 
book, not all of which are relevant to my purposes in this 
Chapter. Zinn is rather more systematic in his discussion 
of the nature and justification of civil disobedience, despite 
the task he sets himself. At the end of the book, he gives,
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'in skeletal form', a theory of civil disobedience which 
summarises much of what has gone before that is of interest 
to us. He writes:
Civil disobedience is the deliberate, 
discriminate, violation of law for a 
vital social purpose.... It may take the 
form of violating an obnoxious law, 
protesting an unjust condition, or 
symbolically enacting a desirable law or 
condition. It may or may not eventually 
be held legal, because of constitutional 
law or international law, but its aim is 
always to close the gap between law and 
justice, as an infinite process in the 
development of democracy. (p. 119)
Zinn regards civil disobedience as essentially a means
of communicating with others (p. 49). But the definition just
quoted omits another aspect of civil disobedience which Zinn
seems to regard as part of its nature:
civil disobedience is the organized expression 
of revolt against existing evils; it does not 
create the evils, but rationalizes the natural 
reactions to them, which otherwise burst out 
from time to time in sporadic and often 
ineffectual disorders. (p. 18; emphasis in 
original)
Zinn says that his definition leaves 'open the question of the
means of disobedience' (p. 39; emphasis in original) and that
the use of violence cannot be ruled out of civil disobedience
by definition, even though
one of the moral principles guiding the 
advocate of civil disobedience is his 
belief that a nonviolent world is one 
of his ends, and that nonviolence is more 
desirable than violence as a means.... (p. 39)
Zinn also extends the notion of civil disobedience beyond the
conventional view to include states' actions which violate
international law (pp. 52-53).
Zinn has two arguments for the justifiability of civil 
disobedience. The first, a negative argument, claims that 
the organised nature of civil disobedience allows the controlled 
expression of protest:
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by providing an organized outlet for 
rebellion, [civil disobedience] may 
prevent chaotic and uncontrolled 
reactions. Riots, it must be said, 
may be useful as barometers showing 
government its inadequacies, showing 
the aggrieved the need for organized 
revolt; but civil disobedience, 
controlling and focusing rebellious 
energy, is more effective in bringing 
positive change. (p. 18)
The positive justification of civil disobedience is based
upon its role within the democratic process:
Democracy must improve itself constantly 
or decay. If citizens maintain a universal 
respect for human rights, rather than for 
law, the society can change fast enough to 
meet the swift-moving expectations of people 
in this century. It is good for citizens to 
learn that laws, when they seriously encroach 
on human rights, should be violated, that 
some conditions are so intolerable that they 
may require violations of otherwise reason­
able laws (like traffic laws or trespass 
laws) to dramatize them. If the effect of 
civil disobedience is to break down in the 
public's mind the totalitarian notion that 
laws are absolutely and always to be obeyed, 
then this is healthy for the growth of 
democracy. (pp. 18-19; emphasis in original)
. Zinn's arguments about the 'necessity' of civil dis­
obedience in a democracy (p. 25) rest upon a rejection of 
Fortas' claims about the availability and effectiveness of 
legitimate avenues for protest and dissent. Zinn sees a gap 
between the interests of the state and the interests of its 
citizens:
The state seeks power, influence, wealth, as 
ends in themselves. The individual seeks 
health, peace, creative activity, love. The 
state, because of its power and wealth, has 
no end of spokesmen for its interests. This 
means the citizen must understand the need 
to think and act on his own or in concert 
with fellow citizens. (p. 122)
According to Zinn, this means that
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We need devices which are powerful but 
restrained, explosive but controlled: 
to resist the government's actions 
against the lives and liberties of its 
citizens; to pressure, even to shock 
the government into change; to organize 
people to replace the holders of power, 
as one round in that continuing cycle of 
political renewal which alone can prevent 
tyranny. (p. 7)
It is therefore 'urgent for American democracy that citizens 
should not relinquish the vital weapon of civil disobedience 
against the already-frightening power of the state' (p. 122). 
Thus civil disobedience 'becomes not only justifiable but 
necessary when a fundamental human right is at stake, and 
when legal channels are inadequate for securing that right'
(p. 119).
Zinn allows that some 'forms' of civil disobedience may 
not be morally justified (p. 123), although he only hints at 
what these might be. One example would be the use of means 
disproportionate to ends (pp. 39-40); another is the use of 
civil disobedience as part of a programme of classical 
revolutionary war, since such a programme is 'not feasible1 
in the United States (p. 123).
It is clear, then, that Zinn's positive arguments about 
the justifiability of civil disobedience rely upon the 
characteristics contained in his definition in the same way 
as in the arguments of the other authors discussed above. (Kis 
negative justification, that civil disobedience allows the 
controlled expression of protest, does not itself amount to a 
justification at all, since it leaves open the more important 
charges dealt with by the positive justification; it could 
hardly even override the charge of illegality.) The basis for 
the positive justification is that civil disobedience is part 
of the democratic system; indeed it 'fills a vital need in a 
political system accustomed to counting heads, but needing
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also to measure passions' (p. 25). But note how this link 
with democracy is contained in his elaboration of what he 
means by 'a vital social purpose' in the definition from p. 119 
quoted on p. 224 above. The relationship between civil dis­
obedience and democracy is included as part of the definition 
of civil disobedience. That it is also used as the basis for 
justifying civil disobedience provides yet another illustration 
of the role that defining characteristics play in the moral 
justification of civil disobedience.
Zinn's definition of civil disobedience also 
establishes a presumption of moral justifiability 
for any moral person. Since he has defined civil disobedience 
as a violation of law 'for a vital social purpose', and hence 
so that its aim 'is always to close the gap between law and 
justice' (p. 119), civil disobedience has a presumption of 
legitimacy based on the attempt to realise the moral ideals of 
communal life. Civil disobedience has the interests of law, 
and hence communal life itself, at heart, and it must therefore 
be accorded a presumption of moral justifiability according to 
Zinn's definition, but a presumption that can, of course, be 
overridden.
The studies in this Section have been designed to unveil 
the structures of the arguments of a diverse group of writers 
on civil disobedience, a group drawn more or less at random 
from the considerable modern literature and exhibiting a 
variety of reasons for their conclusions about the moral 
status of civil disobedience. But their arguments have a 
structural similarity in that, in examining the moral justifia­
bility of the practice of civil disobedience, they are forced 
to concentrate on general features common to all acts of 
civil disobedience, and hence to rely upon an. implicit
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presumption about the moral status of civil disobedience that 
affects the ways they define it. But not only are their 
definitions not morally neutral for them; I have also 
argued, in each case, that the definition could not be neutral 
for any participant in the moral point of view qua participant 
because of the particular relationships between each 
definition and the moral point of view itself. So the 
orthodox dogma about the strict separation of criteria of 
recognition from criteria of justification, both in fact and 
its possibility in principle, is not only denied by actual 
practice, but it could not be otherwise.
But I must emphasise yet again that I am not suggesting 
that these presumptions are necessarily conclusive of the 
moral statüs of civil disobedience, either in general or in 
a particular case. What the definition does is set the grounds 
and some of the limits of moral debate about civil dis­
obedience. It sets our faces in a certain evaluative 
direction, of justifiability or unjustifiability, and lets us 
proceed from there according to a particular moral theory.
It allows the process of justification to begin - of challenge 
and response, undermining and overriding arguments and 
rebuttals, description and redescription. But the definition 
will have done part of that job already; it will have placed 
the onus of justification on one of the parties to the dispute 
according to the requirements of the moral point of view 
itself.
3. Civil disobedience: definition and typology
The studies in the last Section have illustrated some of 
the arguments of Part One of this thesis by analysing 
particular arguments about the nature and moral justifiability
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of civil disobedience. I have sought to show two things: 
first, how each writer's definition of civil disobedience 
is in fact related to his arguments about its moral justifica­
tion in a way that refutes the separability thesis for that 
particular writer; but secondly, I have argued that any moral 
person must recognise the connection between definition and 
presumptions about the moral status of civil disobedience so 
defined, whether or not he accepts the moral theory of the 
writer in question. But although the definition of civil 
disobedience cannot avoid incorporating presumptions about the 
moral status of civil disobedience, that definition ought to 
leave room for debate about the conclusions to be arrived at 
in general or in particular cases. A definition which settled 
the question one way or the other would circumscribe the 
reasoned nature of moral discourse. 'Civil disobedience' is 
not like 'murder'; its moral status can still be an issue.
For these reasons, then, the strategy I shall adopt in 
this Section will be to try to arrive at a definition of civil 
disobedience that preserves its distinctiveness from similar 
forms of action, yet does not establish moral presumptions 
that are likely to be too difficult to override during the 
course of moral debate. My approach is thus closest to Brown's 
among the writers analysed above. But first some preliminaries.
At the core of a great deal of confusion of many writers 
on civil disobedience is a failure to distinguish between two 
aspects of civil disobedience. 'Civil disobedience' is usually 
used as a blanket term, but implicit in many uses of it are 
two distinct elements, each of which is relied upon to emphasise 
different acts. The first refers to acts of civil disobedience, 
observable events in the world. The second refers to a 
particular way of being civilly disobedient, by acting within
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a tradition of civil disobedience, the main exponents of 
which were Gandhi and King. That tradition holds that the 
'true civil disobedient' performs acts of civil disobedience 
in a particular way, emphasising strict nonviolence, 
submission to arrest, conviction and punishment, and a willing­
ness to see opponents as moral persons to be persuaded of the 
justice of the disobedient's claim rather than forced into 
acquiescence. The status of these elements of the tradition 
of civil disobedience has changed from being a matter of 
tactics and/or tenets of personal moral or religious conviction 
to counting as evidence of a basic allegiance to the political 
system wherein the disobedience takes place, and hence an 
indication of what is taken as the essential non-revolutionary, 
submissive and self-limited nature of civil disobedience.
The problem is, however, that these two uses of 'civil 
disobedience' are not always kept distinct, resulting both in 
the pre-emption of moral questions shown earlier and in 
confusion about such things as whether revolutionaries can be 
civilly disobedient or not. Indeed, if a commitment to the 
system is required as part of the very nature of civil dis­
obedience, or of its justification, then either Gandhi was not 
a civil disobedient, or he was not justified in his actions, 
for the whole point of his disobedience in India, a paragon of 
submissiveness, was to remove the political system under which 
he lived. I maintain that acts of civil disobedience can be 
performed by someone who is not part of the tradition of civil 
disobedience, and that one can ask questions about the moral 
justifiability of those acts of civil disobedience just as one 
can ask those questions about the actions of someone who is 
within that tradition. It may be that it is easier to justify 
civil disobedience when it is done according to the requirements
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of the tradition, but that ought not colour the definition
given of civil disobedience itself.
According to the orthodox definition, an act of civil
2 2disobedience is (1) illegal, (2) public, (3) an act of
23 24 25protest, (4) nonviolent, (5) conscientiously motivated,
and (6) the agent accepts the legitimacy of the legal and
2 6 2 Vpolitical systems and submits to arrest and punishment.
I will examine each of these characteristics in turn and then
formulate a definition of my own. I shall then briefly examine
the different types of civil disobedience.
(i) Illegality and civility
The notion of civil disobedience implies the existence of a 
formal system of rules, decrees, regulations, directions and 
commands laid down and enforced by public authorities. This 
is, of course, one (but only one) of the senses that 'civil' 
has in this context. The disobedience is of the public and 
general rules that concern an individual as a citizen, not of 
the private and specific rules that are internal to his golf 
club or his company. The latter can only have limited 
application, bound by the lack of any authority to make rules 
binding on the whole community. Of course, non-public rules 
or decisions may have large effects on the populace ('What is 
good for General Motors ...'). And I want to allow that the 
target of civil disobedience may be the operations of a private 
concern such as a company or a private association. But the 
disobedience must be of the rules etc. of the state (broadly 
understood to include tribunals, agencies, etc.). Disobedience 
to the rules etc. of a 'family, clan, church, lodge, or
business does not count as civil disobedience. 28
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It might seem that the condition of illegality (in a 
fairly broad sense to encompass the legal rules made by the 
sovereign authority or its agents) would be a simple, straight­
forward, uncontroversial characteristic of civil disobedience. 
Nevertheless there has been considerable discussion about the 
status of disobedience to a law either (i) undertaken in order 
to challenge its validity (test-case disobedience), or (ii) 
when the law is declared invalid when the disobedient's case
reaches the courts. Some writers do not consider test-case
29disobedience to be civil disobedience at all. Indeed, van 
den Haag argues that test-case disobedience is not civil dis­
obedience even if it is unsuccessful in having the law in 
question declared invalid, since, in his view, one of the 
distinguishing characteristics of civil disobedience is that 
it is undertaken on moral grounds: 'If a legal defense of the
act is relied on, if legal guilt incurred for the sake of 
moral principle is disavowed, there was no civil disobedience.1'''' 
Other writers specifically restrict the scope of the laws etc.
that may be broken by holding that civil disobedience can only
31be of particular types of laws. Still others claim that
civil disobedience is in fact a recognised legal procedure (at
least in the United States) which can be both legal and illegal
32at the same time.
But most of the discussion has concentrated upon the status 
of test-case disobedience. On the face of it, the problem, and 
perhaps the solution, seem clear: if it is an essential
characteristic of an act of civil disobedience that it be 
illegal, and if the law violated turns out to be invalid, then 
it was not a lav/, and hence no illegal act occurred. Thus the 
act was not one of civil disobedience because it was not dis­
obedient of anything.
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The decision whether to allow test-case disobedience as 
civil disobedience may seem somewhat arbitrary. Nevertheless, 
it is still an important one to make, for if test-case dis­
obedience is to be excluded from civil disobedience, this can 
have the rather counter-intuitive result that the disobedient 
acts of people such as Martin Luther King were not acts of civil 
disobedience, and this conclusion runs counter to the ways in 
which the term is popularly applied. It seems to me that 
whether or not the violation of a law is intended to create a 
test-case on the validity of that law, and whether or not the 
law is subsequently declared invalid, does not affect the 
characterisation of the act as disobedient. That must be 
decided according to whether the enforcing authorities (police,
prosecutors, etc.) consider the law valid and are likely to 
3 3enforce it. Indeed, they usually have little discretion in 
the matter if a clear and public violation has occurred - a 
fact that civil disobedients often rely on. Deliberate acts 
of disobedience designed to provoke a test-case are properly 
counted as civil disobedience if the other conditions are 
fulfilled whether or not the test-case is successful, and 
whether the objection to the law is on technical grounds or 
on substantive grounds. The constitutional doctrine that an 
invalidated lav; is regarded as void ab initio does not seem to 
be realistic; to hold that a law which has been declared and 
enforced by the authorities - perhaps over many years, at 
considerable cost to those subject to it - but which is sub­
sequently and authoritiatively declared invalid was never a 
law amounts to saying that the government acted tyrannically 
and coercively in requiring people to act in accordance with 
the 'non-law'. If an authority (governmental or judicial.) 
follows recognised procedures and declares a pronouncement to
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be a law, and if that authority is empowered to declare and 
enforce such measures, then that pronouncement deserves the 
name ’law' until it is authoritatively declared not to be a 
law, and it ceases to be a law only when it is so declared. 
Although the position does vary somewhat, a person who has 
suffered under such a law has no legal remedy if that law is 
subsequently invalidated. Provided the other conditions are 
fulfilled, therefore, any violation of a measure declared and 
liable to be enforced by the appropriate authorities counts 
as civil disobedience, whether or not it is intended to test 
the validity of the law, and whether or not it is successful 
in doing so.
A more difficult point is Cohen's objection to counting 
successful test-case disobedience as civil disobedience, that 
'there can be no legal justification of civil disobedience.'^ 
Since logical consistency demands that the law cannot justify 
its own violation, Cohen says, successful test-case disobedience 
cannot be counted as disobedience of the law. Two points can 
be made against this position; first, it confuses being 
legally right with being legally justified. Since a person 
who wants to protest against a law, policy or decision can, in 
principle, do so without breaking the law, successful test-case 
disobedience is not necessarily legally right although its 
success makes it legally justified. (The distinction is 
parallel to that between morally right and morally justified 
drawn in Chapter Two, Section 1, pp. 66 - 67 above.) It may
be that the only way to obtain an authoritative pronouncement 
on the validity of a law is to break that law (e.g. in legal 
systems where there is no provision for advisory or declaratory 
judgements on such matters) and in those cases too, success 
renders the disobedience legally justified but not legally 
right.
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Secondly, however, the major premise of Cohen's argument 
is called into question by arguments such as those of Freeman 
and Taylor (cited in Note 32) about the breaking of the law 
being 'a recognised procedure for challenging lav; or policy'.
The evaluation of their arguments (and whether they apply out­
side the United States) requires greater legal expertise than 
I have. On the face of it, however, it seems that the law 
must be able to justify the breaking of its rules when they 
come into conflict with each other, whether or not a question of 
validity is involved. For example, where the law imposes two 
legal obligations, A and B, each of which can only be fulfilled 
at the expense of a clear breach of the other, but where A is 
considered by the law to override B, then I am legally justified 
in fulfilling A rather than B in cases where they do conflict. 
Suppose there is a legal obligation to summon assistance for 
those injured in motor vehicle accidents, and another legal 
obligation to ensure that my car is registered when I drive it. 
Suppose also that I am the only witness to an accident 
involving serious injury, and the only way* I can get assistance 
to the injured is to drive my admittedly unregistered car. My 
legal duty to report the accident overrides my legal obligation 
not to use my car; I am legally justified (and, other things 
being equal, would be morally justified even if I were not 
legally justified) in breaking the law which says that I must 
not drive my unregistered car. But this does not mean that 
driving my unregistered car was legally right (i.e. not 
illegal) after all; that A. overrides B does not alter the 
status of B. (Again, the case is parallel to that where one 
moral principle overrides another.) The law has not authorised 
or permitted me to drive an unregistered car, nor does it
excuse me from the obligation to abide by B. The law justifies
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my use of my unregistered car according to its own rules of 
priority. Thus Cohen's objection fails.
Finally, in order to count as an act of civil dis­
obedience, the act must not only be illegal, but be 
de l iberately so in the sense that the agent knows that his act
will violate the law. The illegality is premeditated rather
35than accidental.
So far I have concentrated on disobedience and illegality 
as an aspect of civility. It is now time to turn to a wider 
examination of the notion of 'civil', for this aspect of civil 
disobedience has generated much of the debate and most of the 
confusion concerning the characterisation of civil disobedience.
The senses given to 'civil' vary widely throughout the 
3 6literature.^ The term is generally used, however, to imply 
a certain attitude on the part of the lawbreaker, an attitude 
that distinguishes the civil disobedient from both the 
'ordinary' criminal and the revolutionary. The civil dis­
obedient, it is said, is motivated by conscience. He is 
compelled to take the grave step of disobeying the law out of
a sense of moral outrage at what he sees happening around him.
But he takes this step reluctantly, aware that his purpose is
not, and must not be thought to be, self-interest but only the
welfare and interests of the whole community, understood not 
only in material terms but also in the sense in which any 
injustice to any of its members is contrary to the communal 
interest. In this view, the civil disobedient accepts that the 
social and political system is legitimate and deserves his 
trust and acceptance in what it requires of him. Nevertheless 
he feels that he cannot, in conscience, allow it to continue 
on its present course in a direction he at least regards as 
morally wrong. Since there are no perfectly just social and
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political systems, it must be accepted that aberrations can 
occur from time to time, even in the best system yet invented, 
and measures must therefore be taken to remedy any injustices 
that do emerge. The need may be so pressing, or those with 
the power to decide so stupid or self-interested, that he is 
forced to disobey what may be a legitimate requirement of his 
citizenship, in order to initiate, provoke, or influence the 
process of change. Thus the civil disobedient uses 'carefully 
chosen and limited means' in order to further 'limited public 
ends';37 he is 'submissive',33 even 'sacrificial.'3^
These and other elements are built into the orthodox 
characterisation of civil disobedience, as we have seen. They 
are not accidental characteristics which civil disobedients 
may strive to realise in their acts. They are necessarily 
present in all acts of civil disobedience (although perhaps to 
varying degrees) and it is this aspect of the orthodox position 
which seems to me to call into question the orthodox attempt to 
separate characterisation from evaluation. Nevertheless the 
notion of civility, of what it means to be a participant in 
communal life, is a vital consideration for the moral justifi­
ability of civil disobedience. I shall return to it in Chapter 
Five.
(ii) Public
The requirement that the civil disobedient act publicly is 
usually used to distinguish civil disobedience from the acts 
of the typical criminal. Acts of civil disobedience must be 
public in two senses: the act itself is not concealed, and 
the agent does not try to hide his own identity. Civil dis­
obedience is overt rather than covert, open rather than 
surreptitious. Some writers interpret this characteristic as 
requiring that the agent must publicise his act and his
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identity, either before its occurrence or at least afterwards. 
This is often done by those who conform to the tradition of 
civil disobedience. It does not seem to me to be required in 
the definition of an act of civil disobedience, although again 
it may be relevant to justifiability as an indication of 
seriousness of purpose or of commitment to community.
(iii) Protest
Acts of civil disobedience are acts of protest. The obvious
sense of protest involves the communication of a grievance,
a desire for change, and this is the sense relied upon by most
writers on civil disobedience. For them, civil disobedience
is an attempt to highlight a deficiency in a law, policy, or
decision, or the manner of implementation thereof, of the
government. The means chosen for doing so is the violation of
a law, which law may or may not be, or be directly related to,
the target of the protest. If the target is the same law that
is violated, or is closely related to it, the civil disobedience
is known as 'direct civil disobedience'. If the lav; that is
violated is not the target of the protest (it may in fact be
regarded as wholly praiseworthy), the civil disobedience is
40known as 'indirect civil disobedience'.
I suggested on p. 231 that the target of civil dis­
obedience could just as well be the policies or decisions of 
a private organisation as those of the government. The 
techniques of civil disobedience that can be used to 'persuade' 
a government to undertake some reform could be equally 
effective (and perhaps even more effective if publicity is used 
in particular ways) against a non-governmental organisation or 
against a business firm. The aims of law-breaking against 
governmental and non-governmental targets can be sufficiently 
similar to allow both under the same umbrella. Law-breaking in
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an attempt to dissuade the Rugby Union from welcoming tours 
by white South African players selected according to the laws 
of apartheid, or to persuade a company to cease its pollution 
of a river or to stop manufacturing arms, seem to me to qualify 
as civil disobedience (other conditions being fulfilled) as 
much as does law-breaking directed against the government for 
similar ends. This is the case too even when the disobedients 
recognise that government action would be inappropriate for the 
results they want and that their disobedience cannot therefore 
be interpreted as an indirect call for government action, e.g. 
where the government has no constitutional or statutory power 
to act. Nor does civil disobedience against a private 
organisation thereby lose its civil character in the sense of 
being associated with the civic order. Private bodies exist 
within the communitas; they have roles and responsibilities 
to the collectivity just as a citizen does. They are there­
fore the proper objects of concern of citizens. But their 
situation is a little more complex than that of government, 
for private bodies are also entitled to protect their legitimate 
interests, and to seek the assistance of the law to do so.
That does not mean that they cannot be the targets of acts of 
civil disobedience; it merely complicates the strategy and 
justifiability of such actions.
The type of civil disobedience aimed at achieving some 
particular change may be called 'political disobedience'. The 
disobedience is civil in the sense that it is political; it 
is an appeal to the citizens to recognise some deficiency in 
the civic order, and to assert civic power to try to have that 
deficiency remedied. This sense of 'political' is wider than 
its usual sense of 'pertaining to the practices and institutions 
of government, etc.' It is used to indicate action and inter-
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action in the public arena in order to bring about change.
It is thus bound up with relationships of power, influence, 
coercion, persuasion, authority, and pressure. Its public 
nature allows an appeal to the collectivity to recognise the 
deficiency in the law, etc, while making that same appeal to 
those directly responsible for it.
There is, however, another type of disobedience which is
not aimed at bringing about public change, but which may still
be regarded as civil disobedience. I call this type 'civil
disobedience of personal integrity' or simply 'personal dis- 
41obedience.' Here the primary object is not to change a lav;,
etc. It is public disobedience arising out of a conscientious
dissent from the demands or the activities of the state or of
a private organisation. The demands of the state may be seen
as quite legitimate in every other respect, but the disobedient
considers that they require him to do something, or to acquiesce
in something, which he regards as a violation of his personal
moral integrity. Similarly, the disobedient may hold that the
activities or lack of them of the state or of a private
organisation are so reprehensible that for him to remain silent
would be for his moral integrity to be compromised. The primary
aim is not that the demand or activity be modified (though that
may also be present), but that the disobedient not compromise 
4 2his integrity. 'Hence I stand; I can do no other.'
This second type of disobedience corresponds to a second 
sense of the word 'protest', that associated with the notion 
of dissent. Since it is not primarily oriented towards changes 
in the civic order, it is therefore not concerned with 
communication in the way that political disobedience is. The 
prospects for the success of political disobedience, and there­
fore part of its justifiability, rest on its ability to
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communicate with the target and, perhaps more importantly, 
with the rest of the citizen body; it is usually the weapon 
of the powerless, who have no other political resource but 
their voices and their ability to influence others with more 
political clout, either individually or collectively. This 
situation leads to the well-known 'media character' of acts 
of protest, from demonstrations to strikes to civil dis­
obedience to riots. If the rest of the citizens do not know 
about it, they cannot bring pressure to bear. Political 
disobedience is educative and communicative because it is 
oriented towards change.
On the other hand, these techniques are not necessary for 
personal disobedience, for the primary aim is not to convert 
and to change, but to conserve and protect. The public nature 
of this kind of civil disobedience is not quite the same as 
in the case of political disobedience. It consists in openness 
and appeal rather than announcement and external publicity 
(although, of course, the action must still be public). This 
is not to deny, of course, that political disobedience may be 
motivated by the same kinds of conscientiousness as personal 
disobedience. But their aims are different, their methods are 
different, and hence their justifications are different.
I shall consider the moral justifiability of political and 
personal disobedience in Chapter Five. Of course, the decision 
might be difficult as to whether a particular case is one or 
the other. A particular agent may desire both to preserve what 
he sees as his own moral or religious integrity and also hope 
to secure some change in government policy that will remove the 
need for him and others to take the stand they do. Political 
and personal disobedience in their pure forms are the two ends 
of a continuum, and different agents may be located at different
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places along it according to the particular aims and motives 
of each. A person who publicly refused to pay taxes purely 
in order to try to secure a change in the tax laws would be 
a paradigm case of political disobedience. On the other hand, 
the act of someone who refused to pay taxes because to do so 
would be to acquiesce in some action or policy he finds 
morally objectionable would be a paradigm case of an act of 
personal disobedience. It may be that the person who tries to 
secure a change in the tax laws knows full well that it is 
highly improbable that those changes will come about, whether 
or not as a result of his efforts. The existing laws may have 
the overwhelming support of the populace, or the government 
may have announced that it has no intention of changing the 
law, a policy supported by the opposition. Yet his dis­
obedience is still political disobedience, because it is aimed 
at change in the law. Whether the lack of prospects for 
success affect its justifiability is a separate question, and 
will be considered in Chapter Five. Similarly, that personal 
disobedience is based on a moral theory that is idiosyncratic 
or misguided does not affect its status as; personal disobedience, 
although it may affect its justifiability.
(iv) Nonviolence
Whether or not civil disobedience is 'essentially' (physically) 
nonviolent has been the most debated point in all the recent 
literature on it. Some writers hold that nonviolence to 
persons is a requirement for an act to be an act of civil 
disobedience, while others consider strict nonviolence to both 
persons and property to be necessary. Still others distinguish 
between initiating violence and responding in self-defence to 
the violence of police and/or bystanders, and allow limited 
and controlled response but not initiation.
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It is easy to see why so many hold nonviolence to be a 
defining characteristic of civil disobedience. First, non­
violence has been part of the tradition of civil disobedience, 
particularly associated with figures in its history such as 
Gandhi and King. Secondly, abandoning violent means towards 
realising one's ends is a tangible sign of the seriousness of 
one's purpose, particularly if no response is offered to the 
violence of others. Thirdly, it is also held to provide proof 
of an agent's commitment to the legitimacy of the system in 
that he deliberately eschews illegitimate means of attempting 
to realise his goals and stays within the bounds of communal 
life:
To satisfy the obligation about nonviolence 
is to submit vital proof of the disobedient 
person's respect for human rights as a moral 
value and for peaceful change as essential 
to the democratic process.
There is a fourth, more pragmatic, reason why the political 
disobedient should be nonviolent: if he is trying to
communicate, educate and persuade, he needs to be able to 
focus attention on the perceived inadequacies of law, policy, 
or decision. Violence tends to intrude into that process to 
such an extent that the point of the protest may be lost.
The second and third of these reasons clearly bear upon 
the justifiability of civil disobedience rather than its 
characterisation, and hence nonviolence ought to be omitted 
from a definition that eschews too many implicit justificatory 
judgements, even if it cannot avoid some. The fourth reason is 
tactical, concerned with what it is best to try to do if a 
particular act of civil disobedience is to be able to achieve 
its purpose, and is thus also inadequate as a grounds for 
including nonviolence in a definition. The first reason (which 
is not necessarily totally distinct from the second and third)
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is an affirmation of a commitment to an ideal of civil 
disobedience (or perhaps to an ideal of political action 
or moral action in general). I have already suggested (on 
p. 230) that it confuses the issue of the definition of acts 
of civil disobedience with a particular way of being disobedient, 
and hence does not provide adequate grounds for including 
nonviolence in the definition.
Cohen is right when he says that either side of the
dispute over whether civil disobedience must be nonviolent
'could be consistently maintained' and that the issue is
4 4'essentially terminological.' But we must not take that to 
mean that it does not matter which side is chosen. I have 
already shown in Section 2 of this Chapter how the inclusion 
of nonviolence in the definition of civil disobedience affects 
the grounds and limits of moral debate about civil dis­
obedience for any participant in the moral point of view. But 
there are other reasons for not insisting on a narrow 
definition of civil disobedience through including character­
istics such as nonviolence. According to Michael Walzer, 
narrow definitions of civil disobedience
rule out certain sorts of unconventional yet 
nonrevolutionary politics which should not 
be regarded as attacks on the civil order.
These may well involve both coercion and 
violence, though always in severely limited 
ways. It is important to recognize the 
significance of such limits when making 
judgements about civility. The insistence 
on the absolute nonviolence of civil dis­
obedience is, in any case, a little dis­
ingenuous, as it disregards, first, the 
coercive impact disobedience often has on 
innocent bystanders, and second, the actual 
violence it provokes, and sometimes is 
intended to provoke, especially from the 
police. I don't doubt that it is preferable 
that no one be coerced and that police 
violence be met with passive resistance, 
but there may be occasions when neither of 
these is politically possible, and there 
may also be occasions, not necessarily the 
same ones, when they are not morally required.
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Such occasions, if they exist, would have 
to be described and delimited precisely.
One of the dangers of a narrow definition 
of civil disobedience is that it simply 
rules out the effort to do this. By 
setting rigid limits to civil conduct, it 
virtually invites militants of various 
sorts to move beyond the bounds of 
civility altogether, and it invites the 
police to respond always as if they were 
confronting criminals. (Sometimes, of 
course, the police are confronting criminals, 
but it is important that we know, and that 
they know, when this is so and when it is 
not.)45
Walzer’s argument is in three distinct parts:
(a) he argues that a strict insistence on nonviolence and 
noncoercion as requirements of civility cannot be maintained 
because civil disobedience is coercive by its very nature 
(note that Walzer seems to concentrate on political dis­
obedience and to ignore personal disobedience), both with 
respect to the target and often also with respect to bystanders.
In addition, Walzer's position is in line with a tendency in
46the growing philosophical literature on violence to argue 
that there is no difference in principle between physical 
violence, the usual target of a definitional prohibition on 
violence, and coercion that does not rely on physical threats 
but which has the same effects. Those who hold this view 
argue that it is inconsistent to reserve the term 'violence5 
to the former and to deny it to the latter. Hence, to make 
civil disobedience nonviolent by definition ignores the 
coercive way it does and must operate, and also ignores 
relevant similarities between violence and other types of 
coercion.
(b) Walzer5s second argument is that a narrow definition of 
civil disobedience enforces a correspondingly narrow notion 
of what it is to be civil in this context, and hence by 
definition places those who see no prospects for change
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through nonviolent civil disobedience, the 'militants of 
various sorts', outside the compass of concern for communal 
life. Yet Walzer wants to claim that this exclusion from 
civil life should not depend solely upon the definition of 
the methods used by the militants. Such definitions prevent 
those who deal with these law-breakers, such as the police, 
from recognising that the reasons for civil disobedience are 
not the same as, or even similar to, the reasons for criminal 
activity in general. This is a further reason why militants 
move beyond the limits of civil disobedience narrowly defined: 
if they are going to be treated as criminals anyway, and if 
real criminal activity might be more effective in achieving 
goals than action within the bounds of civility narrowly 
conceived, then they may have little to lose and much to gain 
by acting outside those bounds.
(c) the third part of the argument is more directly related
to Walzer's own concerns in his paper, and I will not dwell
on it since aspects of his position have been covered in
connection with the discussion above of the illegal nature of
civil disobedience. Walzer wants to suggest that the narrow
definition does not allow consideration of a third type of
civil disobedience alongside direct disobedience and indirect
disobedience, a type 'more indirect than the second, in which
the state is not challenged at all, but only those corporate
4 7authorities that the state (sometimes) protects.'
I agree with these arguments as reasons for excluding 
nonviolence from the definition of civil disobedience. Of 
course, I also want to exclude nonviolence from the definition 
on the grounds that it pre-empts too much of the question 
about whether a particular act of civil disobedience is, or 
can be, morally justified.
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(v) Conscientiousness
In discussing Cohen's views in Section 2 of this Chapter,
I showed how the inclusion of 'conscientious motivation1 (for 
the sake of argument I include similar characteristics such 
as 'done for moral reasons' and 'done to remedy injustice' in 
this category) in the definition of civil disobedience 
establishes moral presumptions about the justifiability of 
acts of civil disobedience. The question now is whether 
conscientiousness still ought to be included in the definition, 
in spite of these presumptions.
Clearly, the way I have defined civil disobedience of 
personal integrity establishes that that kind of disobedience 
is conscientiously motivated. It is also clearly the intention 
of those who define political disobedience as having a 
conscientious element to require that moral reasons be the 
motivating force behind those acts rather than reasons of, say, 
mere expediency or political advantage. But, again, it may be 
that acts of civil disobedience done out of a sense of justice 
or moral outrage are more likely to be morally justified than 
if they are done for political or pragmatic reasons, for we may 
hold that moral reasons are the only kind of reason that can 
override an obligation to obey the law, and that these other 
kinds of reasons cannot. But that is still a separate question 
from the definition of an act of civil disobedience, and there 
are no good reasons why it should be incorporated into it. The 
only reason which could warrant its incorporation is distinctive­
ness, i.e. if there is a risk of confusion between different 
types of action if civil disobedience is not defined as 
conscientious. I do not believe that there is such a risk,
and hence do not propose to incorporate conscientiousness or
4 gany similar characteristic into my definition.
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(vi) Acceptance of the legitimacy of the system and submission
to arrest and punishment
The last two characteristics in the orthodox definition of 
civil disobedience are complementary, and I shall consider 
them together. The acceptance of arrest and penalty is taken 
as evidence of the agent's acceptance of, and allegiance to, 
the legitimacy of the social and political system. These 
characteristics are included for two related reasons: in
order to distinguish civil disobedients from revolutionaries 
and rebels, and in order to ensure that the civil disobedient 
is in fact civil in the sense of acting within the bounds of 
communal society.
The trouble with the first aim is that it occasions
difficulties about the use of the term ’civil disobedience'.
I have already referred to Gandhi's case, for it seems plain
that he v/as a revolutionary in the sense of wanting the
removal of the Raj. Somewhat similar difficulties arise with 
49Thoreau. To make the definition of an act of civil diso- 
obedience rely on what might be a long-term objective on the 
part of the agent (and perhaps not a very prominent or well- 
articulated objective at that) is to invite confusion. There 
seems no good reason why a person bent on the overthrow of a 
regime should not be able to perform an act of civil dis­
obedience in the service of that aim, even though he may not 
be part of the tradition of civil disobedience. Again, the 
moral status of that act is another question.
The second aim is more acceptable. The civil character 
of civil disobedience must rely on more that the fact that it 
is a law that is broken, for all criminals do that, or on the 
fact that the law is broken as an act of protest. It is 
established, in addition, by the fact that an agent acts within
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the bounds of, and according to the ideals of, communal life
itself. Prirna facie evidence for this is a recognition of
liability to arrest and penalty according to the processes of
law, and submission to those processes in the absence of good
reasons for evasion. I do not put it more strongly than that
by requiring submission to arrest and penalty, for there could
well be occasions when those processes are so draconian as to
be themselves incompatible with the conditions of communal life,
50e.g. capital punishment for any act of protest. But the 
onus is on the disobedient to show why he should not submit to 
arrest and penalty. Failure to submit without good reason 
places his act outside civil disobedience by removing part of 
its civil nature.
Thus I define an act of civil disobedience as a public 
act which deliberately contravenes some law or measure endorsed 
by public authority and likely to be officially enforced; it 
is performed as a protest against some law, policy or decision 
(or lack of it) of some lav;-, policy-, or decision-making body; 
those doing it recognise that they thereby make themselves 
liable to arrest and penalty according to the processes of law, 
and that the onus is on them to show why they should not submit 
to those processes.
Some writers on civil disobedience would object to this
definition on the grounds that it blurs an important
distinction between civil disobedience and conscientious
objection. Ernest van den Haag writes, for example,
A refusal to follow a legal command, because 
of a moral or religious objection, is 
'conscientious objection'. Examples are 
refusal to be drafted, to shoot at the enemy, 
to submit to vaccination.... Conscientious 
objection differs from civil disobedience 
because there need to be no attempt to urge 
others to follow7 the course traced by the 
objector's conscience. There never are 
attempts to compel others, or the government,
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to do so. The conscience of the objector 
prevents his participation in what he 
regards as wrong, but either it does not 
claim universal validity, or it does not 
claim the right to impose what it regards 
as universally valid on others. Unlike 
civil disobedience, conscientious objection 
never involves more than violation of the 
law objected to (or.possibly of laws not 
separable from iij. -*^
It seems to me, however, that conscientious objection
which is translated into an act of public lawbreaking with
the other conditions of a civilly disobedient act also present
is no less an act of civil disobedience. Van den Haag’s
definition of civil disobedience requires that a law be
deliberately disobeyed to publicly demonstrate 
opposition, on moral grounds, to laws or 
policies of the government.... [Civil dis­
obedience] must rest not only on personal 
reluctance to obey the law but on a general 
moral principle which makes the object of 
the protest sufficiently objectionable to 
justify defying a law in protest.... Civil 
disobedience is a public act prompted by 
moral principle.5 2
His refusal to include conscientious objection in civil 
disobedience thus rests on a particular view about what it is 
to act publicly in this context. It is to urge others to 
follow one's example, or to claim that they ought to do so 
because the principle at stake is universally valid. But 
this is a rather circumscribed view of the public nature of 
an act of personal disobedience. (I leave aside the question 
of whether it is an accurate representation of conscientious 
objection.) An act of personal disobedience is public in the 
sense that it takes place in the public arena, as a citizen's 
act of witness, as his public charge against the law, policy 
or decision that is objected to. There seems to me to be no 
good reason to deny the term 'civil disobedience' to a 
conscientious act of dissent that violates a law in essentially 
the same way as an act of political disobedience does. Of
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course, not all conscientious objectors act illegally, any 
more than all protestors do. The most common example of 
conscientious objection is connected with liability for 
military service. Someone who registers according to the 
conscientious objection provisions of the law may dissent 
from government policies, but he is not acting illegally.
But someone who both refuses to register and publicly disobeys 
the law requiring that he accept conscription is, ceteris 
paribus, performing an act that is no less an act of civil 
disobedience in the absence of an attempt to change law, 
decision, or policy.
A number of different types of civil disobedience have
been mentioned in the course of the discussion of the definition
of civil disobedience, particularly the important distinctions
between direct and indirect disobedience, and between political
and personal disobedience. Other writers make other distinctions,
but to identify and discuss them all would be to take us beyond
our immediate concerns; some will be mentioned later as they
53prove relevant to problems of moral justification.
CHAPTER FIVE
The Moral Justification of Civil Disobedience
1. Introduction
We can now (at last) examine the moral justifiability of 
civil disobedience. The arguments of the first four Chapters 
of this thesis have been necessary to prepare ourselves for 
that task. We have had to become clear about what it is to 
morally justify an action, about how description is; related to 
moral justification, about what civil disobedience is and why 
it needs justifying, and about whether the law has any legiti­
mate moral claim on the obedience of those subject to it. The. 
major conclusions about these matters may be summarised as 
follows:
(i) to morally justify an action is to meet charges made 
against it from within the moral point of view. There are, 
however, important, differences between three levels of 
justificatory discourse (agent, action, and practice) and 
between undermining and overriding responses to charges. 
Moreover, that an action is morally right is neither a neces­
sary nor a sufficient condition of its being morally justified.
(ii) Some descriptions embody moral presumptions, and hence 
charges, about that which is described, and these charges must 
be recognised by any moral person.
(iii) Any moral person must acknowledge a non-conclusive 
moral obligation to obey the law where the institution of law 
helps secure the common good.
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(iv) The orthodox analysis of civil disobedience cannot 
maintain a strict separation between criteria of recognition 
and criteria of justification; the presumptions embodied in 
a definition of civil disobedience will affect both the onus 
of justification and the ways the moral justifiability of 
civil disobedience so defined may be debated, both in general 
and in specific cases.
We must now consider charges against the moral justif­
iability of civil disobedience in the light of these conclusions, 
particularly with respect to the differences between political 
and personal disobedience on the one hand, and between direct 
and indirect disobedience on the other. In the rest of this 
Section I shall consider the conditions ’which must be satisfied 
if a charge against a practice is to be conclusive against any 
example of that practice. In Section 2 I examine ways of 
undermining and overriding charges concerning political oblig­
ation. Section 3 is concerned with some arguments which deny 
that civil disobedience can be morally justified as a practice, 
and hence deny that any particular act of civil disobedience 
can be morally justified. I then look at charges about civil 
disobedience within a democracy (Section 4), at charges against 
indirect disobedience (Section 5), at some justifying cond­
itions for civil disobedience (Section 6), and at ways of just­
ifying political and personal disobedience (Sections 7 and 8).
Finally, I shall consider the claim that there may be a 'right'
1 *to disobey (Section 9).
Many charges against civil disobedience are made at the 
level of practice. 1 have argued (Chapter Two, Section 4,
* Notes to this Chapter are on pp.360 - 369.
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pp.89-90) that there is no necessary transfer of moral status 
from practice to particular case. A successful charge against 
a practice thereby becomes a relevant and serious practice- 
justification charge against any example of that practice, but 
one that may still be undermined or overridden. Three cond­
itions must be satisfied if a practice-justification charge is 
to be conclusive against any example of that practice:
(i) that charge has to be one that any moral person would have 
to recognise as relevant and serious; (ii) it must be 
one that cannot be undermined, i.e. it must apply to any 
and every example of the practice; and (iii) it must be immune 
to overriding strategies at the agent and action levels. The 
first condition could only be satisfied by a charge that 
invokes the core of morality, for it is only in that way that 
the charge must (logically) be recognised as relevant and 
serious by any moral person. The second condition could only 
be satisfied by an unconditional charge based on the defining 
characteristics of the practice or based on consequences of 
the practice that were always directly causally connected to 
instances of it. The third condition requires that the 
principle or standard invoked by the charge must override any 
other principle or standard that could be applicable to any 
example of the practice.
Thus a formidable task faces those who seek a conclusive 
practice-justification charge against civil disobedience. But 
the prize that awaits success is significant: if it can be 
shown conclusively that the practice of civil disobedience is 
morally unjustified and that this applies to all examples of 
civil disobedience without exception, then that is an important
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conclusion with important consequences. It would mean that 
the description of an act as one of civil disobedience would 
itself entail that it could not be morally justified. The 
focus of moral debate about a disobedient action would thus be 
on whether it was appropriately described as civil disobedience 
or not; once it was decided that the description was properly 
applied, the moral conclusions would follow.
The most plausible basis for such a charge would seem to 
be the core of morality. But there is nothing about core 
principles themselves that requires that any or all of them 
must override all other moral principles, either in general 
or in a particular case. Hence the third condition is likely 
to be the hardest to satisfy - particularly at the level of 
agent-justification where the agent's own moral theory sets 
the standards against which he is judged. This makes it far 
more difficult to argue that a particular core principle 
should always be applicable to instances of a practice and 
should always override all other moral principles that could 
also be applicable. It requires that any moral person who 
does not have that principle in his moral theory with the 
'appropriate' rules of application and priority can be convic­
ted of some logical error, and it is hard to see how this 
might be done.
But there are two other possibilities that must be con­
sidered. First, it is often argued that disobedience always 
leads to the weakening or destruction of the bonds of social 
life. This is obviously a relevant and serious charge that 
must be acknowledged by any moral person, for if it could be 
sustained it would mean that morality itself would be under­
mined. It is, moreover, a charge that cannot be overridden
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within the moral point of view since no other moral principle 
could have priority over the moral point of view itself, and 
hence it would be a conclusive charge at the level of agent- 
justification. I shall consider it as a general charge in 
Section 3, and as a particular charge against disobedience in 
a democracy in Section 4.
The second way of attacking the practice of disobedience 
is to allege in one form or another that all proponents of 
civil disobedience are inconsistent in their view that their 
actions could ever be morally justified, or that they do not 
understand what it is to be a participant in the moral point 
of view. If these charges could be sustained, then civil 
disobedients would have to admit that they had misapplied the 
requirements of the moral point of view and hence that they 
could never claim to be morally justified in their actions.
I shall consider these charges in Section 3.
2. Obligation, Citizenship and Disobedience
The obligation to obey the law must be either undermined 
or overridden if an act of civil disobedience is to be 
morally justified. A charge concerning political obligation 
invokes the core of morality, and hence must be acknowledged 
as relevant and serious by any moral person. Similarly, any 
moral person must acknowledge that there is a relationship be­
tween being a moral person and being a citizen, and hence must 
take seriously any charges based on that relationship. I shall 
examine both these charges in this Section.
I argued in Chapter One, Section 3, and in Chapter Three, 
Section 3 (pp. 32-34 , 133-136 respectively) that there are two 
limits to the moral obligation to obey the law, even where the
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law does fulfil its moral role by helping to promote and 
secure the common good (the conditions within which anyone 
may be moral). First, the demands the law makes upon our con­
duct must be considered in the same way as other moral rules 
requiring us to act, i.e. in the light of the standards of 
reasoned discourse. In the case of lav/, this gives rise to 
what I called 'the constraint of process' according to which 
the standards of reasoned discourse establish the legitimacy 
of certain procedures for enacting laws. In broad terms, these 
procedures are those of democracy. Secondly, the moral role 
of law means that the obligation to obey is also subject to 
'the constraint of content'. The obligation to obey the law 
is not conclusive of itself; a moral person must himself decide 
what to do according to the principles and rules of his own 
moral theory. He must acknowledge the obligation to' obey the 
law, but that obligation is but one element (albeit an import­
ant one) that must enter into his decision.
The moral role of law, and the consequent limits on the 
moral obligation to obey it, encapsulate the general under­
mining and overriding responses to political obligation charges 
against civil disobedience. That the common good is the 
foundation of political obligation in the first place means 
that it is also an important standard against v/hich that ob­
ligation must be judged, although it does not follow that it 
must be the only standard. If the legal system does not help 
secure the common good at all, then no moral person has any 
moral obligation to obey the law on account of its status as
law. If there is no semblance of democracy, then no moral
2person has any moral obligation to obey the law qua law.
Cases where political obligation is undermined through
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failure of the law to secure the common good at all may be 
unusual, but they are not unknown. Conditions of chaos or of 
the breakdown of political authority and social organisation 
sufficient to make the law impotent in fulfilling its moral 
role also mean that there can be no moral obligation to obey 
it. The obligation to obey would be undermined according to 
the constraint of process in a dictatorship in which opposi­
tion was suppressed, or in a political system in which part 
of the population was systematically denied an effective 
political voice, or in which the distribution of power was 
skewed such that one part of the population systematically 
exploited another part. In such cases, no moral person would 
have any moral obligation to obey the law, whether or not he 
was one of those who were oppressed. The standard to be 
applied is not whether the law secures the conditions within 
which particular individuals may be moral according to their 
own moral theories, but whether any individual within the 
society enjoys those conditions.
What is the situation where the law secures the common 
good on the whole, or where there is some degree of democracy 
for all? Although the undermining strategies are not then 
available, the common good is again the most important stand­
ard for judging the obligation to obey (though not the only 
standard): if the common good would be better served by dis­
obedience than by obedience, then the obligation to obey is 
overridden. Of course, such a judgment would have to take 
account of other charges against the act of disobedience, some 
of which will be discussed later in this Chapter. The judg­
ment would also have to be made in accordance with the provi­
sions of reasoned discourse. In particular, there is always
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the danger that self-interest or sectional interest will be the 
standard against which the common good is judged. That is one 
reason why the public face of disobedience is important - to 
try to ensure that the self-serving judgments to which we are 
all prone do not become the only standards on which we judge 
the moral status of our actions. The common good gives rise 
to an obligation to obey the law, but it may also give rise 
to other obligations which override political obligation.
And since the ’allegiance' of the moral person is to the common 
good itself and to a system of law only insofar as it helps 
secure the common good, the obligation to obey is overridden 
where disobedience would promote the common good to a greater 
extent than obedience.
Overriding political obligation by appealing to the 
common good works differently in cases of political disobedi­
ence than in cases of personal disobedience. The aim of 
political disobedients (direct or indirect) in appealing to 
the common good is to remedy some defect in the arrangements 
of communal life, although this is not to say that political 
disobedience can only be justified by the common good. On 
the other hand, where the common good is used as the justifi­
cation for direct or indirect personal disobedience, the 
disobedient says, in effect, that the law compromises his 
moral integrity, either requiring him to act contrary to the 
very foundation of communal life as seen from the moral point 
of view, or by associating him with some breach of the common 
good, even though he is not an actual participant in that 
breach. The personal disobedient's aim is not to secure 
change, for to try to do so may be impossible or inappropriate 
given the circumstances. Rather he concentrates on his own
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participation in the moral point of view and what he is re­
quired to do or what is done in his name. I shall return to 
these matters later in this Chapter.
There is another general charge against civil disobedi­
ence that needs to be looked at here because in one form or 
another it pervades many of the other charges, and because it 
is particularly relevant and serious for any moral person. It 
concerns the limits of the relationship between the individual 
and the community, the extent to which membership must be
subordinate to individuality, and the relationship between
3being a good citizen and a good man. Storing’s version of
4the charge is the most explicit, although it can be read 
into other charges about democratic methods and modes of 
participation for securing social change. He makes it in the 
course of a critique of Martin Luther King's justification of 
civil disobedience, and this puts it in a particular light. I 
shall consider it in general terms, and try to fill some of 
the gaps in Storing's formulation.
The basis of Storing's charge is that civil disobedience 
'is the resort - always a theoretically and practically weak 
resort - of the subject of law, exercised because the subject 
cannot or will not take up the rights and duties of the 
citizen' (p. 96; emphasis in original). To resort to civil 
disobedience as an attempt to secure justice is 'to substitute 
doctrine for political judgment, but the doctrine is empty'
(p. 106); it is a 'political dead end' (p. 117). Politics 
necessarily involves 'heavy and difficult judgments about 
where justice can be done and injustice avoided consistently 
in the overall aim of maintaining and strengthening the 
capacity of the system to act well' (p. 105). To disobey in
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a quest for justice is therefore to forsake politics; civil 
disobedience is
part of the subject’s view, as distinguished 
from the citizen's view, of law and government.
It is the subject for whom the first question 
is obedience or disobedience. It is the subject 
who is restricted in his political participation 
to those modes that are connected with his power 
to obey or not obey. It is the subject whose 
question is not, what shall be done? but, shall 
I obey? For people whose only role is that of 
subject, civil disobedience may indeed be the 
only available form of political participation.
It may sometimes help to secure an excluded 
people a place among the governors of this self- 
governing community. But it is always a feeble 
instrument; because its principles are contradict­
ory, its effects are dubious, it tends to under­
mine respect for the law, and above all its 
foundation is the role and point of view of the 
recipient of law, the subject. Civil disobedience 
is not rule, and it will be the resort of those 
who cannot or will not share in rule.... It is 
inherently subordinate, responsive, dependent, 
and - for the citizen of a democracy - 
degrading, (p. 117)
I shall leave the discussion of the causation charges 
until Section 3 and concentrate instead on the distinction 
between subject and citizen: how does this aspect of
Storing's charge count against civil disobedience? It poses 
the problem in its sharpest form when it is made against the 
citizen of a democracy, the person who has full political rights 
and some opportunity to use thöm. Is the disobedience of such a 
person a rejection of citizenship for the lesser status of an 
apolitical subject, and hence a rejection of participation 
in civility itself?
There is much in the discussions of civil disobedience to 
suggest that it is. The notions of disobedience as action 
addressed to the majority, as an action of last resort, where 
the disobedient accepts the legitimacy of the system, acts 
conscientiously out of a sense of justice, is nonviolent, and 
accepts the punishment, all suggest that the civil disobedient is
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a person for whom civil disobedience represents the failure 
and/or rejection of the normal and legitimate avenues of 
political expression and action - those open to, and used by, 
the citizen in his dialogue with his fellows concerning the 
terms of their association and matters of public policy. The 
person who disobeys after trying these methods is said to go 
beyond the political process itself (except perhaps in some 
cases of test-case disobedience); he denies it as a means for 
solving his particular problem, and in doing so he denies it 
as an integral and necessary part of the political, life which 
any community must have. To resort to civil disobedience, 
then, is to abdicate the obligations that arise out of one's 
role as a citizen and as a participant in the moral point of 
view concerned not only with the common good per se_ but also 
with settled and orderly means for arriving at decisions about 
it. Civil disobedience is therefore a rejection of the ideal 
of community, for it is a denial of one of the essential 
elements of communal life.
It is obvious that such a charge must be taken seriously 
by any moral person, for it questions his status as a parti­
cipant in the moral point of view and as one who shares in 
communal life. Such a charge can be undermined through the 
constraint of process; those who are not citizens may not 
have the political channels through which to try to attain 
goals. Similarly, these channels may not even exist for 
citizens where the regime is undemocratic. Hence there may 
be a warrant for disobedience in such cases, as Storing himself 
seems to recognise. The charge is therefore not decisive 
against the practice of civil disobedience. Let us consider, 
then, whether the charge can be rebutted when it is made
263.
against the citizen of a democracy.
I want to suggest that it can, but only in some circum­
stances which therefore become part of the conditions for 
the moral justification of civil disobedience in this type of 
case. The democratic citizen who disobeys (whether his dis­
obedience is political or personal, direct or indirect) does 
degrade himself as civis; he does act as a subject of law 
rather than the citizen. But it is not the case that he must 
therefore deny or even ignore the obligations he has as 
citizen. Rather he looks to his obligations as a moral 
person, for it is these obligations that are the basis of his 
obligations as citizen in the first place. The democratic 
citizen who disobeys, therefore, does not deny his citizen­
ship; he overrides it and uses disobedience as a means of 
communicating his concern for some aspect of communal life or 
for his own moral integrity. A citizen in a democracy is also 
subject to law. Provided we do not assume that the laws and 
policies within such a society will always be such that the 
citizen’s disagreement is symptomatic of some defect of his 
reason or will, it must be allowed that these laws or policies 
may be unjust or may be contrary to the common good. The 
citizen who chooses to disobey does not necessarily reject 
the need for political life within a community, and hence
reject citizenship itself. He simply chooses a particular way
5of communicating his concern about an aspect of communal life 
or asserts his moral sovereignty by appealing to the common 
good through the constraint of content. The distinction be­
tween democratic citizen and the subject that forms the basis 
of Storing’s charge is therefore too sharp; the citizen who 
is a moral person is both citizen and subject, and the demands
264.
on his actions must be considered in the light of his respon­
sibilities as a moral person - to have regard to the common 
good, and to ensure that he is morally justified in what he 
does. The good man and the good citizen are not distinct at 
this level of analysis, and Storing’s charge therefore fails.
3. Common charges against the practice of civil disobedience 
In Section 1 of this Chapter I suggested that those who 
seek a conclusive practice-justification charge against civil 
disobedience face a difficult task. In this Section I want 
to examine some attempts to make such a conclusive charge.
ß
The first such charge may be called a 'contagion' 
charge. It .is made in a number of wyays, some of which I shall 
consider below. Since civil disobedience necessarily involves 
public illegality, it sets an example of law-breaking as a 
legitimate means of securing goals and thereby encourages 
others to act similarly, including those who may be less 
scrupulous in examining the moral justifiability of their 
actions or who may have dangerous or pernicious principles.
It leads to a breakdown in legitimate and peaceful processes 
of conflict-resolution, and thereby promotes instability.
Civil disobedience is an
assault on our democratic society, an affront to 
our legal order and an attack on our constitutional 
government. To indulge civil disobedience is to 
invite anarchy, and the permissive arbitrariness 
of anarchy is hardly less tolerable that the 
repressive arbitrariness of tyranny. *7
Civil disobedience thus undermines democratic society.^ It
9'stirs up primitive instincts', leads to mass lawlessness 
and anarchy,^ and weakens the fabric of society.^
I shall consider contagion charges that allege that civil
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disobedience always subverts social living itself rather than 
some particular version of it. The weakness of these charges, 
however, is that they rely on causal relationships for which 
there is little empirical evidence, or for which evidence is 
rarely produced. That in itself does not show that contagion 
arguments are unsound, of course. But the onus is on the 
person making a charge to show that it is relevant and serious 
against the action or practice (cf. Chapter Two, Section 2, 
pp. 71-72), and causation charges are undermined unless it 
can be shown empirically that the causal connections hold in 
the way that the charge alleges (Chapter Two, Section 5, pp. 
98-100). There is simply no evidence to show that civil dis­
obedience is, or causes, a threat to communal life itself.
Nor is it enough to allege that others might follow the dis­
obedient's example and that their disobedience would either 
be unjustified or would lead to undesirable consequences.
That it is possible that others might follow the disobedient’s 
example is not a charge against his action unless it can be 
shown that there is a good probability that they will do so 
in every case of disobedience, that their disobedience would 
be subversive of communal life, and that the disobedient bears 
some responsibility for their actions. These conditions seem 
unlikely to be satisfied, and again the onus is on the critic 
to show why a charge based on them must be taken seriously.
Contagion charges against the practice of civil disobed­
ience must therefore be judged 'not proven'. A second way of 
attacking the practice of civil disobedience is to allege in 
one form or another that all proponents of civil disobedience 
are inconsistent in their view that their actions could ever 
be morally justified, or that they do not understand what it
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is to be a participant in the moral point of view. If these 
charges could be sustained, civil disobedients would have to 
allow that they had misapplied the requirements of the moral 
point of view and hence they could never claim to be morally 
justified in their actions. Van Dusen argues, for example, 
that those who argue that civil disobedience against injustice 
can be morally justified are also thereby committed to advo­
cating 'a free right of resistance' since 'no regime can be 
perfectly just.' Prosch argues that civil disobedience
is necessarily coercive since it inevitably treats others as 
means rather than as ends. Some deny that civil disobed­
ience can be civil since (by definition) it breaks the law;
hence, they say, the very notion of civil disobedience is
14self-contradictory. Other charges deny that there are
any morally relevant differences between civil disobedience
and criminal action, and hence that civil disobedience is
15anything more than lawlessness. Some writers accuse
civil disobedients of being arrogant, elitist, or selfish
persons who take the law into their own h a n d s t h e y
expect perfect justice in an imperfect world (the fiat
17justitia charge ) ; and they are unwilling to allow their
opponents the same latitude towards obedience to law as they
claim for themselves. And finally in this list is a familiar
18charge in moral debate: 'but what if everybody did that?1'
Charges such as these are fairly easily undermined, 
provided reasoned discourse prevails. Van Dusen's charge 
assumes that proponents of civil disobedience argue that it 
is morally justified against any injustice, and hence that 
it is morally justified against every injustice. This is
certainly not a common argument, but it would be difficult
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to sustain even if it were. It would require disobedients 
to hold (i) that injustice always overrides all other moral 
considerations concerning action, and (ii) that civil dis­
obedience is always an appropriate form of action against 
injustice. Both these propositions are false. Prosch's 
charge only gets a grip on those who hold that one should 
never treat others as means. Few civil disobedients either 
hold that view or would deny that civil disobedience is 
coercive - but coercive in a particular way consistent with 
the requirements of the moral point of view. The self- 
contradiction alleged in the very notion of civil disobedience
itself is no more than a verbal, victory. Others have argued
19that 'civil' in this context entails nonviolence.
The charge that there is no morally relevant difference 
between criminal behaviour and civil disobedience may also 
be made as a description charge. Distinctiveness is one of 
the reasons civil disobedience is defined as it is. But if 
it is simply denied that these differences are morally rele­
vant, the task is to show that they must be so for any moral 
person, and that these differences can be sufficient to over­
ride charges against criminal behaviour itself.
How might this be done? To use a special term for a 
certain way of breaking the law is no more than a matter of 
convenience, a way of pointing to a set of actions that we 
want to talk about within the moral point of view, to pass 
judgments, to praise and blame, commend and condemn. That 
is why, for example, we distinguish between regicide and 
manslaughter within the class of acts of killing, and 
between perjury, false pretences and white lies within the 
class of falsehoods. These distinctions mark out actions
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that have different morally relevant features. Provided we 
do not build conclusive justifying characteristics into our 
definitions, we may legitimately conclude that particular 
acts from these sets may be morally justified or unjustified. 
It is useful to have a term to use for a class of acts that 
break the law in a way not shared by other illegal acts, 
particularly where the former may be directed towards the 
common good or towards the preservation of moral integrity, 
both of which must be recognised as morally relevant charac­
teristics by any moral person. It is not logically necessary 
to use different terms to mark these distinctions any more 
than it is logically necessary to have different names for 
different species of birds or to use various terms to mark 
distinctions between actions. It is merely a conventional 
reflection of the complex texture of our communal and moral 
lives, and a convenient way of being able to refer to actions 
that may be of concern to any moral person in a way that 
criminal action as such is not.
That civil disobedients are always 'arrogant, selfish 
or elitist' is simply refuted by the examples of those who 
have been civilly disobedient - although this is not to deny 
that some disobedients may act for less than honourable 
motives. Civil disobedients are not committed to the search 
for perfect justice, since it is no part of civil disobedience 
per se that it be done as a means to justice, and it is not 
the case that such an aim is a necessary condition of its 
moral justification. The claim that civil disobedients are 
unwilling to allow their opponents to be morally justified 
in disobeying is commonly put as follows: ’If you are to
claim that those with principles you approve could be morally
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justified in acts of civil disobedience, you must also allow
that those with principles you find repugnant could also
be morally justified in acting in the same fashion. If civil
disobedience by civil rights activists can be morally justified,
20then so can civil disobedience by the Ku Klux Klan.1
The standards of reasoned discourse immediately commit 
the disobedient to agreeing that the Klansman must be subject 
to the same principles of moral justification as himself and 
everyone else. But that does not mean that their actions 
are equally morally justifiable - not even at the level of 
agent-justification. Those same standards of reasoned dis­
course also require that the agent be impartial, that he be 
willing to examine his moral principles and rules in the 
light of evidence, that he give reasons for his actions, and 
that he recognise the needs and interests of others in 
deciding how to act. That is what it means to participate 
in the moral point of view. Hence we must not accept as 
decisive others’ claims to be morally justified in their 
actions; nor, of course, does it follow that we may not inter­
fere with their actions even if they are justified in 
what they do. Those who claim agent-justification for their 
actions are not in the position of themselves certifying the
moral justification of their actions in a way that cannot be 
21challenged. The agent must be open to charges about his 
actions; he must be willing to respond to them according to 
the standards of reasoned discourse within the moral point 
of view. Agent-justification cannot be used as a shield 
against charges and as a licence to follow whatever principles 
are found to be convenient or momentarily attractive. It is
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not a warrant for fanaticism, bigotry, or prejudice.
The disobedient's reply to this type of consistency 
charge, then, is to agree that it would be inconsistent not 
to apply the standards of justification and reasoned discourse 
to all, but to point out that this does not commit him to 
saying that all actions are equally justifiable.
I shall discuss the charge 'but what if everybody did 
that?' as a form of contagion charge concerning the actual 
effects of everybody's doing the action in question. (It may 
also be intended as a way of finding out whether the disobe­
dient acts for moral reasons or not; I shall not discuss 
this use of it). The first question that must be resolved 
when considering it is 'what is to count as doing that?' The 
description of the action obviously makes a crucial differ­
ence to the relevance and seriousness of the charge and to 
the ways it can be undermined or overridden. The more 
detail about intention and consequences that is included in 
the description of the act, the easier it becomes to allow 
it to be generalised without thereby being susceptible to 
consistency or description charges. For example, if an 
action is merely described as 'disobeying the law', then the 
generalisation charge obviously counts against it. If, on 
the other hand, it is described as 'disobeying an unjust 
law as a protest, nonviolently, publicly, after legitimate 
means of securing change have been exhausted, with good 
prospects of success, and without any attempt to evade arrest 
and penalty', then the generalisation charge can be rebutted 
by the claim that anyone required to act by such an unjust 
lav; should disobey it, and should do so in exactly that way.
The difference between the two cases is precisely the
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difference between indiscriminate disobedience and discrimin-
22ate disobedience. But it must be remembered that the
moral person who disobeys is concerned with disobedience 
that can be morally justified, where the decision to disobey 
is taken in the light of the moral point of view and accord­
ing to the requirements of reasoned discourse. That is far 
from the kind of indiscriminate disobedience conjured up by 
the charge. The civil disobedient can perfectly well admit 
that the consequences of indiscriminate disobedience would 
be undesirable while maintaining that civil disobedience 
that is morally justified, even at the level of agent- 
justification, could be generalised without risking such 
consequences.
These attempts to find conclusive charges against the 
practice of civil disobedience are unsuccessful. Some of 
the charges discussed in this Section and the previous one 
work differently when made against civil disobedience within 
a democracy, and hence need to be considered more fully.
That is the task of the next Section.
4. Disobedience in a democracy
It would seem on the face of it that it would be more 
difficult to justify civil disobedience within a democracy 
than within an undemocratic regime, given that the constraint 
of process would be satisfied ex hypothesi. I shall first 
consider a variation of the contagion charge; I shall then 
examine some charges concerning political obligation within 
a democracy; finally in this Section I shall look at the 
relations between disobedience, democracy, and the rule of 
law.
Some contagion charges allege that civil disobedience
272 .
tends to undermine the democratic political process, not 
necessarily by leading to chaos and anarchy, but by shifting 
legitimate modes of political action from the accepted democ­
ratic forms of pressure group activity, lobbying, petitions, 
protest meetings, electoral contests, etc., to direct action 
and confrontation through illegal and therefore illegitimate 
methods. The Final Report of the Eisenhower Commission 
states:
The experience of India seems to indicate that 
civil disobedience has a strong tendency to be­
come a pattern of conduct which soon replaces 
normal legal processes as the usual way in which 
society functions. Put in American terms, this 
would mean, once the pattern is established, that 
the accepted method of getting a new traffic light 
might be to disrupt traffic by blocking intersect­
ions, that complaints against businessmen might 
result in massive sit-ins, that improper garbage 
service might result in a campaign of simply dump­
ing garbage into the street, and so on. Of course, 
these kinds of actions are not unknown in America 
today, but in India they have become a necessary 
part of the political system. Without a massive 
demonstration to support it, a grievance simply 
is not taken seriously because everyone knows that 
if the grievance were serious, there would be a 
demonstration to support it.
The adverse effect upon normal democratic processes 
is obvious. Though not intended to destroy 
democratic processes, civil disobedience tends 
plainly to impair their operation. This is a fact 
to which those who engage in civil disobedience 
should give consideration lest, in seeking to 
improve society, they may well seriously 
injure it.23
In contrast to the other forms of the contagion argu­
ments, there is some evidence of a tendency for groups with 
fewer political resources to resort to direct action in
pursuit of their goals in preference to traditionally
24accepted methods of political action. ' These groups need 
to gain access to those they seek to influence (their 
targets) indirectly, by seeking to influence the target’s
2 7 3 .
2 5'reference publics' - those individuals or groups who 
themselves have influence with the target or to whom the 
target looks for cues on how and when to act. This creates 
an impetus towards particular styles of political action, 
particularly those likely to attract media coverage since 
'the public' is always an important reference public for 
government and private association alike. Certain types of 
illegal action normally attract this coverage, especially 
where large numbers of people are involved and violence is 
possible or actually occurs.
But the use of this as a charge against civil dis­
obedience requires two further points to be established: 
first, it must be shown that democracy has been imperilled 
through this change. Secondly, it is necessary tc show that 
civil disobedience has become a widespread tactic or the 
point to which protest action tends to gravitate.
The danger to democracy seems obvious at first glance, 
for resort to illegality as a normal mode of political 
action would seem to undermine one of the very foundations 
of a society in which the rule of law secures one of the 
bases of that form of communal life. This might be 
particularly so in a pluralist society where many individuals 
and groups compete for the attention of the decision-makers. 
Resort to some types of illegal action as the normal way of 
pursuing political goals obviously invites instability and 
perhaps chaos. (The same might be true of some forms of 
legal action, of course, e.g. strikes, boycotts, non­
cooperation.) Yet we still have to ask whether civil 
disobedience as a common mode of political action would also
invite these consequences, for civil disobedience is not just
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illegal action but a particular kind of illegal action. The 
tradition of civil disobedience exemplified by Gandhi and 
King and incorporated into the orthodox notion is such that 
its proponents can argue that widespread civil disobedience 
so defined, or such actions as a normal part of the political 
process, would in fact be desirable for it would betoken a 
concern for justice and morality that could only be of ser- 
vice to a democratic polity. That is, of course, one of
the normative advantages of the orthodox definition of civil 
disobedience. But does the argument work against civil 
disobedience as I have defined it, as 'a public act which 
deliberately contravenes some law or measure endorsed by 
public authority and likely to be officially enforced ... 
performed as a protest against some law, policy or decision 
(or lack of it) of some lav/-, policy-, or decision-making 
body; [where] those doing it recognise that they thereby 
make themselves liable to arrest and penalty according to 
the processes of law, and that the onus is on them to show 
why they should not submit to those processes' (Chapter Four, 
Section 3, p. 249)?
The charge now seems rather more plausible, for that 
definition allows acts of civil disobedience to be done from 
any motive, base or noble, moral or prudential, concerning 
justice or self-interest. Hence the charge does get a grip, 
but only a precarious one. It only applies if there is good 
reason to think that acts of civil disobedience so defined 
will in fact become widespread as a substitute for 'legiti­
mate' modes of political action over a wide range of issues, 
from the vital to the trivial. That will vary from society 
to society and from time to time. The judgment required is 
again empirical, and although I suggested above that there
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is some evidence to support such a charge against protest 
action in general, there is no such evidence to support it 
against civil disobedience.
Clearly, much also depends on the notion of democracy 
being used, since that will provide grounds for undermining 
and overriding strategies in response to these kinds of 
charges. The nature of democracy is a matter for consider­
able debate; suffice it to say here that those who hold a 
procedural view of democracy are likely to see civil dis­
obedience as a violation of all that democracy stands for, 
since it undermines settled procedures for the peaceable 
resolution of disputes, rejects the central principle of 
majoritarianism, and denies the rule of law through 'taking 
the law into one's own hands'. Seeing democracy in this
way leads to the 'conservative' position on civil dis- 
2 7obedience. ' Those who hold a social theory of democracy,
on the other hand, think that procedures are merely the means
to certain ends which should, on occasion, take precedence
over the means where strict adherence to the latter would
result in a serious contravention of those ends. Power calls
2 8this the 'institutional-libertarian' position; civil 
disobedience should be limited in scope and method; it should 
be almost ritualistic in its efforts to make it clear that 
the disobedient considers himself to be acting in accordance 
with the highest ideals of the democratic ethos.
Thus ideas about the role and form of democratic proce­
dures will play an important part in formulating and respond­
ing to the type of contagion charge that alleges that civil 
disobedience tends to undermine democracy, and the undermining 
and overriding strategies that are appropriate in each case
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are likely to be matters of much debate. But that does not 
mean that we are caught in the relativist's dilemma and can 
do no more than agree to differ. One of the major arguments 
of this thesis has been that any moral person must at least 
acknowledge an obligation to obey the law insofar as it 
helps secure the common good. That obligation is non- 
conclusive, however, for it is subject to (among other things) 
the requirements of the constraint of process according to 
which the ways laws are enacted must conform to the require­
ments of reasoned discourse as part of the moral point of 
view. Broadly speaking, these requirements are that those 
affected by a proposed law should have effective opportuni­
ties to have their views heard, that those who govern should 
be responsive and accountable to the members of the commu­
nity, that the onus is on them to be equitable in assigning 
burdens and benefits, and that the common good may override 
both the laws and the procedures by which they are enacted. 
The view that holds democratic procedures sacrosanct is 
therefore denying that they could ever be overridden by the 
common good. That seems to me to place too much faith in 
those procedures and in the restraint and benevolence of 
those who work within them. Hence the response to the charge 
that civil disobedience always weakens or destroys democracy 
is that - on the contrary - the common good and the moral 
point of view itself may themselves require action outside 
the accepted democratic procedures.
Contagion charges against the practice of civil dis­
obedience within a democracy must be judged inconclusive, 
although there may be particular occasions where they would 
succeed. The charges in the second group that I wish to 
consider in this Section allege, in one form or another,
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that the fact that the political system is democratic is 
not only a reason why there is an obligation to obey the law 
in general and hence any particular law, but that this oblig­
ation is always overriding; disobedience in a democracy
2 9can never be morally justified. There are two related versions 
of this type of charge: (i) 'the laws of a democracy are
enacted in a way that allows anyone a variety of opportunities 
for effective participation in the legislative process, 
and the existence of those opportunities (whether they are used 
or not) combined with the principle of majority rule means 
that there can be no justified disobedience of any law so 
enacted'; (ii) 'disobedience cannot be justified in a democ­
racy because there are always other legitimate ways of 
achieving the same goals'.
There are obvious undermining strategies when each of
these charges is made concerning the law and the political
system in general. The more interesting problems arise when
they are made against civil disobedience where the political
system does follow democratic methods on the whole, for
then the constraint of process is not available as a way
of rebutting them. The first variant of the charge holds
that the opportunity to participate in democratic processes
such as elections, lobbying, petitions, etc., implies a
promise to abide by the outcome, even if one is on the losing
30side, and even if one chooses not to participate. For 
it to be otherwise, it is argued, would amount to agreeing 
to participate and be bound by the result provided one is 
on the winning side, and that can be no part of any communal
278.
life where unanimity is improbable. Those who disobey in
such circumstances are in effect agreeing to accept benefits
but refusing to accept burdens; they agree to play the game
provided they win - and there can be no game at all under
those conditions. The second variant of the charge is
relatively common among those who admit the possibility of
democratic procedures being used to enact unjust or unwise
laws, but who nevertheless insist that those who would change
these laws must adhere to the same democratic methods to 
31remove them. This argument is often combined with a
contagion charge; it is also more commonly made against 
political disobedience than against personal disobedience.
There is an element of truth in these charges, but not 
such as make them decisive in all cases. The availability 
of effective democratic procedures to achieve goals certainly 
does affect the justifiability of political disobedience, 
provided these procedures can be relied upon to be effective 
within the limits of time and urgency. That is why those 
who argue that civil disobedience must be an action of last 
resort do have a point, but it does not follow that dis­
obedience is never legitimate. (I shall consider this point 
again in the next Section.) Moreover, participation in 
democratic procedures such as an election 02: a referendum 
does allow others to expect that the participants will abide 
by the result provided several conditions are met: the
participation must be voluntary; it must be potentially 
effective; it does not amount to submission to whatever the 
result might be, nor to a willingness to abide by whatever 
decisions those elected might make, nor does it signify the 
participants' unconditional consent to whatever those 
elected might do in their names (which is why it is over-
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stating the case to talk of participation implying a promise); 
and fulfilling this expectation is always subject to the 
common good and the constraint of content.
That the political system is democratic, therefore, does 
not mean that political obligation cannot be overridden, 
although it does make it more difficult to do so. It must 
be remembered too that there is room for dispute concerning 
the common good. At one end of the scale are the conditions 
necessary to any form of communal life; at the other end are 
those which facilitate a particular kind of communal life, 
the specific ways a society chooses to organise its institu­
tions and customs according to its own history and circum­
stances. In addition, there are both positive and negative 
aspects to the common good (see above, Chapter Three, Section 
3, pp. 139-142). The latter are concerned with preventing 
individuals from interfering with each other's projects, 
whereas the former involve assisting people to have projects 
beyond those essential to mere physical existence, by help­
ing them to overcome impediments they may have. Thus the 
notion of the common good covers a range of possibilities 
for action, and hence also allows room for dispute about 
just what is for the common good in particular circumstances 
and about the relative priorities of the various elements 
within it. Hence it is possible for a democratic regime 
that does pursue the common good on the whole to be open to 
criticism concerning its policies and its methods for 
implementing them. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to 
non-governmental organisations. It is possible, therefore, 
for civil disobedience to be morally justified by the 
common good, even though the disobedients act in a demo-
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cratic environment in which public authority also pursues the 
common good on the whole.
The final group of charges I wish to consider in this
Section are those that invoke the notion, of the rule of law,
in the sense that the law provides the fundamental framework
within which social activity and (especially) social change
3?ought to take place. " This is the sense in which the 
phrase 'a government of laws, not men' is used; in this 
context, it is summed up by the charge that the disobedient 
'takes the law into his own hands'. (It is often combined 
with other charges about the elitist/arrogant/freeloading 
nature of civil disobedience; I considered these in Section 
3 above. )
In one sense of the phrase, the charge that the dis­
obedient 'takes the law into his own hands’ is beyond dispute, 
for by definition the disobedient acts illegally. But the 
charge is usually meant to convey more than that; it is taken 
to mean that the disobedient puts himself above the law, or 
that he obeys when it suits him and disobeys when it does 
not, or that he is willing to use force in order to get his 
own way, even where the law forbids it. Any of these charges 
may be true of some disobedients. But they are not true of 
all; many disobedients have suffered greatly for their actions, 
and it is simply perverse to accuse them of disobeying and 
obeying when it suited them. Similarly, many disobedients 
see themselves as acting according to the highest ideals of 
lav; as a moral institution, rather than placing themselves 
above the law. The charge about disobedients' willingness 
to use force also betrays an ignorance of much of the 
history of civil disobedience, although it is true that a
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33good deal of civil disobedience has been violent.
Charges concerning the rule of law nevertheless do 
require answering because they invoke the relationship 
between law as a moral institution and the role of the indi­
vidual within the community. This is particularly so when 
the charge is made in the form that alleges that the dis­
obedient puts himself above the law, for in one sense that 
is precisely what the moral person who disobeys relies on 
in order to rebut the charge. (Again, the undermining 
strategies are obvious.) In doing so, the disobedient adopts 
a similar strategy to that used to override charges concern­
ing political obligation and democracy: he argues that law
is a moral institution because of its relationship to the 
common good and the conditions for communal life itself, and 
that therefore the common good provides a standard according 
to which the provisions of law and the role of law within 
the community can be overridden, even within a democracy 
where much of the common good is secured. Like particular 
laws themselves, the rule of law may be overridden according 
to the common good. In a sense, then, the disobedient does 
put himself above the law because his role as a moral person 
and as a citizen means that he must always consider the law 
and the rule of law as subject to scrutiny in the light of 
the requirements of the moral point of view itself, and 
hence in the light of the common good. He must act according 
to his judgment of the requirements of the moral point of 
view, but a judgment made in the light of, and informed by, 
the requirements of reasoned discourse. Not to do so would 
be to deny his role as a moral person.
The arguments of this Section have concerned charges 
made against civil disobedience within a democratic
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political system. I have suggested that disobedience may 
be morally justified even where the political system pursues 
the common good on the whole, and where there are opportuni­
ties for the citizens to influence public policy and hence 
where there can be no appeal to the constraint of process 
as a way of undermining the moral obligation to obey the law. 
My task in the next Section is to examine some charges 
against acts of indirect civil disobedience.
5. Direct and indirect civil disobedience
I mentioned the distinction between direct and indirect 
civil disobedience in Chapter Four, Section 3 (p. 238).
Civil disobedience is direct when the law that is broken 
is the target of the protest; it is indirect when the law 
that is broken is not the target of the protest - the dis­
obedient may, in fact, regard it as morally praiseworthy or 
morally irrelevant. The reason for the distinction is
that 'some injustices are inaccessible to direct resistance
3 4by some who would protest them.' This can occur in
several ways. An individual may not be covered by a par­
ticular law, and hence cannot disobey it; someone who is 
ineligible for the draft cannot himself disobey a law requir­
ing registration. Secondly, there can be no direct dis­
obedience where the aim is to protest the lack of a law or 
policy. Thirdly, the target of the protest might not be 
part of government at all, but some private association or 
corporation. Fourthly, the aim may be to protest a particu­
lar government policy not related to any law that can be 
disobeyed; thus, for example, some might protest the govern­
ment’s nuclear policy by trespassing at hydro-electric power 
stations, even though they approve of that method of
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generating electricity and of the law of trespass, because
there is no law concerning nuclear power.that they can dis- 
35obey.
The importance of the distinction between direct and
indirect disobedience is also reflected in the practice of
civil disobedience. Bedau, for example, claims that 'even
the casual observer during the past decade must know that
much, if not most, civil disobedience ... in this country
3 6was indirect....' It is sometimes argued, however, that
the distinction is also morally relevant because indirect
civil disobedience is more difficult to justify than direct
37civil disobedience. Others argue that indirect civil dis­
obedience can never be morally justified; Fortas writes:
In my judgement civil disobedience ... is never 
justified in our nation, where the law being 
violated is not itself the focus or target of 
the protest.... [T]he disobedience of laws 
which are not themselves the target of the pro­
test - the violation of lav/s merely as a tech­
nique of demonstration - constitutes an act of 
rebellion, not merely of dissent.'50
Some of the charges made against indirect civil dis­
obedience amount to contagion charges and consistency 
charges, and are discussed elsewhere in this Chapter. I 
want to examine two other charges that can be brought against 
indirect disobedience but not against direct disobedience. 
First, it is sometimes claimed that indirect civil
disobedience is harder to morally justify than direct dis-
39obedience because it is less likely to be effective.“ I 
shall consider below whether success and effectiveness are 
relevant to moral justifiability; for the moment, let us 
assume that they are. It is necessary to consider the charge 
against indirect political disobedience, and against indirect
284.
personal disobedience.
The charge does have a certain plausibility in the first 
case. The aim of political disobedience is to secure change 
through communication, pressure, persuasion or example.
Where the particular goal of the protest is not immediately 
apparent from the shape and circumstances of the action, 
communication, etc., become that much more difficult. But 
we need to note four things: first, it does not mean that
indirect political disobedience cannot be morally justified, 
only that it might be more difficult to do so when compared 
with direct political disobedience; secondly, the charge is 
undermined if it can be shown that the prospects for success 
are good compared with those for direct political disobedi­
ence; thirdly, circumstances may mean that there is no real 
choice between direct and indirect political disobedience; 
fourthly, however, it is true that civil disobedience is 
more likely to be morally justifiable if there is some 
relationship between the law that is broken and the object 
of the disobedience. That relationship may be symbolic or 
tactical, but the closeness of the relationship will affect 
the effectiveness of the attempt to communicate and persuade, 
and hence will affect moral justifiability. Thus provided 
the choice is a realistic one, indirect disobedience of a 
law without this proximate relationship to the object of the 
protest is less likely to be morally justified than dis­
obedience of a law with it. To protest against the lack of 
a law regulating river pollution by trespassing on some 
polluting factory's grounds helps make a point in a way that 
protesting the same matter by burning a draft card does not; 
each is conventionally appropriate in certain circumstances 
and for certain ends, tactical and symbolic as well as
2 8 5.
substantive.
The case with indirect personal disobedience is slightly 
different. An act of personal disobedience is done in order 
to preserve the agent's moral integrity. It is easy to see 
how this might be done in the case of direct personal dis­
obedience and hence what counts as success. But the relation 
is rather more difficult in the case of indirect personal dis­
obedience, for here the agent is not himself being required 
to act in some way he finds morally objectionable. Rather 
he disobeys in order to dissociate himself from some evil 
done in his name, and it is then difficult to know what is 
to count as success, or, indeed, whether the notion is rele­
vant at all. Others may not regard the agent as responsible 
for the evil in the first place, and so need no persuasion 
or evidence of dissociation. Indeed, this can become a 
charge against indirect personal disobedience: you ought
not to disobey because nobody does think you responsible in 
any way, and nor could they do so (imagine someone personally 
disobeying the law now because they feel that the institution 
of slavery in ancient Greece does or should constitute a 
monstrous blot on the conscience of mankind). Of course, 
someone may want to dissociate himself from the church that 
produced the Spanish Inquisition, or from the kind of poli­
tical party responsible for the New Deal, but he would have 
to have some reason for doing so now for his disobedience to 
make sense, and hence for it to be capable of being justified. 
He might, for example, want to bring about a resurgence of 
moral sensibilities, or point to some injustices which still 
persist long after their cause has been forgotten. In that 
case his disobedience begins to straddle the gap between the
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political and the personal, and prospects for success do seem 
to be of some moral relevance. In other words, the conditions 
for indirect personal disobedience to be intelligible action 
in the first place also make it unlikely that questions of 
success and effectiveness will be morally relevant. To be 
successful in dissociating oneself from a government that 
condones slavery, for example, through indirect disobedience 
requires not only that the agent see his action as one of 
dissociation, but also that he choose a form of action that 
is conventionally understood as registering dissociation.
But the point behind personal disobedience (whether direct 
or indirect) is moral integrity, the agent's image of himself 
and the kind of person he is in the light of his own moral 
theory. Success and effectiveness of the kind alleged in the 
charge are largely irrelevant to this enterprise, and it is 
therefore undermined.
The second charge against indirect civil disobedience 
I wish to examine concerns circumstances where there is a 
choice between direct and indirect civil disobedience. Can 
it be alleged that - other things being equal - the dis­
obedient would be morally unjustified in using indirect 
rather than direct disobedience?
Such a charge can be successful - provided other things 
really are equal. That is not to say that a disobedient must 
always choose direct disobedience whenever he has a choice.
The choice may be unrealistic in terms of, say, the penalty 
to be imposed, or in terms of tactical or symbolic considera­
tions. But if there is little or nothing to choose between 
direct and indirect disobedience from the moral point of view, 
then it would be less justifiable to disobey indirectly than
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it would be to disobey directly. The reason is analogous to 
that just discussed: better to confront the adversary
directly than indirectly; better to engage in face-to-face 
dialogue than to allow the chance that the point of the 
disobedience might be diverted; better to allow more scope 
to reasoned discourse than to risk that the object of the 
protest might be misunderstood. These points are particularly 
applicable to personal disobedience; to disobey indirectly 
when one could also have disobeyed directly (other things 
being equal) would open the agent to charges about the 
seriousness and strength of his purpose, about his character, 
and about his consistency: 'you say that you are against
that lav;, and that you are prepared to break the law to 
preserve your integrity; why do you not break the law itself 
instead of some other law - there is nothing to choose 
between either course, morally speaking, so why not do it?'
If the agent is to claim to be justified in indirect dis­
obedience in such circumstances, he will have to do so in 
terms of nonmoral considerations (ex hypothesi) and will thus 
show that he is willing to subordinate the former to the 
latter, and thus will be open to further charges. Hence, 
other things being equal, direct disobedience is more justi­
fiable than indirect disobedience.
6. Five justifying conditions
The central role of charges in the justification of 
actions has meant that we have had to consider a number of 
moral charges against the practice of civil disobedience, 
particularly wrongness, description, consistency and causa­
tion charges (see Chapter Two, Section 5). I have concluded 
that none of them succeeds against every instance of civil
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disobedience. I have also looked at several charges against 
disobedience in a democracy, and again I have concluded that 
none is decisive. I now want to shift the emphasis of the 
analysis towards the decision to disobey.
To say that a specific set of conditions is always 
necessary and sufficient for the moral justification of an 
action may be to overlook the variety of ways moral charges 
can be made against an action according to its circumstances, 
its consequences, and the moral theory of the agent. I do 
not believe that it is possible to arrive at such a set of 
conditions for the moral justification of acts of civil dis­
obedience unless these conditions are understood as no more 
than a set of possible charges against any such act, each of 
which must be either undermined or overridden if the action 
is to be morally justified, but which cannot exhaust the ways 
charges can be made against the disobedient act. The follow­
ing five conditions are often claimed to be individually 
necessary (and sometimes jointly sufficient) for the moral 
justification of an act of civil disobedience:
(a) Must civil disobedience be used as a last resort when
4 0all legitimate means of protest have been exhausted? There 
is some point to this, but that point is limited, for two 
reasons: first, to require that legitimate means for secur­
ing change be exhausted may be to require too much. In a 
democratic polity, for example, there is always the possibility 
of another petition, another deputation, or waiting for another 
election. It is more realistic to require that civil dis­
obedience not be used unless legitimate methods have been 
tried and found wanting; such a requirement is reasonable 
because it recognises the obligations of citizenship while
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being realistic in its assessment of what legitimate protest 
methods can achieve, even within a democracy. Secondly, 
such a requirement must always be interpreted in the light 
of the urgency and seriousness of the case and the prospects 
of success.
(b) Must civil disobedience have reasonable prospects of
41success in order to be morally justifiable? I discussed 
this question earlier in the case of direct and indirect dis­
obedience; let us now see whether the assumption made then 
was warranted.
That success may be relevant to the moral justification 
of acts of disobedience is apparent from the following argu­
ment: both political and personal disobedience are aimed at
some goal, viz. social change, and preserving moral integrity 
respectively. Where the disobedient must override a charge 
against his action, he does so by claiming that attaining the 
goal is more important than the standard invoked by the charge 
and he makes this judgment according to the common good, or 
the moral point of view itself (including i:he requirements 
of reasoned discourse), or according to the rules and prin­
ciples of his own moral theory. But he thereby lays himself 
open to two further possible charges: the goal does not in 
fact override the original charge, and the goal will not be 
attained. Success is therefore always relevant where the 
agent must override political obligation, although the 
criteria of success in cases of political disobedience are 
quite different from those in personal disobedience. In the 
former case, the criteria are matters of more or less tangible 
changes in laws, policies, etc. - although whether particular 
changes have in fact occurred may be a matter for consider­
able dispute. The nature of the goal in cases of personal
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disobedience is altogether different, and the particular 
ways success is relevant to justifiability is thereby differ­
ent as well. Charges against personal disobedience which 
assume criteria of success appropriate to political disobed­
ience are therefore undermined. The converse does not hold, 
however, since it is always a relevant charge against an 
agent - political disobedient or not - that he is acting 
contrary to his moral theory.
Success is relevant to the moral justifiability of civil 
disobedience in cases where political obligation is under­
mined only if there are other moral charges against the action 
which must be overridden - which is to say that there is 
good reason to consider the action unjustified in the first 
place. That is moire than likely to be the case, although 
precisely what these charges will be cannot be determined a 
priori.
That success is relevant to the moral justifiability of 
an act of disobedience does not mean that the fact or likeli­
hood of failure entails that the action cannot be justified. 
Nor, of course, does it mean that success is the only rele­
vant factor, or that it must override all other relevant 
factors. It may do so, but that will depend on the circum­
stances of the action, the other charges against it, and so 
on. In addition, the prospects for success will often be a 
matter of judgment and hence can be the subject of disagree­
ment among reasonable people. Success may have to be judged 
over a long period of time, or in terms of people's attitudes, 
and so on. And the prospects for the success of political 
disobedience may be overshadowed by the need for personal
disobedience.
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(c) One of the most contested points in the literature on
42civil disobedience is whether it must be nonviolent. There 
are several distinct positions on the matter; some say that 
civil disobedience must be absolutely nonviolent, while 
others argue that civil disobedients must not initiate 
violence, although there may be circumstances where they 
would be justified in using violence in response to the 
violence of others. In Chapter Four, Section 3 (pp. 242-246)
I argued against those who include nonviolence in their 
definitions of civil disobedience. It is now time to con­
sider the question of the justifiability of the use of 
violence by civil disobedients. One charge against their 
being violent is that it might prejudice their chances of 
success. This is more than a merely tactical matter; since 
success and effectiveness are relevant to moral justifica­
tion, so violence is similarly relevant if it is likely to 
bear upon these matters.
But, of course, that is likely to be a relatively minor
matter compared with the obvious charge against violent dis-
43obedience: that violence against persons is a denial of
the respect due to persons; that the use of violence repre­
sents a rejection of the methods of reasoned discourse, a 
use of moral beings principally as means and therefore in a 
way contrary to their moral nature. Violence against persons 
is clearly against the core of morality, and hence goes 
against the conditions for having a communal life at all.
A charge about the use of violence is therefore extremely 
serious. But to decide a. priori that it could not be over­
ridden would be to maintain that no other consideration could 
ever be more important. It may be unlikely that any consid­
eration would override the use of violence, even on
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utilitarian grounds; but the possibility that one might do 
so in some circumstances at least has to be recognised. In 
addition, there are morally relevant differences between 
violence to persons and violence to property, between aggress­
ive violence and defensive violence, between the extent and 
seriousness of the damage or injury, and between injury that 
is deliberately inflicted and that which is an unforeseen 
consequence of some other action.
These matters cannot be decided in the absence of 
particular actions in particular circumstances. The 
possibility that a violence charge against an act of civil 
disobedience might be overridden has to be recognised, even 
though we might think that the circumstances in which this 
could happen would be rare and difficult to imagine. One 
must reserve judgment even while conceding that the disobed­
ient who acts violently has to be able to make out a very 
good case indeed in order to be able to claim that his 
action was morally justified.
(d) Some writers claim that the disobedient is not morally
justified in his action unless he accepts both arrest and
44the penalty he is given. (Some of course use these as
defining characteristics, a view I rejected in Chapter Four,
Section 3, pp. 248-249.) Others argue that the disobedient
45must not even try to defend his actions in court. That 
seems too stringent, since it would remove one way of chall­
enging a law in cases of direct disobedience, whether 
political or personal. Requiring acceptance of arrest and 
penalty as criteria of justification is most plausible as 
signs that the disobedient recognises the authority of the 
law and acts out of concern for the communal interest and 
not out of self-interest. Both are matters relevant to the
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moral justifiability of the disobedient act, but I do not 
agree that submission to the judicial system should be 
required as a condition of justification. I prefer instead 
to make it a part of the definition of civil disobedience 
that the disobedients recognise that they are liable to 
arrest and penalty, and that the onus is on them to justify 
evading arrest or not submitting to the penalty. I prefer 
to put the matter this way for four reasons: first, sub­
mission to the judicial system on a particular occasion is 
not necessarily the only way that the disobedient can signify 
his recognition of the authority of the law; secondly, how­
ever, requiring submission as a sign of the recognition of 
the legitimacy of the system would not allow rebels and 
revolutionaries to be civil disobedients, and I do not want 
to exclude them on such grounds - I would rather allow that 
they could act in this way and judge them morally on their 
reasons for action, their methods, etc.; thirdly, it would 
require acceptance of whatever penalty might be imposed, and 
however severe the government and/or the police and/or the 
judiciary were determined to be against such disobedients to 
certain laws, or against disobedients as such; and fourthly, 
it could be unreasonable in cases of direct political dis­
obedience where the penalties and their administration were 
precisely the matter at issue.
(e) To these may be added a fifth that is often implicitly 
assumed in discussions of the moral justification of civil 
disobedience: must the issue be seri.ous, i.e. must the change
sought through political disobedience be an important one, 
or must the damage to the agent's moral integrity be con­
siderable? Clearly, only a serious matter could override 
political obligation - even at the level of agent-justification.
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Where the obligation to obey is undermined through the failure 
of lav; to help secure the common good or'through a denial of 
the constraint of process, the same importance of the issue 
is not necessarily required; that will depend on the other 
charges that can be brought against the action - probable 
consequences, urgency, other obligations, and so on.
7. Justifying political disobedience
The political disobedient acts to secure some change in 
law, policy or administration. His target may be either a 
private association, a company, or the government or other 
public authority. He may try to morally justify his action 
according to (i) the common good; (ii) his own moral theory; 
(iii) considerations he admits to be non-moral. I shall 
consider each in turn, with particular reference to the 
differences between disobedience where the regime is undemoc­
ratic and/or does not pursue the common good, and disobed­
ience within a democratic regime that is concerned for the 
common good; for convenience, I shall refer to these regimes 
as 'undemocratic' and 'democratic' respectively.
(i) The common good as justification
To claim that political disobedience is justified by the 
common good is to argue that there is a fundamental 
deficiency in communal life as seen from the moral point of 
view, and that legitimate methods are inadequate for remedy­
ing that defect. The disobedient argues that the common good 
overrides all other moral obligations and all other moral 
reasons against the action. He is also committed to the view 
that any moral person must be concerned about the deficiency 
in communal life and must acknowledge an obligation to help
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rectify it. That does not mean that civil disobedience is 
the only way to do so, or that it is the best; the disobedient 
must therefore meet the charge 'Why disobey?' His answer 
must be in terms of the effectiveness of disobedience as a 
way of securing the change, or in terms of long-term tactical 
considerations: that political disobedience now will help
to create the climate within which other means can be used 
to bring about change. Whether or not this means that he 
must override political obligation will depend on whether he 
claims that the institution of law itself is deficient in its
moral role; he may allow that it is not, and argue that some 
other communal institution is responsible for the failure to 
secure the common good, and that the obligation to obey is 
therefore overridden.
The notion of the common good refers to the social con­
ditions within which any moral person may live according to 
the principles and rules of his own moral theory, whatever 
these might be (although, of course, he will have to acknow­
ledge the core of morality and the requirements of reasoned 
discourse). I have argued (p. 279) that there can be room 
for dispute about what precise social arrangements are neces­
sary to secure the common good; reasonable people may legiti­
mately disagree about whether a particular social goal is in 
fact being secured, or whether or not certain social arrange­
ments do enough to secure the common good for some groups - 
and hence whether the common good is secured for any moral 
person. I also distinguished between 'positive' and 
’negative' elements of the common good. In addition, the 
common good is not exhausted by the core of morality and the 
promotion of opportunities for autonomy; there will also be 
those matters that depend on a community's particular way of
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interpreting and implementing the core, on its resources, 
its situation, its culture, and its history. Just what will 
count as part of the common good will comprise more than the 
bare minimum conditions for life as such; the common good 
will also include those conditions of social living that 
make it possible for any person to acknowledge the wants, 
needs, and interests of others as relevant to his decision 
how he_ should act. It thus requires a recognition of 
autonomy in a context of mutuality and community, and hence 
requires social conditions that remove the necessity for 
anyone to deny the moral status of others in order to live 
according to the principles and rules of his own moral theory.
It is, therefore, possible for moral persons who adhere 
to the requirements of reasoned discourse to emphasise 
different elements of the common good, to reflect these diff­
erences in various principles and rules within their moral 
theories, and hence to claim to act according to the common 
good where other reasonable people would not agree with them. 
There may thus be an element of disobedience of personal 
integrity behind claims that political disobedience is morally 
justified by the common good; indeed, this may be used as a 
way of retreating from some charges about the justifiability 
of political disobedience, e.g. based on success; the agent 
simply changes the focus of his action so that the charge is 
either undermined or overridden.
How should the political disobedient act when he claims 
to be morally justified according to the common good? The 
key to his action is his claim that any moral person must be 
concerned about the deficiency in the common good, and hence 
must acknowledge an obligation to help rectify it. The
297.
disobedient's action is therefore an appeal to the moral 
persons who share his communal life to recognise that commun­
al arrangements are not securing the common good, and that 
other legitimate methods of social change are inadequate to 
change the situation. The way the disobedient acts must 
reflect the justification he claims, for otherwise he would 
lay himself open to charges about his consistency and about
his commitment to the principles he claims justify his 
4 6action. The disobedient who looks to the common good as
the justification of his action must therefore act in a way 
that reflects the moral point of view itself and the ways 
social and political institutions and arrangements do or do 
not fulfil their moral roles. The aim of political disobed­
ience in this case is to communicate concern to other moral 
persons so that they too will recognise the defect in the 
common good and act to bring about the necessary changes in 
law, policy or administration. Hence there needs to be an 
emphasis on making sure that the message is conveyed to the 
audience, and so on avoiding ways of acting and circumstances 
which detract from communication. Indeed, there may well be 
a need to act in a way or in a situation that symbolises the 
agent's concern for the common good lest his audience fail 
to recognise his action a_s such - particularly where the 
disobedience is indirect; the agent may need to adopt a 
culturally-recognised role, or to act in a manner or at a 
time and place with a conventional or cultural significance 
appropriate to his goals. These are important parts of the 
tradition of civil disobedience of Gandhi and King; they 
make good political and moral sense.
The moral person must, of course, also be open to charges
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that the common good will in fact be damaged rather than 
helped by his disobedience. Such a charge is a common one 
against disobedience and revolution, even against oppressive 
and unjust regimes, e.g. through contagion charges. The 
disobedient must therefore weigh the chances that his action 
will in fact retard the eventual attainment of the common 
good (e.g. by provoking official repression or by giving 
scope for an extremist backlash) or that remedying a defect 
in one aspect of the common good will cause it to be defi­
cient in another area. Judgments about these matters are 
notoriously difficult, of course, but they need to be made, 
and made according to the requirements of reasoned discourse 
as far as is possible in the circumstances.
Political disobedience that claims justification accord­
ing to the common good is inherently subversive and revolu­
tionary in an undemocratic regime. The disobedient who 
claims such a justification is arguing that the basis of 
social life itself is fundamentally flawed according to the 
moral point of view. Indeed, the very fact that the regime 
is undemocratic is a negation of the requirements of the moral 
basis of social life, since either the common good itself is 
neglected or laws are enacted in ways that do not satisfy the 
constraint of process and hence are contrary to the require­
ments of reasoned discourse. No moral person therein has 
any obligation to obey the law qua law. The charges against 
the political disobedient therefore reduce to those concern­
ing the appropriateness of his methods given the circumstances, 
the likely effects on the common good, chances of success, 
the consistency of the action with the justification claimed 
for it, and the action seen in the light of the agent’s moral
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theory. All these are important, of course, but the fact 
that the agent is claiming justification in terms of the 
common good gives him a way of overriding them. Success, 
consistency, and the agent’s notion of the common good become 
the only bases for moral charges against his action.
I have not accepted the arguments of those who say that 
the civil disobedient must accept arrest and punishment, 
since I have preferred to put the matter less categorically, 
as a matter of the onus of justification for evasion. That 
the regime is undemocratic means that no moral person has 
any obligation to obey the law as such; the imposition of 
penalties, etc., is therefore no more than physical coercion. 
Undemocratic regimes are unlikely to look kindly on 
opposition at all, let alone opposition through breaking the 
law on the grounds that the very basis of communal life is 
morally flawed. To ask the disobedient to submit to arrest 
and punishment as evidence of his commitment to the common 
good is likely to amount to asking moral persons to be heroes 
and not merely to ensure that they are morally justified in 
what they do. There may also, of course, be good prudential 
reasons for submission - or for not disobeying in the first 
place.
Similar considerations apply to political disobedience 
within a democratic regime, although the scope for arguing 
that the disobedience is justified is rather more restricted. 
The disobedient must acknowledge the nature and concerns of 
the regime in the way he acts and in the way he makes his 
appeal to his fellows. He has a particular responsibility 
to ensure that he acts according to the requirements of 
civility and communal life, since he must now accept that
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there are alternative avenues for securing change. His 
attempts to communicate to his fellows must be even more 
circumscribed than in the previous case, for it is now even 
more important that he show that he acts out of concern for 
the same principles and values that are acknowledged and 
pursued by the regime itself. The communicative, and hence 
perhaps symbolic and ritualistic, aspects of his action thus 
assume much more importance, particularly where his disobed­
ience is indirect; it becomes more difficult to argue that 
he should evade arrest and punishment; it becomes virtually 
impossible to justify violence, particularly against persons; 
the seriousness and urgency of the issue become very important 
in allowing democratic methods to be rejected; and his 
responsibility is to ensure that he acts in a way that is 
consistent with the justification he claims and the require­
ments of the moral point of view.
This might make it difficult to justify political dis­
obedience in such circumstances. But it is not impossible 
to do so. As I have said, reasonable people may disagree 
about the common good and about ways of pursuing it; the 
conditions of communal life may come to reflect a particular 
group's preferences and deny those of another group; certain 
interest groups may come to influence the political process 
to the disadvantage of other groups; private associations 
or companies may pursue their goals to the detriment of the 
common good. Such situations can occur, even though the 
political system is largely democratic, and even though the 
common good is one of the main concerns of the political, 
administrative, and judicial processes. The common good is 
not, however, the only concern of these processes, and dis-
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obedience becomes a way of rectifying the balance of advan­
tage and of keeping the moral role of the institutions of 
communal life before the attention of the members of the 
community and of the decision-makers. It thus becomes an 
appeal to the shared understanding of what it is to be a 
participant in the moral point of view given the particular 
society he lives in. The extent of agreement among reason­
able people about whether or not there is a defect in the 
common good, and what should be done about it, therefore 
becomes an important - though not decisive - element in the 
disobedient's assessment of his arguments and of the justi­
fiability of his action. That few agree with his analysis 
and his methods must make him pause, although it need not 
deter him completely.
How should the democratic regime respond when faced with 
acts of political disobedience that are claimed to be morally 
justified according to the common good? The responsibilities 
of the community and of the regime are similar to those I 
outlined in Chapter One, Section 2 (pp. 20-24) concerning 
the question 'Why should I be moral?' Reasoned argument 
should prevail on both sides; each must examine the other's 
arguments in a spirit of cooperation; where disagreement 
persists, each must accord the other the respect due to a 
participant in the moral point of view, but each must act as 
it considers itself morally justified. It follows, however, 
that punishment should be tempered by the recognition that 
the disobedient acted as a moral agent out of concern for 
the conditions of communal life, and not out of concern for 
his own material or social interest. That may not be enough 
to excuse the disobedient from punishment altogether, for
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the function of law is not exhausted by its moral role; but 
it should mitigate the punishment and allow him to be treated 
differently from other law-breakers not so justified.
The nature of the claim to justification therefore sets 
the standards which the agent must use in deciding how to 
act, given the issue, the circumstances, the nature of the 
regime, and so on. The claim that political disobedience 
is justified by the common good immediately underlines the 
way the disobedient himself conceives his action - as an 
essential part of his role as a participant in the moral 
point of view. It also establishes a way of overriding 
charges against it that must be recognised by any moral per­
son, although this does not mean that everyone must agree 
with his interpretation of the common good; it can also be 
the basis of further charges against his action.
(ii) The agent1s moral theory as justification
There are some similarities between claiming justifica­
tion according to the common good, and claiming it according 
to a moral theory, since the common good must be an important 
concern of any moral person and must figure in any moral 
theory, and given the responsibility each moral person has 
to ensure that he acts justifiably. I will therefore discuss 
the justification of political disobedience according to those 
principles and rules of the agent’s moral theory that are not 
concerned with the common good.
The essential difference between this way of justifying 
political disobedience and doing so by reference to the common 
good is that the disobedient does not now appeal to a criterion 
for making the change in law, policy or administration that 
must be recognised by any moral person. He appeals instead
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to one of his moral principles and its associated rules of 
application and priority, and claims this as the reason why 
the change should be made and why political disobedience is 
an appropriate way of bringing it about. There is nothing 
illegitimate about the claim itself; the common good is not 
the only basis for the arrangement of communal life, and 
hence does not exhaust the scope of political disobedience. 
Nevertheless, of course, actual or likely harm to the common 
good will always be an important charge against the agent's 
disobedience. But, once again, the use of a particular 
standard of justification also limits the agent's action in 
various ways. If the change the agent seeks is likely to be 
of general application, he must consider whether or not he 
would be imposing a requirement that others act according to 
the principles and rules of his moral theory. For him to 
use disobedience to simply impose his moral theory on others 
would be as inconsistent with the moral point of view as it 
is for the law to simply impose requirements for action 
contrary to the constraint of process. The political disobed­
ient's goal, therefore, is not so much that the law, etc., 
in fact be changed to fit his moral theory, but that the 
matter be placed on the political agenda, as it were, so that 
the recognised processes for change in law, policy, or admin­
istration as the case may be can take his objections into 
account. His appeal is therefore to the shared moral 
theories within the community, and his disobedience must be 
judged accordingly. There may be no reason why the change 
should not be made; it may be to the net advantage of all, 
whether or not they regard the matter as a moral one, or 
whether they give it the same importance as he does. But his
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goal as a moral person cannot be to impose his moral views 
on others, but rather to communicate concern and to ask that 
the matter be considered. Of course, he may try to persuade 
his fellows to hold the same views as he does or they may 
try to argue that his moral theory is inconsistent or un­
satisfactory in some other way. Both sides have a responsi­
bility to act in the light of reasoned discourse and the 
common good; it may be that his attempts to place the matter 
on the political agenda reveal defects in communal arrange­
ments in terms of the ways individuals can effect change, 
and that the focus of his disobedience therefore shifts to 
the common good. But provided the agent can meet such 
charges against his action, and provided he does so accord­
ing to the requirements of reasoned discourse, he is morally 
justified in disobeying.
Political disobedience justified by the agent's moral 
theory within a democratic regime must override political 
obligation, and hence must be aimed at an important goal.
Where the regime is undemocratic, however, the disobedient 
is vulnerable to charges about why he does not disobey in 
order to seek the common good rather than according to the 
requirements of his own moral theory, since moral persons 
have an obligation towards the common good wherever it is 
not being secured. 'If you are going to risk disobedience 
anyway,' the charge might run, 'why not do so for the common 
good, since you cannot claim that your own moral theory could 
override it.' The agent's reply to such a charge has to be 
in terms of the appropriateness of seeking the two goals 
through political disobedience given prevailing circumstances? 
what justifies disobedience in pursuit of some goals does not
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justify it in pursuit of all goals, not even the common good. 
Tactics must prevail on occasion, even at the cost of the 
common good - although the moral person might be hard pressed 
to justify deferring indefinitely action aimed at securing 
the common good, particularly in regimes where it is hardly 
secured at all.
(iii) Non-moral justification
Just what is and what is not a non-moral consideration 
will, of course, depend on the agent’s moral theory after 
due regard has been paid to the core of morality in the light 
of the requirements of reasoned discourse. I shall take it 
that such disputes have been resolved, even through an 
agreement to differ, and that the agent is claiming that his 
political disobedience is justified by the need to secure a 
change that he counts as morally irrelevant.
If there are no relevant and serious moral charges that 
need to be overridden, the disobedience is not so much
justified as 'not morally unjustified*. (It may, of course, 
need to be justified against charges made from within another 
point of view.) There is always at least one charge against 
the moral justifiability of disobedience within a democratic 
regime, viz. that concerning political obligation. Political 
disobedience cannot therefore be morally justified by non- 
moral considerations within such a society. That charge is 
undermined in an undemocratic regime, but the agent is still 
always vulnerable to the charges concerning his obligation 
to pursue the common good, although it may be that considera­
tions of success and tactics preclude such disobedience, and 
so that particular charge may be overridden. The disobedient
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may also have to consider whether the change he seeks will 
be inconsistent with the requirements of reasoned discourse 
as summarised by the constraint of process. If all such 
charges are met, political disobedience aimed at non-moral 
ends may be ‘not morally unjustified' within an undemocratic 
regime.
8. Justifying personal disobedience
Let us now consider these three ways of justifying 
personal disobedience. The third can be dismissed immediate­
ly, for the very notion of personal disobedience as aimed at 
preserving the agent's moral integrity does not allow the 
claim that it is justified by non-moral considerations.
There are, however, important differences between justifying 
direct and indirect personal disobedience, and I shall 
consider the two separately.
(i) Direct persona1 disobedience
Direct personal disobedience occurs when an agent refuses 
to comply with a law when he considers that to obey would be 
for him to act contrary to the principles and rules of his 
moral theory. Again we need to consider two ways of justify­
ing such disobedience: according to the moral point of view
and the common good, and according to the other aspects of 
his moral theory.
The agent claims that the common good justifies his 
direct personal disobedience when he considers that the 
action the law requires of him weakens or destroys one or 
more of the social conditions within which anyone may be moral,
or because it is a denial of the way people should be treated
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according to the requirements of the moral point of view 
itself. Again, of course, there may be disagreement about 
whether the law does require action contrary to the common 
good, etc., and the disobedient may be required to show why 
political disobedience is not appropriate.
The nature of the claimed justification influences the
way the agent is disobedient in the same way as for political
disobedience. Where the regime is democratic and is itself
concerned for the common good, the direct personal disobedient
is appealing to a standard of justification which must
be recognised by any moral person and which must in
principle be recognised by the regime, given its concern for
the common good. The actions of the disobedient must reflect
this fact; his action must make it plain that he alleges a
defect in the arrangement of communal life, although, he does
not himself seek to have it remedied but simply refuses .'to
act in a way that would or might be contrary to the common
, 4 7good. It is therefore not 'a decision in favour of self’ 
but the action of a moral person who refuses to act in a way 
that he regards as incompatible with the fundamental require­
ments of the moral point of view itself.
There is another way that the direct personal disobedient 
may claim that the common good justifies his action; this 
time his claim is not that the particular action required of 
him is contrary to the common good, but that the fact that 
he is required to act by the law in question is contrary to 
the common good because the way the law was passed did not 
satisfy the constraint of process. He may regard the action 
required by law as morally neutral in itself, or even as 
morally required; he argues, however, that it is an illegiti-
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mate imposition upon him since it did not become a law by a 
process that was legitimate according to the moral point of 
view and the requirements of reasoned discourse. Where he 
regards the action required by law as morally required, he 
will have to decide whether or not to disobey according to 
the relevant rules of priority. And, of course, he may be 
open to a variety of other charges concerning his action, 
his moral theory, and concerning the consequences of acting 
in that way in those circumstances. Where the regime is 
generally democratic, his action will need to acknowledge 
that the law in question is out of character, although he 
may need to consider questions of urgency and efficiency in 
deciding whether the constraint of process has in fact been 
violated.
Personal disobedience in a democratic regime clearly 
requires that political obligation be overridden, and since 
that obligation is owed to the institution of law as such 
and not to particular laws, the justification of direct 
personal disobedience obviously requires that a particular 
law's affront to the agent's moral theory be considerable. 
The common good is important enough to override political 
obligation, but it also limits and moulds the manner of dis­
obeying in order that no aspect of the disobedient's action 
can be inconsistent with the justification claimed for it. 
This may require the disobedient to choose carefully the 
occasion on which he disobeys, to consider deeply whether he 
should accept arrest and punishment, and so on. The direct 
personal disobedient in an undemocratic regime does not need 
to consider the same limitations on his action, although his 
decision may well be much more difficult given the probable
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consequences of even personal disobedience. But he is not 
absolved from the need to have regard for the requirements 
of what it means to be a moral person who shares in communal 
life; his obligations as such may be overridden by circum­
stances when it comes to ways of bringing about social change. 
But when he himself is required to act in ways that are 
antithetical to the very nature of the moral point of view 
itself, the moral person may be faced with fundamental yet 
desperately difficult decisions about what he would be justi­
fied in doing. Those who disobey, with all that may entail, 
deserve the highest admiration; those who do not may yet be 
morally justified in what they do. The need to act so as to 
preserve his moral integrity may make the agent liable to 
considerable hardship and suffering, and may open his family 
and friends to similar consequences. All these are relevant 
to the justifiability of his action, of course; the moral 
demand for integrity does not mean that all else must be 
sacrificed for the sake of moral principles pure and simple - 
one can act with integrity by recognising that the probable 
consequences are such as to make the price of direct disobed­
ience too high. The other obligations of the moral person 
must also be considered when deciding how to act in response 
to the state’s demand that he act contrary to his moral theory. 
To hold that these other obligations are overriding is not 
necessarily to avoid hard decisions, though it may be. Civil 
disobedience of all kinds - whether direct or indirect, 
personal or political, in a democratic regime or not - often 
requires considerable moral and physical courage. That other 
obligations sometimes override it is not necessarily evidence 
of a lack of commitment or of courage.
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(ii) Indirect personal disobedience
Indirect personal disobedience is the agent's attempt
to dissociate himself from laws, etc., that he finds morally
repugnant. I noted above (Section 5, p. 285) that such a
disobedient needs to be able to establish that he bears some
responsibility for the laws, etc., that he protests against
in order for his disobedience to make sense. He needs to
consider why he should dissociate himself from the lav;; he
must, that is, establish his 'standing' in order to be able
to claim that his moral integrity is threatened. How might
he do this? I shall consider two related ways.
A person may argue that his role as a citizen and as a
participant in communal life means that laws, etc., that are
made and enforced through public power carry his authority
4 8since they are made in his name. ' He may further claim 
that he must dissociate himself from such a law because he 
finds it incompatible with his moral theory to bear some 
responsibility for it, and that various circumstances make 
it impossible or inappropriate to do so through legitimate 
channels or through other forms of protest action or dis­
obedience. A parallel argument might establish his standing 
concerning the activities of a private association or company; 
he then claims to act as a citizen who is part of the 
political community that permits the company to act in that 
way; he may disobey to show his concern for the effects the 
company's activities may have on the community's image, or 
perhaps as a way of expressing concern to the government in 
the hope that it too will investigate the company's operations 
(this begins to merge into political disobedience).
Secondly, however, a person may claim standing simply
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as a moral person. His attempts to dissociate himself from 
the law in question are then not so much a matter of absolving 
himself from some responsibility for it as whether he can 
stand by and not register his protest. His integrity is not 
compromised through some more or less tenuous association 
with the law, etc.; rather he chooses indirect personal 
disobedience as a way of saying that he objects to the lav;, 
etc., on moral grounds and that he cannot stand by and 
acquiesce in it. He argues that the test of moral convictions 
must lie in actions, and that the law, etc., is so objection­
able that he could not feel that he really does have important 
moral convictions, that he really is a moral person, unless 
he expressed his protest in some tangible form. His dis­
obedience is an act of witness that he may recognise as 
futile from the very beginning, but which he nevertheless 
considers necessary.
The justifications claimed in each case may again be 
the common good or the agent’s own moral theory. Many of the 
points made earlier concerning these justifications and with 
respect to their use in democratic and undemocratic regimes 
are also applicable to these cases, and I shall not repeat 
them. Again, too, the nature of the justification that is 
claimed will affect the way the disobedient must act. There 
is, however, an important difference between direct and 
indirect disobedience that makes this connection even more 
important in the latter: the disobedient is more likely to
be able to choose the manner and circumstances of his action 
in a way that direct disobedients usually are not. This is 
not always the case; the need for indirect disobedience may 
depend on the actions of others that are outside the dis-
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obedient's control. But there is usually more scope for the 
indirect disobedient to be able to tailor his action to the 
justification claimed for it in the circumstances, and this 
opportunity must also be reflected in his actions.
Any moral person has standing concerning the common good, 
whether or not the object of his protest is a result of the 
actions of government or of some private association or 
company. Similarly, any citizen has standing with respect 
to the activities of government, for that is part of what 
it is to be a citizen. It may be more difficult, however, 
for the citizen to claim standing with respect to the legiti­
mate activities of a private association or company unless 
he can argue in terms of the common good or the (non-moral) 
public interest.
Standing is much more difficult to establish where the
indirect personal disobedient claims justification according
to the principles and rules of his own moral theory. The
disobedient does not now act as a citizen or as a moral
person with an obligation towards the common good. He must
argue (a) that the law, etc., is morally wrong according to
4 9 .his non-core moral principle P; (b) that P is an important 
moral principle according to his rules of priority; (c) that 
not to object to the violation of P would call into question 
the extent of his commitment to P as an important moral prin­
ciple, and hence his claim to be a moral person; (d) that 
indirect personal disobedience is an appropriate way of 
maintaining his integrity, given circumstances and likely 
consequences, etc.; and (e) that he is not trying to impose 
his views on others. Clearly, his argument may be vulnerable 
at each point., provided of course that he is open to argument
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according to the requirements of reasoned discourse. Points 
(c) and (d) are the keys to his claim to'justification; I 
need not repeat the problems with the latter. There may be 
difficulties with the former concerning the fact that it is 
the agent1s perception of the inconsistency between holding 
P and not protesting its violation that will be important, 
although not necessarily decisive; the agent therefore has 
a particular responsibility to consider carefully the reasons 
which he claims justify his acting in that particular way, 
just as he has, of course, in any case of agent-justification.
I have also said enough about the differences that the 
democratic or undemocratic nature of the regime make to the 
justification of civil disobedience for me not to have to 
canvass the relevant points yet again. Two further points 
must be made, however: (a) the agent who claims that his
moral theory justifies his indirect personal disobedience 
within a democracy may be hard pressed to show why the non­
core principle P overrides political obligation; and (b) such 
an agent in an undemocratic regime will need to have good 
arguments to avoid a consistency charge concerning the 
extent to which his integrity is already compromised by the 
nature of the regime itself, and hence why his indirect 
personal disobedience should be justified as an attempt to 
preserve integrity.
9 . Conclusion: a right to disobey?
The task of this Chapter has been to examine the moral 
justifiability of civil disobedience in the light of the 
arguments and conclusions of the preceding Chapters. The 
model of justification developed in Chapter Two has led to
314.
an approach to that task in terms of charges against actions 
and practices. The account of what it is to be a moral person 
introduced in Chapter One and expanded in Chapter Three has 
meant that any moral person has had to acknowledge certain 
matters as important but non-conclusive reasons for acting; 
it has also meant that the assumption of the orthodox 
analysis of civil disobedience about the strict separability 
of matters of definition from matters of moral justification 
must be rejected (Chapter Four). Three of the reasons for 
acting that must be acknowledged by any moral person are of 
particular importance for the moral justifiability of civil 
disobedience: (i) that fact that there can be a moral oblig­
ation to obey the lav/ based on the role of the institution of 
law in helping secure the common good - the conditions within 
which anyone may be moral; (ii) that the common good may 
establish an obligation to obey the law can also be the stand­
ard by which that obligation may be overridden, although it 
is not necessarily the only way of doing so; and (iii) the 
manner of disobedience must reflect the kind of justification 
claimed for it in the circumstances in which it takes place - 
particularly the nature of the political regime within which 
it occurs.
I have argued that no charges are decisive against every 
act of civil disobedience, that the moral person may on occas­
ion have an obligation to be disobedient in order to secure 
the common good, and that civil disobedience may be morally
justified, even in a democracy. It is sometimes claimed that
50there is therefore a moral right to civil disobedience.
What can we make of such a claim?
The kind of rights-talk that occurs in this context is 
only one example of its use, and (as in other examples) it
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can easily become a complex mixture of rhetoric and argument.
'I have a right to disobey' is a way of saying that there are 
conclusive reasons why the agent should be allowed to disobey 
without interference from others. It is a way of making an 
actual or pre-emptive charge against those who might want to 
stop him from disobeying, or punish him for having done so.
For A to claim a moral right to disobey is for him to say 
that others should acknowledge that his disobedience is morally 
justified and that they should not interfere in his action or 
condemn him for it. But there is nothing in being morally 
justified that amounts to a conclusive reason why others must 
not interfere. Another person B can quite consistently 
accept A's claim to justification while arguing that he (B) 
is himself morally justified in trying to stop A from acting 
in that way, or in punishing A for his action. B must, of 
course, consider whether his moral theory really does require 
him to take action against A, for he must respect A as a moral 
person and hence as one entitled (indeed required) to act 
according to the principles and rules of his own moral 
theory - always subject, of course, to charges against his 
action and to the requirements of reasoned discourse and of 
the moral point of view itself.
That A is morally justified in disobeying is, then, not 
necessarily a conclusive reason why others ought not inter­
fere, and hence cannot sustain the claim of a right to disobey. 
A more plausible basis for claiming such a right concerns the 
reasons why A claims to be morally justified in his action 
in the face of charges against it. If A can show that his 
reasons for disobeying would also justify anyone in acting 
in the same way, then his claim to a right to disobey, and 
hence to freedom from interference, must be recognised by
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any moral person. There are two possibilities to be consider­
ed. First, A may claim justification according to the 
constraint of content, and hence claim a right to disobey 
since the constraint of content is part of the moral point 
of view itself, and thus must be recognised by any moral 
person. But again such a justification does not amount to 
a conclusive reason why others would not themselves be 
morally justified in interfering, and hence cannot sustain a 
claim to a right to disobey, Secondly, A may claim justif­
ication on the grounds of the need to secure the common 
good. But if A can sustain such a claim by meeting charges 
against his action, the claim of a right to disobey seems to 
be somewhat superfluous, for other moral persons must then 
acknowledge that all moral persons, themselves included, 
have a moral duty to disobey rather than a mere right to 
do so.
The claim of a right to disobey as a way of saying that 
there are conclusive reasons for being allowed to act with­
out interference cannot be sustained. And if it is weakened 
to the claim that there are good moral reasons why others 
should not interfere, then the use of 'right' seems only 
to add persuasion and rhetoric to the agent's claim that he 
considers himself morally justified in disobeying, since 
the charge against others' actions must be considered in terms 
of their moral theories, and hence may be undermined or 
overridden accordingly.
There is, however, another use of 'I have a right to 
disobey' - to forestall charges against the justifiability 
of the action by reinforcing a claim to agent-justification.
It thus becomes a way of emphasising that it is the agent's
moral theory that must be used in deciding on the justif-
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iability of his action. In this sense, the claim to a 
right to disobey affects the moral evaluation of the action 
by reminding others of the standards to be used in evaluating 
him on account of his action. Implicit in it, however, is 
the claim that the agent is morally justified in his action, 
and that he has met the charges against it according to the 
requirements of reasoned discourse appropriate to agent- 
justification. This use of the term 'right' is thus no more 
than a forceful way of reminding others of the requirements 
of the logic of the justification of actions, and merely 
trades on the presumptions contained in some uses of the 
same term according to conventional morality.
We have now reached the end of our examination of 
the moral justifiability of civil disobedience. That task 
has taken us much further afield than is common in discussions 
of that topic in the literature, particularly because of 
the need to develop an account of what it is to justify 
an action within the moral point of view. A.J. Ayer has 
pointed out that the account one gives of political obligat­
ion amounts 'to the advocacy of a certain form of political 
51organisation.' He does not, however, go on to state the 
obvious corollary: that an account of political obligation 
will also be an account of whether or not disobedience can 
be legitimate, and whether and in what circumstances it may 
be morally justified. I have argued that the moral point of 
view itself establishes the moral authority of a particular 
form of political organisation, but that it also establishes 
that a certain form of disobedience may be legitimate against 
that very same political organisation. One must, of course, 
recognise that civil disobedience may be used foolishly, or
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for morally unconscionable ends, or as a mere diversion from 
other less dramatic forms of political action. But we 
should not let that distract us from the fact that it can also 
be an expression of the highest moral ideals associated with
communal life.
NOTES
PREFACE
1. (Carbondale: Soutliern Illinois University Press, 1971).
2. Sidney Hook, The Paradoxes of Freedom, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1962), p.106.
3. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
4. I began writing this thesis in as non-sexist a way as » 
I could. To my shame, however, I found that my prose 
became even more convoluted than normal as I grappled 
with ’s/he', ’his or her’, ’one’, and the need to 
avoid constructions that required the use of personal 
pronouns. Regretfully, therefore, I abandoned the 
attempt and resolved to explain my failure in a Note. 
Hence I do not intend the constant appearance of 'he’, 
'him', and 'his' to imply that women are not moral 
persons, or that they might not have an obligation
to obey the law, or be morally justified in 
disobeying it.
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CHAPTER ONE
1. This is similar to Kurt Baier's notion of a point of 
view as defined by a principle; see The Moral Point of 
View: A Rational Basis of Ethics» abridged edition,
(New York: Random House, i9 65) , p.91. There are other 
similarities between Baier's approach and his con­
clusions and those in Chapters One and Two of this 
thesis, and I am much indebted to his work, although 
what follows will make it clear that I do not agree 
with all he has said. For other discussions of the 
notion of a point of view, see Jon Moline, 'On Poinrs 
of View', American Philosophical Quarterly, 5(1968), 
pp.191-198; James Rachels, * Evaluating from a Point of 
View', Journal of Value Inquiry, 6(1972), pp.144-157;
J.O. Urmson, The Emotive Theory of Ethics, (London: 
Hutchinson, 1968), Chapter 9.
2. Charles Taylor, 'Neutrality in Political Science', 
Philosophy, Politics and Society, 3rd Series, ed.
Peter Laslett and W.G. Runciman, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1967), p .30.
3. Limits of space do not allow me to do more than out­
line the main points of this debate. The two main 
protagonists of the formalist view and the descrip- 
tivist view have been R.M. Hare and Philippa Foot 
respectively. Hare's views were developed in The 
Language of Morals, (London: Oxford University Press,
1952) and Freedom and Reason, (London: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1963). His paper 'Descriptivism' in his 
Essays on the Moral Concepts, (London: Macmillan, 1972) 
provides a succinct summary of his views on the matters 
at issue. Foot has brought together her main writings 
in moral philosophy in Virtues and Vices and Other 
Essays in Moral Philosophy, (Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1978). There is now a consider­
able secondary literature, particularly on Hare. For 
useful collections, see the papers in Part Four of 
The Is-Ought Question, ed. W.D. Hudson, (London: Mac- 
mTHafT] I969T7 and The Definition of Morality , ed.
G. Wallace and A.D.M. Walker, (London: Methuen, 1970).
4. The gist of the example is taken from Philippa Foot,
'Moral Beliefs', Virtues and Vices, pp.110-131.
5. Indeed, H.L.A. Hart regards it as 'an excessively 
Protestant approach'; see his 'Legal and Moral Obli­
gation', Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. A.I. Melden, 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), p.100. 
Similarly, Alasdair MacIntyre writes of ‘the acids of 
individualism [that] have for four centuries eaten 
into our moral structures, for both good and ill'.
A Short. History of Ethics, (New York: Macmillan, 1966),
p . 266 .
6. In particular, see Hare's Freedom and Reason, passim.
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7. Traces of it can be found in Plato’s Protagoras, and 
there is a clear line of development running through 
Hobbes and Hume to a number of modern writers such as 
Philippa Foot, Charles Taylor, Kurt Baier, Alasdair 
MacIntyre, H.L.A. Hart, and G.J. Warnock. Of course, 
not all hold the same version of it.
8. Strictly speaking, this sentence should read ' . . . 
central to any moral theory concerned with actions and 
dispositions to act.' I have assumed without argument 
that the moral point of view is concerned with actions 
rather than with some kind of ’inner state' that 
either never is, or could never be, expressed in 
action. Such an assumption seems warranted by the 
facts of our moral experiences. One can conceive a 
world in which random sensations passively experienced 
were the subjects of evaluation as good or bad, etc., 
but such evaluation seems to be far removed from the 
world of the mora1.
9. There is a similar argument in Julius Kovesi, Moral 
Notions, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), 
pp. 56-57 :
It is not proper to say that everybody’s wants, 
likes and dislikes, aspirations and ideals 
enter into the formation of cur social and 
moral notions, not only because not everybody 
in space and time took part in their formation 
but because it is not a numerical universality 
that we need. What we should say is that only 
those wants, etc., that are anybody’s wants 
are incorporated in our social and moral notions, 
and the function and purpose of these notions 
in our lives must be such that anybody should 
be able to and should want to use them in the 
same way and for the same purpose. Since we 
form our notions from the very start from the 
point of view of anybody, these terms do not 
reflect my wants but anybody's wants. The 
tension between my preferences and what is good, 
or between what I would like to do and what I 
ought to do enters into our life already with 
our language. (emphasis in original)
10. In The Object of Moral!ty ,(London: Methuen, 19 71), 
P .1407~g7j . Warnock suggests that it should not be 
regarded as very surprising that religious
believers and non-believers do not in fact, all 
that often, come to grossly different practical 
conclusions. There is for one thing the point, 
of which too much is sometimes made (as perhaps 
by Nietzsche), that non-believers may, so to 
speak, uncritically inherit certain moral ideas 
from a tradition founded in beliefs which they 
no longer hold; and there is also the point that, 
in reasonably civilized societies, religious 
believers are not disposed to attribute to their 
deity requirements on conduct that seem too
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purely capricious, arbitrary, and pointless. It 
thus tends to come about, unsurprisingly enough, 
that the sanctions and rewards of religion are 
taken for the most part to be attached to conduct 
that would anyway be regarded as objectionable or 
the reverse, and at the same time that non­
believers approve and disapprove what is believed 
by others to attract religious rewards and pen­
alties. It is often stressed that religion 
influences moral ideas; it is equally obvious that 
moral ideas have influenced religions. (emphasis 
in original)
11. Cf. Peter Winch, 'Nature and Convention', Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society, new series, 6 0TÜF59 -60), 
pp.231-252; P.F. Strawson, 'Social Morality and 
Individual Ideal', The Definition of Morality, ed. 
Wallace and Walker, pp.98-118.
12. I say little in this thesis about the ways in which one 
moves from the moral evaluation of agents' actions to 
the moral evaluation of their characters. That would 
be a serious omission if I were concerned to offer a 
complete account of moral evaluation. That is not my 
purpose, of course, and I shall only draw attention to 
various points where what I have to say is connected 
with the evaluation of character. Rules of translation 
provide the means for moving from the description and 
evaluation of an action to the application of a 
'character-description/evaluation'. Thus, for example, 
if a person treats an animal in one of a variety of 
ways, then we can say that he is cruel; if he acts 
towards others in certain ways, he is spiteful, mean-
. spirited, cruel, vengeful, kind, cooperative, generous, 
or gentle. Other character-description/evaluations are 
applied similarly. In each case, a trait of character 
can be exhibited through a range of actions; it is the 
function of rules of translation to bridge the gap 
between particular actions or types of actions and 
character. In many cases, of course, these rules will 
be simply those of language use; in others, they will 
be conventional within a particular society. The 
possibility of competing descriptions of an action (to 
be discussed later in this Chapter and in Chapter Two) 
also provides scope for differing assessments of the 
agent's character. And, of course, there is always 
the possibility that an agent will exhibit contrary, 
or even contradictory, traits of character on a single 
occasion ('he was being cruel in order to be kind'), or 
at different times, towards different social groups, in 
various social contexts, and so on. Rules of excuse 
and mitigation are, of course, ways of modifying 
assessments of character arising out of consideration 
of actions; I discuss them in a little detail below 
(Chapter Two, Section 5).
13. This notion plays an important role in the argument of 
this thesis. By 'presumption' I mean a reason that 
counts for or against the moral status of the action 
in question, but a reason that is. open to undermining
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or to overriding. A presumption about an action, 
therefore, is not necessarily conclusive about the 
moral status of the action. It can also determine 
where the onus of justification lies, for it can 
constitute a charge against the action that must be 
countered, and so influence the conduct of the moral 
debate about the action. (I discuss charges and 
justifications in detail in Chapter Two.) The notion 
°f a 'prima facie reason' for or against an action is 
similar to my use of 'presumption1; it is, however, 
used to mean either (i) that it is still an open 
question whether a reason does or does not count 
against an action, and (ii) that the reason does so 
count, but may yet be overridden by other reasons.
Prima facie also carries overtones of W.D. Ross's 
particular (and not altogether consistent) usage in 
The Right and the Good, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), 
esp. p p .19-20. I have therefore tried to avoid the 
term altogether. But cf. Bruce Landesman, 'The 
Obligation to Obey the Law', Social Theory and Practice, 
2(1972), pp.74-76. '
14. Here I have in mind an analysis such as that in H.L.A.
Hart, The Concept of Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1961), pp.190-194. Hart discusses five 'truisms' 
about human existence (human vulnerability, approximate 
equality, limited altruism, limited resources, limited 
understanding and strength of will) which together 
'disclose the core of good sense in the doctrine of 
Natural Law' (p .194) . My notion of the core of morality 
is similar to his notion of 'the minimum content of 
natural law' (p.189), although I extend my analysis 
into areas that are outside his concerns. I have 
avoided the use of the term 'natural law' because of 
the medieval and theological associations of the term, 
while being aware that natural law traditions are much 
more extensive than that. In fact, my argument belongs 
to that part of secular natural law concerned with the 
relations between law and morals that are grounded in 
logic and the facts of human existence rather than in 
divine revelation.
15. 'But', it might be objected, 'a similar argument will 
also establish a general duty to abide by the informal 
means of social regulation, such as customs and traditions. 
And that would be absurd.' Absurd or not, I believe
that there are good reasons to abide by these informal 
means where they help to secure social life, but that 
they do not give rise to duties to do so. For three 
things must be kept in mind: (i) there has to be a clear
distinction drawn between customs, etc., that are part 
of the framework within which persons may be moral, and 
those that are merely conventional habits of behaviour 
that are not part of this framework, such as the rules 
of etiquette; (ii) on the analysis given here and in 
Chapter Three, duties and obligations are not conclusive 
in themselves; and (iii) customs, etc., are more likely 
to fall foul of the two constraints introduced in the 
very next paragraph of the text. In other words, while 
there is a general duty to abide by all the mechanisms
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of social regulation which set the conditions within 
which any moral person can be_ moral, the terms of that 
duty derived from the moral point of view itself 
mean -that it is more easily set aside in the case 
of the informal methods than in the case of the law.
16. There are some similarities between this view and that 
of Oliver Wendell Holmes as outlined in his 'The Path 
of the Law', The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes,
ed. Max Lerner, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1943), pp.71-89. 
Holmes refers to the body of 'systematized prediction 
which we call the law' (p.73), and says that 'the 
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, amd 
nothing more pretentious, is what I mean by law' (p.75). 
But to say that a judgement that some action is illegal 
involves a prediction about how the courts will view 
that action is not to say that the law itself :Ls a 
prediction of what the courts will do. Cf. Alex Frame 
and Paul Harris, 'Formal Rules and Informal Practices:
A Study of the New Zealand Rent Appeal Boards', New 
Zealand Universities Law Review , 7(1977), p .214: 'It
is one thing to say that the fact that lav/ is made up 
of rules of various kinds enables prediction with more 
or less reliability; it is quite another to say that 
the law itself is a body of prediction ...' (emphasis 
in original). The point about the use of descriptive 
terms in laws in ways that are outside ordinary usage 
is nicely illustrated by the New Zealand Electoral Act 
1956. This Act includes the following provision:
127. Interfering with or influencing voters —
(1) Every person commits an offence and shall 
be liable on summary conviction to a fine not 
exceeding fifty pounds who at an election ...
(c) At any time on polling day before 
the close of the poll makes any statement 
having direct or indirect reference to the 
poll by means of any loudspeaker or public 
address apparatus or cinematograph or 
television apparatus....
In Section 2 of the Act, 'statement' is defined as 
including 'not only words but also pictures, visual 
images, gestures, and other methods of signifying 
meaning'. The inclusion of this last clause, and of 
the phrase 'direct or indirect reference' in the 
extract given above, mean that there is considerable 
uncertainty about (i) what is to count as a statement, 
and hence what is to count as making a statement; and 
(ii) whether a statement has direct or indirect refer­
ence to the poll. Clearly, then, for an individual to 
claim that an action was or was not illegal under this 
part of Section 127 amounts to a prediction of what the 
authoritative bodies will (or perhaps ought to, given 
suitable precedents, the requirements of consistency, 
etc.) decide. The same principle applies generally.
17. For a brief discussion of the types and roles of re­
descriptions, see Julius Kovesi, 'Against the Ritual 
of "Is" and "Ought"', Midwest Studies in Philosophy,
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3(1978), pp.15-16. Redescriptions are discussed 
in a little more detail in Chapter Two, Section 5.
18. What follows is, of course, an oversimplification of 
the ways in which moral evaluation actually occurs.
In the first place, I do not suggest that a moral 
person always acts only after careful deliberation 
according to the principles and rules of his own 
moral theory. What I am suggesting, however, is that 
the moral evaluation of actions, etc.,(both his and 
those of other persons) must be carried out according 
to these principles and rules within the bounds of 
reasoned discourse. Secondly, it is not the case that 
a moral theory just functions as a kind of calculating 
machine, whereby certain information forms the input, 
is processed, and the output is a moral evaluation.
Nor is it always the case that the action that is the 
subject of moral evaluation just presents itself, as 
it were. The moral significance of some actions may 
have to be pointed out to us, through challenges about 
the consistency of our moral judgements, for example. 
And the process of 'challenge and response' in 
justification, to be dealt with in detail in Chapter 
Two, is a good deal more complex than this brief sketch 
might suggest. My concern here is simply to show that 
the ways in which moral questions arise for an 
individual, and the kinds of questions that will arise, 
depend upon that individual's moral theory.
19. Cf. S.E. Toulmin & K. Baier, ‘On Describing‘,• 
Philosophy and Ordinary Language, ed. Charles E. Caton, 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963), p.200: 
‘Roughly speaking, we say that John Doe is describing 
something to Richard Roe only if the purpose of his 
utterance is of a kind which a picture might serve.'
20. Cf. W.G. Runciman, 'Describing', Mind, 81(1972), p.386:
But since there are no complete descriptions any 
more than there are ideal observers, no more 
can be said than that as in the context of a 
value-judgement you must not fail to report 
anything which, if you had reported it, would 
have modified my approval or disapproval, so in 
the context of a description you must not fail 
to report anything which would have modifed my 
recognition of the state of affairs described, 
(emphasis in original)
21. Cf. J.L Austin, 'A Plea for Excuses', Philosophical 
Papers, ed. J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock,(Oxford: 
"Clarendon Press, 1961) , pp.148-149 :
Apart from the more general and obvious problems 
of the use of 'tendentious' descriptive terms, 
there are many special problems in the particular 
case of 'actions'. Should we say, are we 
saying, that he took her money, or that he 
robbed her? That he knocked a ball into a 
hole, or that he sank a putt? That he said 
'Done', or that he accepted an offer? How far,
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that is, are motives, intentions and conven­
tions to be part of the description of actions? 
And more especially here, what is an or one or 
the action? For we can generally split up what 
might be named as one action in several distinct 
ways into different stretches or phases or stages 
Stages have already been mentioned: we can dis­
mantle the machinery of the act, and describe 
(and excuse) separately the intelligence, the 
appreciation, the planning, the decision, the 
execution and so forth. Phases are rather 
different: we can say that he painted a picture 
or fought a campaign, or else we can say that 
first he laid on this stroke of paint and then 
that, first he fought this action and then that. 
Stretches are different again: a single term 
descriptive of what he did may be made to cover 
either a smaller or a larger stretch of events, 
those excluded by the narrower description being 
then called 'consequences’ or ’results' or 
'effects’ or the like of his act. So here we 
can describe Finney's act either as turning on 
the hot tap, which he did by mistake, with the 
result that Watkins was scalded, or as scalding 
Watkins, which he did not do by mistake.
(emphasis in original)
22. E.g. Austin, ‘A Plea for Excuses'; Alan R. White, 
'Introduction', The Philosophy of Action, ed. White, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 19 6 8) , pp,l-18; 
Stephan Korner, Fundamental Questions of Philosophy: 
One Philosopher's Answers, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1969), Chapter 7; A.I. Melden, 'Action', Readings in 
the Theory of Action, ed. Norman S. Care & Charles
' Landesman, (Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University 
Press, 1968), pp.27-47; Richard Taylor, Action and 
Purpose, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966) 
Chapter 8.
23. Cf. Christopher Cherry, ’Describing, Evaluating, and 
Moral Conclusions’, Mind, 83(1974), pp.341-354.
24. Cf. Kovesi, Moral Notions, esp. Chapter 4; Hart, The 
Concept of Law; p.188.
25. This is one of the reasons why'there is somewhat less 
room for manoeuvre in the application of moral 
principles, since there are rules and conventions of 
language governing the application of the descriptive 
terms of the principles. It is, of course, always 
possible that someone will stipulate the meaning of a 
term in order to eliminate any moral presumptions 
implicit in its conventional use, or in order to make 
it apply to a different range of cases than usual (as 
was done in the case of 'statement' in the Electoral 
Act; see Note 16). Of course, the terms of moral 
discourse are not precise instruments, and a certain 
amount of vagueness is to be expected. Hence there 
might be cases where a term is extended to cover 
actions normally outside its scope, through the need 
to maintain consistency, for example. But it is also
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the case that large-scale, variable, or idiosyn­
cratic stipulations of the application of terms would 
undermine the requirement that moral evaluation be a 
public activity that allows the possibility that 
others might evaluate an agentrs actions according to 
that agent's moral theory.
CHAPTER TWO
1. Cf. Kurt Baier, 'The Practice of Justification1, 
Journal of Value Inquiry, 9(1975), p.34; John Kleinig, 
Punishment and Desert, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1973) , p. 1.
2. Cf. Paul W. Taylor, Norma11ve Piscourse, (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961), p„70 (emphasis 
in original):
It is correct to say that we do not justify 
propositions but verify them, and that we do 
not verify decisions, acts, or dispositions, 
but justify them. We verify (or confirm) a 
proposition by showing chat it is true, that 
is, by giving the evidence for it, or by 
offering reasons in support of it, or by 
proving it, or by specifying the grounds on 
which it rests and showing that they are good 
grounds. We justify a decision, an act, or a 
disposition by giving reasons for making the 
decision, for doing the act, or for having the 
disposition. Or else, if there are good reasons 
•both for and against it, we justify making the 
decision, doing the act, or having the dis­
position by showing that the reasons for it 
outweigh the reasons against it. Thus we speak 
of justifying (not verifying) one's decision to 
join the army, to buy a new car, or to follow 
someone's advice. We say that a person is 
justified in doing a certain act. ("He is 
justified in firing that employee.") And we 
speak of a person's attitudes as being 
justified. ("He is justified in disapproving 
of that new law.")
3. For an argument showing that some moral evaluations 
are 'jointly act and agent evaluational', see 
Michael Stocker, 'Act and Agent Evaluations', Review 
of Metaphysics, 27(1973), pp.42-61.
4. A.G.N. Flew, '"The Justification of Punishment"', 
Philosophy, 29(1954), pp.291-307. (All following 
quotations from this article are from p.295, and any 
emphasis is Flew's.) Other discussions not cited 
below are: Virginia Held, 'Justification: Legal and 
Political', Ethics, 86(1975-76), pp.1-1.6; Thomas C. 
Mayberry, 'Morality and Justification', Southern 
Journal of Philosophy, 6 ( 196 8) , pp.205-214 ; Douglas N. 
Morgan, 'Is Justification Scientifically Impossible?', 
Ethics, 69(1958-59), pp. 19-47; James Rachels, 'Wants, 
Reasons and Justifications', Philosophical Quarterly, 
18(1968), pp.299-309; Henry L. Ruf, ‘On Being"Morally 
Justified', Journal of Value Inquiry, 3(1969),
pp.1-18.
5. John Patterson, 'How to Justify an Injustice', Mind,
82(1973), p.258. The point is also made by Lawrence 
Becker, On Justifying Moral Judgements, (Lon don:
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Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), p.71:
The failure to find reasons against doing X 
constitutes a failure to find X to be unjustified 
or wrong from a reasoned point of view. And 
that is enough to 'ground' the matter, to stop 
the demand for justification. For if X cannot 
be reasoned to be wrong, then at the very least 
it will be unobjectionable from that standpoint 
and the questions cease.
6. Patterson, 'How to Justify an Injustice', p.259.
Leslie Macfarlane makes a similar distinction, 
although his terminology of 'negative' and 'positive' 
justifications respectively conveys the sense of the 
distinction rather more clearly than Patterson's 
'type (a)' and 'type (b)';see Macfarlane's paper 
'Justifying Political Disobedience', Ethics, 79(1968-69), 
p . 2 7 .
7. Patterson, 'How to Justify an Injustice', p.259.
8. John Kemp points out that there are two senses of 
'justify': it can mean the giving of any reasons for 
X 'without any implications for the satisfactoriness 
of the reasons given'; or, in the more common sense,
'the reasons given must be good ones; its use 
indicates success, not merely attempt, and implies 
that the reasons offered in support of the belief or 
action really do support it, and support it adequately.'
Reason,_Action and Morality, (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1964), p.l02n.
9. Carl Wellman, Challenge and Response: Justification in 
Ethics, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University 
Press 7 1971) . Page references in the text of this 
Section are to this book; any emphasis is Wellman's.
10. Flew, '"The Justification of Punishment"', p.295.
11. Cf. Baier, 'The Practice of Justification', p.35:
'... justifying something, A, is the activity of 
showing that A does satisfy the standards of accept­
ability which A is required to satisfy.' (emphasis in 
original); Kleinig, Punishment and Desert, p.2:
'... demands for justifTeation have as their aim the 
elimination of an apparent discrepancy between an 
agent's (or agency's) responsible beliefs or behaviour 
and some norm or standard.'
12. Wellman, Challenge and Response, pp.274-275 (emphasis 
in original) .
13. See Bernard Williams, 'Politics and Moral Character', 
in Public and Private Morality, ed, Stuart Hampshire, 
(Cambridge : "Cambridge ~Un ive r s i t y Press, 1978),
pp,55-74; Michael Walzer, 'Political Action: The 
Problem of Dirty Hands', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
2(1973), p.171:
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When rules are overridden, we do not talk or 
act as if they had been set aside, canceled [sic], 
or annulled. They still stand and have this much 
effect at least: that we know we have done some- 
thing wrong even if what we have done was also 
the best thing to do on the whole in the circum­
stances. Or at least we feel that way, and this 
feeling is itself a crucial feature of our 
moral life.
14. For a discussion of this, see Thomas Nagel, The 
Possibility of Altruism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1970), pp.63-67, 109-111.
15. My use of 'practice' is much wider than that adopted 
by John Rawls in ‘Two Concepts of Rules', in Theories 
of Ethics, ed. Philippa Foot ,(London: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1967), p p .144-170. Rawls uses 'practice'
as a sort of technical term meaning any form of 
activity specified by a system of rules which 
defines offices, roles, moves, penalties, 
defences, and so on, and which gives the activity 
its structure. As examples one may think of 
games and rituals, trials and parliaments.,
(p . 144n)
My use is rather less formal than Rawls'. By 'practice' 
I mean the action considered in isolation from 
particular and variable circumstances. Thus I regard 
things like smoking, acting courageously, and 
promising as practices whereas Rawls would only apply 
the term to the last of these.
16. Other wrongness charges will invoke rules of trans­
lation from descriptions of actions to judgements 
about character, e.g. 'That was a spiteful thing to 
do!‘ or 'You helped him out of nothing more than 
naked self-interest' or 'Saying that was hypocritical*. 
These charges against motives may be answered (i) by 
responding to any wrongness charge about actions 
contained in them; and the way this is done will 
depend on the form the wrongness charge takes; or
(ii) by attacking the rule of translation invoked in 
the charge, e.g. 'I did not act out of cynicism but 
out of a realistic assessment of the situation.' 
Evaluation of an agent's character is outside the 
scope of justificatory discourse itself, but the 
result of looking at whether an agent was justified 
in acting as he did can have implications for a 
judgement about his character - or at least about that 
aspect of his character that could be called into 
question in that case. If we conclude that A was 
morally justified in doing X, i.e. that in the light 
of the circumstances he acted in accordance with the 
reasoned provisions of his own moral theory, then our 
evaluation of that aspect of his character cannot be 
negative as a result of our consideration of that 
action - even if we conclude that his action was 
wrong. That is not necessarily to say, of course,
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that we must therefore approve of his character in 
part or in whole. We may still want to mount charges 
directly against his motives without proceeding via a 
consideration of the justifiability of his action.
If, on the other hand, we conclude that A was 
unjustified in doing X,. then no conclusion necessarily 
follows about how we are to evaluate that aspect of 
his character. That will depend on the grounds on 
which we have reached that conclusion about his action, 
and on the appropriate rules of translation. Con­
clusions about the justifiability of A's doing X, 
therefore, do not entail conclusions about any aspect 
of A's character. And, of course, our use of rules 
of translation in a particular case may be forestalled 
or have^o be modified in the light of the circum- 
stances7in the light of rules of excuse and mitigation. 
I consider these rules later in this Section.
17. Cf. Kleinig, Punishment and Desert, p.8:
Words like "honesty", "stealing", "obscenity", 
"murder", "treachery", "sincerity", "lying", 
etc., already mark out for us, within a moral 
sphei'e of discourse, various types of behaviour 
or ways of behaving. So that when a justifi­
catory dispute arises, what is often up for 
consideration is the proper description of 
certain beliefs or behaviour.
Julius Kovesi distinguishes four different types of 
redescriptions ('Against the Ritual of "Is" and 
"Ought"', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 3(1978), 
pp.15-16):
(i) 'evaluative redescription', where ’we employ 
the various "good-phrases" to shift an 
object from under one description to under 
another description';
(ii) ’ideological redescription’, where redes­
cription is according to a 'distorted 
conceptual framework, an ideology or a 
mythology', e.g. the Nazi's redescription 
of the murder of the Jews as 'the final 
solution';
(iii) 'diluting redescriptions', where 'an attempt 
is made to deny or ignore a morally relevant 
fact which would distinguish the act from a 
morally neutral family of acts', e.g. to 
redescribe '"murder" as "killing"' or '"lying" 
as "saying something"';
(iv) 'substantiated redescriptions', where we ask 
'for the relevant facts that would substan­
tiate the original description; that 
establish its 'correctness'.
18. The philosophical literature on excuses is still_
surprisingly sparse, twenty years after Austin first 
made his plea and despite its renewal in many 
collections since. See his 'A Plea for Excuses', in
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his Phi1osophica1 Papers, ed. J.O. Urmson and G.J. 
Warnock,(Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1961), pp.123-152;
See also Psichard B „ Brandt, Ethical Theory, (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959), pp„471-474; Hanna 
Fenichel Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1972) , pp.149-151.
For a brief analysis of excuses in a legal context, 
where the notion has received rather inore attention 
than in moral philosophy, see H.L.A-. Hart, 'Legal 
Responsibility and Excuses', in Determinism and 
Freedom in the Age of Modern Science, ed. Sidney Hook, 
(New York: New York University Press, 1958), pp.81-104.
19. Excuse strategies are not very important in the con­
text of civil disobedience, and I have included this 
brief section for the sake of completeness in the 
discussion of responses to charges.
20. Cf. Austin, 'A Plea for Excuses', p.125; Brandt,
Ethical Theory, p.471n.
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CHAPTER THREE
1.  A . P . D1E n t r e v e s , The M e d i e v a l  Co n t r i b u t i o n  t o P o l i t i c a l  
T h o u g h t , (New Y o r k :  The H u m a n i t i e s  P r e s s ,  19 59) , p . 3 .
D' E n t r e v e s  a l s o  s a y s  t h a t  t h e  p h r a s e  ' p o l i t i c a l  
o b l i g a t i o n '  i s  ' f a r  more  p o p u l a r  i n  E n g l i s h  t h a n  i n  
o t h e r  E u r o p e a n  l a n g u a g e s '  a n d  t h a t  h e  f e e l s  ' p e r s o n ­
a l l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  h a v i n g  i n t r o d u c e d  [ i t ]  i n t o  my 
own n a t i v e  l a n g u a g e ' ;  'On t h e  N a t u r e  o f  P o l i t i c a l  
O b l i g a t i o n ' ,  P h i l o s o p h y , 4 3 ( 1 9 6 8 ) ,  p . 3 0 9 .  S e e  a l s o  
h i s  ' O b e y i n g  Whom' ,  P o l i t i c a l  S t u d i e s , 1 3 ( 1 9 6 5 ) ,  
p p . 1 - 1 4  a n d  ' P o l i t i c a l  O b l i g a t i o n  a n d  t h e  Open 
S o c i e t y ' ,  The  Open S o c i e t y  i n  T h e o r y  and  P r a c t i c e , e d . 
D. G e r m i n o  a n d  K. v o n  B e y m e , (The H a g u e :  M a r t i n u s  
N i j h o f f ,  1 9 7 4 ) ,  p p . 2 6 - 3 1 .
2 .  M e l v i n  R i c h t e r , '  The P o l i t i c s  o f  C o n s c i e n c e :  T . H .  G r e e n  
and  H i s  Age ,  ( L o n d o n :  W e i d e n f e l d  a nd  N i c o l s o n ,  1 9 6 4 ) ,  
p . 230 .
3.  S e e ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  D ' E n t r e v e s ,  M e d i e v a l  C o n t r i b u t i o n , 
p . 3  a nd  'On t h e  N a t u r e  o f  P o l i t i c a l ’ O b T T g a t i o n ' , p . 3 0 9  ; 
A n t h o n y  Q u i n t o n ,  ' I n t r o d u c t i o n ' ,  P o l i t i c a l  P h i l o s o p h y , 
e d .  Q u i n t o n ,  ( L o n d o n :  O x f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 6 7 ) ,
p . 9 ;  G l e n n  T i n d e r ,  P o l i t i c a l  T h i n k i n g :  The P e r e n n i a l  
Q u e s t i o n s  , 2nd  e d i t i o n ,  ( B o s t o n :  L i t t l e  , B r o w n , 1 9 7 4 ) ,
P • 8 3 ;  L . J .  M a c f a r l a n e ,  Modern P o l i t i c a l  T h e o r y ,
( L o n d o n :  N e l s o n ,  1970)  , p . x x i i i ; I s a i a h  B e r l i n ,
' D o e s  P o l i t i c a l  T h e o r y  s t i l l  E x i s t ? ' ,  P h i l o s o p h y ,  
P o l i t i c s  a n d  S o c i e t y , 2nd s e r i e s ,  e d .  P e t e r  L a s l e t t  
a nd  W.G. R u n c i m a n ,  ( O x f o r d :  B a s i l  B l a c k w e l l ,  1 9 6 2 ) ,  
p . 7  a n d  L a s l e t t  a n d  R u n c i m a n ' s  ' I n t r o d u c t i o n ' ,  p . i x .
4 .  Thomas M c P h e r s o n ,  P o l i t i c a l  O b l i g a t i o n ,  ( L o n do n :  
R o u t l e d g e  a nd  Kegan  P a u l ,  1 9 6 7 ) ,  p p . 41-49.  P h i l i p  
A b b o t t  s a y s  t h a t  t h e  p r e o c c u p a t i o n  oT t h e  l i b e r a l  
t r a d i t i o n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  t h o u g h t  w i t h  p o l i t i c a l  o b l i ­
g a t i o n  ' h a s  made t h e  p r o b l e m  t h e  c e n t r a l  t a s k  o f  
m o d e rn  p o l i t i c a l  p h i l o s o p h y . . . . '  The S h o t g u n  b e h i n d
t h e  Door  •_L i b e r a l i s m  a nd  t he  P r o b l e m  o f  P o l i t i c a l
O b l i g a t i o n , ( A t h e n s ,  G e o r g i a :  The U n i v e r s i t y  o f  
G e o r g i a  P r e s s ,  1 9 7 6 ) ,  p . l .
5 .  M c P h e r s o n ,  P o l i t i c a l  O b l i g a t i o n , p . 43.
6 .  M c P h e r s o n ,  P o l i t i c a l  O b l i g a t i o n , p . 8 4 .
7 .  Hanna  P i t k i n ,  ' O b l i g a t i o n  a nd  C o n s e n t ' ,  P h i l o s o p h y , 
P o l i t i c s  a n d  S o c i e t y ,  4 t h  s e r i e s ,  e d .  P e t e r  L a s l e t t ,  
W.G. R u n c i m a n ,  a n d  Q u e n t i n  S k i n n e r ,  ( O x f o r d :  B a s i l  
B l a c k w e l l ,  1 9 7 2 ) ,  p p . 4 5 - 4 6 .
8.  P i t k i n ,  ' O b l i g a t i o n  a n d  C o n s e n t ' ,  p . 4 5 .
9 .  P i t k i n ,  ' O b l i g a t i o n  a n d  C o n s e n t ' ,  p . 4 8  ( e m p h a s i s
i n  o r i g i n a l )  .
1 0 .  P i t k i n ,  ' O b l i g a t i o n  a n d  C o n s e n t ' ,  p . 6 2 .
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11. See, for example, R.M. Hare, 'Political Obligation',
Social Ends and Political Means, ed. Ted Honderich, 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 19 76) , p.2.
T.H. Green defines 'political obligation1 as 
including 'the obligation of the subject towards the 
sovereign, the obligation of the citizen towards the 
state, and the obligation of individuals to each 
other as enforced by a political superior.’ Lectures 
on the Principles of Political Obligation, introd.
A. Eh Lindsay, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1967), sect. 1.
12. Margaret Macdonald, 'The Language of Political Theory', 
Essays on Logic and Language, ed. Antony Flew,(Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1951), pp.167-186; McPherson,
Political Obligation, passim; Pitkin, 'Obligation and 
Consent’, pp.76-79 (although she only regards it as 
meaningless in the case of the fourth type of question 
mentioned in Section 1 above). See also John R.
Carnes, 'Why should I obey the Law?', Ethics, 71(1960-61), 
pp.14-26. For a discussion of the 'meaningless 
question' argument, see Richard Flathman, Political 
Obligation, (London: Croorn Helm, 1972), pp.89-108;
Carole Pateman, 'Political Obligation and Conceptual 
Analysis', Political Studies, 21(1973), pp.199-218;
S.I. Benn and R.S. Peters, Social Principles and_the 
Democratic State, (London: George Allen and Unwin,
1959), pp.70-71, 299-300; Richard Wasserstrom, 'The 
Obligation to Obey the Law', Essays in Legal Philosophy, 
ed. Robert S. Summers, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970), 
pp.2 81-2 85 .
13. McPherson, Political Obligation, pp.2, 15-16, 20-21; 
Macdonald, 'Language of Political Theory', pp.183-184.
14. McPherson, Political Obligation, p.22.
15. McPherson, Political Obligation, pp.51-53; cf.
Macdonald, ‘Language of Political Theory', p.184.
16. McPherson, Political Obligation, p.54.
17. Macdonald seems to recognise this when she writes
('Language of Political Theory', p.183) : 'That some
laws promote desirable social improvements in the 
general conditions of living for the majority of the 
people, is a good reason for accepting them. But it 
is not the sole justification for accepting any and 
every law.'
18. McPherson, Political Obligation, pp.43, 84.
19. McPherson, Political Obligation, pp.64-65 (emphasis 
in original); cf. Macdonald, 'Language of Political 
Theory' , p . 184.
20. Pitkin, 'Obligation and Consent', pp.62-63 (emphasis 
in original).
21. See, for example, Pitkin, 'Obligation and Consent', 
pp.76-80; Flathman, Political Obligation, p.89;
335 .
John Rawls, 1 Two Concepts of Rules’, Theories of 
Ethics, ed. Philippa Foot,(London; Oxford University 
Press, 1967)., pp,144-170; J.L. Mackie, Ethics;
Inventing Right and Wrong, (Harmondsworth; Penguin, 
1977), pp.67-72. In particular, see John R. Searle,
'How to Derive "Ought" from "Is"' and the discussion 
thereof in The Is-Qught Question, ed. W.D. Hudson, 
(London; Macmillan, 1969), Part III.
22. McPherson, Political Obligation, pp. 61-6 4.
23. Macdonald, 'Language of Political Theory’, p.184 
(emphasis in original).
24. That obligations arise out of roles, rules and agree­
ments gives a basis on which to differentiate between 
those cases where ’ought’ can be translated into 
’obligation' and those where it cannot. One can 
therefore talk about prudential, instrumental, and 
advisory uses of ’ought’, where the use of that term 
implies good, and perhaps even important and over­
riding, reasons for action, without necessarily being 
committed to using ’obligation’ in those contexts«
25. Cf. Chapter One, Note 13. Harry Beran argues against 
the kind of analysis of ’ought’, ’obligation’ and 
’duty’ I have advanced (’Ought, Obligation and Duty’, 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50(1972), pp . 20 7- 
221). Beran holds that 'A ought to do X’ is logically 
equivalent to 'There are conclusive reasons for A’s 
doing X’; duties are ’determined’ by roles - roles are 
’defined’ in terms of duties; and ’A person's obligations arise out of the commitments he makes'. 
(p.216). Obligations can conflict, 'oughts' cannot 
(p.218) . Hence there is no need to speak of conclusive 
and non-conclusive uses of 'ought.' and 'obligation' 
since 'the distinction between a reason for action and 
a conclusive reason for action is already embodied in 
ordinary language through obligation statements always 
having the former force and (unqualified) ought state­
ments always having the latter force’ ('In Defense of 
the Consent Theory of Political Obligation and 
Authority’, Ethics, 37(1976-77), p.261n). There
are three main points at issue: (i) Beran seems to me
to be wrong when he claims that obligations are always 
voluntary whereas duties arise out of roles. 
Obligation-talk can be a way of referring to the 
weight of duties within a role, e.g. a traffic police- 
man 'T* role-obligation (i.e. overriding duty) to help 
at the scene of an accident rather than to give 
parking tickets. The same holds for imposed roles. 
Consider too what is involved in working to rule; it 
is precisely changing the weighting of duties - and 
also of role-obligations, (ii) Hence I do not accept 
Beran's claim that obligations can only be acquired 
through voluntary commitments. (iii) Nor is it plausible to argue that the non-conclusive/conclusive 
distinction corresponds to the obligation/ought 
distinction. Beran’s analysis of conflicting 'oughts' 
in the example 'On the one hand I ought to do X, on 
the other hand I ought to do Y , so what will I do?’
3.36 .
(p.220) is to argue that either it is a 'loose* way 
of speaking parallel to some uses of 'know' (in, e.g.,
'I just knew you'd win!'}, or it is elliptical for 
'Considering only that I promised to do X I ought to 
do X , and considering only....T (p.220; emphasis in 
original) and hence is a rendering in terms of con­
clusive reasons. But now Beran must admit that he 
has a case of two incompatible but conclusive reasons 
for action, yet he does not allow that they can 
conflict. That seems plainly contrary to our moral 
experience, not least since it seems to mean that 
only the overriding reason for action was really an 
'ought' whereas the rest were not (but it is unclear 
just what they now are).
26. There is an extensive literature on legal obligation, 
particularly concerning its relations with other types 
of obligation. See, in particular, H.L.A. Hart, 'Legal 
and Moral Obligation', Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. 
A.I. Melden, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1958), pp.82-107, and The Concept of Law, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1961), esp. p p .79-88; J.C. Smith, 
Legal Obligation, (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press", 19 76) ; the articles in Nomos XII: Political and 
Legal Obligation, ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W, 
Chapman^ (New York: Atherton Press, 1970), esp. Chapter 
1 (John Ladd, 'Legal and Moral Obligation’) and the 
commentaries by Murphy (Chapter 2) and MacGuigan 
(Chapter 3), and Chapter 4 (Alan Gewirth, 'Obligation: 
Political, Legal, Moral1); and the articles in Lav.7 and 
Philosophy: A Symposium, ed. Sidney Hook, (New York:
New York University Press, 1964), Part 1.
27. Hart argues that there are 'three salient features 
distinctive of the concept of a legal obligation...
(1) dependence on the actual practice of a social 
group, (2) possible independence of content, and (3) 
coercion.' 'Legal and Moral Obligation', p.100.
Cf. The Concept of Law pp.79-88. The second feature 
is unobjectionable: I have a legal obligation to obey 
a valid law independent of what it requires me to do. 
Hart understands the third feature in a broad sense; 
since the law is a reason for acting, breach of a law 
renders 'at least permissible the application of 
coercive repressive measures' to those who deviate 
from it. ('Legal and Moral Obligation', p.90).
Unlike Austin, Hart does not regard the sanction as 
part of the defining characteristics of a law. The 
first condition is crucial. Hart analyses it in terms 
of general acceptance of certain procedures for 
arriving at rules of behaviour, a recognition of 
authority and of jurisdiction. The rules created 
according to those procedures 'owe their status as 
obligations ultimately to the underlying practice of 
the social group in accepting the legislative enact­
ments as constituting standards of behaviour...'
('Legal and Moral Obligation', p.93). These social 
practices constitute or give rise to the 'secondary 
rules' of the legal system, that 'specify the ways in 
which the primary rules [of obligation] may be con-
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clusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, 
and the fact of their violation conclusively determined’ 
( The Concept of Law, p „92) ,
Hart also distinguishes being 'obliged' to do X 
from having an ’obligation’ to do X (The Concept of 
Lav;, pp.80-88; 'Legal and Moral Obligation’, pp. 89-90). 
The former expression emphasises the sanctions likely 
to follow if a rule is not obeyed; it is a psycholo­
gical statement ’referring to the beliefs and motives 
with which an action was done’ (The Concept of Law, 
p.81). The latter, however, depends on the three” 
features mentioned at the beginning of this Note. 
Statements that someone was obliged to do X are made 
according to ’the external aspect of rules’ by 'an 
observer who does not himself accept’ the rules. 
Obligation statements, on the other hand, refer to 
’the internal aspect of rules’; they are made from 
the point of view of a member of the group ’which 
accepts and uses them as guides to conduct’ (The 
Concept of Law, p.86). Hart’s analysis of secondary 
rules leads to the conclusion that legal validity 
establishes legal obligation. For a critique of Hart 
and a contrary view, see Roscoe E. Hill, 'Legal 
Validity and Legal Obligation’, Yale Law Journal 
80(1970), pp.47-75. '
My discussion of legal obligation in the text 
shows that, like Hart, I take a positivist view of 
legal obligation. I hold, however, that I am legally 
obliged to do X whenever the practices of the legal 
system may impose a sanction on me should I fail to 
do X and whether or not I have a legal obligation to 
do X. That hardly seems to be a psychological state­
ment about my attitudes towards doing X; I am legally 
obliged to do X in such cases whether or not I feel 
obliged to do X. Hence legal validity establishes 
legal obligation, but being legally obliged does not 
necessarily follow from either.
28. Again, there is a considerable literature on the notion 
of moral obligation. I have benefited particularly 
from H.A. Prichard, Moral Obligation: Essays and 
Lectures, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949)7 Chapter 5; 
Ladd, 'Legal and Moral Obligation’; Gewirth,
’Obligation: Political, Legal, Moral’; Kurt Baier, 
'Obligation: Political and Moral’, Nomos XII: Political 
and Legal Obligation, ed. Pennock and Chapman,
Chapter 6; Mackie, Ethics, Chapter 3; Hart, 'Legal and 
Moral Obligation’.
29. Citizenship has been another rather neglected topic in 
modern political philosophy. One hesitates to suggest 
why this might be so, but perhaps it is connected with 
the modern emphasis, at least since Locke, on the 
individualistic aspects of political life, on rights 
rather than duties, and on interests defined in terms 
of the satisfaction of individual utilities rather than 
as communal or collective goods. Notions of citizen­
ship seem to be based on notions of human nature, from
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the Greek notion, where citizenship implies a duty of 
political activity arising out of one1s status as a 
member of the polis, to the modern democratic notion, 
where individuals may act as citizens in pursuit of 
both public and private goals. For an account of 
Green's view of citizenship, see Richter, Politics of 
Conscience, Chapter 11. See also Dennis F, Thompson,
The Democratic Citizen: Social Science and Democratic 
Theory in the Twentieth Century, (CambridgeT Cambridge 
University Press, 1970); Michael Oakshott, On Human 
Conduct, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), esp. Chapter 
2; Michael Walzer, Obligations: Essays on Disobedience., 
War and Citizenship, (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1971), Part 3; Herman van Gunsteren, ’Notes on a 
Theory of Citizenship’, and Geraint Parry, ’Citizen­
ship and Knowledge', both in Democracy, Consensus and 
Social Contract, ed. Pierre Birnbaum, Jack Lively, and 
Geraint Parry, (London: Sage, 1978), pp.9-35, 37-57 
respectively.
30. M.B.E. Smith argues that there is no non-conclusive 
obligation to obey the law; 'Is there a Prima Facie 
Obligation to Obey the Law?’, Today's Moral Problems, 
ed. Richard Wasserstrom, (New York: Macmillan, 1975), 
pp.384-409. He considers three kinds of arguments for 
such an obligation (benefits received, implicit consent 
or promise, and utility or general good), and concludes 
that all three are unsatisfactory and hence that there 
is no general but non-conclusive obligation to obey
the law. One can, of course, agree that these 
arguments do not establish such an obligation yet. not 
be entitled to conclude that no argument can do so. 
Smith's next move, however, is to argue that even if 
we admit that there is a non-conclusive obligation to 
obey, 'it is at most of trifling weight' and hence 
better ignored in the interests of simplicity (p.404). 
Smith's tests for the weight of an obligation (p.403) 
are, however, tied directly to the consequences of 
violating it.. But while the consequences of 
ignoring a moral obligation might be trivial, that 
does not show that the obligation itself was trivial.
31. The fact of legal obligation thus establishes a moral, 
presumption about the action; cf. Chapter One, Note 13. 
It will be apparent that I do not accept the natural 
law argument that an unjust or immoral law is not 
really a law at all and hence cannot impose legal 
obligation (one may of course be legally obliged to 
obey it).
32. Here I am in broad agreement with Peter Singer's 
conclusions in his Democracy and Disobedience, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1973) .
33. To my mind, the most persuasive evidence comes from 
those who have explored elitist aspects of political 
structures and processes. For an excellent collection 
of contemporary evidence, see Robert D. Putnam, The. 
Comparative Study of Political Elites, (Englewood 
CliTfs7_N~ J .: Prentice-Hall, 19 76). Many works of
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political sociology contain discussions of this type 
of evidence; see, for example, Robert E. Dowse and 
John A. Hughes, Political Sociology, (London: John Wiley, 
1972),Chapter 5, The theoretical explanations of 
these phenomena are, of course, another matter; see 
in particular the works of Pareto, Mosca, Michels, 
and C. Wright Mills. For a good general discussion, 
see T.B. Bottomore, Elites in Society, (London; C.A. 
Watts, 1964). ~ ~
34. For examples and discussions of pluralist analyses, 
see Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power
in an American City, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1961); Part IV of Power in Societies, ed. Marvin E,
Olsen, (New York: Macmillan, 1970); Dowse and Hughes, 
Political Sociology, Chapter 5. Elite-pluralism is 
also treated in Dowse and Hughes and in Joseph 
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3rd 
edition, (New York: Harper and Row, 19 5 0) ; E.E. 
Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People: A 
Realist1s View of Democracy in America, (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 19 60) . For critiques of 
democratic-elitism/elite-pluralism, see Dowse and 
Hughes and Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic 
Elitism, (London: University of London Press, 1969) . 
Steven Lukes' analysis of the notion of power in 
Power: A Radical View, (London: Macmillan, 1974), is 
a salutary reminder about how the debates between the 
pluralists and the elitists can be seen as based on 
quite different uses of a fundamental notion.•
35. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political 
Obligation, sect. 7.
36. See, for example, Abe Fortas, Concerning Dissent and 
Civil Disobedience, (New York: sFgnet Books', 1968) , 
and Herbert J. Storing, 'The Case Against Civil 
Disobedience', On Civil Disobedience: American 
Essays Old and New, ed. Robert A. Goldwin, (Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1969) , pp.95-120 (both will be analysed 
in Chapter Four below); Morris I. Leibman’s arguments 
in William Sloan Coffin, Jr. and Leibman, Civil
Pisobedience: Aid or Hindrance to Justice?, (Washinctcn:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
1972), esp. pp. 20 , 72 , 82 , 90.
37. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, introd. A.D. Lindsay,
(London: Dent, 191917 John Locke, 'Second Treatise 
on Civil Government', Social Contract, introd.
Sir Ernest Barker, (London: Oxford University Press, 
1947), pp„1-206; references to this work in the text 
will be to S_T followed by the section number.
38. I pass over the differences between Hobbes and Locke 
concerning a contract of society as opposed to a 
contract of government.
39. Both made by Hume in 'Of the Original Contract',
Social Contract, introd. Barker, pp.207-236.
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40. But not unknown, as J.W. Gough reminds us in The 
Social Contract; A Critical Study of its Development, 
2nd edition, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), p.254: 
'There have been, of course, and are conditions and 
circumstances in which the terminology of contract is 
apposite and appropriate. Such was feudal society, 
for instance, and such again (as between the 
federating units) is a federal state.'
41. Leviathan, Chapters 17 and 18. The limited exceptions 
Hobbes allows are where the sovereign requires a 
person to act contrary to the laws of nature; see
Ch ap te r 21.
42. Joseph Tussman, Obligation and the Body Politic,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1960); Pitkin, 
'Obligation and Consent'; Beran, 'In Defense of the 
Consent Theory of Political Obligation and Authority'. 
For a discussion of Tussman's theory, see Karen 
Johnson, 'Political Obligation and the Voluntary 
Association Model of the State', Ethics, 86(1975-76), 
pp,17-29 .
43. I have interpreted Locke as implying a distinction 
between those who are members and subjects on the one 
hand, and those who merely submit to government on the 
other. Locke is not at all clear on this; my inter­
pretation is based on ST, 73, 116,118, 119, 120, 121, 
122 .
44. Macdonald, 'The Language of Political Theory', p.184.
Cf. Flathman, Political Obligation, p»220: ’Assuming
the circumstances are right for the question of 
consent to arise, for B to consent he must: (a) know
what he consents to, (b) intend to consent to it,
(c) communicate his knowledge of what he is consenting 
to and his intention to consent (that is, communicate 
his consent) to the person or persons to whom the 
consent is given.'
45. Plato relies on a similar argument in the Crito, 50-51; 
The Trial and Death of Socrates, trans. John 
Warrington, (London: Dent, 19 6 3) . Plato also argues, 
as Locke does, that for a citizen to remain in Athens 
despite opportunities to leave is evidence of an 
agreement to obey the law; the Laws tell Socrates:
Nevertheless we proclaim, by the fact of our 
having offered the opportunity to any Athenian 
who cares to make use of it, that any adult 
citizen who, after seeing how the State and we 
her laws are administered, does not like us is 
free to take his property and go away wherever 
he pleases. None of us places the least obstacle 
or prohibition in the way of such action on the 
part of any one of you, whether he chooses to 
make his home in an Athenian colony or in some 
foreign country where he will live as an alien.
We declare, on the other hand, that those of you 
who remain here, with full knowledge of how we
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administer justice and generally manage the State, 
have thereby entered into an agreement, with us 
to do what we ordain. (Crito, 51)
46. There is an obvious relationship between the modern 
theory of collective goods, as developed by Mancur 
Olson and others, and my notion of the common good as 
constituting a reason for obedience to lav/ on the part 
of any participant in the moral point of view. The 
crucial question raised by that theory is similar to 
that posed by Thrasymachus in the Republic: why be 
just? Given that the institutions of civTl life 
provide the conditions within which I can pursue my 
goals, would it not be more rational for me to ignore 
the constraints of law whenever it is in my interests 
to do so? I argued in Chapter One that the moral 
point of view itself requires that the interests of 
others be taken into account in deciding how to act, 
so that the extreme egotist on which the collective 
good theory is based is not, in my view, a participant 
in it. I have argued in this Chapter that (given 
certain conditions about the common good and the 
constraints of process) any moral person must acknow­
ledge a prima facie obligation to obey the law even 
though it might not be to his own personal advantage 
to do so, whether in the short term or in the long 
term.
47. Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 21. It is sometimes over­
looked that Hobbes does place some restrictions on the 
sovereign’s use of civil law. In Chapters 26 and 27, 
Hobbes argues that the laws must be adequately 
published ('by voyce, writing, or some other sufficient 
argument of the same'; p.143); there can be no 
retrospective legislation (’No Law, made after a Fact 
done, can make it a Crime’; p.156); physical coercion 
to break the law is not permitted (p.160); the breaking 
of a law that has been overruled by the sovereign is 
not to count as an offence (p.160). These are hardly 
enough to turn Hobbes from absolutist to moderate; but 
it is worth noting that his sovereign is not totally 
unbounded.
48. Part of Hobbes’ argument for an obligation to obey the 
sovereign is, of course, prudential: the alternative 
to obedience is a return to the state of nature. That 
may be true of a general obedience to law; it does not 
in itself count as a reason why a particular individual 
should obey. That will depend on the chances that 
others will or will not obey.
49 . Tussman, Obligation and the Body Politic, pp.28-29, 31.
5C . Tussman, Obligation and the Body Politic, p . 36 .
51. Tussman, Obligation and the Body Politic, p . 36 .
52. Tussman, Obligation and the Body Politic, pp.36-37.
53. Pitkin, 'Obligation and Consent’, p . 62 .
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54. Pitkin, 'Obligation and Consent', p.57 (emphasis in 
original). A similar argument (mutatis mutandis) 
could perhaps be advanced concerning" Hobbes^inT-(as I 
shall suggest in the next Section) Rousseau. Pitkin, 
however, confines her attentions to consent theorists.
55. Pitkin, 'Obligation and Consent', pp.61-62.
56. Pitkin, 'Obligation and Consent', pp.63-64.
57. Pitkin, 'Obligation and Consent', p.62. This is, of
course, similar to the cast of John Rawls' A Theory 
of Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971) . 
Rawls does not, however, discuss 'hypothetical 
consent' as such, although he does say that he accepts 
’the essentials' of Pitkin's interpretation of Locke 
(p.113n) .
58. Pitkin, 'Obligation and Consent', pp.6 3, 64, 73.
59 . Pitkin, 'Obligation and Consent', p . 73.
60 . Beran, 'In Defense of the Consent Theory of Political
Obligation and Authority', p.262. Beran does qualify 
the definition to exclude 'political minors' (p.268) 
but this does not affect my argument so I shall omit 
it. My earlier discussion of Beran's notion of 
obligation (Note 25 above) shows that Beran regards 
obligation as non-conclusive; I shall not include 
this qualification in my discussion.
61. Beran, 'In Defense of the Consent Theory of Political 
Obligation and Authority', p.269.
62. Beran, 'In Defense of the Consent Theory of Political 
Obligation and Authority', p.270.
63. Beran, 'In Defense of the Consent Theory of Political 
Obligation and Authority', p.262n.
64. J.-J. Rousseau, 'The Social Contract', Social 
Contract, introd. Barker, pp.237-440; references in 
the text will be to SC followed by Book and Chapter 
numbers. Other works on Rousseau I have found useful 
are Roger D. Masters, The Political Philosophy of 
Rousseau, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1968); L.J. Macfarlane, Modern Political Theory, 
(London: Thomas Nelson, 1970) , Chapter 3; Emile 
Dürkheim, Montesquieu and Rousseau: Forerunners of_ 
Sociology, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1965); Ronald Grimsley, The Philosophy of Rousseau, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1973); Charles W. 
Hendel, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Moralist, 2 vols., 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1934).
65. Hence the apparent paradox in SC, I, 7 where Rousseau
says: 'In order, then, that the social compact may not
be but a vain formula, it must contain, though un­
expressed, the single undertaking which can alone give 
force to the whole, namely, that whoever shall refuse 
to obey the general will must be constrained by the
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whole body of his fellow citizens to do so: which is 
no more than to say that it may be necessary to compel 
a man to be free - freedom being that condition which, 
by giving each citizen to his country, guarantees him 
from all personal dependence and is the foundation 
upon which the whole political machine rests, and 
supplies the power which works it.' The paradox lies 
more in the choice of words than in the argument. It 
is reminiscent of Hobbes' phrase that 'Covenants, 
without the .Sword, are but Words' (Leviathan, Chapter 
17). Rousseau's claim is only puzzling if we forget 
his argument about civil society being necessary to 
human perfectibility and concentrate instead on the 
negative notion of freedom as the absence of restraint. 
Note too that Rousseau also claims that 'when the State 
is instituted, residence implies consent. To live in 
a country means to submit to its sovereignty (SC, IV,
2; he adds a footnote, however, that 'this must always 
be understood to relate to a free State...').
66. Rousseau argues that the state should be small (SC, II, 
9, 10; 111,1,4,5); citizens should be independent of 
their neighbours (11,12); there will be certain social 
and economic preconditions for legitimate government 
(11,10); there should be no powerful interest groups 
or partial associations (11,3; III,4); there should be 
equality of citizens (11,11; III,4); assemblies are 
the keystone of the political structure, for 'the 
sovereign cannot act save when the People are assembled' 
(111,12); representatives must be no more than delegates 
(III, 14,15); an elective aristocracy is the best of 
all governments (III, 5); the general will may be dis­
cerned through voting (II, 3; IV,2); there must be a 
civil religion (IV, 8). Cf. Masters, The Political 
Philosophy of Rousseau, pp.410-413; MacfäFIane, Modern 
Political Theory, pp.231-238.
67. SC, II, 3. Rousseau here talks of the difference 
between the general will and the will of all. The 
latter is concerned only with 'interests that are 
partial, being itself but the sum of individual wills. 
But take from the expression of these separate wills 
the pluses and minuses - which cancel out, the sum of 
the differences is left, and that is the general will.' 
Cf. Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau, 
p.326; Macfarlane, Modern Political Theory, p.112.
68. Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau, pp.66-74.
69. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1963).
70. Bernard Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the 
State, 4th edition, (London: Macmillan, 1923), pp.108- TÖT7"
71. Hobbes too speaks of the social contract in terms of 
will; the only way out of the state of nature
'is, to conferre all their power and strength
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upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that 
may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of 
voices, unto one Will: which is as much as to 
say, to appoint one Man, or Assembly of men to 
beare their Person; ...and therein to submit 
their Wills, every one to his Will, and their 
Judgements, to his Judgement... it is a reall 
Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person, 
made by Covenant of every man...' (Leviathan,
Chapter 17) .
72. The inspiration for Bosanquet's analysis of political 
obligation is clearly and explicitly Rousseau. He 
holds that Rousseau did not succeed in giving an 
account of political obligation, although he made 
considerable progress (Philosophical Theory of the 
State, pp.94-95). Bosanquet claims that the individual's 
'real' will is always immanent in his actual will.
The state helps us attain our rational will, and we 
therefore have an obligation to obey it. The job of 
the state is to hinder 'hindrances' (p.181) to our 
attaining self-realisation through making our own 
unique contribution to the universal, for therein lies 
our true individuality and hence our true liberty. 
Bosanquet's analysis seems to me to succumb to some of 
the same difficulties as does Rousseau's with respect 
to the analysis of will and obligation noted above.
For trenchant criticisms of Bosanquet's theories, see 
L.T. Hobhouse, The Metaphysical Theory of the State, 
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1918) especially 
Lecture III on the notion of a real will.
73. The Lectures will be referred to in the text as LPPO 
followed by the section number, the Prolegomena (4th
- edition; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899) äs PE
followed by the section number. See also Green's 'On 
the Different Senses of "Freedom" as Applied to Will 
and to the Moral Progress of Man', Lectures on the 
Principles of Political Obligation, introd. Lindsay, 
pp.1-27, and 'Lecture on Liberal Legislation and 
Freedom of Contract', The Works of T.H. Green, 3 
vols., ed. R.L. Nettleship, (London: Longmans, Green 
& Co., 1911), vol. 2, pp.365-386. Other useful sources 
on Green are Richter, Politics of Conscience; A.J.M. 
Milne, The Social Philosophy" of English Idealism,
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1962), Chapters 3,4; V.R. Mehta, 
'T.H. Green and the Problem of Political Obligation', 
Indian Political Science Review, 7(1973), pp.115-124;
John Rodman, 'Introduction', The Political Theory of 
T.H. Green: Selected Writings, ed. Rodman, (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964), pp.1-40, and 'What is 
Living and What is Dead in the Political Philosophy of 
T.H. Green', Western Political Quarterly, 26(1973), 
pp.566-586.
74. Hence Green rejects the notion of presocial natural or 
innate rights because they postulate a moral state 
that can be separated from a social state. He holds 
that any form of association or commiunity may confer 
rights, e.g. the family or 'human society in any other
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form' (LPPO, 141). The state, in fact, 'presupposes 
other forms of community, with the rights that arise 
out of them, and only exists as sustaining, securing, 
and completing them' (LPPO, 134) . Hence it is the 
capacity for moral action that entitles the individual 
to rights, whether or not they are acknowledged by 
the state. The slave therefore has rights, because
there is a consciousness of objects common to 
the slave with those among whom he lives, - 
whether other slaves or the family of his owner,
- and ... this consciousness constitutes at 
once a claim on the part of each of those who 
share it to exercise a free activity condition­
ally upon his allowing a like activity in the 
others, and a recognition of this claim by the 
others through which it is realised.... Now 
that capacity of living in a certain limited 
community with a certain limited number of 
human beings, which the slave cannot be prevented 
from exhibiting, is in principle a capability of 
living in community with any other human beings, 
supposing the necessary training to be allowed; 
and as every such capability constitutes a 
right, we are entitled to say that the slave has 
•a right to citizenship ... and that in refusing 
him not only citizenship but the means of 
training his capability of citizenship, the state 
is violating a right founded on that common 
human consciousness which is evinced both by 
the language which the slave speaks, and by 
actual social relations subsisting between him 
and others (LPPO, 140).
The slave's claim to be free is 'his right implicit to 
have rights explicit' (LPPO, 145). But since the state 
does not recognise this right, 'he is not limited in 
its exercise by membership of the state.... The 
obligation to observe the law, because it is the law, 
does not exist for him' (LPPO, 145). Richter is thus 
mistaken when he accuses Green of self-contradiction;
'it is impossible to reconcile the assertion that rights 
are such only when socially recognised, with the con­
trary view that there exist rights which ought to be 
granted, whether or not they are in fact recognised' 
(Politics of Conscience, p.264) . Richter interprets 
'recognition' too narrowly; it is not the formal 
recognition by the stäte that gives rise to rights, 
but a communally acknowledged moral capacity of which 
a necessary part is a concern for the common good.
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83. John P. Clark distinguishes four distinct types of 
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ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, (New York: 
New York University Press, 1978) , pp.21-22. See also 
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Philosophy. 8 vols., ed. Paul Edwards, (New York: 
Macmillan, 1967), vol. 1, pp.111-115. The essays in 
the Nomos volume have been the main sources for this 
discussion, along with Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense 
of Anarchism, (New York: Harper and Row, 1970);
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to Robert Paul Wolff's In Defense of Anarchism1-", (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1972); Richard Taylor, Freedom, 
Anarchy and the Law, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice- 
Hall, 1973) .
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Pennock and Chapman, pp.91-ll0.
85. See, for example, Clark, 'What is Anarchism?', pp,9-10, 
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103-107.
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ed, H.L.A. Hart, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1955), Lecture 1, esp. pp.13-18.
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88. Apart from the writings of Marx and Engels cited 
below, the main sources for the following discussion 
have been Eugene Kamenka, The Ethical -Foundations of 
Marxism, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962);
John Plamenatz, Karl Marx's Philosophy of Man,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); Ralph Miliband,
Marxism and Politics, (London: Oxford University 
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Philosophy, 1(1959), pp,17-38.
89. In The German Ideology, ed. C.J. Arthur,(New York: 
International Publishers, 1970), Marx and Engels 
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The ideas of the ruling class are in every 
epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which 
is the ruling material force of society, is 
at the same time its ruling intellectual force.... 
The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal 
expression of the dominant material relation­
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which make one class the ruling one, therefore 
the ideas of its dominance, (p.64: emphasis in 
original)
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we detach the ideas of the ruling class from 
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itself in the place of one ruling before it, is 
compelled, merely in order to carry through its 
aim, to represent its interest as the common 
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not elaborate.
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CHAPTER FOUR
1. For an account of disobedience in ancient times, see 
David Daube, Civil Disobedience in Antiquity,
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 19 72) . Daube 
remarks that it is no accident that the disobedience 
of the Hebrew midwives and of Antigone both involve 
women, for they 'are largely outside the power 
structure; indeed, on the whole they belong to the 
oppressed ones of this earth' (pp.5-6), and so non­
violent resistance is more appropriate to their 
situation. Daube comments that it is also noteworthy 
that in both these cases of disobedience, the defiant 
actions are 'elementary loving offices: assistance at 
birth and burial' (p.6).
2. Hugo Adam Bedau, 'Introduction', Civil Disobedience:
Theory and Practice, ed. Bedau,(New York: Pegasus, 
1969), p.l5n. The practice of attributing the term 
'civil disobedience' to Thoreau himself apparently 
originates with Gandhi, who writes: 'Civil Disobedience
is civil breach of unmoral statutory enactments. The 
expression was, so far as I am aware, coined by 
Thoreau to signify his own resistance to the laws of
a slave State. He has left a masterly treatise on 
the duty of Civil Disobedience.' Non-Violent 
Resistance (Satyagraha), (New York: Schocken Books, 
1961), p.3. See also William A. Herr, 'Thoreau: A 
Civil Disobedient?', Ethics , 85 (1974-75), pp . 87-9 1.
3. See, for example, Chapters I-V of Book VI of William
Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy, first published 
in 1785: 'Of the Origin of civil Government', 'How
Subjection to civil Government is maintained', 'The 
Duty of Submission to civil Government explained', 'Of 
the Duty of civil Obedience, as stated in the Christian 
Scriptures', 'Of Civil Liberty' respectively; The 
W7orks of William Paley, (London: William Smith, 184 2) . 
See also Francis Wayland's The Duty of Obedience to 
the Civil Magistrate (1847) and Nathaniel Hall's The 
Limits of Civil Obedience (1851), Chapters 10 and 15 
respectively of Civil Disobedience in America: A 
Documentary History, ed. David R. Weber,(Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1978). For a study of 
Wayland, see Edward H. Madden, Civil Disobedience and 
Moral Law in Nineteenth-Century American Philosophy, 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968),
Chapter 2. For a useful account of contemporary views, 
see Paul F. Power, 'On Civil Disobedience in Recent 
American Democratic Thought', American Political
Science Review , 64(1970), pp.35-47.
4 . Madden, Civi 1 Disobedience and Moral Law, p .31.
5. Gene G. James, 'The Orthodox Theory of Civil Disobedience',
Social Theory and Practice, 2 (1973) , p.475 . The lead
papers at that symposium were by Richard Wasserstrom 
('Disobeying the Lav;'), Bedau ('On Civil Disobedience'), 
and Stuart M. Brown (Civil Disobedience' - discussed 
in Section 2 of this Chapter). All the papers were
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published in Journal of Philosophy, 58(1961), pp.641- 
653, 653-665, 669-681 respectively. Strictly 
speaking, there are two orthodoxies, as Power points 
out in 'On Civil Disobedience in Recent American 
Democratic Thought', (although he uses the terms 
'currents' and 'alignments'). On the one hand there 
are the conservatives, who may be further divided into 
the 'neo-conservatives' (p.35) and the 'full conser­
vatives' (p.36n) . The neo-conservative views 'political 
obligation from a stress on the rule of law as the 
balance-wheel between majority will and minority 
rights' (p.35); he 'sometimes approves or condones 
civil disobedience, especially to test the consti­
tutionality of statutes' (p.36), but his main concern 
is to discuss the 'special conditions under which 
civil disobedience might take place without endangering 
a democratic system' (p.36). Full conservatives are 
those who think that civil disobedience can never be 
compatible with democracy since it leads to chaos, 
violence, and anarchy (p.36). Power calls the 
other orthodoxy (p.36) the 'institutional libertarian'
(or simply 'libertarian'). This group covers a wide 
variety of views, but those in it commonly combine 'a 
defense of a legal democratic order with sponsorship 
of evolutionary changes in the distribution and uses 
of power to better meet human needs' (p.36). They 
welcome 'the incorporation of responsible law-breaking 
into democratic theory as a beneficial, though rarely 
used, mechanism' (p.36) . There is a good deal of 
common ground between neo-conservatives' and 'liber­
tarians' concerning at least the definition of civil 
disobedience (p.37) . I shall use the term 'orthodoxy' 
to refer to this common ground, although it is perhaps 
worth pointing out that the libertarians seem to be 
more represented in the literature than either the neo­
conservatives or the full conservatives.
6. Bedau, Review of Carl Cohen, Civil Disobedience; 
Conscience, Tactics, and the Lav; , (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1971), in Journal of Philosophy, 
69(1972), p.181. For similar characterisations of an 
orthodox position, see James, 'The Orthodox Theory of 
Civil Disobedience', pp.475-498 (James also takes 
Cohen as representative of the orthodox analysis) and 
Elliot M. Zashin, Civil Disobedience and Democracy,
(New York: Free Press, 1972), p .110. The books by 
Cohen and Zashin are discussed in detail in Section 2 
of this Chapter.
7. Cohen, Civil Disobedience, p.92.
8. Cohen, Civil Disobedience, p.92 (emphasis added; cf.
P .12) . See also Carl Cohen, 'Civil Disobedience and 
the Law', Rutgers Law Review, 21(1966), p.3. For 
similar statements, see Jeffrie G. Murphy, 'Introduction', 
Civil Disobedience and Violence, ed. Murphy, (Belmont,
Calif•:Wadsworth, 1971), p.2; W.T. Blackstone, 'Civil 
Disobedience: Is It Justified?', Georgia Law Review,
3 ( 1969), p.683 and 'The De finition ~of~ CrvTl 
Disobedience', Journal of Social Issues, 2(1971), p.4;
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Bedau, 'Introduction1, Civil Disobedience, ed. Bedau, 
pp.17-18. ‘
9. Bedau, at least, seems to have had second thoughts.
See his 'Retribution and the Theory of Punishment',
Journal of Philosophy, 75(1978), p.606: 'It is quite 
clear now, even if it was not some years ago, that
the definition of "civil disobedience" is not altogether 
independent of the justification of civil disobedience'.
10. Edward H. Madden and Peter H. Hare, 'Reflections on 
Civil Disobedience', Journal of Value Inquiry, 4(1970) , 
p.81 (emphasis in original).
11. For example, by James, 'The Orthodox Theory of Civil 
Disobedience', and by Bedau in his Review of Cohen's 
book.
12. See, for example, James Luther Adams, 'Civil Dis­
obedience: Its Occasions and Limits', Nomos XII:
Political and Legal Obligation, ed. J. Roland Pennock 
and John W. Chapman, (New York: Atherton Press, 19 70) , 
pp.293-331; Hugo Adam Bedau, 'On Civil Disobedience', 
and 'Civil Disobedience and Personal Responsibility for 
Injustice', Monist, 54(1970), pp.517-535; Fred R.
Berger, Obligation and Disobedience: A Study of the 
Justification of Civil Disobedience in the Democratic 
State, (Unpublished PhD "dissertation, University of 
California at Berkeley, 3.969) and '"Law and Order" and 
Civil Disobedience', Inquiry, 13(1970), pp.254-273;
Joseph Betz, 'Can Civil Disobedience be Justified?',
Social Theory and Practice, 1 (19 70) , pp.13-30; James
F . ChTldressj Civil Disobedience and Political 
Obligation: A Study in Christian Social Ethics, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); Harrop A. Freeman 
'Civil Disobedience' in Freeman et al., Civil 
Disobedience, (Santa Barbara: Center for the Study of 
Democratic Institutions, 1966), pp.2-10 and 'Civil 
Disobedience and the Law', Rutgers Law Review, 21(1966), 
pp.17-27; Robert T. Hall, The Morality of Civil 
Disobedience, (New York: Harper and Row, 1971);
Jeffrie G. Murphy, 'Introduction', Civil Disobedience 
and Violence, ed. Murphy, pp.1-8; John Rawls, 1 The 
Justification of Civil Disobedience', Civil Disobedience, 
ed. Bedau, pp.240-255, and A Theory of Justice, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p.364; Ernest 
van den Haag, 'Civil Disobedience and the Law',
Rutgers Law Review, 21(1966), pp.27-42; Rudolph H. 
Weingartner, 'Justifying Civil Disobedience', Philosophy 
for a New Generation, 2nd edition, ed. A.K. Bierman 
and James A. Gould, (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 
pp.327-335.
13. James writes ('The Orthodox Theory of Civil Disobedience', 
pp.486-487; emphasis in original) :
Cohen and other orthodox theorists greatly admire 
Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. and seem to 
have taken their actions as models in defining 
civil disobedience. It should not be surprising, 
then, that Cohen has defined civil disobedience
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in such a way that it can be morally justified. 
Indeed, he has gone much further. By insisting 
that civil disobedience be public, conscientious, 
carefully aimed at specific injustices, and 
usually, if not always, nonviolent, he has 
defined it in such a way that most acts of civil 
disobedience would be justified.... Cohen has 
failed in his attempt to first determine the 
nature of civil disobedience and then determine 
whether it is justifiable. He and other orthodox 
theorists have insured its justifiability by 
building it into the concept.... It may be that 
only the type of civil disobedience practiced by 
Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. is morally 
justifiable, but it serves the purpose of neither 
ordinary language nor political theory to insist 
that this alone is civil disobedience.
14. Although Zashin speaks of 'the self-limitation often
observed by civil disobedients' (p.105; emphasii
added), which implies that self-limitation is not a 
necessary characteristic of civil disobedience, he 
more often speaks as though it is.
15. Zashin's model of justification is quite close to 
Wellman's, although the latter is not mentioned in the 
book.
16. Brown does not elaborate on what he means by 'nulli­
fication', and the distinction between it and 
'unconstitutional' is not clear. They cannot' be the 
same, since Brown has ruled out the latter from civil 
disobedience.
17. This is essentially the same point that James makes in 
the passage quoted in Note 13 above.
18. Reprinted in Civil Disobedience, ed. Bedau, pp.72-89.
19. King, 'Letter from Birmingham City Jail', Civil 
Disobedience, ed. Bedau, p.77.
20. For other discussions of Fortas' arguments, see G.B. 
Baldwin, 'Justice Fortas on Dissent and Civil 
Disobedience: Heretic or Hero? A Little Bit of Both', 
Wisconsin Law Review, 1969(1969) [sic], pp.218-230; 
Bedau, 'Civil Disobedience and Personal Responsibility 
for Injustice', pp.518-525; Alan Gewirth, 'Civil 
Disobedience, Law and Morality: An Examination of 
Justice Fortas' Doctrine1, Monist, 54(1970), pp.536~
555; Lawrence R. Velvel, 'Protecting Civil Disobedience 
Under the First Amendment', George Washington Law 
Review, 37(1969), pp.474-481.
21. Cf. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London:
Duckworth, 1977), p.185: 'The [Ö.S.] Constitution
fuses legal and moral issues, by making the validity
of a law depend on the answer to complex moral problems, 
like the problem of whether a particular statute 
respects the inherent equality of all men. This fusion 
has important consequences for debates about civil
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disobedience....' Cf. Dworkin, 'On Not Prosecuting 
Civil Disobedience', Civil Disobedience and Violence, 
ed. Murphy, p.114. This paper appears (with some minor 
amendments) as Chapter 3 of Taking Rights Seriously. 
Substantial portions also appear in Dworkin's paper 
'A Theory of Civil Disobedience', in Ethics and Social 
Justice, ed. Howard E. Kiefer and Milton K. Munitz, 
(Albany: State University of New York, 1970), pp.225- 
239. See also Francis A. Allen, 'Civil Disobedience 
and the Legal Order', University of Cincinnati Law 
Review, 36(1967), p.7; Alexander M. Bickel, The 
Morality of Consent, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1975), p .94.
22. Adams, 'Civil Disobedience: Its Occasions and Limits'; 
Christian Bay, 'Civil Disobedience', International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 17 vols., ed.
David L. Sills, (New York: Free Press, 1968), vol. 2, 
and 'Civil Disobedience: Prerequisite for Democracy
in Mass Society', Civil Disobedience and Violence, 
ed. Murphy, pp.73-92; Bedau, 'On Civil DisobedTence' 
and 'Civil Disobedience and Personal Responsibility 
for Injustice'; Berger, Obligation and Disobedience, 
and '"Law and Order" and Civil Disobedience'; Betz,
'Can Civil Disobedience be Justified?'; Blackstone, 
'Civil Disobedience: Is It Justified?' and 'The 
Definition of Civil Disobedience'; Brown, 'Civil 
Disobedience'; Childress, Civil Disobedience and 
Political Obligation; Cohen, 'Essence and Ethics of 
Civil Disobedience', The Nation, 16 March 1964, pp.257~ 
262 , 1 Civil Disobedience and the Law', 'Defending
Civil Disobedience', Monist, 54(1970), pp.469-487, and 
Civil Disobedience; Freeman, 'Civil Disobedience and 
the Lav;'; Richard Lichtman, untitled paper in Freeman 
et al. , Civil Disobedience, pp.13-17; Paul F. Power, 
'Civil Disobedience as Functional Opposition1,
Journal of Politics, 34 ( 1972), pp.37-55; Rawls, 'The 
Justification of Civil Disobedience' and A Theory of 
Jus tice; van den Haag, 'Civil Disobedience and the Law'; 
Richard Wasserstrom, untitled paper in Freeman et al., 
Civil Disobedience, pp.18-19; Weingartner, 'Justifying 
Civil Disobedience'; Elliot M. Zashin, Civi1 
Disobedience and Democracy.
23. E.g. see the works cited in Note 22 by the following 
authors: Berger, Betz, Childress, Cohen, Power, Rawls, 
van den Haag, Weingartner, Zashin, plus Daniel B. 
Stevick, Civil Disobedience and the Christian, (New 
York: Seabury Press, 1969) .
24. E.g. see the works cited in Note 22 by the following 
authors: Adams, Bedau, Berger, Betz, Blackstone, 
Childress, Cohen (but not in Civil Disobedience, where 
nonviolence is expressly excluded from the definition 
of civil disobedience; there are some signs that 
Cohen was moving towards this position in his 1966 
article 'Civil Disobedience and the Law', but he still 
includes nonviolence as a defining characteristic in 
his 1970 article 'Defending Civil Disobedience', 
although he says there (on p.469) thcit its inclusion 
is 'arguable'), Freeman, Lichtman, Power, Rawls,
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van den Haag, Wasserstrom, Weingartner, and Zashin, 
plus the following: Abe Fortas, Concerning Dissent and 
Civil Disobedience, (New York: Signet Books, 1968)1 
Gandhi, Non-Violent Resistance (Satyagraha). The 
following authors expressly exclude nonviolence from 
their definitions of civil disobedience: Bay, in the 
works cited in Note 22; Cohen, Civi1 Disobedience;
Madden and Hare, 'Reflections on Civil Disobedience'; 
Michael Walzer, 'Civil Disobedience and Corporate 
Authority5, Chapter 2 of his Obligations: Essays on 
Disobedience, War, and Citizenship, (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1971), pp.24-45. David Weber writes 
tliat the assumption that 'nonviolence is a necessary 
aspect of civil disobedience [is] arbitrary and 
unhistorical. It has led among other things to a view 
of Thoreau which misrepresents him by making his civil 
disobedience far more similar to Gandhi's and King's 
than it actually is.5 'Introduction', Civil Disobedience 
in America, ed. Weber, p.23.
25. See the works referred to in Note 12 above. For an 
argument against the conventional view that civil 
disobedience is grounded in conscience, see Burton 
Zwiebach, Civility and Disobedience, (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1975), Chapter 5.
26. E.g. see the works cited in Note 22 by the following 
authors (I have also included those who stipulate 
that the civil disobedient is neither a revolutionary 
nor a rebel): Adams, Bay, Blackstone, Brown, Childress, 
Cohen ('Essence and Ethics of Civil Disobedience' and 
'Civil Disobedience and the Law'), Fortas, Hall,
Lichtman, Power, Zashin, plus Hannah Arendt, 'Civil 
Disobedience' Chapter 2 of her Crises of the Republic, 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), pp.43-82. The 
following expressly reject this characteristic:
Madden and Hare, 'Reflections on Civil Disobedience', 
and Stevick, Civil Disobedience and the Christian.
27. E.g. see the works cited in Note 22 by the following 
authors: Adams, Bedau (only in the Monist article, 
where the civil disobedient must be willing to accept 
the legal consequences of his act of civil disobedience, 
'save in the special case where his act is intended to 
overthrow the government' - p.519; Bedau notes (p.519n) 
that the definition offered in this article is 'some­
what broader than the one offered some years ago in my 
article, "On Civil Disobedience"'), Berger, Betz, 
Blackstone, Childress, Cohen ('Civil Disobedience and 
the Law'), Lichtman, Wasserstrom, Zashin. Again, Madden 
and Hare expressly reject submission to arrest and 
punishment as a defining characteristic.
28. Madden and Hare, 'Reflections on Civil Disobedience', 
p.81. Some authors allow disobedience to non-state 
authorities to count as civil disobedience, Michael 
Walzer considers that corporate authorities are now 
part of the state apparatus to such an extent that 
disobedience to corporate rules and regulations can 
count as a type of civil disobedience alongside direct
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and indirect civil disobedience; see 'Civil Disobedience 
and Corporate Authority1, pp.24-25. In the 'Preface' 
to his Civil Disobedience in Antiquity, Daube coins 
the term 'para-civil disobedience' for the conscien­
tious breaking of the rules of a smaller group not 
the state and conscientious illegality on the part of 
state authorities themselves. Although state 
officials can, of course, act illegally, it is hard 
to know why their conscientious illegality should be 
any different from ordinary civil disobedience so 
defined (other things being equal). It is more 
difficult to know what to make of claims that the 
state itself acts illegally, and perhaps does so 
conscientiously. For a remark alleging that the 
government engages in civil disobedience 'with great 
regularity' see William Sloan Coffin's statement on 
p.61 of William Sloan Coffin, Jr. and Morris I. Leibman, 
Civi1 Disobedience: Aid or Hindrance to Justice?, 
(Washington: /American"Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, 1972). Coffin's views on civil 
disobedience were eventually, and ironically, cited 
in support of some of the illegal actions of the 
Nixon Administration by Jeb Stuart Magruder, a White 
House official and a former student in Coffin's 
ethics classes at Yale. See Magruder's 'Testimony 
before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential 
Campaign Activities' and Coffin's 'Not Yet a Good 
Man', Chapters 43 and 44 respectively of Civil 
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cannot be infringed in an act of civi1 disobedience. 
Hence, in effect, not every law (e.g. the legal 
prohibition of murder) can be violated civilly'
(emphasis in original).
32. Freeman, 'Civil Disobedience', in Freeman et al.,
Civil Disobedience, pp.4, 5; cf. his ‘Civil Disobedience 
and the Law', p.18: 'Disobedience to State commands has
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total law.' See also Taylor, 'Civil Disobedience: 
Observations on the Strategies of Protest1, p.99;
Bickel, The Morality of Consent, pp.96, 97, 101. Bickel 
holds that the definition of civil disobedience must 
reflect the form of the legal order, particularly the 
difference between a unitary system and a federal 
system, where there are 'laws within laws and lav/s above 
laws' (p.96). Hence behaviour which would be civil 
disobedience in a unitary system might not be in a 
federal system. Indeed, it is 'often invited by the 
many-tiered process of law formation characteristic of 
our own system' (p.96; for Bickel's definition of civil 
disobedience 'applicable to our legal order', see p.99). 
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'two faces' of civil disobedience: 'disobedience under
despotism' is a form of revolution; it 'exhibits an 
extreme of self-sacrificial protest wherein courage is 
empowered by desperation.' But 'where ...human rights 
are presupposed by free government, civil disobedience 
is given moral sanction.' Hence 'disobedience under 
democracy' is not a threat but 'a socially useful 
instrument of peaceable human betterment,..., a symbol of 
individual freedom of belief.' See Virginia Black, 'The 
Two Faces of Civil Disobedience', Social Theory and 
Practice, 1(1970), pp.17-25. (The quotations above are 
from pp.18-20,)
33, 'The act of disobedience must be illegal, or at least be
deemed illegal by powerful adversaries Bay,' 'Civil
Disobedience', p.473. I assume that Bay intends 
'powerful adversaries' to refer to those responsible for 
detecting breaches of the law and bringing those 
responsible before the courts. Cf. James, 'The Orthodox 
Theory of Civil Disobedience', p,479: 'In short, whether
a civil disobedient has in fact broken some law depends 
on how his act is interpreted by the courts, not on some 
"universal feature" of the act itself. Civil 
disobedience, therefore, need not be illegal.' Freeman 
argues similarly in 'Civil Disobedience and the Law', 
p.18. For a discussion of the discretion of prosecutors 
in the United States, see the papers by Dwork.in cited in 
Note 21 above,
34, Cohen, 'Essence and Ethics of Civil Disobedience', p,260 
(emphasis in original),
35, Madden and Hare, 'Reflections on Civil Disobedience',
p,84n: 'There may be some question of how premeditated
the illegal act must be to count as civil disobedience.
The answer is that it need not be planned, though it 
must be consciously and rationally accepted before being 
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the crowd is asked to disperse, at which time some 
individuals, believing the request to be harrassment, may 
refuse and be arrested for disturbing the peace. Such 
acts constitute civil disobedience if they meet all the 
other criteria' (emphasis in original), Cf, Zashin,
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Disobedience1, p.670.
36. Bay, 'Civil Disobedience', pp.473-474, distinguishes 
five different meanings of 'civil' which 'would appear 
plausible', all of which it is reasonable to consider 
'equally legitimate': a recognition of the general 
obligations of citizenship; the opposite of 'military' 
in a broad sense, linked with the ‘customary stress on 
nonviolence'; the opposite of 'uncivil' or 'uncivilised', 
embodying 'ideals of citizenship or morality that will 
inspire adversaries and/or unlookers, hopefully, toward 
more civilised behavior, or behavior more in harmony with 
the ideals that inspire a given campaign of civil 
disobedience'; to refer to the distinction between public 
and private; and to suggest 'that the objective of 
obedience is to institute changes in the political 
system, affecting not only one individual's or group's 
liberties but the liberties of all citizens.' Cf. Bay, 
'Civil Disobedience: Prerequisite for Democracy in Mass 
Society', p.77 .
37. Bay, 'Civil Disobedience', p.473,
38. Childress, Civil Disobedience and Political Obligation, 
p* 11.
39. Cohen, 'Civil Disobedience and the Law', p,6.
40. The terminology varies, but the following make the same 
kind of distinction; Arendt, 'Civil Disobedience';
Bedau, 'On Civil Disobedience' and 'Civil Disobedience 
and Personal Responsibility for Injustice' ; Cohen-,
'Essence and Ethics of Civil Disobedience', 'Civil 
Disobedience and the Law', 'Defending Civil Disobedience', 
and Civil Disobedience; Fortas, Concerning Dissent and
- CiviT~Disobedience; Ha11, The Morality of Civil 
" DTsobedience«
41, The distinction is not entirely unknown in the literature, 
but it is not given sufficient emphasis. See Gandhi, 
Non-Violent Resistance (Satyagraha), p.175; Leslie J. 
Macfarlane, Political Disobedience, (London; Macmillan, 
1971), Chapter 1; Cohen/ Civil Disobedience, Chapter 3, 
Section 3; Hall, The Morality of Civil Disobedience, 
Chapter 2.
42. I shall discuss the distinction between civil disobedience 
and conscientious objection later in this Section. Some 
writers also exclude personal disobedience from the ambit 
of civil disobedience on the grounds that civil 
disobedience is a collective act; see, for example,
Arendt, 'Civil Disobedience', p.46, and C.J.F. Parkin, 
'Violence, Nonviolence, and Social Change', Violence, ed. 
J.M. Barrington,(Wellington: Dept, of Justice for the 
Royal Society of New Zealand (Wellington), 1971), p.8 of 
the paper. Others regard personal disobedience as 
closer to noncompliance than to civil disobedience. Such 
restrictions seem to me to overlook an important facet
of civil disobedience. They also have the rather 
unfortunate consequence of excluding Thoreau from being
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a civil disobedient; see Herr, 'Thoreau: A Civil 
Disobedient?'. Another distinction that is sometimes 
made is between what Bay calls 'active1 and 'passive' 
civil disobedience ('Civil Disobedience: Prerequisite 
for Democracy in Mass Society', p.76). Passive 
disobedience is the refusal to do what is required; 
active disobedience is a positive act which does that 
which is prohibited.
43. Power, 'Civil Disobedience as Functional Opposition',
p.40. Cf. Cohen, Civil Disobedience, p.24: 'Inevitably
a violent protest will result in the focusing of public 
attention on the fact and extent of the injury done 
rather than upon the reason for the protest or the need 
to eliminate its causes.'
44. Cohen, 'Civil Disobedience and the Law', p.3. As noted 
before, however, Cohen changed his stand on the relation 
of violence and civil disobedience between his 1964 
article 'Essence and Ethics of Civil Disobedience', 
which required that civil disobedience be nonviolent, and 
his 1971 book Civil Disobedience, which recommended that 
it should be.
45. Walzer, 'Civil Disobedience and Corporate Authority', 
pp.24-25.
46. Examples of recent literature are Violence, ed. Jerome A. 
Shaffer, (New York: David McKay, 1971); Ted Honderich, 
Three Essays on Political Violence (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1976); Leslie Macfarlane, Violence and the 
State, (London: Nelson, 1974); there are also many 
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Moral Problems, ed. Richard Wasserstrom, (New York: 
MacmTTTan, 1975) .
47. Walzer, 'Civil Disobedience and Corporate Authority', 
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to exclude conscientiousness from the definition, viz. 
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to 'operation­
alise' because there are no behavioural signs that are- 
sufficient for the attribution of conscientiousness.
But this seems to me to be inadequate as a reason for 
rejecting conscientiousness as part of the nature of 
civil disobedience (although I wish to exclude it on 
other grounds). The structure of our shared understanding 
of actions is such that we have certain conventional 
ways of signalling and recognising action grounded m  
conscience, of which strict nonviolence and submission 
to arrest and penalty are but two. To include these in 
the definition of civil disobedience is to place severe 
restrictions on the way that conscientiousness can be 
exhibited in this area and to pre-empt certain 
justificatory questions in the process. It follows that 
operational difficulties are inadequate as grounds for 
excluding conscientiousness as a defining characteristic 
of civil disobedience.
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particular person's view of what the law is, and he 
does not behave unfairly so long as he proceeds on his 
own considered and reasonable view of what the law 
requires'; 'On Not Prosecuting Civil Disobedience', p.121. 
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disobedience; I shall consider it in Chapter Five.
52. 'Civil Disobedience and the Law', pp.27-28.
53. For an exhaustive survey of types of nonviolent action, 
including civil disobedience, see Gene Sharp, The 
Politics of Nonviolent Action, 3 vols., (Boston: Porter 
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CHAPTER FIVE
1. I shall not say much about charges of the type analysed 
by Wellman and discussed in Chapter Two, Section 2 (pp. 
76-78 above), although charges of these types are some­
times made against civil disobedience; see, for example, 
Morris I. Leibman, 'Civil Disobedience - a Threat to our 
Law Society', American Bar Association Journal, 51(1965), 
pp. 645-647, and Note 21 below. I shall also not be 
concerned with charges against test-case disobedience 
since it raises questions that must be considered within 
particular politico-legal traditions. For extensive 
discussions of the role of civil disobedience in the
US legal system, see Mark R. MacGuigan, 'Democracy and 
Civil Disobedience', Canadian Bar Review, 49(1971), pp. 
222-279; Nicholas W. Puner, 'Civil Disobedience: An
Analysis and Rationale', New York University Law Review, 
43(1968), pp. 651-720; Sanford Jay Rosen, 'Civil Dis­
obedience and Other Such Techniques: Law Making through
Law Breaking', George Washington Law Review, 37(1969), 
pp. 435-463; Francis A. Allen, 'Civil Disobedience and 
the Legal Order', University of Cincinnati Lav; Review,
36 ( 1967) , pp. 1-38 , 175-195; Alexander M. Bickel,
Politics and the Warren Court, (New York: Harper and Row,
1965), pp. "TT^Dl and The Morality of Consent,(New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1975).
2. It does not follow, of course, that disobedience is there­
by justified, for there may be other charges that can be 
brought against the action, or there may be other reasons 
why the agent ought to obey, or why he has an obligation 
to do so. My conclusions in this Chapter are close to 
Burton Zwiebach's in his Civility and Disobedience, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) although
we get to them in quite different ways. Zwiebach's 
'central thesis' is that 'disobedience is justified
when it is a rightful denial of the obligation imposed 
by a law or other communication of authority: when, in
other words, we are not obligated to do what the law or 
public authority commands' (p. 4). Zwiebach too estab­
lishes a connection between the moral life on the one 
hand and the social order and politics on the other 
(Chapters 3 and 4). Political obligation arises out of 
a 'culture of civility' that also limits it (pp. 64-70). 
Zwiebach also argues that it is 'categorically wrong to 
exclude anyone from the process of moral argument' (p.
71), a somewhat weaker claim than mine about the need 
to consider any moral person when evaluating social 
arrangements against: the common good; he does, however, 
mention the requirement that we assume 'responsibility 
for our fellows' as inseparable from the common life 
(p. 159). Zwiebach argues that 'a free and responsible 
man' does 'pick and choose' which laws to obey (p. 150). 
His analysis of civil disobedience is also parallel to 
mine; he discusses the need to preserve stability as an 
argument against civil disobedience (Chapter 7); dis­
obedience as 'a mode of imposing accountability' (p.
130); and the 'varieties of disobedience' (Chapter 6).
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Zwiebach's analysis falters at several points. His con­
ception of what it is to justify an action is inadequate, 
and his notion of what justifies disobedience (his dis­
cussion is not just of civil disobedience; indeed, he 
confesses that he does not know what the term means - 
p. 145) is thus too narrow, although it is somewhat 
broader than might be apparent from the statement of 
the 'central thesis' quoted above. He also seems unaware 
of the differences between being obliged and having an 
obligation, despite giving a good deal of attention to 
Hart. Yet there is much in his book that is instructive, 
particularly the discussion of civility.
3. Aristotle, Politics, ed. Sir Ernest Barker,(New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1962), 1276b (Book III, Ch. iv, 
sect. 3), pp. 101-102.
4. Herbert J. Storing, 'The Case Against Civil Disobedience',
Civil Disobedience: American Essays Old and New, ed.
Robert A. Goldwin,(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), pp.
95-120. Page references in the text of this Section are 
to Storing's article; his arguments are examined in more 
detail in Chapter Four, Section 2, pp. 206-214.
5. This type of appeal to fellow members of the community
is an important element in John Rawls' theory of civil 
disobedience in A Theory of Justice, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1971). Rawls confines his discussion 
to disobedience in a nearly just, and therefore democra­
tic, society (p. 363). Civil disobedience is defined
as 'a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political 
act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bring­
ing about a change in the law or policies of the govern­
ment' (p. 364). He assumes that 'in a reasonably just 
democratic regime there is a public conception of justice 
by reference to which citizens regulate their political 
affairs and interpret the consitution' (p. 365). Civil 
disobedience consists in an appeal to the sense of 
justice of the majority of the community (p. 364), 'an 
invocation of the recognised principles of cooperation 
among equals ... an appeal to the moral basis of civic 
life ...' (p. 385). There is 'a presumption in favour
of restricting civil disobedience to serious infringe­
ments of the first principle of justice, the principle 
of equal liberty, and to blatant violations of the 
second part of the second principle, the principle of 
fair equality of opportunity' (p. 372).
There are obviously a number of similarities between 
Rawls' theory of civil disobedience and that developed 
in this thesis, particularly concerning the relations 
between politics and .the moral basis of communal life, 
and between my use of 'the common good' and his use of 
the sense of justice of the majority. Nevertheless,
Rawls' theory is less than convincing, for three main 
reasons (I omit criticisms of the theory of justice 
upon which it rests): first, it is unclear whether it
is an empirical question that the majority has a sense 
of justice in the sense that Rawls requires, or whether 
he merely assumes that it would in any reasonably just 
society; secondly, Rawls' distinction between civil dis­
obedience and conscientious refusal (the latter does
362 .
not invoke a sense of justice, and is therefore not poli­
tical in the sense that civil disobedience is - p. 369) 
is artificial because it posits too sharp a separation 
between a shared sense of justice and private morality; 
thirdly, however, the theory takes too much for granted 
about how protest action in general and civil disobed­
ience in particular can work. On this last point, see 
Section 4 below, and Elliot M. Zashin, Civil Disobedience 
and Democracy, (New York: Free Press, 19 72) , Chapters 5 
and 6; Paul Harris, ’Pressure Groups and Protest', 
unpublished paper (1979); Frances Fox Piven and Richard 
A . Cloward, Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed,
How They Fail,(New York: Pantheon Books, 1977). For
other critiques of Rawls' theory of civil disobedience, 
see Peter Singer, Democracy and Disobedience,(Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1973), pp. 86-92; Brian Barry, The 
Liberal Theory of Justice: A Critical Examination of
the Principal Doctrines in 'A Theory of Justice' by John 
Rawls, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), pp. 140-141;
Vinit Haksar, 'Rawls and Gandhi on Civil Disobedience', 
Inquiry, 19 (1976), pp. 151-192; Zwiebach, Civility and
Disobedience, pp. 44-55.
6. Richard E. Flathman, Political Obligation, (London:
Croom Helm, 19 72) , pp" 2 6 8-2T4T
7. Lewis H. van Dusen, Jr., 'Civil Disobedience: Destroyer
of Democracy', American Bar Association Journal,
55(1969), p. 1237
8. To Establish Justice,_To Insure Domestic Tranquillity,
Final Report "of the National Commission on the Causes 
and Prevention of Violence (Eisenhower Commission), 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1969),
pp. 88-103.
9. Leibman, 'Civil Disobedience - a Threat to our Law 
Society', p. 647.
10. See Charles E. Whittaker's remarks in Whittaker and
William Sloane Coffin, Jr., Law, Order and Civil 
Disobedience,(Washington: American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, 1967), p. 78.
11. Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., 'On Civil Disobedience and
Draft Resistance', Civil Disobedience: Theory and
Practice, ed. Hugo Adam Bedau/(New York: Pegasus, 1969),
p. 196.
12. Van Dusen, 'Civil Disobedience: Destroyer of Democracy',
p. 124.
13. Harry Prosch, 'Limits to the Moral Claim in Civil
Disobedience', Ethics, 75(1964-65), pp. 103-111. Cf.
D. Rucker, 'The Moral Grounds of Civil Disobedience', 
Ethics, 76(1965-66), pp. 142-145.
14. See, for example, Morris I. Leibman's remarks in
William Sloan Coffin, Jr., and Leibman, Civil Disobed­
ience: Aid or Hindrance to Justice?,(Washington:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
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1972), pp. 13-14, 90; Storing, 'The Case Against Civil 
Disobedience', p. 96.
15. Louis Waldman, 'Civil Rights - Yes; Civil Disobedience -
No (A Reply to Dr Martin Luther King)', Civil Disobedience: 
Theory and Practice, ed. Bedau, pp. 106-115. Waldman 
makes the most extreme consistency (or perhaps causa­
tion) charge when he writes (p. Ill): 'Hitler ...
followed a philosophy and practice of direct action and 
civil disobedience.... Hitler's Germany and all that it 
represents in modern experience, with all its tragic 
consequences, is a most potent argument against civil 
disobedience.' For a particularly vivid equation of 
civil disobedience and lawlessness, see the comments of 
Senator Sam Ervin quoted in James Luther Adams, 'Civil 
Disobedience: Its Occasions and Limits', Nomos XII:
Political and Legal Obligation, ed. J. Roland Pennock
and ~Jo'hn W. Chapman, (New York": Atherton Press, 19 70) , p.
301. Senator Ervin is quoted as saying 'I make an 
affirmation which is subject to no exception or modifica­
tion. The right of clergymen and civil rights agitators 
to disobey laws they deem unjust is exactly the same as 
the right of the arsonist, the burglar, the murderer, 
the rapist and thief to disobey the laws forbidding 
arson, burglary, murder, rape and theft.'
16. See Leibman's remarks in Coffin and Leibman, Civil
Disobedience: Aid or Hindrance to Justice?, pp. 17, 21,
23, 39, 40-41; John Cogley, 'Private Judgment: Above the
Law?', Center Report, 6(August 1973), p. 34.
17. Fiat justitla et ruant coeli (Let justice be done tho' 
the hea vens~fallj"l Wi11iam Watson, Quodlibets of Religion 
and State (1602), from The Concise Oxford Dictionary of 
Quotations,(London: World Books, 1972). Another version 
is Flat justicia et pereat mundus (Let justice be done 
even if the world perishes); Hannah Arendt, 'Civil 
Disobedience' , Crises of the Republic,(Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1973), p. 51.
18. See the discussions in James F. Childress, Civil Dis­
obedience and Political Obligation: A Study in Christian
Social Ethics,(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971),
p. 19If; Fred R. Berger, '"Law and Order" and Civil Dis­
obedience', Inquiry, 13(1970), pp. 267-270; Joseph Betz,
'Can Civil Disobedience be Justified?', Social Theory 
and Practice, 1(1970), pp. 26-27; Carl Wellman, Morals 
and Ethics , (Glenview, 111.: Scott, Foresman, 1975), p. 9; 
Richard Wasserstrom, 'Disobeying the Law', Journal of 
Philosophy, 58(1961), pp. 648-651 and 'The Obligation
to Obey the Law', Essays in Legal Philosophy, ed. Robert 
S. Summers, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970)", pp. 285-292.
For an analysis of generalisations in moral argument, 
see Marcus G. Singer, 'Moral Rules and Principles',
Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. A.I. Melden,(Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1958), pp. 160-197.
Singer develops these in more detail in Generalization 
in Ethics,(New York: Knopf, 1961).
19. E.g. Hugo Adam Bedau, 'On Civil Disobedience', Journal 
of Philosophy, 58(1961), p. 656; Rucker, 'The Moral
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Grounds of Civil Disobedience', p. 143.
20. See, for example, van Dusen, 'Civil Disobedience:
Destroyer of Democracy', p. 125; Ernest van den Haag, 
'Government, Conscience and Disobedience', in Philosophy: 
a Modern Encounter, ed. Robert Paul Wolff, (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 463; Morris
Keeton, 'The Morality of Civil Disobedience', Texas Law 
Review, 43(1965), pp. 514-515; Hugo Adam Bedau, 'Civil 
Disobedience and Personal Responsibility for Injustice', 
Monist, 54(1970), pp. 522-525. There is also an element
of this charge in Ervin's statement quoted in Note 15 
above.
21. Power argues that 'some "conscience" justifications of
disobedience raise the issue of self-certification through 
rationally unreachable claims' ('On Civil Disobedience in 
Recent American Democratic Thought', p. 38). This 
amounts to a knowability charge in Wellman's terms. See 
also Tom C. Clark, 'Philosophy, Law and Civil Disobedience', 
Ethics and Social Justice, ed. Howard E. Kiefer and 
Milton k7 Munitz, (Albany, N.Y.: State University of
New York, 1970), p. 249, and Leibman's remarks in Coffin 
and Leibman, Civil Disobedience: Aid or Hindrance to
Justice?, pp. 40-41.
22. Wasserstrom, 'The Obligation to Obey the Law', pp. 287- 
288; Zwiebach, Civility and Disobedience, pp. 204-206. 
Building justifying criteria into the definition of civil 
disobedience is one way of ensuring that only those with 
certain principles or certain motives can be civil.dis- 
obedients at all. Alternatively, the definition can be 
left neutral in this respect and the gate-keeping task 
allotted to justifying criteria, e.g. by arguing that 
the only justified disobedience is where obedience is 
rendered to God rather than to man. This particular 
criterion can be used either as an overriding strategy, 
or as an undermining strategy as in some accounts of 
natural law. The question of how to act where there
is a conflict between man-made law and God's law has 
been very important in the history of disobedience, but 
it is one that I touch on only slightly. There are 
Biblical texts to support the priority of God's law, 
e.g. Acts 5:29, ‘we ought to obey God rather than men'.
For discussion of these matters see, for example,
Harrop A. Freeman, 'A Remonstrance for Conscience', 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 106(1957-58), 
pp. 806-830; Joseph J. Farraher, S.J., 'Moral Preemption, 
Part II: The Natural Law and Conscience-Based Claims
in Relation to Legitimate State Expectations', Hastings 
Law Journal, 17(1966),pp. 439-453; Civil Disobedience
irn America: A Documentary History, ed. David R. Weber,
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1978).
23. Eisenhower Commission, To Establish Justice, pp. 101-102.
See also Amitai Etzioni, Demonstration Democracy, (New 
York: Gordon and Breach, 1970); David H. Bayley, 'Public
Protest and the Political Process in India', Protest,
Reform and Revolt: a Reader in Social Movements, ed.
Joseph R. Gusfield, (New York: John Wiley, 1970), pp.
298-308.
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24. I have argued this in some detail in 'Pressure Groups 
and Protest'.
25. Michael Lipsky, 'Protest as a Political Resource1,
Group Politics:_A New Emphasis, ed. E.S. Malecki and
H.R. Mahood,(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972),
p. 161. Lipsky's arguments are analysed in my 
'Pressure Groups and Protest' and in Piven and Cloward, 
Poor People's Movements.
26. For example, Howard Zinn, Disobedience and Democracy:
Nine Fallacies on Law and Order. (New York: Vintage
Books, 1968), pp. 18-19, 123-124; Zashin, Civil Dis­
obedience and Democracy, pp. 144-145. Some have argued 
that civil disobedience can help the powerless 'crack 
the facade of governmental authority' and hence bring 
about a more responsive government and bureaucracy and 
a new awareness of the power ordinary people can have 
through active political participation; Michael Hamel- 
Green et al. , 'Opening Statement.' in Lauchlan Chipman 
and Hamel-Green et al., On Trial: Conscience and the
Law,(Melbourne: Heinemann, 1974), pp. 54-55. Cf.
Harris L. Wofford, Jr., 'Law as a Question: the Uses
and Abuses of Civil Disobedience', On Civil Disobedience: 
American Essays Old and New, e d. Go Id win ~  pi 8~0l
'civil disobedience, well understood and wisely prac­
tised, as part of a new politics of direct citizen 
participation, is a possible antidote (and the one least 
tried so far) to the withering of consent in an over­
planned and programmed technological society.' Others, 
indeed, have argued that governments ought to tolerate 
civil disobedience and that there are some good reasons 
for conscientious objection clauses in many more laws 
than is usually the case. See, for example, Ronald 
Dworkin, 'On Not Prosecuting Civil Disobedience', Civi1 
Disobedience and Violence, ed. Jeffrie G. Murphy, 
TBelmontT, Üalif. : Wadsworth, 1971), pp. 112-130; Robert
T. Hall, 'Legal Toleration of Civil Disobedience',
Ethics, 81(1970-71), pp. 128-142; Sidney Gendin,
'Governmental Toleration of Civil Disobedience', 
Philosophy and Political Action, ed. Virginia Held, Kai 
Neilsen and Charles Parsons,(New York: Oxford University
Press, 1972), pp. 160-174.
27. Paul F. Power, 'On Civil Disobedience in Recent American 
Democratic Thought' , American Political Science Review,
64 (1970), pp.. 35-36. ' ~ "
28. 'On Civil Disobedience in Recent American Democratic
Thought', p. 36. Power also argues that a reason why 
the New Left had not contributed much to the discussion 
of civil disobedience is as a result of their view that 
civil disobedience is ' little more than a mechanical 
strategy in the struggle against the alleged evils of 
the American and associated systems' (p. 36). Yet it
should not be concluded that the New Left has not been 
involved in civil disobedience, particularly in the US 
concerning civil rights and the Vietnam war; see, for 
example, Part 2 of The New Left: A Documentary History,
ed. Massimo Teodori, (London: Jonathan Cape, r97 0T~.
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29. I have particularly benefited from the discussions in
Singer, Democracy and Disobedience; Zashin, Civil Dis­
obedience and Democracy; Brian Barry, 'Is Democracy 
Special?’, Philosophy, Politics and Society, 5th series, 
ed. Peter Laslett and James Fishkin,(Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1979), pp. 155-196; David Spitz, 'Democracy 
and the Problem of Civil Disobedience', American Political 
Science Review, 48(1954), pp. 386-403.
30. John Plamenatz, Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation,
2nd edition, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 
170-171; D.D. Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy, 
revised edition, (London: Macmillan, 19767, p. 114;
Singer, Democracy and Disobedience, pp. 47-59. For a 
contrary view, see Marshall Cohen, 'Liberalism and Dis­
obedience', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1(1972), p. 
312.
31. See, for example, Abe Fortas, Concerning Dissent and Civil
Disobedience,(New York: Signet Books, 1968); Leibman's
remarks m  Coffin and Leihman, Civil Disobedience: _Aid or
Hindrance to Justice?, pp. 20, 52, 72; Clark, 'Philosophy, 
Law and Civil Disobedience', pp. 248-249.
32. The most prominent advocate of adherence to the rule of 
law in this sense (there are, of course, other senses) 
in the literature is Fortas in Concerning Dissent and 
Civil Disobedience. For a discussion of his views on 
this question, see Betz, 'Can Civil Disobedience be 
Justified?', pp. 27-30.
33. See Weber's 'Introduction' to Civil Disobedience in 
America, ed. Weber, p. 23.
34. Bedau, 'Civil Disobedience and Personal Responsibility 
for Injustice', p. 520 (emphasis in original). Bedau's 
paper is the most sustained discussion of indirect civil 
disobedience in the literature, although a number of 
writers make the distinction (see Chapter Four, Note 40). 
See also Mark R. MacGuigan, 'Democracy and Civil Dis­
obedience'; Francis A. Allen, 'Civil Disobedience and 
the Legal Order'; Rudolph Weingartner, 'Justifying Civil 
Disobedience', in Philosophy for a New Generation, 2nd 
edition, ed. A.K. Bierman and James A. Gould,~TNew York: 
Macmillan, 1973), pp. 327-335.
35. See Bedau, 'Civil Disobedience and Personal Responsi­
bility for Injustice', p. 520.
36. Bedau, 'Civil Disobedience and Personal Responsibility 
for Injustice', p. 519.
37. Carl Cohen, 'Civil Disobedience and the Law', Rutgers 
Law Review, 21(1966), p. 4. See also MacGuigan, 
'Democracy and Civil Disobedience', p. 226 and 
Weingartner, 'Justifying Civil Disobedience', p. 333.
Fortas, Concerning Dissent and Civil Disobedience, p.
124. See also Erwin N. Griswold, 'Dissent - 1968',
38.
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Tulane Law Review, 42(1968), pp. 726-739, analysed in 
Bedau, ' Civil Disobedience and Personal Responsibility for 
Inj ustice1.
39. E.g. Childress, Civil Disobedience and Political Obliga­
tion , p. 221.
40. See, for example, Childress, Civil Disobedience and 
Political Obligation, p. 191; Clark, 'Philosophy, Law
and Civil Disobedience, p. 244; Rucker, 'The Moral Grounds 
of Civil Disobedience', p. 143; Adams, 'Civil Disobedience: 
Its Occasions and Limits', p. 304f; Zashin, Civil Dis- 
obedience and Democracy, pp. 128-129; van den Haag,
T Government", Con science and Disobedience', pp. 466-467; 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 373; Michael Bayles,
'The Justifiability of Civil Disobedience', Review of 
Metaphysics, 24 (1970-71), pp. 12-13; Etziom, Demonstra-
tion~Democracy, pp. 43-44.
41. Bayles, 'The Justifiability of Civil Disobedience', p. 18.
For an interesting account of the effectiveness of civil 
disobedience in a non-democratic context, see Alfred G. 
Meyer, 'Political Change through Civil Disobedience in 
the USSR and Eastern Europe', Nomos XII: Political and
Legal Obligation, ed. Pennock and Chapman, pp. 421-439. 
Rawls •suggests~that 'the effectiveness of civil dis­
obedience as a form of protest declines beyond a certain 
point; and those contemplating it must consider these 
constraints'. (A Theory of Justice, p. 374). That is 
true,at least for those types of civil disobedience for 
which effectiveness in this sense is relevant.
42. See Chapter Four, Note 24. John Morreall, 'The Justifi­
ability of Violent Civil Disobedience', Canadian Journal 
of Philosophy, 66(1976), pp. 35-47 argues that there may 
be little moral difference between violent coercion and 
nonviolent coercion, and that requiring civil disobed­
ience to be nonviolent by definition is little more 
than arbitrary. See also my 'The Concept of Violence', 
Political Science, 25(1973), pp. 103-113, and Zwiebach's 
seven rules concerning violence; Civility and Disobedience, 
pp. 218-219.
43. Similar reasons can be given for charges concerning 
violence against property based on its nature as a result 
of, and as means towards, human projects. I shall 
largely pass over the distinction and will consider the 
questions about the moral justifiability of violent civil 
disobedience in terms of violence against persons.
44. See the works cited in Chapter Four, Note 27 and the
following: A.D. Woozley, 'Civil Disobedience and Punish­
ment', Ethics, 86(1975-76), pp. 323-331; Marshall Cohen,
'Liberalism and Disobedience'; Ernest van den Haag, 
Political Violence and Civil Disobedience, (New York:
Harper and Row, 1972f, p. 33; Rosen, 'Civil Disobedience 
and Other Such Techniques', pp. 455-456. Howard Zinn 
expressly argues against such a moral requirement; 
Disobedience and Democracy, pp. 120-121.
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45. Some say that he must not try to evade punishment 
although he may plead 'not guilty1 in order to obtain 
publicity or in order to defend his action on moral 
grounds; others insist that he must plead 'guilty' and 
accept punishment without question or defence, moral 
or otherwise. See Childress, Civil Disobedience and 
Political Obligation, p. 187, and Power, 'On Civil 
Disobedience in Recent American Democratic Thought', pp. 
40-41, where the issue is discussed in terms of the 
distinction between libertarians and conservatives.
46. He must also, of course, be open to the types of charges 
discussed earlier in this Chapter. I shall not repeat 
those arguments.
47. Bickel, The Morality of Consent, p. 104.
48. In 'Civil Disobedience and Personal Responsibility for 
Injustice', Bedau considers what he calls the 'Thoreau 
Principle', i.e. that the individual bears some respon­
sibility for the unjust acts of his government 'which 
(a) he knows he has not intentionally, knowingly, or in 
his own person directly inflicted, and (b) are not 
inflicted by someone acting as the executor of his inten­
tion' (p. 526). Bedau constructs an argument which 
shows that 'an otherwise perfectly valid law or institu­
tion can serve both to authorize and to enable acts 
whereby ordinary persons who neither commit, direct nor 
approve of those acts are nevertheless to be faulted if 
they do not withdraw their implicit support for such 
acts' (p. 532). Bedau concludes that Thoreau's Principle 
is insufficient 'as a general justification for indirect 
civil disobedience' (p.~533; emphasis added) since not 
every act of indirect civil disobedience is based on it. 
Nevertheless, it 'can go some distance towards justifying 
certain kinds of indirect civil disobedience' for persons 
who accept certain principles of moral responsibility
(p. 535) , viz. (i)that 'A person becomes responsible for 
the acts of another (person, government) if and only if 
(and to the degree that) he (a) has authorized that other 
to act, or (b) has enabled that other to act, (c) knows 
how that other has used his position and authority to 
act, and (d) he continues to do (a) and (b), i.e. he does 
not act to revoke the authority granted or to prevent 
its abuse' (p. 529); and (ii) that 'anyone at all respon­
sible for unjust acts, whether of his own or of another's, 
must act so as to acquit himself of the fault incurred 
by that responsibility' (pp. 530-531). Three points can 
be made. First, these principles obviously do not require 
that anyone responsible for unjust acts according to this 
principle would be justified in using civil disobedience 
to acquit himself of that responsibility. Secondly, the 
conditions for responsibility for the actions of a govern­
ment in a democracy require a particular theory about the 
relations between citizen and government that amounts to 
a particular notion of democracy. Thirdly, the Thoreau 
Principle cannot be directly applied to the actions and 
policies of private associations (corporations, companies) 
unless the authorising or enabling relationship is held 
to be present. Again, this might require a particular 
theory about the relations between citizens, government
369 .
and private associations.
49. It is, of course, possible that a person may hold the 
principle 'Always use indirect personal disobedience to 
dissociate yourself from laws, etc., which violate prin­
ciples P, Q, R ,*...' Not to abide by it given the rele­
vant circumstances would clearly be inconsistent. The 
more interesting cases, however, are those where the 
agent holds an important (non-core) principle concerning, 
say, sexual conduct, the treatment of animals, or busi­
ness practice, and sees that principle violated by others. 
These are the focus of the discussion.
50. See, for example, M.K. Gandhi, Non-Violent Resistance
(Satyagraha), (New York: Schocken Books, 19 6TT, p. 174;
T .H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obli­
gation , introd. A.D. Lindsay, (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1967), sects. 137-147; Zwiebach, Civility 
and Disobedience, Chapter 5; Henry D. Thoreau, 'Civil 
Disobedience’, Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practice,
ed. Bedau, pp. 27-48; Zinn, Disobedience and Democracy, 
p. 120; Michael Walzer, 'The Obligation to Disobey',
Obligations :__Essays on Disobedience, War and Citizenship ,
TNew York: Simon and Schuster, 19 70) , Chapter 1; John
Rawls, 'The Justification of Civil Disobedience',
Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practice, ed. Bedau,
pp, 240-255; Irving Kristol, 'Civil Disobedience is not 
Justified by Vietnam', Civil Disobedience: Theory and
Practice, ed. Bedau, pp. 208-209; Bayles, 'The Justifi­
ability of Civil Disobedience', pp. 6-11; Mulford Q. 
Sibley, The Obligation to Disobey; Conscience and the 
Law,(New York: Council on Religion and international
Affairs, 1970).
51. A.J. Ayer, Philosophy and Politics,(Liverpool: Liverpool
University Press, 1969),~p'. 21~.
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